

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972

SENATE RESOLUTION 60

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Phase II: Campaign Practices

WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 26 AND OCTOBER 3, 1973

Book 10



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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)



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NOTE.—Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972 PHASE II: CAMPAIGN PRACTICES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1973

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gurney, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, investigator; David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels; Marc Lackritz, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; H. William Shure and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flanigan, assistant publications clerk.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel will call the first witness.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Buchanan, will you stand up and raise your right hand?

Do you swear that the testimony which you shall give to the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, is it true you are not appearing with counsel today?

TESTIMONY OF PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is accurate.

Mr. DASH. Do you have a statement that you prepared that you wish to read to the committee?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do. I have a statement, abbreviated statement of about, I would think, no more than 15 minutes at the most.

Mr. DASH. Would you please read it?

Senator TALMADGE. Do we have copies of it, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have given copies to the—

Mr. DASH. One copy has just been obtained. No copies under our rule were submitted to the committee, I think they were submitted to the press but not to the committee.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They were submitted to the committee about 20 minutes ago for Xeroxing. A young lady came to me and said they would be distributed to the Senators and members of the staff.

Senator GURNEY. Are they being Xeroxed?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Should I proceed with the statement or do you want to wait for the copies?

Mr. DASH. Proceed with your statement then, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for a variety of reasons, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Select Committee but in candor, I cannot speak with the same enthusiasm for the manner in which the invitation was delivered. At the President's personal directive, his White House staff has been called upon and has cooperated, I believe fully, with the committee. Specifically, this witness has certainly done so. Nevertheless, the surprise announcement that I was to be called as a public witness before these hearings was made over national television before even the elementary courtesy of a telephone call of notification had been extended.

Of greater concern to me, however, has been an apparent campaign orchestrated from within the committee staff to malign my reputation in the public press prior to my appearance. In the hours immediately following my well-publicized invitation there appeared in the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, the Chicago Tribune, and on the national networks, separate stories all attributed to committee sources alleging that I was the architect of a campaign of political espionage or dirty tricks. According to the Post, committee sources were in possession of my memorandums recommending infiltrating the opposition.

In the Times the charge was that the committee had a series of Buchanan memorandums suggesting "political espionage and sabotage against Edwin S. Muskie of Maine and other candidates for the Presidential nomination."

One wire service stated that Mr. Buchanan would be questioned about "blueprints and plans concerning the scandal."

In the Chicago Tribune, the headline read: "Nixon Speech Writer Blamed for Muskie Plot." The story read, and I quote: "Senate investigators have evidence that Patrick J. Buchanan, one of President Nixon's favorite speechwriters, was the secret author of a political sabotage scheme."

In the Baltimore Sun under a major front page headline reading: "Buchanan Linked to 1972 Dirty Tricks," the story ran thus:

Patrick J. Buchanan, a Presidential consultant, may emerge as yet another architect of the 1972 White House dirty tricks strategy, according to congressional sources.

Mr. Chairman, this covert campaign of vilification carried on by staff members of your committee is in direct violation of rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure for the Select Committee. That rule strictly prohibits staff members from leaking substantive materials. Repeatedly, I have asked of Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner information that they might have to justify such allegations. Repeatedly, they have denied

to me that they have such documents. When I asked Mr. Lenzner who on the committee staff was responsible he responded, "Mr. Buchanan, you ought to know that you cannot believe everything you read in the newspapers." It was his joke and my reputation.

So it seems fair to me to ask how can this Select Committee set itself up as the ultimate arbiter of American political ethics if it cannot even control the character assassination in its own ranks.

For the record, Mr. Chairman, let me state the following: I did not recommend or authorize, nor was I aware of any ongoing campaign of political sabotage against Senator Muskie or any other Democratic candidate. I did not recommend either verbally or in memorandums that the reelection committee infiltrate the campaigns of our opposition. I have never met nor spoken with nor can I recall ever having heard the names of Messrs. Hunt, Liddy, McCord, Ulasewicz, Reagan, Barker, or Segretti, until those names appeared in the public press.

Nor have I ever heard until the terms were made public the code names of Ruby 1, Ruby 2, Crystal, Sedan Chair, and Sedan Chair 2, or Fat Jack. Even today I could not testify with certitude as to whom these terms refer.

Now, let me move quickly to the heart of the public allegations, against me—but more generally against our Presidential campaign.

It is being argued that illicit Republican strategy and tactics were responsible for the defeat of the strongest Democratic candidate for President—and for the nomination of the weakest.

It has been contended publicly that the Democrats were denied—by our campaign and strategy—a legitimate choice at their own convention.

It is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged campaign but an utter fraud, "a political coup by the President of the United States." These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether untrue.

Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Muskie. Republicans were not responsible for the nomination of Senator McGovern.

To suggest that, is first of all to do a grievous injustice both to Senator McGovern and his campaign organization.

Senator McGovern was nominated because his men wrote the rule-book, his men were in the field earliest and worked hardest; his campaign was precisely targeted on the primaries they could win, and because he was possessed of the best political organization the Democratic Party has seen in at least a dozen years.

It was not Donald Segretti who put together the organization that carried, for Senator McGovern, the crucial Wisconsin primary.

It was not any agent of the Committee To Re-Elect the President who was out winning McGovern delegates in States like Georgia, Virginia, and Louisiana.

Senator GURNEY. Would you pull your mike a little bit closer? I am having great difficulty in hearing you, there is so much noise at the table.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

It was not our personnel, but theirs, who worked out Senators McGovern's victorious campaign and convention strategies.

The McGovern people won their own nomination—and they lost their own election.

As Theodore H. White has written in his latest and best campaign history: All of the dirty tricks of 1972, added together in the ultimate balance, had "the weight of a feather."

Now, one of the suggestions that I recommended, that Republicans, in the spring and summer of 1971, concentrate their political resources upon Senator Muskie—rather than dissipate them on the dozen other potential aspirants for the nomination.

That statement is essentially true.

Senator Muskie was targeting his political attacks upon the President—as was every single one of the other potential nominees.

No requirement exists in ethics—or logic—or law—that we provide equal time in political response to each of our potential opponents.

The reasons for recommending the focus upon Senator Muskie were basic:

He was the frontrunner. Alone among the Democrats he led the President in the national polls. He appeared to me to be both the strongest candidate, and the candidate with the greatest opportunity of uniting the warring wings of the Democratic Party.

Candidly, it was my hope, if not my expectation, that our political counterattacks, concentrated primarily, but not exclusively, upon the Democratic frontrunner, might contribute to opening up the Democratic primaries and preventing a closed convention.

There was nothing—and is nothing—in my judgment, illicit or unethical or improper or unprecedented in recommending or adopting such a political strategy.

The resources which we recommended for employment in that summer and fall, all of them legitimate, were basically these:

National committee speakers and publications including Monday.

Republican chairmen and organizations in States Senator Muskie visited.

The Committee To Re-Elect—its media resources, and its developing State organizations.

Surrogate speakers from the national administration including the Vice President and Cabinet.

Congressmen and Senators from the Republican Party who would use the forum of the White House or Capitol Hill either to defend the President against Senator Muskie's allegations—or to put Senator Muskie himself on the defensive.

Also, use of the media, through briefings and conversations and the like by political operatives, to carry the message.

There is no Republican individual or organization, Mr. Chairman, to credit or blame for the decline in the candidacy of Senator Muskie.

The narrowness of his victory in the New Hampshire primary was a reflection of his declining standing in the national polls.

The enormous margin of his defeat in Florida was a consequence of the unanticipated appeal of the candidacy of George Wallace.

His defeat in Wisconsin came at the hands of one man, Governor Wallace, who had been there but a single day and another man, Senator McGovern, who had organized the State for 18 months.

As for the general election, Mr. Chairman, the President of the United States did not achieve the greatest landslide of any minority party candidate in history because of Watergate and dirty tricks—but in spite of them.

Watergate was the most deleterious issue in our national campaign. In our own estimation, and that of political analysts, the Watergate tragedy cost the Republican Party millions of votes.

The reasons for the landslide of 1972 are chronicled elsewhere; they need not be repeated here at length. Basically they are these:

The President read the mood of the Nation better than his opponent.

The President had conducted an administration, for 4 years, that had won the confidence or support of millions of Democrats.

The President's stand upon the issues of defense and welfare, upon taxes and government, upon coercive integration and busing, were closer to what the American people wanted than those of his opponent.

But we won as well, Mr. Chairman, because of the quality and character of our candidate.

If one looks back over the political history of this country, there is only one other man, other than Richard Nixon, who has been his party's nominee for President or Vice President five times. That is Franklin Roosevelt.

No other individual in our political history has served in both of the same high offices for so long a period of time as has the incumbent President.

He is not the leader of a majority party.

He had been—since 1946—a member of the minority party in American politics.

And thus, his political career, I believe, is all the more impressive.

That political record, Mr. Chairman, is no accident. It is no fluke, and that election of 1972 was not stolen.

And the mandate that the American people gave to this President and his administration cannot and will not be frustrated or repealed or overthrown as a consequence of the incumbent tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan, any newspaper stories derogatory of him that are indicated as having been leaked or come from sources in this committee. I know of no staff member who has done it; I have searched to find such staff members, if there were any. We have had a problem like this before and I think we all know that the problem of leaks is one that cannot always be solved. Also, this has been a problem, I think, that has plagued the inquiry in this area not only with this committee, but with the Department of Justice and the White House itself. It is not even known whether or not these sources did come from the Senate committee. But I would deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan, newstories that reflect on his character, reflect on his activities, and I can assure the committee that they did not come from any source that I know of in the committee, and certainly not from any counsel that I know of.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, could I say a word in that respect?

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Senator BAKER. I join with majority counsel in deploring the allegations that Mr. Buchanan alludes to, and I commend him for taking that position. I have talked to Mr. Dash on a number of occasions not related to this matter, but to other alleged leaks from the committee, and I can verify from firsthand information that Mr. Dash on every occasion, has made a conscientious effort to locate such leaks and I entirely believe him when he says he deplores such leaks.

Unfortunately, we live in a pretty leaky atmosphere. I am not defending against the allegations that you make Mr. Buchanan; I am simply saying in a sense of fairness to Mr. Dash that I am sure that he genuinely expresses that regret and that concern, as I do, too. It does not help the mandate of this committee to have the matter thrashed out in the press before a witness appears. It does not help to have speculative stories about it. It does not help to have a witness' summary published verbatim in the newspaper, which once happened.

But let me quickly say as the senior Republican on this committee that for my part, I am convinced that Sam Dash means exactly what he said.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to say, Mr. Buchanan, that I share your consternation about leaks. One thing I have never understood, having been a lawyer and been accustomed to keeping the secrets of my clients, I have never understood why such a large part of earth's inhabitants have such little restraint, that just as soon as they get anything in their minds, it comes tumbling out their mouths. I have noticed leaks ever since I got to Washington 19 years ago. Somehow or other, it seems to me that they are increasing, that the number of people who cannot exercise self-restraint seems to be growing rather than diminishing. I deplore the leaks which so often reflect on a man's character. I can guarantee that one man in this committee has never leaked anything. That is myself. I learned long ago that as Kipling said, "Man can kiss and tell. Wisely has the poet sung, Man can hold all kinds of posts, If he'll only hold his tongue."

I notice in recent months leaks have come out of the White House, come tumbling out of the Department of Justice, have come tumbling out of every congressional committee of both Houses of Congress. It is a most deplorable state and very unjust to people who have become victims of these leaks.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the statement and I was unaware that you were into the British poets.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir. Not only the British but the Irish and the Scottish.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, when did you first begin working for President Nixon in any political campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I met President Nixon—frankly, I met him briefly when I was a caddy at Burning Tree Country Club in 1954. But formally, I met Mr. Nixon in 1965, in December, when he spoke at a political meeting filling in for Senator Dirksen in southern Illinois, when I was an editorial writer with the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. I went over and indicated to him that if he were going to run in 1968, I would like to get aboard early. He made some inquiries. We had some long extended conversations and I joined his staff in January of 1966.

I served with him in the 1966 political campaign. We traveled some 35 States, on one or two occasions into Tennessee, I think, Senator Baker. That was my first association with him. I remained on his staff through 1967 and the 1968 campaign and joined the White House as a special assistant in January of 1969.

Mr. DASH. When you joined the White House as special assistant, what, specifically, were your responsibilities, Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, you have got essentially—my functions correspond to that of general assignment reporter for a newspaper. I only have three definite and ongoing assignments. They would be as speech-

writer for the President on major speeches; oversight of the President's daily news summary, which is prepared by Mort Allen; and third, the preparation of the briefing books and briefing materials for the President for all his press conferences, which has been a function of mine for almost 8 years.

Mr. DASH. Now, to whom in the White House did you report from the period of your appointment to the White House position that you held through May of this year?

Mr. BUCHANAN. May of this year? Well, through April of this year, the primary channel of communication with the President would be H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, President's Chief of Staff. He would not be the exclusive channel. The President would contact me on occasion directly. But that would be the primary channel.

Mr. DASH. Now, in the course of your duties at the White House, did you have occasion to write a series of memorandums to the President, or to Mr. Haldeman, or anybody else?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, being a writer, yes; I did. That is the format I generally used for communication in the White House, was memorandums. I have written numerous, scores if not hundreds, of memorandums to both the President and, I am sure, to Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Buchanan, did you bring with you or produce in accordance with the subpoena issued to you on Sept. 20, 1973, copies of your memorandums dealing with political strategy for the President or Presidential primaries of 1972 and the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; I did not. I first went to get the direction of the Director of the President's Counsel. I believe this matter is in court. I have read—because of the brevity of the time I was given to prepare for this testimony, I have not had an opportunity to read all of the political strategy memos that I have sent between 1971 and 1972, but I have read a number of them. Again, I did not bring them here; I first went for the direction of the President's Counsel.

Mr. DASH. Do you have those memorandums in your possession in your office at the White House?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, that would not be precise. I have some in my White House files. Most of my memorandums from 1971 to 1972 are down in the basement of the Executive Office Building. I have had the opportunity to Xerox some of these, my secretary has. That is a limited number, just because of the sheer volume.

While I am allowed to Xerox and read these memorandums, I could not without authorization from the President's Counsel remove them from the White House, nor would I.

Mr. DASH. Would you tell us when did your file of memorandums become part of the Presidential Papers and not in your complete—

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think they have always been part of the Presidential Papers.

Mr. DASH. When were they removed from your control?

Mr. BUCHANAN. They were removed at my direction and frankly, I thought it was only temporary. It was indicated, an individual who had worked for me in the campaign in 1972 came back from a committee hearing and he said, "They are going to subpoena all our files."

So I said, "Well, let's go down to the counsel's office."

So we went down to the counsel's office and the counsel indicated that it would be best if all our files were placed under, taken down—

stairs, at least from 1971 and 1972, and so they were. But I had that access and I did have the right to Xerox those particular memorandums—

Mr. DASH. What counsel advised you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I couldn't be certain which individual. It was certainly Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and/or Mr. Parker, I would think.

Mr. DASH. And is it the position of counsel at the White House that these memorandums dealing with political campaign strategy are not available to us under the subpoena because of executive privilege?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think you will have to ask counsel what their position is, but I think that is not unreasonable in light of the fact that many of the memorandums are to the President of the United States. Many of the memorandums deal with recommendations for Presidential action. Many of the memorandums were prepared at the direction of the President.

I think you would have to talk to those individuals to ascertain what the legal grounds on which they withheld them are.

Senator ERVIN. If I may interject myself at this point, the White House and myself have very fundamental disagreements about the nature and scope of executive privilege. The Constitution and laws of the United States place certain obligations upon the President. I accept executive privilege to a limited extent. I think the President is entitled to receive the uninhibited advice of his aides, which is being sought by him or given by them, to enable him to perform in a lawful manner the official duties of his office.

For that reason, I accept the validity of executive privilege to this extent: In my judgment, the President is entitled to have kept secret confidential information, confidential communications made to him by an aide, or even confidential communications among his aides, which have for their purpose enabling him to perform in a lawful manner his constitutional and legal duties.

Further than that, executive privilege does not go. Since it is not a part of the official duty of a President to run for reelection, and since it is not the official duty of a President to conceal evidence of wrongdoing, I do not think the President has the right to withhold any information in his possession that deals with political activities, or which deals with wrongdoing. And I am gratified to know that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell agreed with me on my view of executive privilege at the time he was before this committee.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, first, I think it would be a mistake to make the assumption that anything in my memorandums indicates a recommendation for wrongdoing.

Second, a number of these memorandums were prepared prior to the campaign of 1972, and they deal with my analysis of individuals which would also have an impact on Presidential strategy with regard to legislation and Presidential strategy, say, with regard to defense issues, because we were being criticized on those scores.

Third, there is no question that the character of my rhetoric in some of these memorandums would be, in your term, uninhibited. I have been writing these confidential memorandums to the President for close to 8 years and—that will be my statement.

Senator ERVIN. I didn't intend to intimate that I had any opinion that there was anything in your memorandums that indicated wrong-

doing. I was just laying down a proposition. But I do infer that there is much in your memorandums that dealt with political activities.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would be true.

Senator ERVIN. I do not think the Constitution and laws make it the official duty of anybody to run for President of the United States and, therefore, executive privilege can't possibly cover that. That is my own opinion, and I am glad to say that John Mitchell agreed with me.

Thank you.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, just one last question on that. I think you mentioned that action was taken concerning the control of these papers after a witness returned and said the papers might be subpoenaed.

Can you tell us what witness?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It was not a formal witness before the committee. It was my aide, Khachigian. There was no subpoena forthcoming.

Mr. DASH. Now, the committee has been able to acquire by subpoena from the Committee To Re-Elect the President's records, a number of memorandums—not, certainly, all of your memorandums—and you will find on your table for later use during questioning, a file of those memorandums with tabs and a summary.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Dash, let me comment upon that.

The other night, when I had my discussion with you and Mr. Lenzner, I asked you candidly, at that time, if there were any memorandums in your possession which I could look at and study in preparation for discussion before this committee. You and Mr. Lenzner showed me something like, somewhere between 4 and 6 memorandums. There are a good deal more than 4 or 6 memorandums here. There are dozens of them of tremendous length. If you had shown me these memorandums, I would be a good deal more prepared to testify fully about their contents.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, you will recall when you did that, you also informed me that you had a complete file of your own memorandums. These are from that file?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; they are not. You have memorandums dating back to 1969—2 in 1969—and 1970. I have no memorandums in my operative file that I would even Xerox that deal with 1969 and 1970. I understood that was not within the purview of the committee.

Mr. DASH. At the appropriate time a memorandum is referred to, you can raise whatever questions you wish. Not all of those memorandums may be referred to. They are the memorandums that the committee did receive and we felt you should have them at your table.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Dash, I don't think I need a counsel; I need a librarian more.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, excuse me.

Is my understanding correct, Mr. Buchanan, that you thought you were informed that you would be able to see all the documents you were being queried on?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I had a discussion with Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner. I asked repeatedly. I said, "Listen, I did not recommend any dirty tricks. If you have any strategy memo that could be misconstrued, I would like to see it. If you have any memo you want to take up with me in committee session, let me see it; I will be happy to discuss it."

Mr. THOMPSON. You were asking to see your own memorandums?

Mr. BUCHANAN. My own memorandums, because in my files there are thousands of memorandums which I could not have possibly read in the 24 hours I was given to prepare for this testimony. I am prepared to discuss any of these memorandums if I am given an opportunity to look them over.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, as a general proposition, I think that we should have done this with past witnesses and I think we ought to do it with future witnesses. If we have documents, especially documents that the witnesses themselves prepared, essentially their own work product, I don't think it serves the committee's purposes to put the witness in the position of being able merely to surprise him with a document that maybe he hasn't seen for a few years. I don't think there is anything wrong; I think it is only proper and right that a witness, especially when he has requested it and it is promised him, be able to review his own memorandums, particularly when he is asked to come in here and testify in detail, especially about sentences in his own memorandums, in public. I think he ought to have a chance to sit and read the whole memorandum.

Senator ERVIN. I agree with you, and I would suggest that we give Mr. Buchanan all of the memorandums that they are going to ask him about, and if he wants to adjourn the meeting so he can read them before we question him, I will be glad to take that up with the committee; and, on the other hand, if he wants to proceed, I will assure him I will give him plenty of time to refresh his recollection about the memorandums.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, this again is in a context of a subpoena that we served on Mr. Buchanan for his memorandums which he prepared, and which was not forthcoming under the directions of the White House to give us those. There was no promise to supply him all of the memorandums that we had. It is not for the purpose of surprise, but direct questioning of this witness by the committee is not accomplished by providing all of the memorandums in advance, so that any testimony that can be given may be rehearsed testimony.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in this very thick folder there are something like 34 memorandums, and I was presented these memorandums last night about 6 o'clock, so I do not know about the witness being surprised but I certainly am, and I have had no opportunity to go over this at all. I have leafed through a few of these, did it last night. They have nothing to do with dirty tricks at all. But I think also, in the proper procedure of this committee, it would be an excellent idea if Senators had an opportunity of seeing voluminous memorandums that the committee apparently has had for many weeks.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question to put things in perspective for my own purpose? Could I ask where we got these memorandums?

Mr. DASH. We got these memorandums by subpoena of the files of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, that are either in the archives or from Mr. Magruder's files which are presently in the possession of the Special Prosecutor.

Senator BAKER. So all of these documents came either from the Committee To Re-Elect or from the archives?

Mr. DASH. Or from the Special Prosecutor who was holding Mr. Magruder's files.

Senator BAKER. So one way or the other they came from the Committee To Re-Elect or the White House files?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. If I can make a statement.

Senator BAKER. Before you make a statement was any protest made about the delivery of any of these documents?

Mr. DASH. No protest.

Senator BAKER. You have no litigation?

Mr. DASH. Given to us by subpoena and by the Special Prosecutor as well as subpoena on the archivist of the Committee To Re-Elect.

Senator BAKER. The only question is whether the witness and the committee has had a chance to look at this inch-and-a-half folder.

Mr. DASH. We have had this problem before. These folders and exhibits come to us over a period of time. We also have had the problem that has been indicated earlier, and I only feel it is fair to make this record, since it has been referred to, as to when various members of the committee get exhibits. We have had the problem of when exhibits do appear in the press, and I have indicated, how I deplore the question that Mr. Buchanan raised concerning revelations in the press, since it is the effort of the committee to hold as tightly as possible all of its documents so that there are no leaks.

The emphasis is to try to put together for the full committee all of the material that we have in advance of calling the witness as early as we can for the committee. Yesterday was the first time that we could actually index and put these things together for the committee, and prepare them ourselves as the staff of this committee.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I can verify the difficulties, and Mr. Dash and I have worked together on these matters trying to get these things out in sufficient time for members of the committee and for ourselves.

The problem that I see, though, and one that I think needs verification—Mr. Dash in his statements and purposes of the committee is not served by not providing these documents to the committee in advance. A criminal defendant under rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure has a right to copies of his own recorded statements well in advance of trial, and I do not think it is right to bring a witness in here and surprise him with one of his own documents. I think he ought to have a chance to look at his own documents, especially if they have been promised to him.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think you accurately summarized the dilemma when you said that it really is up to the witness to decide whether he wants to proceed at this point or not and I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, that we leave that decision to Mr. Buchanan.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Mr. DASH. May I ask Mr. Buchanan one question? Mr. Buchanan, did you not tell us that, in fact, you were informed by the archivist as to the memos we had Xeroxed?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right, I was informed by the archivist as to memos you had Xeroxed. I was not sure these were in your possession. If

these memos were in the archives, we were not sure what you had, and we asked you what you had, and I was not informed.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Cochairman, let me just mention, I am altogether unfamiliar at this point in time with the first 10 memorandums that deal with—going to 1970. I do not believe they have anything to do with the 1972 campaign.

My first—I am aware of the first memorandum, March 24, 1971, which has to do with strategy for the 1972 campaign, and I do not know if I have read or looked over all of these memos; I do recognize a number of them. I am fully prepared to go ahead and testify to these, and if there are some in here that I have not seen or looked over in the last couple of weeks, then we can take a few minutes and I can look them over. Would that be fair? It is up to No. 10. The ones before that I would have to sit back and read because I have not seen those.

Mr. DASH. We may have to because, on the question of whether they are relevant to this inquiry, I think I will be able to at least state an argument as to the relevance of those that I will refer to, and if Mr. Buchanan would like to read them first, before any questions, then I would desist, but I would like to proceed in a certain line of questioning which may—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Sure.

Mr. DASH [continuing]. Lead into some of those memorandums.

Mr. BUCHANAN. OK. We will do the best we can.

Senator BAKER. Let us make sure we understand what we are doing.

Senator ERVIN. Let me see if I understand the witness. Do you want some time to read the memorandums?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, Senator, I would prefer to go ahead. As I say, these memorandums, the first 10, deal with prior to the 1970 congressional elections. I do not think, in glancing over it, they have anything to do with 1972 at all. They may have. I am prepared fully to testify now and if we run into a memorandum that they quote from, and I have not read or seen in 4 years, maybe I can sit back and take a look at it.

Senator ERVIN. We can rule on that when it is presented but my impression is that people run for office about 6 and 7 years in advance now and I think—

Mr. BUCHANAN. We were more successful—

Senator ERVIN. That was one reason why the Democratic Party suffered a defeat and that so many of its candidates got out and ran so long in advance.

Senator BAKER. I take it, Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with you, and I have been the victim of having to run 6 or 7 years in advance. I know the symptoms, but 6 or 7 years in advance, according to my mental arithmetic, would take us back to 1961 and I think we ought to take that into account as we proceed.

Mr. DASH. I do not think we will go back to 1961, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH. How were your memorandums routed?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The primary channel of communication for political memorandums, it was to the President. It would go through Mr. Haldeman, other than that the principal strategy memorandums would go to Mr. Haldeman and a copy to the Attorney General.

Mr. DASH. All right, now. Sometime during the summer of 1971 were you asked to direct an investigation of Daniel Ellsberg?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is correct.

On July 6—if I recollect the date correctly, I was called to a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office where Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, and Mr. Haldeman were present at various times, and I was asked to not so much conduct the investigation, I believe, as to oversee the investigation and to serve as White House liaison, an assignment I rejected.

Mr. DASH. In rejecting it—by the way—what reason did you give for rejecting it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I felt that for me an investigation of Daniel Ellsberg was a waste of my time and my abilities.

Mr. DASH. Did you prepare any memorandums with regard to that assignment request?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I did. I rejected the offer verbally, and subsequent to that I believe on July 8 I did prepare a memorandum for Mr. Ehrlichman indicating my reasons why I not only did not want to undertake it myself, but did not see the value of doing so. I do not have a copy of that memorandum, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. We do not have either.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am going to talk to the grand jury tomorrow about the particular memorandum but I have to go back to the White House and sit down and study it before I could give you any details.

Mr. DASH. I am not asking you for that at this moment and we do not have a copy of it either, Mr. Buchanan. But I would like to show you a memorandum dated August 26, 1971, from Mr. David Young to Mr. John Ehrlichman which is already in the record of this committee as exhibit No. 91. Do you have it there? If it is not in the file, it should be loose.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Exhibit No. 91?*

Mr. DASH. It should be loose on the top of your pile.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Are these in chronological order the way they are going to come, right?

Mr. DASH. If you will turn to page 4 of that memorandum, you will note that there is an item 9 that raises the question: "How quickly do we want to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" And you see an asterisk—

Mr. BUCHANAN. This thing, is this from David Young, the 28th, page 4?

Mr. DASH. Yes, page 4.

Mr. BUCHANAN. How far down here?

Mr. DASH. Down to the last line.

Senator BAKER. What date?

Mr. DASH. August 26, Senator Baker. I think everyone has it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have got it, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Yes. If you have it, it is No. 9, the last line of the memo on page 4 and the question put there is: "How quickly do we want to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" You will note there is an asterisk, and if you turn the page—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

*See Book 6, p. 2646.

Mr. DASH [continuing]. The last half of the page has an asterisk and it is followed by the following language:

In connection with issue 9, it is important to point out that with the recent article on Ellsberg's lawyer Boudin we have already started on a negative press image for Ellsberg. If the present Liddy-Hunt project No. 1 is successful, it is absolutely necessary to have an overall game plan developed for its use in conjunction with the Congressional investigation. In this connection I believe that the point of Buchanan's memo attacking Ellsberg in the press should be borne in mind namely that the situation being attacked is too big to be undermined by planted leaks among the friendly press.

Is that a reference to Buchanan's memorandum—the memorandum you referred to when you refused to accept the assignment?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think it would have to be because I have gone through all of my chron file, have all of my memorandums through July, August, and September, and that is the only memorandum that makes a reference to Mr. Ellsberg. There are a couple of points I would like to make in reference to this. I trust I did not have the impression that what the assignment I was being offered was something illicit or unethical or wrong, it was not, and I did not understand it that way from Mr. Haldeman, Colson, or Ehrlichman.

Second, in the memorandum, I would not like to be held to the exact verbiage of my memorandum right now, not having looked at it, but I did suggest—frankly, my personal view was that a national address be made and that the subject of the national address would be the New York Times decision and Washington Post decision, and I drafted a speech which was not delivered, but the speech had no mention of Mr. Ellsberg in it, and it was my feeling that not having done that, the situation with regard to the public opinion which had decided frankly in favor of the newspapers, a decision to publish those documents which we disagreed with, the documents not being particularly disadvantageous to the Nixon administration since they were from the early Kennedy and Johnson years, I felt we should argue this thing out on principle on the front pages in a major address dealing with the New York Times, and the Washington Post, and not try to, in effect, speak to columnists who tended to agree with us and ask them to argue this issue on the back pages. That would be inefficacious.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, in line with your statement that you did not understand there was any request for wrongdoing, I wish to stress in questions I will be putting to you, I don't wish you to infer any inference from the question of any wrongdoing or impropriety on your part.

As a matter of fact, I think that one of the values of your being here today and being able to testify is to aid the committee in deliberating what is proper, what is not proper. This is a problem that the committee will have to resolve ultimately under its mandate, and I would like to ask you from time to time, your own opinion on that to aid the committee and that therefore, I would like to express the fact that my questions are seeking to suggest impropriety on your part.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did you know though that a special unit under Mr. Ehrlichman was contemplated, and was, in fact, set up to investigate Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; I did not. The first I heard of the Plumbers unit was when I believe I read it in Newsweek, and my understanding of my assignment was it would not be an investigation conducted inside the White House at all, by White House personnel but it would be outside.

Mr. DASH. Did you know Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Very well. Mr. Krogh is a good personal friend of mine. Mr. Young, I worked with on briefing books occasionally when he worked with Dr. Kissinger. I knew him less well than I knew Mr. Krogh.

Mr. DASH. Did you have any working relationship at all with regard to this particular matter?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I had nothing to do with the thing once we signed off.

Mr. DASH. After you turned down the offer to sort of coordinate this investigation of Mr. Ellsberg, did Mr. Colson talk to you about it and indicate that you had been given first opportunity and that he had gone ahead and picked somebody else?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well this came very recently. Mr. Colson had called me, he said, simply to alert me as a courtesy that he had discussed the Ellsberg thing before some Senate Committee, and he said:

I told the Senate Committee that you had been offered the assignment of investigating the Ellsberg thing first and that you turned it down and that I had, after you turned it down, I had spoken to you by telephone to offer it to you again and that you had turned it down again by telephone.

And I have no recollection of that telephone call with Mr. Colson but I am sure it is accurate.

Mr. DASH. By the way, when did you first learn of the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office?

Mr. BUCHANAN. When Mr. Mort Allen who runs the President's news summary came walking into my office with the item off the A wire.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, would you turn to your memorandum of June 8, 1972, which is tab 27 [exhibit No. 187] and turn to page 11 in that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Is that a memorandum that you prepared?

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is known euphemistically as the assault strategy. This is not—I did a memorandum like this but this does not look like my typewriter. This is not the format. This is not the—I did do a memorandum of considerable length on this subject, it looks like mine but it does not look like the top of it. Mine would be a memorandum from the President to Buchanan and Khachigian and giving the date, but it is nothing like the format, but I did prepare a format at great length on the various 40 items on assault strategy; that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Is it true a number of your memorandums that you did prepare on a certain form were actually transmitted to Mr. Magruder of the committee, and sometime they retyped them in another form?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think from what you gentlemen showed me the other night it appears that is what was done to a number of them. This was conceivably done here. I am sure this was my memorandum, I am sure it was done here. I thought you gentlemen had retyped them.

Mr. DASH. We have not retyped them.

Mr. BUCHANAN. OK.

Mr. DASH. Let me point to paragraph 25 which has a heading "Ellsberg" and reads:

McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsberg to violate Federal law is a matter which we should wait to exploit, say, two months after the Democratic Convention. It should serve as a centerpiece of a national speech, perhaps by the Vice President.

Now, was that in your memorandum, do you recall making that recommendation?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am sure it is because what you do not have is, coupled with this, if you will, the attack strategy was what was known as a quotations or attack book. In that book there is a public statement by Senator McGovern of our paragraphs from Parade magazine wherein he himself states publicly, I believe that he encouraged, he told Daniel Ellsberg, I believe, that: "I can't do this because I am a Senator, but why don't you go to the New York Times?"

In my judgment that was a political error on his part—the quotation was a public one—the quotation was in the medical quotations book and my recommendation was, having researched Senator McGovern thoroughly, having gotten ahold of this quotation, we should hold back and use this as a centerpiece of a speech later in the campaign; that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Then it would be fair to say that one of your recommendations during the campaign was to attempt to make some tie-in between the Ellsberg matter and Senator McGovern's campaign.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There was no need to make the tie-in. It was going to use Senator McGovern's own quotations. That was a matter of public record.

Mr. DASH. In preparation for the campaign of 1972, Mr. Buchanan, were task forces created at the White House to deal with various aspects of the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't think they were at the White House. I think the Committee To Re-Elect had a number of some 15 task force-type groups which would study various aspects of the campaign, and I think they were inclusive, these groups, of White House personnel.

Mr. DASH. Were you given any particular assignment in the campaign of an opposition nature?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think it was around mid-1971 I was named chairman of the opposition research, opposition tracking, opposition analysis group which would be one task force within the campaign.

Mr. DASH. What was your responsibility in that particular position?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I saw my responsibility as essentially analysis of the strength and weaknesses and potential strategies and scenarios of the potential Democratic candidates for the Presidency.

Mr. DASH. Who worked with you in this task force; who assisted you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Some of the memorandums I did, quite frankly, before I was given the assignment. I think the one you mentioned—Muskie on March 24—I think the assignment came in either May or June, I believe with—when Mr. Ken Khachigian was a political assistant of mine.

Mr. DASH. Now, in the course of your duties during the Presidential campaign of 1972 and also your duties at the White House, were

you of the view that a number of tax exempt foundations were unfriendly to the President or to the Republican Party, and indeed helpful to the Democratic Party?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, that has—that might have been mentioned during 1971 or 1972, but there is an idea or thought that I have had back as far as 1969 and 1970 and it is my view that, for example, the tax exempt funds of the Ford Foundation, which is the largest of all foundations, which has something like 18 percent of all assets of foundations, that these, by and large, were being channeled, when they were, into public policy institutes, and others which were in basic disagreement with our own political philosophy and that these tax exempt multimillions have the effect, in my personal judgment, of unbalancing the political process, so I have recommended and have drafted speeches actually to lay this out on the table, much as we laid out what I felt was the base of the networks on the table, at the same time to create some of our own institutions which would be a counterpart of, say, the Brookings Institution which would be conservative institutions that is true. But I do not think that was an issue or a matter that was—I may be wrong, I have not read all these memos but it was under active consideration in the campaign of 1971 or 1972. I know I recommended it to the President after the campaign of 1972 that we ought to establish our own institutions, our own public policy things on a competitive basis.

Mr. DASH. Well, did you not believe that the leading contender in the beginning of the Democratic primaries for the Presidential candidacy, Senator Muskie, had a special relationship with the Ford Foundation?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I think Senator Muskie when one—Senator Muskie went on two trips, I believe, again it was a matter of public record, two or three that were sponsored by the Ford Foundation, one of them was to Japan, I believe, and one of them was elsewhere. Again, my view is that we ought to make the whole question of tax exempt foundations and the use of their funds, especially a giant one like the Ford Foundation, to unbalance the political process, in my judgment, we ought to make it a public and political issue, and I have recommended speeches dealing with that subject.

Now, on the Muskie recommendation, I think you would have to—before moving on that—you would have to make the case nationally against the Ford Foundation and McGeorge Bundy's operation.

Mr. DASH. Did you make the recommendation that an investigation should be made concerning the Ford Foundation's activities in political affairs with regard to Democrats?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I did an investigation myself in 1970, in the summer of 1970, but again this did not have to do with 1971 or 1972. I read every article that was written, and the books that were written on the Ford Foundation in a 10-day vacation period, and you did not need other than the material that I had at hand in the public sector as to where these funds were being channeled. It is a matter of public record where the Ford Foundation puts its funds.

Mr. DASH. All right, now, Mr. Buchanan, would you turn to your memorandum—24 to the President, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170]. On that subject, "The Muskie Watch." If you will turn to page 7 of that memorandum.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Your librarian has made an error. My 24 here is a memorandum to John Mitchell and H. R. Haldeman. I do not have that here.

Mr. DASH. Is that tab 10?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Tab 10?

Mr. DASH. It is your memorandum of March 24.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am sorry. "The Muskie Watch," yes, sir.

What page is that?

Mr. DASH. Page 7.

Senator ERVIN. There is a vote on in the Senate, so we will have to suspend.

Mr. DASH. This will give you an opportunity, Mr. Buchanan, to read it.

[Recess.]

Senator ERVIN. The committee will resume.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, we will resume the questioning.

I directed your attention to the March 24, 1971, memorandum, which is a memorandum from you to the President on the subject, "The Muskie Watch." I have asked you to look at page 7 of that memorandum. I will read into the record the short paragraph on the top of page 7, headed "The Ford Foundation":

When Whitney Young passed away, one saw a picture of Ed Muskie in the surf with Young and one learned that they were gathered in Nigeria on a Ford Foundation-financed trip. Now, in my research on Ford, this is the third such trip. Muskie was the only Democrat who made both junkets to Japan (some of our Republican friends went also on one) financed by Ford. Certainly some troublesome questions could be raised about Muskie's connection with McGeorge Bundy's giant institution—and are they behind his candidacy. Investigation should be done on this score. This goes hand in "globe"—I guess the word is "glove", really—hand-in-glove with the Foundation speeches.

Therefore, you were recommending at that time that investigation should be done?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, but the investigation would be investigation of the public record. All the materials I had on the Ford Foundation came from huge volumed magazine articles; they came from reading the voluminous testimony before the Patman Committee, which uncovered, I believe, or elevated the fact that the Ford Foundation had provided stipends for eight of Senator Kennedy's campaign assistants. An investigation would be a simple matter to go down the list of Muskie staffers, and ascertain if any of these were on the payroll of the Ford Foundation. But that is all I can say on that.

Mr. DASH. Well, then, actually, and I think you have testified to this briefly, even prior to this particular memorandum, and actually, a year earlier, in March 1970, you indicated to the President, or the President indicated to you, the belief that investigation should be made of the large foundations to learn which foundations supported the Democratic Party and which were favorable to the administration. Do you recall that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Which investigation—what is the date of the memorandum?

Mr. DASH. Let me refer you to your memorandum of March 3, 1970, tab 4.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think I can explain that very simply for you. The investigation was made. It was made by me in June of 1970. I got

Reader's Guide, every publication, books, everything I could read on the Ford Foundation, the Patman hearings. I took them to Florida and spent 10 days researching and writing. I wrote there. I had every connection of the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the Fund for the Republic, the Institute for Policy Studies, and other satellite institutions. I made my recommendations in the form of two addresses. The speeches were written. As written here, they have never been delivered. But this seemed to me to be a purely legitimate activity and the fact that—

Mr. DASH. I am not questioning that, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The fact that the Ford Foundation is using its tax-exempt funds to fund, by and large, liberal or left institutions presents a distortion, in my judgment, of the American political process. There is no conservative foundation which even approaches the resources of Ford or which is as active in funding either liberal institutions or social action agencies. So my argument was that this was a matter that ought to be put in the public record. That is why I wrote the speeches and the investigation was not anything done covertly in any manner.

Mr. DASH. Well, as a matter of fact, Mr. Buchanan, I would like you to turn to tab 4 [exhibit No. 164], which is your memorandum of March 3, 1970, to the President, in which you did put down most of this on record, and I think from this memorandum, must have come your investigation and later understanding of the foundation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is inaccurate. Let me tell you, Mr. Dash, second to the political realignment, the dream of the American conservative is to put together our own Brookings Institution. I believe—is this the idea for the MacArthur Institute?

Mr. DASH. No. Do you have tab 4? It is a memorandum on White House letterhead, March 3, 1970.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have not been shown this memorandum before. Oh, there it is, the MacArthur Institute.

Mr. DASH. I am not talking about the MacArthur Institute at this point. The first page of the memorandum which has a date, March 3, 1970, on it.

Mr. THOMPSON. I believe that is the MacArthur Institute.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have not been shown this memorandum prior to today. I have not seen this for close to 4 years.

Mr. DASH. I am going to ask you some questions. You may have time to read it—take as much time as you want. There was 20 minutes during our brief recess in which I had asked you as one of the things to look at some of these memorandums.

In any event, is it not true that the very opening paragraph of that memorandum states that the President directed several of us to give thought to how to combat the institutionalized power of the left concentrated in the foundations that succor the Democratic Party?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is an accurate reading of the first sentence, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, have you believed that it is appropriate for the administration, either the White House or any of its representatives, to influence Federal Government grant programs in a way to deny grants to unfriendly foundations in favor of proadministration foundations?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would depend. I am not that conversant with grants, but if the grants are based on lowest bidder, then it should be done honestly. If the grants are discretionary within the authority of the President to turn them over to one institution or another, I would recommend to the President that he turn any grants for studies or projects like that over to institutions which generally support the values and principles in which we believe, and not to other institutions such as the Brookings Institution, which in my judgment, amounts to, really, a government in exile for the Democratic Party.

Mr. DASH. And in fact, if you look on page 4 of your memorandum, which follows your recommendation for the MacArthur Institute, which would be a Republican conservative foundation, there is a heading, "What About the Money" that would fund such an institute? If you look at item 3 under that, the recommendation is that all Federal contracts now going to institutions which are essentially anti-administration would be shifted to this new baby—and to other pro-administration foundations. Antiadministration foundations should be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the Cabinet would be all that would be required to get cooperation here and Budget could be on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets any more money.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There is nothing in there. Of course, it is a lowest bidder thing. I do not have any recommendation in here for violating the law. But I would urge that the Nixon administration, if there are discretionary funds, if there are institutions which are supportive of the values in which we believe, then our discretionary contracts for studies and the like should go to institutions which concur with our ideas. I repeat, but what does this have to do with the campaign of 1972?

Mr. DASH. This is in the contention of the question I asked earlier about the Ford Foundation and the influence of foundations in the campaign. I think this is the background of that which led up to that. That is why it is relevant.

Now, do you also believe, Mr. Buchanan, or did you advocate that it is an appropriate function of the White House or its representatives to use the Internal Revenue Division as a weapon against foundations you believe are friendly to the Democratic Party and unfriendly to the administration?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have recommended on several occasions, once when I received in the mail a political attack on the President and the Vice President and the Attorney General—it was a strictly political attack, in violation of the law, in my judgment, because at the end of the political attack, it said, please send in your tax-exempt dollars now. On each of these occasions—there were two or three when these things occurred—I recommended to Mr. Haldeman that this matter be looked into. It appeared to me to be a violation of the law. It was the use of tax-exempt funds for political operations; it was disadvantageous to the administration and if these institutions were using their tax-exempt status to engage in politics, then we should move to remove their tax-exemption status.

As you will recall, in 1969—I am sorry, 1967—President Johnson directed that the tax exemptions of the Sierra Club be removed for violation of its tax exemption by virtue of its lobbying. It had only sent out a single ad, I believe, on a conservation issue.

Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, in a single memorandum on the next page, Mr. Buchanan, page 5 of your general memorandum on the so-called liberal foundations and a requirement for a Republican conservative foundation, at the very top of the page, you state that:

One of my primary concerns about this is that it requires a strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division——

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH [continues reading]:

And an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax Exempt Office. Am not sure we have the right now.

Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of our Internal Revenue to engage in combat with some of these lesser anti-Administration institutions like the Stern Foundation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. Let me give you the reasoning on this thing.

After the election of 1964, when Barry Goldwater was defeated, there was a conservative foundation that had some personnel that had worked in Senator Goldwater's campaign. They came within an ace of losing their tax-exempt foundation status even though they had not engaged in any political activities. There is an apprehension in my mind that the Democratic Party came into power and any tax-exempt institution created which was not really as clean as a hound's tooth, in which any sort of conservative political activity occurred would have that tax exemption withdrawn.

Mr. DASH. Was there any request that you know of by the administration for either tax audits or tax reports from the group of foundations that you classified as liberal or——

Mr. BUCHANAN. No. I think that is—the expenditures of foundations, I believe, as a result of the 1969 tax act, I believe were a matter of public record. I have never seen a tax return of anybody, any institution or any individual, that I can recall since I have been in the White House. I do not know why you would have to look at a tax return. It is a public record what the Ford Foundation's income, its assets, its disbursements are. You can just read their annual report. I do not believe I recommended that, but again, I have not looked——

Mr. DASH. No, I just quoted your recommendation. I have not suggested that you have.

I have asked you whether or not, based on that recommendation, you are aware of any implementation or followthrough of any request for tax reports?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, because as I say, it is not a tax report you would look for if you are trying to remove the tax exemption of an administration. It is not a financial hanky-panky. It is whether they are engaged in the political process where they have no business.

For example, I saw a report back in 1967 or 1968 of the National Student Association. It had decided to engage in lobbying and the like and it was engaged in wholly political activity. But the same report that you had which was a public report, incidentally, showed that they had set up some sort of dual fund which enables them to get tax-exempt funds in one pot and the other is nontax exempt.

Mr. DASH. But your recommendation of what would be required as a friendly fellow or friendly staff in the Internal Revenue would mean some aggressive activity.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is well known that the Internal Revenue Service, in our view, was politically controlled by Democrats, or had been at that particular time.

Mr. DASH. Do you know whether or not after this—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Did we clean it out?

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. We have only gotten something like 10 schedule C positions. At this particular time, we had only filled with one of our own. It has been the impression, I think perhaps justified, in the past that the tax-exempt division of the IRS had been biased against conservative tax-exempt organizations and had been very lenient in regard to liberal tax-exempt organizations and their activities which crossed the boundary into politics.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you know or do you know, Mr. John Caulfield?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I know him very well.

Mr. DASH. Did you know of his work at the White House, and what his work was at the White House?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I knew he was doing routine investigations. I had no knowledge of some of the activities which have become public.

Mr. DASH. And you had no relationship in any way with him?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have a closer personal relationship. He is a very good friend of mine.

Mr. DASH. Did you know about the political activities of a person known as Fat Jack? I think in your statement you indicated you did not know the person.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The first I heard of Fat Jack is when it came out in Mr. Hunt's testimony.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had a spy in the Muskie campaign headquarters who was photographing Muskie material and turning them over to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I was not aware that we had a spy. On two occasions we received—I received, personally—documents from the Muskie campaign which were fairly low-grade political ore. They were sent over by the Committee To Re-Elect. They were unsolicited papers and they were in a photographed form, but whether the individual there was a leak or a spy or whether it was Fat Jack or one of these other code names or how it came to the Committee To Re-Elect, I could not tell you to this day.

Mr. DASH. How did you—you say you received some material that came from the Muskie headquarters?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It came out of the Muskie campaign, that is correct. There were several batches of photographed documents and, as I stated, it was fairly low-grade political ore. Leaks are not uncommon in campaigns, and a recommendation made to the Committee To Re-Elect asked what I should do with it, and I said most of it is insignificant, but there are two or three items in which Evans and Novak might be interested—the fact that Senator Muskie proposed using public funds in public hearings to advance his candidacy, which would seem to me to be a matter which the people had a right to know.

Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, did Mr. Evans and Mr. Novak, did they publish the matter in their column?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Published, I could not say with certitude. What I recommended that we send to them was the material that was published. I would have to be shown by the staff—the column—and I would also have to be shown, I think, again the material we had. But

we did get material on two occasions, and I did recommend that it be sent to columnists Evans and Novak. Evans and Novak did print on two occasions, I believe, material from Muskie's campaign; I do not know whether this was the same thing. Mr. Hunt testified, maybe I am mistaken, there were maybe 10 batches of it. If that is true, we did not see it.

Mr. DASH. Yes, you only saw two batches?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Just two occasions.

Mr. DASH. Two occasions.

Now, an important part of your assignment in the 1972 campaign was to recommend strategy, was it not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And what, in fact, was your major recommendation at the beginning of the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would say that in 1971, as I stated at the outset, my principal recommendation was that given the fact that we had 12 Democrats opposing us, all of them attacking the President, that we ought to concentrate and focus our political resources primarily, if not exclusively, on Senator Muskie, who was then the frontrunner leading the President in the polls.

Mr. DASH. Did you put these recommendations in the form of a memorandum?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I certainly did.

Mr. DASH. It was your recommendation, was it not, and I think you have just indicated, that the Republican Party all through the campaign actually attempted to affect the primaries so as to affect Mr. Muskie's chances in the primaries?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, there is no doubt about it that in the summer of 1971, we were counterattacking against Senator Muskie. He had to run the gauntlet of the political primaries, and—right. If you are devising a political strategy, you would have to take these into consideration and providing scenarios for the primaries, the Democratic primaries was one of our functions.

Mr. DASH. And this actually led to one of your—or at least the basic memorandum was the one I think we referred to already, the memorandum of March 24, 1971, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170], which you called the Muskie watch.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There were four basic ones. One was an analysis of Senator Muskie. One was an analysis of Senator Humphrey, another an analysis of Senator Kennedy, and another an analysis of Senator Jackson.

Mr. DASH. Is it not true, Mr. Buchanan, that you personally believed that the 1972 election was more than an ordinary Presidential election but had a direct relationship for the safety of the country?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is a line, I believe, out of a memorandum of mine, the Muskie watch—let me say I would not—I would have been less apprehensive had Senator Jackson been the nominee than Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern. Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern had won their election, given their views with regard to American policy in Southeast Asia, I think it would have been a little short of a catastrophe, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. If Senator Muskie had won the election?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Given his views on Southeast Asia and later in the campaign of Senator Humphrey. The only Democrat I would have

been mildly comfortable with would have been Senator Henry Jackson.

Mr. DASH. So actually, you expressed that view on page 7 of the memorandum?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes; this is the Muskie watch.

Mr. DASH. Let me just read you the language that you had:

We ought to go down to the kennels and turn all the dogs loose on Ecology Ed. The President is the only one who should stand clear, while everybody else gets chewed up. The rest of us are expendable commodities; but if the President goes, we all go, and maybe the country with us. My view——

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. That was your——

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Dash, if you read my articles in the New York Times, which are a fourth or fifth draft, you will know my rhetoric is somewhat hot and you can imagine what the first draft is like and that is one of them.

Mr. DASH. In your——

Mr. BUCHANAN. Incidentally, let me make a point here. The exaggerated metaphor is really the staple of American political language. In the campaign of 1972, I recall Mr. Gary Hart said publicly: "If the Nixon people do to us what the Humphrey people did to us, which is underestimate us, we will kill them."

I am sure Mr. Hart did not mean physical violence on us, and when I said we are going down to the kennels, the reference was not to King Timahoe. [Laughter.]

Mr. DASH. What actually did you have in mind when you were talking about being chewed up and doing everything that you could in order to go down the line to see that Muskie would not succeed?

Mr. BUCHANAN. As I say, others disagreed with this—the Buchanan memos are not the campaign. I made strategy, others disagreed with me. Others felt Senator Kennedy perchance would be a stronger candidate than Senator Muskie and if we focused our political resources which were formidable, on Senator Muskie and he would decline in the polls the result might be the nomination of Senator Kennedy would be stronger. My personal view was otherwise. I always felt Senator Muskie would be the strongest candidate, that analysis indicates that, and we do not have political resources we could not focus on all 12 of the Democrats and I asked the President, or recommended to the President, that the limited resources we were building then, these be focused on Senator Muskie.

Mr. DASH. Let me put this in somewhat focus to see what your understanding was as to how far you would want to go because of how you saw the fate of the country at that time. We have had testimony before us from Mr. Mitchell, the former Attorney General, who, I think, in response to Senator Talmadge's question, stated that in order to reelect the President he would practically do anything, and in that case he was being questioned involving subornation of perjury and coverup. Of course, there is no question with you, Mr. Buchanan, with regard to that.

But would you have gone as far, though, did you feel as strongly as Mr. Mitchell, do you endorse Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Charles Colson was quoted once as saying, "I would do anything the President of the United States would ask me to do,

period." I would subscribe to that statement for this reason: The President of the United States would not ask me to do anything unethical, improper, or wrong or illegal.

Mr. DASH. I think your statement really is that I would not go as far as Mr. Mitchell's statement.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I do not know that Mr. Mitchell has been demonstrated to be guilty of anything. I do not know the fact of these cases involving the Watergate and I think we ought to leave that up to the courts. I am loyal to the President of the United States, that is correct. I have been loyal to him for 8 years.

Mr. DASH. I am not questioning that, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. What is it that you are questioning, Mr. Dash?

Mr. DASH. I am just asking you, in the memorandum, where you have indicated the nature of the danger that you saw to the country, and the importance that the forces of the Republican Party including the White House be aimed at knocking out the frontrunner, Mr. Muskie, how far would you go to do that? What tactics would you be willing to use?

Mr. BUCHANAN. What tactics would I be willing to use? Anything that was not immoral, unethical, illegal, or unprecedented in previous Democratic campaigns. [Laughter.]

Mr. DASH. We will leave that general definition and see whether or not some of this we might be able to define a little more clearly. Did you have any discussion with anyone at the White House about the possibility of hiring someone like a Donald Segretti?

Mr. BUCHANAN. We certainly did. As you know Mr. Richard "Dick" Tuck is the well-known Democratic prankster, we enjoyed some of his tricks against us as well as, I am sure, he did. I recall in just three, briefly three of his favorites, one of them was in 1962 when Mr. Nixon began to deliver a major address from the back of a railroad train he put on an engineer's cap and signaled the engineer to drive off leaving Mr. Nixon standing there.

Another of his favorites was during a major political speech just as the speaker reaches the denouement he drops the fire escape on him.

The third was, we were at the Hotel Hilton down there in Miami Beach, and out front demonstrating—I thought it was welfare mothers or we heard it was welfare mothers at the time, they were all black, they were all pregnant, and they were all carrying placards that said "Nixon's the one." [Laughter.]

Some of the things done to us were hilarious. Mr. Haldeman as he has testified, indicated that maybe it is about time we had ourselves a political Dick Tuck. I was called into a meeting with Mr. Chapin and several others and asked how the Dick Tuck should be structured. My recollection of the meeting is that it should be a small operation, and that because of 1971 we were depoliticizing publicly the White House, it ought to be under the Committee To Re-Elect the President. That was the last I have heard. I do not know if that was the—if Donald Segretti turned out to be the Dick-Tuck-gone-away or not.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chapin was at that meeting with you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. He was in Mr. Chapin's office.

Mr. DASH. Did you learn Mr. Chapin in fact hired Mr. Segretti?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I never heard the name Mr. Segretti until it came out in the banner headlines of the Washington Post.

Let me just state, make a point here also. When these things were done by Mr. Richard Tuck, they were considered humorous, pranks, stunts, and we thought of them as such. But when some of the things done by our people which were similar to those that were done, it resulted in screaming banner headlines in the Washington Post about political sabotage. Now there is a line across which political tricks should not go, quite clearly. One of them obviously was in Florida. The salacious attack on Senator Jackson, and Senator Humphrey, and another I think was against us, against the President when phone banks of McGovern's campaign, I believe, were used in California to get near violent demonstrations denying the President of the United States a right to speak. These things clearly got out of hand I think in both campaigns.

Let me move to Donald Segretti. The first I heard of that, as I said, was the Washington Post and I think you have testified that I was called in to a meeting at the White House in October of 1969 when this came out, to discuss the handling of the Segretti matter and that was the first of any idea we had about the thing or I had about his activities.

Mr. DASH. What was your relationship with the Committee To Re-Elect the President and Mr. Magruder during the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. My personal relations with the Committee To Re-Elect was minimal. I had a political aide who had liaison with them on some matters but my strategy memorandums and my analysis and things like this, these would go directly up to the President, or to Mr. Haldeman, or to Mr. Ehrlichman sometimes, so my relationships with Jeb Magruder were very few. I was on a committee which they ran on Monday nights, but which was not a significant one, but they were fairly minimal. I know Jeb Magruder fairly well.

Mr. DASH. I think having said you "did not become aware of Mr. Segretti," you are not able to really tell us what kind of acts Mr. Segretti may have done?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I don't; that is true. I think he has pleaded guilty, hasn't he, to some things, maybe I am wrong.

Mr. DASH. There is one count.

Now, were you aware that Mr. Magruder actually had working for the Committee To Re-Elect the President political espionage operatives who, like Segretti, were working in the field?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't know that Segretti was—you see there is a differentiation between pranksters and infiltration.

Mr. DASH. I am talking about infiltrators.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As I mentioned, I received those Muskie documents. I didn't know if that was a spy or if that was a leak. I don't know today the source of them. I could not testify to that. I do not believe I knew of any spies in the other campaigns, because I do not believe I received any other documents other than these two, and the very fact that I received just these two, would lead me to believe that we did not have widespread espionage operation going.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Or spies.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware that any activities were going on, as a political espionage matter under Mr. Magruder through Mr. Segretti which were also aimed at the candidacy of Mr. Muskie?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, if you set a grand strategy, if the strategy I recommended and, incidentally, I did not set the strategy. I was not on the senior strategy board during the campaign, and I did not set the strategy for the primary thing but I recommended it. If my recommended strategy were adopted, and if there were pranksters out there, I am sure they would fit in underneath that but I do not know that. I don't know that for sure.

Mr. DASH. Now, it is true, is it not, that you recommended as a goal of the Republican campaign effort during the Democratic primaries that the securing of Senator McGovern would be the best candidate for Mr. Nixon to run against?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, that would not be accurate—I think you have a memo. I have a line in there that says: "We have not been so good in our lives that providence is going to reward us with the nomination of Senator McGovern." That was a statement in 1971. I did not even do an analysis on Senator McGovern in 1971 because we did not consider him a serious candidate. We began to consider Senator McGovern a serious candidate just prior to the Wisconsin primary when we got report of the strengths of his organization, and after the Wisconsin primary we did do an analysis, a strategy analysis of the coming Democratic primaries which led us to believe that McGovern could win the nomination. In my judgment, McGovern was the candidate we wanted most at that point in time, and I believe, I did make a recommendation that all political resources of the Nixon campaign and of the Nixon public campaigns that they leave Senator McGovern alone and let him proceed unimpeded on the nomination because there was a strong chance he would win it.

Mr. DASH. Let me refer you, Mr. Buchanan, to a memorandum of April 12, 1972, to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman from you and Mr. Khachigian which is tab 23 [exhibit No. 183], April 2. Do you have that memorandum? April 12, excuse me.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Let me see if I am right. The cover memorandum?

Mr. DASH. It is a cover memorandum.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH. And then the one that is from you.

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is right. This is our scenario, I think, of how we felt projections and predictions of all—

Mr. DASH. Yes; let me read at least the first paragraph which I think sets forth the position that you have been testifying to:

Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early primaries, locking up the convention in April, and uniting the Democratic Party behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The likelihood—great three months ago—that the Democratic Convention could become a dignified coronation ceremony for a centrist candidate who could lead a united party into the election—is now remote.

Now, if we look to page 8 of that same memorandum.

Senator BAKER. What are you looking at, Sam?

Mr. DASH. Tab 23, April 12, 1972, memorandum.

Senator BAKER. Tab 23?

Mr. DASH. Tab 23, and I am now referring to page 8 of that memorandum, Senator Baker. And on the very top of that page:

Our next goal. What we need now is a decision on whom we want to run against. We believe that McGovern is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He could be painted as a left radical candidate, the Goldwater of the Democratic Party, and at this point in time we would inundate him. The Wallace Democrats, south and north, as well as the Daley and Meany Democrats would have to take hemlock to support a fellow whose major plank is to chop \$32 billion out of defense. Also he is weak with the blacks and would have to cater to that vote. To his great disadvantage Humphrey can take the blacks for granted in a contest with the President.

So in that memorandum the deal was, as stated, to have Mr. McGovern as the candidate for the Democratic Party.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It asks for a decision, I believe, from the campaign hierarchy in the first sentence.

Mr. DASH. That was your recommendation?

Mr. BUCHANAN. My recommendation was repeatedly that we ought not to do anything to Senator McGovern in any way to impede his run for the nomination and, frankly, Mr. Dash, if anything was done against—even in the way of pranks or something like that—against Senator McGovern in that period of time, then it would certainly have been contrary to any recommendation that I had made.

Mr. DASH. Well, actually, on page 24 you make—on tab 24 [exhibit No. 184], your next memorandum, dated April 27, 1972, from you to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman—that is exactly your recommendation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH [reading]:

With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pull out of Muskie the chances of McGovern's nomination are immensely improved. Thus we must do as little as possible at this time to impede McGovern's race.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think the reason for that was there were some self-starters on our side. We had frankly had one candidate, Senator Muskie, on whom we have done enormous research who had dropped out of the race. We had done enormous research on Senator McGovern and there were some individuals within the campaign organization of the Republican Party who were recommending we move now to be critical and lay on the record Senator McGovern's positions in order to get him on the record before the convention, postconvention criticisms being given little credence and my recommendation was that we not do that, that we not be critical of Senator McGovern, that we stay out of his effort, and I don't mean that in any pejorative sense but that we don't criticize him.

Mr. DASH. Yes, you notice a handwritten statement which I think is legible even in the Xerox at the bottom which says, "I agree with this. Pass along to our staff. RNC," et cetera, that looks like John Mitchell.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is the very first I have seen of that notation but that indicates Mr. Mitchell concurred with the strategy.

Mr. DASH. Concurred with your recommendation.

Did you believe during the campaign, or advocate that the administration should use its power to make judicial appointments, including the President's power to nominate persons for Supreme Court vacancies either for political purposes or to deride the Democratic Party?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I recommended since back in 1968 or 1969 that the President of the United States appoint, first, a southern judicial conservative to the Supreme Court and, secondly, an American of ethnic descent, preferably an Italian to the Supreme Court, a distinguished jurist, because I feel that would be good for the country and I think it would have been good for us and it is consistent with our philosophy, that is right.

Mr. DASH. Would you turn to , I think it is, a memorandum on tab 19 of October 6, 1971, and it is a cover memorandum which attaches to your memorandum.

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is the memorandum on dividing the Democrats' research.

Mr. DASH. Yes, dividing the Democrats.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They—let me place this in context.

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. This says from research as requested. My understanding of this—I had been asked to do a long-range analysis of any issues, of any recommendations, of any move that we could take which would result in divisions in the Democratic Party, the fact being that we can't win unless the Democratic—if the Democratic Party is united, which is about twice the size of ours, there is no way we can win a national election and we had recommended for a long period of time that we move to win to our side certain specific segments of the Democratic Party and my recommendations are the southern Protestants, if you will, and the northern Catholics, both of those strategies, and I think this is my long-range analysis of all the possible fissures and faults running through the old Roosevelt coalitions.

Mr. DASH. Right.

Now, on page 3 of that memorandum under regional fissures, number one.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH [reading]:

The Supreme Court nomination of a southern district constructionist will force Democratic northern liberals and major candidates to anger either the south or the veto vote or the blacks and the labor movement and the northern liberals, a highly qualified southern conservative nominee to the Supreme Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is one of those occasions where good policy is also good politics, I think, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. But what is—your recommendation here was that even the President's filling a Supreme Court vacancy—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Dash, there is no secret to any individual of the national press corps or any individual who knows me that I would recommend strong conservative judiciary officials be put on the U.S. Supreme Court. I have been recommending that since 1966 to the President. I would recommend it today, and the side effect of that is to be divisive within the National Democrats; that is an ancillary benefit with which I am delighted.

Mr. DASH. Did you say it was an auxiliary?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Ancillary.

Mr. DASH. Ancillary.

Now, did you in a memorandum spell out what breadth there might be to a Senator Edward Kennedy Presidential candidacy?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right, but it was an analysis—I think this was on a request. After I did the Muskie analysis, I was asked to do an analysis on other Presidential candidates. I did one on Senator Kennedy, I believe.

Mr. DASH. That would be your June 9, 1971, memorandum, which is tab 13 [exhibit No. 173].

Were you aware, by the way—I am not making any special references to that, but that does take in the possibility of, the strong possibility of a Kennedy candidacy?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is right. We were low in the polls, or relatively low in the polls in 1971. I think this reflected that it was our feeling that we were low, that if the President looked extremely vulnerable that Senator Kennedy would move, but that if we were strong and looked fairly invincible, that Senator Kennedy would lay back.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, my next question would not directly relate to anything of your knowledge, but the date of this memorandum is related to testimony we have already received in this committee. It is June 9, 1971, which recognizes Kennedy as perhaps a strong candidate.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH. But we received testimony from Mr. Hunt yesterday that he had received instructions from Mr. Colson to fabricate some State Department cables that linked the Kennedy administration to the assassination of Diem.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Dash, as I have stated, I never heard of E. Howard Hunt until June 1972.

Mr. DASH. I am not connecting that with this. I say the date of the memorandum certainly shows that the administration—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, it does not show that. It is a memorandum to the President doing an analysis of Edward M. Kennedy, and my analysis indicated that I thought we should focus on Senator Muskie. I do not believe there is anything in here which suggests that we ought to do anything unethical.

Mr. DASH. I think you misunderstood my question, Mr. Buchanan. I am not suggesting that you or your memorandum suggested anything other than it brought out the fact that Mr. Kennedy was not to be forgotten as a possible Presidential candidate.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There was a division of opinion within the White House and even within the opposition research room as to who would be the strongest candidate. I think the feeling of some individuals was that Senator Kennedy would be a good deal stronger candidate than Senator Muskie, but I did not share that view.

Mr. DASH. Were you ever asked to help develop a newspaper ad campaign following up on Vice President Agnew's attacks on radical liberals?

That is 1969.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Vice President Agnew's attacks; you mean, in the Des Moines speech and other speeches? This was in 1969.

Mr. DASH. Right. During the 1972 campaign, did you participate in getting attack ads placed in newspapers against Democratic candidates?

Mr. BUCHANAN. There was only one candidate, McGovern—right. We recommended—as a matter of fact, a large portion of what we were

doing—we recommended a significant budget for the political offensive as an approach to the pro-Nixon commercials, and so on. We recommended placement of those critical materials, but even more important, to emulate the Johnson commercials against Goldwater and the Humphrey against Agnew, use of television spots against Senator McGovern, and we did some which I thought were very successful.

We reviewed those materials and while I do not know if we prepared them, I certainly reviewed some ads. They brought them over to me to look at.

Mr. DASH. I would like to just bring your attention to a memorandum from you to Messrs. Clark MacGregor, Haldeman, and Colson, August 1, 1972, which is tab 32 [exhibit No. 192].

Do you have that memorandum before you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. DASH. Now, do you see political suggestions? [Reading:]

1. In the Assault Book, we have the quote from McGovern about not "manufacturing foolish projects" like the space shuttle. Would it not be wise to have this put into ads and pamphlets right now in the area of California which just benefited Humphrey from the space shuttle.

No. 2, along the same lines, the old anti-Tydings ad which was so effective, in my view, in Maryland. "If Joe wins you lose," would seem to me an ideal all-purpose ad for GOPers in areas affected by McGovern space and defense cuts. "If McGovern wins, we lose." Again, the negative ads, I would think, will do more to make the President a big winner than a positive "re-elect the President."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. Can I explain why I believed that?

Mr. DASH. Of course.

Mr. BUCHANAN. My feeling was that when the President was in the polls at 65 percent, every vote—or almost every vote—from 55 percent to 65 was less a pro-Nixon vote or an enthusiastic pro-Nixon vote than it was a vote against the candidate of the Democratic Party and our most effective political strategy, since these were Democrats, rather than have us say, you know, what a great job we have done, was you should focus on the reason why they are voting for Richard Nixon. They were voting for Richard Nixon, quite frankly, and we recognized that, not because they were the most strong supporters of ours—in fact, they were the most lukewarm—but because they were in strong opposition to Senator McGovern. That is why we recommended that we get the strongest slice of the anti-McGovern voters with these commercials rather than with the pro-Nixon commercials.

Mr. DASH. Were these also supposed to be signed by the Committee To Re-Elect the President or the Republican Party or citizens groups?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I would think Democrats for Nixon would have been an effective one at the time. But it did not make much difference.

Mr. DASH. In other words, you would use some sort of group that would look like a group of citizens?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, there is nothing in there about doing that. Political advertisements in newspapers are a common staple. We ran ads in newspapers and I do not know that they were done unethically. All the attack ads which were run, I think, were run after the Republican Convention. I think most of the attack ads—or the offensive ads, I should say—these had on them the identification of Democrats for Nixon, which we felt would be a more effective appeal to Democrats than a Republican group.

Mr. DASH. Did you ever recommend or approve the use of Republican campaign funds to go into an ad of this kind, which would be

placed in the papers, which would have as its support a citizens group?

Mr. BUCHANAN. A citizens group? Well, in the campaign, there are hundreds of citizens groups that go up, that are set up. You know, citizens for honest government, citizens for this, citizens for that.

But here is the thing.

Mr. DASH. You would prepare the ad?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I just do the copy. I do the copy or I clear the copy. I do not go out and find out what the political committee is going to be. I would basically probably not do the copy. The advertising folks would bring the copy in, I would clear it, say sharpen this, and I would say, it should be placed in Illinois or this should be placed in California. The details of these things and whether it was a Republican group or whether it was Democrats for Nixon, these would more than likely be decisions of other individuals, I think.

Mr. DASH. Well, whether anybody did it, whether Republicans or Democrats, would not such an ad be, in effect, a manufactured ad because it would give to readers the impression that a group of citizens felt so strongly about a particular issue that they would be putting their own money into purchasing that space and giving the message, which in fact—

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, Mr. Dash, I have ghosted speeches for Presidents, Vice Presidents, Senators, Republican chairmen; I have ghosted letters to editors. What is illicit about ghosting an ad in which individuals are going to put their names on them?

Mr. DASH. I am asking your advice, not raising any question of what is illicit. What I am saying is, in effect: although you say you have ghosted speeches; to ghost or manufacture an ad or a letter to the editor that purports to be a letter from a citizen and is read by fellow citizens as an irate citizen's response, which, in fact, is actually written by a mythical campaign worker and sent to a citizen to sign—really, is that a true way to mold citizen opinion?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, as long as there is an individual who is willing to sign a letter and asks you to draft it, or you draft it and an individual, if it does not conflict with his views, I don't think there is anything, as I say, that would seem to me to be in the same category with a speechwriter who is told by a candidate or a President or a Vice President, draft me a speech and make these points on it. It becomes the property and the views become the views of the signers. There is nothing compulsory. It is strictly voluntary.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, did you ever recommend any covert or clandestine activities to be taken on during the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, it would depend. My own view is that there are such things as covert and clandestine intelligence activities that are not wrong, that are not unethical and things like that. It is conceivable, yes. But what did you have in mind?

Mr. DASH. Turn to tab 16 [exhibit No. 176] of your July 28, 1971, memo.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Did you say 15, sir?

Mr. DASH. 16.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Here it is.

Mr. DASH. Do you have it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Turn to page 5.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. Incidentally, this memorandum is not in my memorandum form. The approved-disapproved comment is—

Mr. DASH. I know. I think you told us that in executive session, but that probably is another memorandum which you had prepared, but was rewritten by the committee with their approved and disapproved form.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Page five, you see Special Projects. [Reading:]

We would like to utilize Ron Walker's resources where possible to handle some close-in operations, pickets and the like, and candidates visit various cities.

What did you have in mind in that kind of recommendation?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, when you have Senator Muskie traveling to a city, he will bring with him a traveling national press corps which will be interested in the size of his crowds at airports, will be interested in the circumstances surrounding his appearance. If you have at the airport a group of individuals with a sign that they throw up at the right moment, "This is Nixon country," for example, you are liable to get an Associated Press photograph with Senator Muskie with the sign, which is, we feel, advantageous.

Mr. DASH. Who was Ron Walker?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Incidentally, this, I believe, was rejected. Ron Walker was in charge of the President's advance men and so he would have—there are advance men we have in various cities around the country who, when you go in there, they handle crowds and scheduling and they could organize these demonstrations. It would be a less expensive operation than having men travel around in advance and do it.

So, he would have an advance in place. I am not certain of it, but my recollection is that this idea was rejected and we were not allowed to use White House advance men for these types of things, and we did use State chairmen, State committees, and the like.

We would phone to them and they would set up the demonstrations or they would issue the statements there.

Mr. DASH. This would be to give the appearance of a demonstration against the candidate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would be one example, yes, sir. Or you could have your literature of the Committee To Re-Elect. Or you could write up, say, if Senator Muskie were having difficulty with some particular question, a list of questions, something like that, you could draft the questions and get the local Republicans there to put them on the press bus, or to hand out their flyers at the Muskie rally, put them on the seats of chairs, things like that.

Mr. DASH. Would you turn to your memorandum of August 13, 1971, which is tab 18 [exhibit No. 178]?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right, the '72 sponsors club.

Mr. DASH. There it says:

Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak column from the July 25 Washington Post which indicates that the Democrats are setting up a '72 sponsors club similar to the President's club of the LBJ era. For \$72 a month, there are a number of privileges accorded to those who contribute.

Pat Buchanan has suggested that we have someone we know, preferably a Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This could be arranged by having the individual write in explaining that he had read about the club in the newspaper and is fed up with the Administration's policies and wants to contribute his share and become a member of the club. This would give us many advantages in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their strategy.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir, that idea is taken out of Larry O'Brien's campaign book. He has recommended in his campaign book that it is a good thing for Democrats to get on the mailing list for all Republican materials they could find. Our recommendation was that someone get on the mailing list for all these Democratic materials so that we get an ongoing flow of their political literature.

Mr. DASH. Again, Mr. Buchanan, the point is not whether it is done by Democrats or Republicans, because our mandate is to look into the entire activity. Is this a form of infiltration?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is. Yes, you get on the mailing list. Our news summary is on the mailing list of Common Cause. We get all their publications. Our reason is we have to put them in the President's news summary. It is not because we agree with their goals. I don't think it is any more infiltration than that.

Mr. DASH. Were you aware of the covert activities sponsored by the Republican Party for the Democratic National Committee during the time of the convention?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Was I aware of any? No, I was not aware of any. I would trust we had some intelligence people down at Miami Beach to see how they handled their convention—that is a gigantic affair—how they handled their press, how they handled their demonstrations. Frankly, their scheduling was a little weak in terms of the hour of the morning at which Senator McGovern spoke. I would hope we would have people down there looking at this, but this was not my function.

Mr. DASH. Would you look at your memorandum of April 10, 1972, on tab 22 [exhibit No. 182], to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman? Page 2 of that memorandum.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir

Mr. DASH. Just at the bottom, "the dangers" are:

If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably point up to the Republicans at the Fontainebleu to distract attention from themselves.

Thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate that the Republicans up there told us to come down here and "raise hell." Anyone at the observation post should be clean as a hound's tooth—and the observation post should have no hand in any "covert operations" on-going in Miami.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is right.

If you look at the top of that page, it says "The Republican forward observation post should be made public."

That was my recommendation. I was at the 1968 Democratic Convention in an observation post, which was made public. I had recommended that we set up a similar observation post at Miami Beach with the Democrats and that I go down there from the White House, with someone else at the White House. I believe we did have one. But the reason I did not go and this recommendation was withdrawn was because, frankly, of the Watergate incident and apprehension on my part that if, from the podium, they said they have some Republican spies up there in the Fontainebleu and they are there from the White House, we would never have caught up with the story.

I did recommend a forward observation post down there. We had it in 1968 at the Chicago convention of the Democrats. Governor Love of Illinois was in both the observation post and—

Mr. DASH. But you recommended that it be kept clear or clean, away from any covert operations?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. There were 2,000 press in Miami Beach. I certainly hope we had people down there demonstrating for Richard Nixon. But anything like that should be kept away from the observation post, we should be clean as a hound's tooth out of apprehension at the allegations made against us so we could say flatly, no, we had nothing to do with X, Y, or Z.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. I would like to show you a pamphlet which purports to be issued by Citizens for a Liberal Alternative.

By the way, do you know of the group, Citizens for a Liberal Alternative?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No; Len Garment called me one night after someone had come back from the committee, and he asked me, Mr. Buchanan, or Pat, are you familiar with Citizens for a Liberal Alternative? I said, it sounds like a fine organization.

Senator, this pamphlet has only been shown to me. I have seen a Xerox of this. This pamphlet has been shown to me by the staff, I believe Monday night. Prior to that, Mr. Lenzner showed me a copy of it which was not identifiable.

My recollection of this is largely based on my political assistant, Ken Khachigian, who tells me that I edited it. To my recollection, this pamphlet was not my idea, I did not draft it, I did not order it produced, I did not order it distributed. I do not know to whom it went, but if he says I edited it, I edited it, rather, the text of it. He is an honest individual and I assume he did it.

Mr. DASH. Did he tell you that he prepared it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, he said he told you that he prepared it.

Mr. DASH. All right. Do you know that the fact is that there is no such organization as Citizens for a Liberal Alternative?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. The error in this—from my understanding—is that it failed to have on it the proper identifying name of an individual who belonged to the organization, which is not an unroutine shortcoming in a Presidential campaign. As a matter of fact, I have brought with me, Mr. Dash, as I said I would the other night, a 47-page diatribe against Senator McGovern which was released all over the Democratic Convention and which similarly lacks identification. From Time magazine; I understand the author of this is Mr. George Meany and sponsorship is Mr. Barkin. I trust that if we could introduce that one into your evidence, they will go through the same 3 hours of discussion of that as we are going through material like this.

Mr. DASH. And what in effect this was aimed to do was to show liberal Democrats, purportedly from an organization of liberal Democrats, that Senator Muskie was, as it says in the first page, Ed Muskie will be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells that we have now, and make him a candidate of the Democratic right.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The rhetoric is not leftwing rhetoric, but the statements on Senator Muskie's position on gun control is accurate, on the statement with regard to the black Americans—there is not an inaccuracy in terms of the writing—

Mr. DASH. What I suggest is that the purpose of the pamphlet as you see it is to represent to liberal Democrats that a liberal Democrat organization is urging them to not vote for Senator Muskie.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. Mr. Dash, the thing looks to me, it is a fairly unsophisticated document. A fairly unconvincing document. It looks to me like more of a joke. It does not look like it is going to convince an intelligent liberal Democrat to do anything.

Mr. DASH. The record will show that this particular pamphlet was distributed quite widely throughout the country by different operatives.

Mr. Chairman, I have referred to a number of memorandums and specifically read from these memorandums during the course of my questioning of Mr. Buchanan, and also this particular pamphlet. I would like to have those particular memorandums, and especially those portions that I have read from, identified for the record and admitted in evidence.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Can we introduce the Meany pamphlet, sir? I brought it with me.

Mr. DASH. Do you have the Meany pamphlet?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes; this is the document here, the McGovern record, a critical appraisal. Attached is the Time article.

Senator ERVIN. Without objection we will receive both documents for the record at this time.

[The documents were marked exhibits Nos. 158 and 159*.]

Mr. DASH. By the way, is that one of the files we subpoenaed?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, it is not; I do not believe so. I just had this in hand fairly recently.

Mr. DASH. How did you obtain that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not know. I think it was sent to us.

Mr. DASH. Did you request it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, we have done, in our own spare time, a little political research into the background of other political activities. Just as the committee suggested that things went wrong in the Republican campaign, we felt there were some errors in the Democratic campaign and we brought it to your attention.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Buchanan, I am sure we have. If you have any additional things, we will be glad to see them.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I only have this one.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Dash, I might say there are others and you will indeed receive copies and you will not be disappointed.

Mr. DASH. I take it they are not presently in the committee files.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No; I do not know what the committee file has got other than my memos.

Senator BAKER. I do not believe I will tell you.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Buchanan, I think you have given us some instruction into the practicalities of American politics that are unfortunate policies of unorthodox matters of both political parties.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1973

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Buchanan, several documents were referred to

*See pp. 4055 and 4059.

this morning and I would like to go over a few of them with you. You were asked to respond to particular passages from particular documents that were read along and I think it is important that we get the full and complete flavor of the documents in case there is any misunderstanding. I would refer to page 7, of tab number 10 [exhibit No. 170], which is a memorandum for the President from you; subject: the Muskie watch; and I would like to discuss your paper on Senator Muskie, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Humphrey.

I think in fairness to your position, we might point out, at least one other than the ones read to you. On page 7, the final paragraph, it says, "The attacks should not be name calling, they should be well thought out."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. THOMPSON. In the first place, when you say attacks, what are you talking about?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would be, the reference would be to the political offensive, political speeches, political statements, political advertising, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Political speeches by whom?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think I indicated what I felt to be the political resources which we could utilize. As well as I can recall, in 1971, the President vetoed our authorization, if you will, to bring in the Cabinet and to utilize the Vice President. This is not to suggest that we gave any directives of any kind to the Vice President, but in mid-1971, I think there was sort of a general rule that the Cabinet and the Vice President would not engage in political colloquy, and the other resources I think I have named were the national committee, of course, the burgeoning resources of the Committee To Re-Elect. You have State parties, and you were beginning to get State committees. You have Republican Congressmen and Senators who were willing to take a hand in it, Senator Dole, who was an extraordinarily effective spokesman, I felt in our behalf. You have the Republican publication Monday which had high credibility with the national media and which was readily picked up on wires. These would be a few of the resources.

Mr. THOMPSON. So when a public figure, in effect, made a speech promoting the candidacy of the President and taking a position against the leading Democratic opponents, that would be an attack; is that right?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right, that would be a political attack, right.

Mr. THOMPSON. What was the political climate with regard to name calling? Was there name-calling throughout the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think if you go through some of these, the March 14, 1972, memorandum, I think you will find a recognition and awareness on our part that when the campaign gets heated things are going to get out of hand. They invariably do. You have statements made that are too much, that are excessive, so we recommended that one individual, and I named in that memorandum, the Attorney General, or that he designate a deputy who would be assigned to clear all political copy coming—all attack, offensive copy coming out of the campaign in order that we not run into the same problem we ran into in 1970 when some of the ads were excessive and counterproductive. But there is an awareness, I think, through a

number of these memorandums that things, when you get into the heat of a campaign, individuals do go too far. Some of the—I recall in Senator McGovern's campaign—I am sure Senator McGovern now, would not like to refer to the fact that he compared American policy in Indochina with the nationalist extermination of the Jews or that he compared the President of the United States with Adolf Hitler. These things were excesses, I think, in the campaign that occurred and we were cognizant that they would occur. Some things would occur on our part as they occurred on the other side.

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me ask you to turn over to page 8 of that same memorandum. In the final paragraph you say:

My recommendation then is for creation of the Muskie watch, an operation working perhaps within the Republican National Committee, which may even be a publicized operation, doing constant research on Ed.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, frankly, I had even considered myself—I was, in my own mind fairly certain, not that Senator Muskie would get the nomination, so I had thought myself of sort of resigning from the White House Staff, making a fairly high level operation in the Republican National Committee which would have all the research and data on Muskie to which the political reporters could come and which would be a publicized operation and which could issue statements vis-a-vis Senator Muskie, but even though in some of these memorandums it said that the Muskie watch was created, in reality it was not created. The Muskie watch amounted to actually little more than the research files of Buchanan and Khachigian.

Mr. THOMPSON. In any of your recommendations regarding the possible candidacies of the leading Democrats, did you in any way advocate the defaming of anyone?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, no. In a public statement that sort of thing is not only mistaken, it is counterproductive.

Mr. THOMPSON. I refer you to tab 13 (exhibit No. 173), if I may, on page 5. That memorandum is dated June 9, 1971. Confidential.

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is the Kennedy memorandum.

Mr. THOMPSON. For the President from you. EMK, political memorandum. You discuss pros and cons, his assets, deficiencies, and on page 5 under the heading of Chappaquiddick, you state: "This, of course, will be kept in the public mind by the press—speculating on whether it is helping or hurting EMK."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. THOMPSON [continues reading]: "We ought to stay miles away from it—indicating even in private, it is hard to say the affect; we don't know."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Mr. THOMPSON. Was this policy followed?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It was. Let me add another case similar to the thing when Senator Eagleton's problems came over the national wire the President directed—I was in the room when he did it—directed all Republican spokesmen out on the campaign trail to make no comment whatsoever about it. This, the Chappaquiddick thing, I think, the same policy was in effect. This would be my recommendation, that our speakers make no reference whatsoever to it in public statements, and this was made in the course of a confidential memorandum. I believe it was a course that was followed.

Mr. THOMPSON. In these evaluations, did you set up the strong points of the candidates as well as their deficiencies?

Mr. BUCHANAN. We certainly did. As a matter of fact, the memo on Hubert Humphrey is very laudatory, as I recall.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is tab 11 [exhibit No. 171] and that was next on my list.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

As a matter of fact, you lead off—the sources of these were basically three: One was the files, the excellent files maintained at the Republican National Committee on tracking of candidates. The second was our own research operation under Mort Allen, the news summary, we would get about 30 newspapers and magazines; everything on those candidates would go in those files. You read that. The third would be conversations I had on a regular basis with political reporters.

Mr. THOMPSON. Would you read the first paragraph of that memorandum dated April 19, 1971, for the President?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Entitled "Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey." It reads:

One emerges from a perusal of our "Humphrey file" with a grudging regard for old Hubert. Since November, with but a few notable exceptions, the ex-Veep has conducted himself remarkably well. He receives an excellent price. He has maximized his assets, and minimized his deficiencies. The result is that today, unlike six months ago, the man is a serious contender for the Democratic nomination.

And it moves on from there to analyze, how we analyzed, how Senator Humphrey made a rather, what we felt was a remarkable comeback and had made himself a credible candidate for the Democratic nomination in a period of time wherein no one felt that he would have had another opportunity.

Mr. THOMPSON. You were asked to address yourself to broader issues respecting the propriety of certain things and I believe multiplicity, this in historical context, and to preface my next question. I would like to read certain passages from "Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power," written by Evans and Novak, and ask you to evaluate this in terms of your own political experience. It says:

Behind the slapdash, jerry-built campaign structure, one element of strategy was devised in comparatively orderly—and extremely secretive—fashion. It was what was known as the anti-campaign.

Not often did all these members of the anti-campaign meet at the same time.

About the Johnson campaign—

They came and went, and Feldman and Sharon were first among equals. The job was easily defined: embarrass the Republicans, get under Barry Goldwater's skin, thereby achieving Johnson's overall goal of winning by the biggest possible margin.

For example, it was learned early in the campaign that half a dozen small liberal church journals, one of them published by the Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, had scathingly editorialized against Barry Goldwater as a man not to be entrusted with the Presidency.

Just a couple of more paragraphs.

Normally these editorials would not have found their way to congregations across the country until months after publication. The anti-campaign operation, duplicated them by the hundreds and saw that they got appropriate church groups throughout the nation in a matter of days.

Another project was more typically in the realm of black politics. If Goldwater were to speak somewhere at six o'clock, one local anti-Goldwater speaker—usually a Democrat but sometimes a Republican—would be scheduled at four

o'clock and then another man at eight o'clock. Thus Goldwater would be bracketed by the opposition. An impression of feverish anti-Goldwater activity would be given on the very day of his appearance.

Now, the point here:

Another anticampaign ploy was to make generous use of the letters columns of local newspapers. The anti-campaign group would ask a Republican businessman known to be backing Johnson to write an anti-Goldwater letter to the editor of his local newspaper on a day calculated to get the letter published just as the Goldwater caravan swept into town. Or, just before Goldwater's arrival, a local democratic official would be told to plant a letter in the newspaper publicizing Goldwater's position on a major issue if, as so often was the case, the Goldwater position was anathema to the majority of voters in that city.

This clandestine operation was Johnson's campaign pet and he was kept closely informed of everything the group did.

First of all, is this what we are talking about in regard to the letter-writing system? How do you evaluate its propriety in American politics?

MR. BUCHANAN. Well, we had established within the—we did structure the thing within the Republican National Committee a letter-writing campaign in 1969. The purpose of it was to make efficacious use of political volunteers with computers and the like, licking envelopes and things like that. There are not much more of those assignments. More worthwhile would be a letter to the editor operation and what you do is draft sample letters and you send out letters that are published to show your volunteers in various States how to write a short sharp letter. You recommend they write to their local newspaper and then you begin to send them fact sheets and other information on issues that you want—if in favor of welfare reform or in favor of revenue sharing, something like that—send them short fact sheets and you have to rely on the individual in the State to do his own job and then they would send back to you Xeroxes, say, of letters that had been published. I think it is an effective use of volunteers and we had a structure like this set up at the Republican National Committee which, I believe, was transferred to the Committee To Re-Elect the President in 1972.

I think the group that you are referring to could have been Meyer Feldman's five o'clock club in Johnson's administration, the counterpart of which would have been our "9:15 group" in the White House which was known as the—enshrined by John Osborne and Jules Witt cover as the attack group, which is the phrase of Chairman Ervin, was not a minor organization. We had similar organizations like that.

MR. THOMPSON. It is your opinion, then, that as long as the people who sent these letters out ascribed to the viewpoint espoused, those were proper campaign practices?

MR. BUCHANAN. I believe so, right. If the signatures are not forged, if the people agree with the point of view, the drafting of a letter for them is no more unethical, I think, than the ghosting of a speech.

MR. THOMPSON. Thank you, sir.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. You say that they contemplated using the Attorney General or somebody in the Department of Justice to scrutinize the press releases?

MR. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir. Well, to be candid, it was this memorandum I believe I sent on March 14, recommending that the Attorney General clear all campaign copy. At that point in time, it was my un-

derstanding or our expectation that the Attorney General would be, by the time these campaign materials were prepared, the campaign chairman.

Senator ERVIN. So the Attorney General, while drawing a salary from the Federal Government and ostensibly discharging the duties of Attorney General, was censoring and passing on campaign releases?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; that would not be accurate. The attack organization strategy, the memorandum that I drafted was for the fall campaign, which would begin after the Republican Convention in August. By that time, it would be our expectation that the Attorney General would no longer be Attorney General, but would be our campaign chairman.

Senator ERVIN. But you did not hold back the press releases until he actually retired and became campaign manager did you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not believe we ran any national media ads, which I was referring to, during the time that Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General. The national media campaign, all of which was to be cleared, was post-August, I think.

Senator ERVIN. I thought you were talking about press releases. I make a distinction between a national advertisement and a press release.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would make the same distinction, Mr. Chairman. If you have a review function by the Attorney General, I would—although I do not know that I stated it—generally restrict it to major stuff. If you have a small, minor, fairly insignificant release, I think that can be done down the line. But anything like those ads in 1970, for example, which were controversial and counterproductive, was designed to make sure the campaign chairman or someone in authority—one person cleared all the materials before the public.

Senator ERVIN. It does strike me, as a strict constructionist, that it is rather peculiar to have an Attorney General pass upon the wisdom of issuing press releases while he is still in that office.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, I am not a lawyer, but there is a precedent for that in Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, that is one reason I have been advocating divorcing the entire Department of Justice and the Attorney General from political matters. I would think that—incidentally, I might state that when the committee passed on the nomination of Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mitchell said he agreed with me on that point. That is twice he has agreed with me, once on my executive privilege and once on stopping the Attorney General from being a political adviser to the President.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, far be it from me to disagree with both you and Mr. Mitchell, Senator, but in his book on the Presidency, Clinton Rossiter indicates that the President of the United States himself, one of his duties and roles is that of political leader of his party. It seems to me that political duties are really inseparable from the function of the Office of the Presidency.

On legislation and the like, where I would make recommendation to the President or he would ask me my view on that, invariably, the political impact of the decision would go in there. There is sort of a—between issues and politics—there is a sort of symbiosis, and I do not know that you can really draw a hard and fast line as to what is and what is not political. It is a difficult thing to do.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, it is. We have tried to draw it in the case of the FBI and the CIA.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. It has always seemed to me somewhat incongruous to unite the functions of being a campaign manager and censor of campaign materials with the Office of Attorney General. I think the Attorney General ought to—but that is something you and I are not responsible for. I would just make this observation, as I frequently have. The fact that Bobby Kennedy may have done this did not justify Attorney General John Mitchell doing it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; tu quo que is the weakest of all arguments.

Senator ERVIN. Now, you say that the President issued instructions not to talk about the problems of Senator Eagleton?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir. I was in his office the day the report came in and I recall the President said, "Send out orders I want everybody who is out on the road, surrogates, everyone, informed that they are not to discuss this matter in public."

Senator ERVIN. Now, you made the memorandums to the President in your function as director of strategy about what should be done in the campaign; did you?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have been doing political memorandums of this kind for the President for almost 8 years, Senator, and some of these memorandums were done before I had the function and some of them were done subsequent to the function.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. Well, the President was not altogether above the battle during the campaign of 1972, was he?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, my memorandum would go in. The disposition or the decision as to what the final strategy would be, as I have indicated, would be made very often without my knowledge as to whether my strategy or my recommendations were accepted.

Senator ERVIN. Did you make recommendations to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir; I think most of the strategy memorandums after mid-1971 were addressed to the Attorney General and to Mr. Haldeman. I would be fairly confident that the President would have seen some of them, but that would be something that Mr. Haldeman would have to testify to.

Senator ERVIN. I have been a little troubled by the proposition that the President stood above the battle in 1972 because I think, having been a candidate for a number of offices, I have never seen a candidate who was not interested in what was going on in his campaign.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There is no doubt about it. The President was interested in what happened in his campaign, but you can campaign fairly effectively by being President of the United States, as the returns of the Presidential campaign of 1972 would indicate.

Senator ERVIN. But he was interested and did issue directives from time to time, did he not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. From my conversations with him, I would say he indicated a mild interest in the outcome of the 1972 campaign; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. I was very much intrigued by your testimony, and I want to commend you for the frankness of your testimony that you advised the President that they should see that grants were channeled to organizations that supported the President's philosophy.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Can I clarify that, sir?

Senator ERVIN. Yes, sir, I would be glad for you to.

Mr. BUCHANAN. If you are talking about the grants and contracts and things like that, that are up for bids, if there are discretionary funds at the disposal of the White House—in other words, the White House says the State Department is doing a study of a foreign policy problem, and it is within our discretion as to whom that contract should go—my recommendations would invariably be that we give the contract to those particular public policy institutes which were supportive of our point of view and philosophy.

Senator ERVIN. And you favor that, even in cases that the other party or applicant was better qualified, as long as the matter was discretionary with the President?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I certainly would not recommend that he grant to totally unqualified and incompetent individuals; but if it is six of one and half a dozen of the other, I would favor our side.

Senator ERVIN. Suppose it was seven of one and five of the other?

Mr. BUCHANAN. We are getting close, Senator. I think if it were eight to four, we might go the other way.

Senator ERVIN. I would judge from your testimony that if something had to be submitted to the lowest bidder, the lowest bidder should get it, but if it is anything that is discretionary, the ones favored should be the ones whose political philosophy and activities harmonized with those of the President; otherwise, they would be disqualified or should be?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, here is the thing: Let me give you an example in the Brookings Institution. I am sure if you asked them to do a study—this is purely hypothetical—on some disarmament problem and they had the capability to do it, and some other public policy institute also had the capability to make the study effectively, I am sure both of them would do the best they could. They both would do objective research. But in my view, if we have discretionary funds and it is within our decision, we ought to support our own decisions which support our philosophy and our point of view and our values, that is right.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I suppose that is a practical application of the “if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours” philosophy.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, it is not uncommon in American politics. It is not unethical or wrong, I believe, either, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. One reason I am a Democrat is because Andrew Jackson said the Government should emulate the example of heaven’s rain and shed its benefits equally on all people.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, I believe President Jackson was the father of the spoils system.

Senator ERVIN. Yes, but he ran things pretty well under the spoils system. [Laughter.]

Well, I realize that in all probability, politicians of both parties have yielded to that principle. But it is rather disconcerting to have it asserted here as official policy for the campaign to take the taxpayers’ money and turn it over in the form of grants or compensation to people on the basis of the fact that they share the President’s philosophy rather than let it go on the basis of merit.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, Senator, as I have stated, my recommendations would be as they were. But the recommendations of Buchanan

are not necessarily coterminous with administration policy. I do not know that this has been followed at all.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I will have to say I admire the Buchanan recommendations. They are very forthright.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. I do not fully approve of all of them, however. [Laughter.]

I think you have a sense of humor and I am glad I have one, because I do not know how you would get over the rough spots of life without one. I am like you; I do not object to some humorous things being done in a political campaign. But I infer from the testimony that you gave this morning that if it is true, as has been charged, that some persons in Florida forged, made a forgery on what purported to be the letterhead of Senator Muskie and disseminated it, broadcast it, making salacious attacks upon Senators Jackson and Humphrey for the purpose of discrediting them, that is beyond the pale.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That crosses the line, Senator. My own view is that there are four gradations. There are things that are certainly utterly outrageous and I would put that in with the kind of demonstrations against Vice President Humphrey in 1968 which denied him an opportunity to speak for almost a month. Then, there is dirty tricks, then there is political hardball, then there is pranks. I think you will almost have to leave it to the individual and his own sense of ethics as to what is permissible. There is no question but what the line was probably breached in both campaigns in 1972 and perhaps previous ones.

Senator ERVIN. Sometimes, that is left to people's determination that have no ethics and we have very unethical things happen.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir; that is very true.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Baker.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is really a fascinating line of inquiry, Mr. Buchanan, and you are a fascinating witness in that you not only have clear perception of your role in the political realm of the United States, but the verbal agility to express them most clearly and forthrightly. It is an opportunity for us to examine some areas of this inquiry that we really have not had a chance to touch before. I do greatly admire your description of the gradations of political activity. I think I want to pursue that just for a moment a little later. Let me make one or two inquiries of you first.

The question of whether or not the President was above the campaign in 1972 or was engaged to a significant degree in the campaign in 1972 and what the quality of the Presidential role is in a campaign, is one that concerns me greatly. For instance, I am concerned as much for how active a President is, as how disengaged he may be from a campaign. I happen to think that the President is necessarily a politician, and I think the tighter his control of the political process is, the better off we all may be. So I have no quarrel and I hope and trust you have no quarrel with the President conceptualized as a politician. I think it is inevitable and essential. Would you agree with that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would agree; yes, sir.

Senator BAKER. The second point I think you have touched, that has major significance for us, is not completely spelled out in the mandate of S. Res. 60 which created this committee, but I think it is clearly implied in the scope and jurisdiction of our inquiry. That is, what is the role of the favored, tax-free foundation in public life? I am not going to prolong and extend the conversation and colloquy that you and the chairman had about the awarding of discretionary grants of contracts. I think I understand what you mean and I think it means, all other things being equal, we are going to give it to ourselves instead of theirs.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Precisely.

Senator BAKER. If all other things aren't equal, we may think about it a little more.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is right.

Senator BAKER. But there is another question in that, and I am deeply disturbed about the role of foundations in any event, because of their tax-free situation, they are able to amass huge sums of money and control huge blocks, huge amounts of capital in this country and I think this committee ought to look into what is the appropriate role, if any, in the formulations by foundations of public policy, public attitudes, and political undertakings. That is just as fuzzy and indistinct as your gradations of political activity. But I suggest that that may be an inquiry that we need to approach, and I hope that we shall.

Would you agree that that is a significant part of the political picture of this country?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do. My conception that there seems to be an imbalance in the political process when I don't believe there are any major foundations that have more than \$1 billion in assets, or at one point they didn't, with the sole exception of the Ford Foundation, which has \$43 billion in assets, generating an income of probably \$180 to \$200 million. And these funds, of course, have been used for quasi-political operations. They have been used for public policy institutes like the Brookings Institution, various funds on the west coast, the Institution for Policy Studies, and by and large, the institutions they fund. The quasi-social action movements they fund are on one side of the political spectrum, which I think, given the enormous power and wealth of the Ford Foundation, they can tend to tilt the balance in the other direction.

Frankly, if we, the conservatives, had a foundation such as the Ford Foundation with similarly funded public policy and study institutes and the like, I would not complain. The situation is analogous to that, in my view, of the networks, where a particular philosophy and point of view of a small group of men has tended to dominate these media conglomerates and, really, to control the flow of news and information to the American people. To me, that is not a satisfactory situation and it is a matter that ought to be raised in the political forum. I have recommended since 1970 that we do so.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Buchanan, I have neither the time nor the inclination at this point to try to fill in the blanks in those three broad categories that I have tried to describe, that is, the role of nonprofit foundations in the formulation of public policy or public attitudes,

keeping in mind that foundations, by reason of their tax-exempt status, are, in effect, subsidized by the Federal Government. They are subsidized to the extent that they are free of taxation which must be borne by other individuals and not borne by that foundation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Precisely.

Senator BAKER. And second, the question of where do you draw the line on political activity; and third, to what extent should the President be involved.

Let me focus in on just one of those three, though, for the remaining minutes I have in this series of the inquiry. That is, what is appropriate and what is not appropriate as political activity? I suppose that is such a subject—I have inquiry that we will ever establish it satisfactorily, but we have to try. We have to establish some sort of guidelines if we fulfill the charge of our jurisdiction as a committee.

But precedent is good. Precedent gives us at least some insight into what has gone on before. I have a copy of the Democratic Campaign Manual that was delivered to me this morning, which I have had a chance to peruse briefly. Are you familiar with that manual?

Mr. BUCHANAN. If it is Mr. O'Brien's manual, I have read segments of it. I am not totally familiar with it; yes, sir.

Senator BAKER. Neither am I. I have only had a chance to scan it briefly. It was given to me, I believe, by Mr. Khachigian, who works in your office.

Mr. BUCHANAN. He is our researcher.

Senator BAKER. I would like to call your attention to two or three sections of it and see if you have some personal knowledge of it. Some mention was made of letter-rewriting campaigns in your campaign and things of that sort. I notice in the section entitled "Women," which I didn't think was permissible anymore, but in the section entitled "Women," it reads on page 4, it says:

Stay at home volunteers can use their brains and typewriters to promote the candidate through public letter columns in the local papers. These are read from cover to cover in many homes. Letters should be brief and concentrate on one point. Such letters can serve to set the record straight when mistakes have been made; to call attention to the candidates' programs.

And so forth.

There is another section under the section, "Newspapers," on page 11 of that subsection, which says:

The letters to the editor pages have a high readership. Most newspapers which oppose you editorially will print your side of the story in the form of a letter. Make such letter short and to the point. Don't spend your time abusing the paper or the editor. Use the space you will get to state your argument and be positive whenever possible.

It seems to me in this Democratic manual, they are suggesting, in effect, a program for writing letters to the editor and mass letters to groups.

Is this, in your experience, a form of political activity that has been practiced?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It certainly is, Senator. My familiarity with that is partly due to the fact that I used to be an editorial writer and we ourselves would edit letters to the editor. Our surveys indicated in a number of cases that the letters-to-the-editor column had a higher readership than our own editorials. It is a useful device for the writer

to present his views in a political campaign. It is a fairly useful activity.

Senator BAKER. There is another reference also under the Women's section that says, "Talkers." I am sure Larry O'Brien did not pick that.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They used the term "Women" before their 1972 convention, I imagine. That would be copersons in there now, Senator.

Senator BAKER. Copersons would be better.

However, it is not my function to advise on the editorial comment. It says:

"Call in" and "open mike" radio and TV shows offer a good opportunity for putting across the candidate's views and records—at no cost. Organize teams to call in to these shows to speak up on the issues of the campaign. They must be well informed, persuasive, polite, and natural.

That, I take it, is a standard, more or less accepted campaign practice in the United States.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes.

Senator BAKER. We get to a few others, however, that come to my particular attention. On page 8 of "Research," it says: "Arrange for some of your staff members to have their names placed on the opponent's mailing list" et cetera.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

That is what Mr. Dash was referring to. That is what we were doing when we said the Democrats had set up some group called 72 which cost \$72 to join. Some of our people would send in \$72 in order to get some of the literature sent out by those organizations.

Senator BAKER. "Candidate expenses" under "Budgeting."

The candidate's first consideration must be paying for permanent expenses: meals, hotel rooms, telephone calls, et cetera. He pays for them out of his own pocket, have the treasurer arrange to pay out of a special fund or the general fund, or allow for a contributor to pick up certain bills. Most of the candidate's personal expenses will be incurred in traveling, but there are many shortcuts to limiting on-the-road spending. Contributors can be persuaded to lend the candidate their telephone, hotel, or gasoline credit cards.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't have any knowledge, or much knowledge of the financial end of it, but I guess that would come under the terms of a campaign contribution. I don't know how something like that would be handled.

Senator BAKER. Or how it would be reported.

Mr. BUCHANAN. How it would be reported, right.

Senator BAKER. It might be reported under the "in kind" section of the Federal Reporting Act. There is a section that deals with that, but if it is in fact a service or a facility and of the amounts to a certain amount under the Federal statute, it has to be reported.

Another section of budgeting, on page 4, it states:

Some of the finest campaign stationery, for example, is designed and supplied by the printer or shop favoring the candidate. Buying at wholesale, sympathetic merchants are often happy to provide supplies as their contribution to the campaign.

Which I take it as well would be something that should be considered—

Mr. BUCHANAN. It would have to be reported.

Senator BAKER [continuing]. Should be considered in terms of the

general campaign fund. Here is one that particularly caught my attention also under fund raising on page 8. It says:

If the hotel is running the bar at the social hour, see if you can get a percentage of the gross. Normally, 10 to 20 percent.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. O'Brien goes into some detail.

Senator ERVIN. I was just going to inquire whether under the regulations, the gross was the beverage or the receipts for the beverage.

Senator BAKER. I was going to inquire whether it was in kind or in currency.

I think that covers it. But the point I am reaching for, Mr. Buchanan is, that this committee's function is to try to undertake to identify those things that are illegal, unethical, immoral, or undesirable. To do that, we have to establish some understanding of the range of political activities of the United States.

Now, I am not alleging by reference to the Democratic campaign manual that these things are illegal. I am not alleging that they are necessarily improper. But I do ask you whether or not, in your knowledge as a practicing politician and a Federal official, they fall generally in the purview and scope of what is done in campaigns by both parties—that is, letter writing, such as letters to the editor, such as getting your name on the other fellow's mailing list, such as trying to get stationery supplies and equipment donated to you and things of that sort?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, in terms of—first, my knowledge would only deal with getting on the mailing list and getting information in a legitimate fashion. I think everything you stated up there seems to me to be routine, although I have no specific knowledge, for example, when we travel with the candidate or with the President in areas—to me, I don't know how advance men work to set up rooms, who pays for what, things like that. We just go in and out.

I tell you, that might be an education if you get a couple of first-rate advance men up here to tell you how they put these things together.

Senator BAKER. We may have to do that.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am very, very limited in that area. I have no knowledge of how they do it.

Senator BAKER. Let me ask you one final, concluding line of questions in the few minutes I have remaining. You were questioned rather extensively on the political activity in your office and by you in monitoring the campaign of Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern or Senator Humphrey and the like.

Do you know of your own knowledge, or can you tell us whether or not such political monitoring activity—that is, keeping account of the political health and prospects of potential adversaries, in a Presidential campaign is the general practice and is always done, or has been as far as you know?

Mr. BUCHANAN. As far as I know, it has, and the Republican National Committee, of course, under Senator Dole was a very effective organization and their research there was some of the best I have ever seen. But to my knowledge, there has always been a sort of tracking of the opposition.

I have read books where it was said that President Kennedy had his eye on Senator Goldwater and was watching the progress of his candidacy. I am sure Larry O'Brien, Mr. O'Brien when he was in the

White House, might have had something to do with political activity there. So, I think these sort of things are really, in my judgment, routine. As I suggested to the chairman——

Senator BAKER. Mr. Buchanan, do you think they are desirable? I happen to think they are.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I believe they are. I believe they are.

Certainly, if a President; let us say a President has a program and policy he wants to have carried out in foreign policy that is going to take over 8 years, he has to be reelected to do that and he should have someone on his staff who understands these matters and can research these matters and can counsel and advise him on how best to be reelected without which reelection there cannot be any continuation of policy.

Senator BAKER. I will conclude this time segment by relating quickly a story they tell on former Speaker Sam Rayburn who was hearing a glowing account of a distinguished Vice President of philosophers, theorists, doctors of this, that or the other, professional men who had gathered around a duly-elected President. After this long account had been given by the newly elected Vice President, he asked, "What do you think, Mr. Sam?" He said, "I think I would feel better if one of them would run for sheriff."

I frankly and honestly confess that I think politics is essential to the functioning of a self-governing system and I do not think you can separate the President from politics and I do not think you should and I hope you would agree with that.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I concur with you, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Talmadge.

Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Buchanan, I believe you testified this morning that part of your duties and responsibilities at the White House was to provide a news analysis to the President and brief him prior to press conferences; is that accurate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would—the President's daily news summary is something which I do not prepare but which is in my jurisdiction. It is prepared for the President and placed upon his desk every morning and prepared by a staff headed by Mort Allen. It is in my jurisdiction and I am generally responsible for it, but I do not make a significant contribution to its preparation. I did during the campaign of 1972, which I will mention in a minute.

With regard to press conferences, I am the desk man, if you will, for all the research and material from the National Security Council, from the Domestic Council, from the various shops in the White House and the agencies, the briefing materials which come to me which are cut, digested, and then presented to the President in his briefing books for his press conferences. I have been doing that for 6 or 7 years.

Now, with regard to the campaign of 1972, Senator, there was an aspect of that, a news summary where I did make a contribution. I would come in in the morning at 6:30 or so and we would go through the seven or eight Eastern papers and the Chicago Tribune, if it were available, and through the news summary would do a complete political analysis to put on top of the news summary which would go on the President's desk and we did it from September through the election.

Senator TALMADGE. Immediately after the break-in of the Watergate you were aware many of the newspapers had speculative stories and articles about various people in the White House and in the Com-

mittee To Re-Elect the President being involved in the coverup. Were any of those newstories withheld from the President?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir, they were not. As a matter of fact, given the fact that we would not include in the President's news summaries news items like, say, a natural disaster abroad and news items that are not of specific interest to the President, it would probably be a higher percentage of copy within the President's news summary devoted to an issue like Watergate than there would in your average newspaper.

Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Buchanan, I send by a member of the staff a memorandum prepared by you, Patrick Buchanan, dated March 3, 1970, on White House stationery—Xerox copy including your signature, and I will ask you to please identify it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Is this one I have seen?

Senator TALMADGE. One you testified about this morning. I want your identification for the purpose of inserting it in the record.

Mr. LENZNER. It is tab 4 [exhibit No. 164].

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is one that I have not—as I said, this is one of the ones I was not shown the other night.

Senator TALMADGE. It is the one you testified about this morning.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. They asked various facets of me and I testified—

Senator TALMADGE. Will you take your time and testify about it and see if it is a true, accurate Xerox copy with your signature affixed thereon?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It appears to be, yes, sir. This is the March 3, 1970, memorandum, and it appears to be my memorandum, yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. I thank the Chair, and I believe the chief counsel says all these memorandums will be inserted in the record.

Mr. Buchanan, I ask you please to turn to page 5 of that document and follow with me the following language beginning with paragraph 1:

One of my primary concerns about this—

And we are referring to foundations and your recommendations to the President—

is that it required a strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division and an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the tax-exempt office. I am not sure we have this right now.

You may or may not recall that Randolph Thrower, a constituent of mine—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. A fine lawyer, fine gentleman, outstanding Republican, was then collector of internal revenue.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. He held that office from April 1969 to June 1971. Did Mr. Thrower leave his office under pressure?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Not to my knowledge, Senator Talmadge. I just could not answer that. It is true that Mr. Thrower was in the Internal Revenue but I believe, as I have stated, my understanding of the situation was that we had done an unsuccessful, and quite candidly a very bad job, of taking effective control of the agency as was within our rights by appointing our own schedule C's to those available positions which we had open to us.

Second, it was our belief, justified or not, that within the Tax-Exempt Division there was basically a hostility to our point of view, and for us to set up, say, a MacArthur Foundation or a John Adams Foundation as we talked about it, and to have that set up and say we left office in 1972 and have politically inspired individual removed, its tax exemption would be a problem.

Senator TALMADGE. I thought Mr. Thrower was supposed to be a friendly man. He was appointed by the President.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Sir, this is not just the head of the Internal Revenue Division. There is an office within it, I believe.

Senator TALMADGE. Did he not run it, did he not head it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. He headed the entire agency but as I say, Senator, our view was that we did not, we were not staffed in depth at the Internal Revenue, IRS.

Senator TALMADGE. Please follow with me further on the same page. Paragraph 5:

Some of the essential objectives of the institution—

And this is the proposed foundation that you propose to establish, would have to be blurred, even buried in all sorts of other activities that would be the bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that would provide the cover for the more important efforts.

Are you not recommending the same thing to be set up that you are complaining about in other sections of your memorandum?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, Senator, there is indeed a gray area in the thing in terms of political activity. One of my recommendations, quite candidly, was that within this foundation we would set up a group; a lawyer about 35 years old and with some young law clerks who would gage the qualifications of Federal judges across the country in terms of both their qualifications and philosophy, and these type of things. Quite candidly, if another administration came in they would say that is political activity and we will take away its tax exemption and so my recommendation was, basically would be, that this would not be a highly publicized thing within this institution; that is correct.

Senator TALMADGE. Let us read further now. The next paragraph:

Every menial task of Government possible would be sent over to the foundation to carry out at cost-plus-10.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is right.

Senator TALMADGE. What do you mean by that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, that would be instead of sending these assignments over to the Brookings Institution and have them do it at cost-plus-10, we would send them to our new institution. This is only a discretionary contract, Senator. This would not be—

Senator TALMADGE. Go ahead, are you finished?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No. This would be—we have not an available institution, conservatives do not today, to do the kind of work that that the Brookings Institution does. I am sure the Brookings Institution, cost-plus-10 simply means that the Brookings Institution—or, I am not sure a slight margin on what they do in terms of assignments, and we would simply—what this says is we would shift these assignments over to the new institution if we set it up.

Senator TALMADGE. I want to make myself perfectly clear. As a member of the Finance Committee and as a member of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, I have worked as hard as I

know how to keep that service out of politics, out of anyone's politics, Democratic politics and Republican politics alike. I am thoroughly aware, as you are, that some of these foundations have intruded into the political arena when they should not have. We have tried to correct it in legislation. I have even tried to go further, I have inserted in tax bills provisions to get them out of the arena of voter registration. But I lost that battle on the Senate floor. It seems to me that what you are proposing here is to try to get unfriendly foundations out of the political arena and get friendly foundations in.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No.

Senator TALMADGE. Is that what you are seeking to do?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, what I am seeking to do is—would be to establish—first off, it is my belief, as expressed in this memorandum, there is a bias that had already existed within the Internal Revenue Service. In my judgment, I do not recommend, incidentally, that you take away the tax exemption of the Brookings Institution. I do not believe in politics.

Senator Talmadge. If they get involved in politics, I think their tax exemption should be denied because they violate the law.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I agree 100 percent but I do not think the Brookings Institution engages in politics. It engages in studies which are used. I think that law should be very tight. But, we should have institutions similar to that in my judgment, and secondarily, what you see here is a reflection of my view that there was a political bias that existed against conservative institutions, whereby the IRS would look at them a good deal harder than they look at others.

Senator TALMADGE. How were you going to determine what is political and what is not if you get into the area of thought control?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, if you are referring to—

Senator TALMADGE. I do not see how you can outlaw liberal foundations.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You cannot, Senator.

Senator TALMADGE. And say they must be conservative to get the tax exemption. The only yardstick you can have, as I see it, is whether or not they engage in politics and if they are engaged in politics, Democratic, Republican, Liberal, Conservative, or Reactionary they ought to be put out of business.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Not put out of business, have their tax exemption taken away.

Senator TALMADGE. Exactly, that is what I mean.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would concur with that but even though I am critical of the Brookings Institution as biased in the other direction, I agree with the use of tax exemption for institutions which study public issues even if they are liberal or conservative as long as they are studying public issues. But if they are engaged in voter registration, if they are demonstrating up on the Hill for legislation, if they are lobbying, if they are taking out ads to influence the votes of Congressmen one way or the other, I would concur. But as long as it is educational, Senator, even if it is liberal, I have got no objections to its tax exemption.

Senator TALMADGE. You and I are in thorough accord on that. The only difference I can see is the one distinction. You are opposed to

unfriendly foundations and favor friendly foundations. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think that would be a fair statement; that I am opposed to unfriendly, in favor of friendly, but I would not recommend, I do not believe, removing the tax exemption from a foundation which was strictly engaged in studying issues even if it were a liberal foundation.

Senator TALMADGE. All right, let us go one step further in your memorandum. On page 4, paragraph 3. Page 4 of your memorandum, paragraph 3, the second sentence:

Anti-Administration foundations should be cut off without a dime.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, there is a differentiation between giving antiadministration foundations our money and leaving them with their tax exemption. I believe that we ought not to fund liberal tax-exempt foundations. There is no inconsistency in that position, with the statement that they also ought to be allowed to keep their tax exemption. I do not think we ought to fund them, simply.

Senator TALMADGE. Are you not talking about tax money belonging to over 200 million American people?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, here is the thing. You are talking about it two ways. You are talking about it as if we in the White House are giving tax exempt—I am sorry, I mean tax funds to a foundation. They get a death tax exemption and they get a tax exemption as well. My only recommendation would be to cut off the first.

Senator TALMADGE. You use the phrase “our money.” You really are talking about the taxpayers’ money.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Taxpayers’ money.

Senator TALMADGE. Let me make this suggestion to you.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. If you have some recommendations for improvement of foundations to get them out of the political arena, you get the President to send up an appropriate message and you will have my support.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you very much, Senator. It will be appreciated, I can tell you.

Senator TALMADGE. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney.

Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this matter of foundations has intrigued the Congress for a long time and I would like to pursue that a little further. As I recall the testimony this morning, Mr. Buchanan, you did make, I think, a general statement that the big foundations support liberal Democrat views. Is that a fair statement to make?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The biggest one, the Ford Foundation does. No. 2, I believe is the Rockefeller Foundation. But when you get down below that to Lilly and Duke and some of the others in the top 10 they are, some of them, Mellon, for example, are supportive of conservative things but conservative foundations, to be quite candid, are less aggressive than the Ford Foundation.

Senator GURNEY. Could you give us examples of how the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, give their support?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, exclusive of the Rockefeller Foundation which I had not studied, the Ford Foundation, for example, provides

funds for the Institute for Policy Studies. The Institute for Policy Studies holds, has held, it is my recollection, it is Baskin's and Barnett's outfit, they hold seminars with Congressmen, for staffers and the like and they deal in trying to influence Congressmen and the like to vote in one direction. They get very close to the line but they, in turn, if I am not mistaken, the Institute of Policy Studies has in turn funded the Quicksilver Times which was a radical—it is one of the radical, what they call underground newspapers which has a political point of view which is sold for profit.

Senator GURNEY. Do you have any copies of that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. This is, as I say, the studies that I did, Senator, were done in 1970, and I could get the background. All that material was in the speeches we had drafted and had set for delivery. There is, of course, the highly celebrated also, the fund that the Ford Foundation provided to ex-Kennedy staffers in 1968.

Senator GURNEY. Well, would you furnish a copy of the draft of the speech for the record?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I will take a look at the speech and I would have to take a look at that speech first.

Senator GURNEY. Go on.

Mr. BUCHANAN. In 1968, the Ford Foundation under Mr. Bundy provided sort of severance pay for the Democratic staffers of Senator Edward Kennedy. In the mayor's race in Cleveland, in 1968, I believe, they funded a voter—Ford Foundation funded a voter registration drive in the black area which was partially responsible for the defeat of Seth Taft and a victory for Mr. Stokes in that area. I believe the legislation now is that you can fund voter registration drives, but you have to do it over an area of something like five States. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference under Mr. Abernathy is the one that caught my attention. What was done there—they, of course, are funded by the Ford Foundation, or have been. They sent to me what was a strictly political literature document which was called in effect, "We did *x*, *y*, and *z* to Mr. Nixon and Mr. Agnew," and at the bottom of that it said, "Send in your tax-exempt contributions." Now, this is what we raised Cain about, Mr. Haldeman and I. It was checked out and some of these groups like that group in the NSA, I believe, set up dual funds. In other words, if you send in your check and declare it tax exempt, they say it goes into educational funds. I don't know what efforts there has been made to see if there is a commingling of funds or not of those things. These would be a few of the things that I can recollect from those particular speeches.

Senator GURNEY. These are examples of direct political activity.

Mr. BUCHANAN. These were examples of direct political activity. But one of the questions I was making earlier was—it is just my judgment—that if you have a number of public policy institutions that are of the liberal persuasion, I agree with the tax exemption for these kinds of institutions even if you disagree with them. But if you have got a giant like the Ford Foundation which is pouring tens of millions of dollars into the creation of studies which, in effect, argue for a particular point of view, persuasively, like you take a Brookings study, as soon as a study—Brookings study—is done, you will see it on the front page of the New York Times and the Wash-

ington Post precisely what they recommended, and these things are moved into the political bloodstream, and one of my basic contentions is that there is an imbalance in resources with regard to these foundations.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Buchanan, it seems as if a copy of the Quick-silver Times has turned up here, so if I can have a staff member take it over to Mr. Buchanan—would he identify this as what he is talking about. Is that the publication?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It appears to be. This is a—came across March 23 to April 6, 1972, edition. Right. The information I have came out of an article, I believe, in the Washingtonian magazine, or I would have to check the source but it indicated that IPS.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Chairman, may we have that marked as an exhibit and included as an exhibit?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It indicated that the Institute of Policy Studies which was the beneficiary of Ford money—

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, an exhibit has just been given the witness which we haven't seen. Frequently, when I have presented exhibits and minority counsel has not seen it, questions have been raised about it. I don't even know what that paper is.

Senator GURNEY. I wonder if a staff member would give it to Mr. Dash so he can look at it. It is a very interesting publication.

Mr. THOMPSON. I believe Mr. Lenzner has seen that publication.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator Gurney, I do not speak with the authority of the administration on this issue. This is a matter of personal interest to me but I have always felt that legislation perhaps which would—the Ford Foundation is divided into four separate very powerful divisions, one of them is foreign, I think one of them is national affairs, which budget has been increased, one of them education, and the other is something else. If legislation were passed, say to restrict the foundation to a particular percentage of the gross national products in its assets, that legislation could result in the dismantling of the Ford Foundation's essential power structure while leaving all the benefits there. In other words, you could—national affairs would be one foundation, education would be another separate foundation, this would be another separate foundation, and if one of those foundations determined to move into the political arena, then perhaps that could, the tax exemption on that particular foundation might be, if they wanted to, the tax exemption could be withdrawn but it seems to me this is the problem. It is the concentration of political power in all those resources and frankly something analogous to an antitrust situation with regard to the Ford Foundation, I think, would be advantageous to the political process.

Senator GURNEY. On page 5 of tab 4 [exhibit No. 164], in the paragraph marked four—it is about the middle of the page.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. You mentioned, you say this: "We would be striking at the heart of the establishment." What do you mean by the word "establishment" there.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, that would be, and it might not be, in agreement with this, but in my own view there is existent in the country in essence an intellectual and political establishment to which the major networks, the Ford Foundation, some of your major public policy

institutes, the dominant media on the eastern seaboard, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the Senate and others can be said to belong. I think, this is my view, I think there is a prevailing line set by these groups and they are in control of significant political assets and there is nothing conspiratorial or anything of that nature about it, but I think it is essentially the political establishment of the country, the dominant political establishment of the country against which you might set to be simplistic, Mr. Nixon and his middle American constituency.

Senator GURNEY. Are you saying that in these large foundations you are talking about there really is an establishment that directs its views oriented in the liberal direction?

Mr. BUCHANAN. There is tremendous interlocking directorates. If you take a look at Mr. Kaysen's institute at Princeton, the Brookings Institution, the Ford Foundation, Harvard Center for the study of, Kennedy Center for the study of politics and things like that, I think, you will find the same individuals who move on these various board of directors and, I think, it is not unfair to characterize that as—and the term is not necessarily pejorative—as a national establishment.

Senator GURNEY. In tab 10 [exhibit No. 170] on page 7, if you would turn to that, there is also a meaning of the Ford Foundation. Tab 10, I think is the Muskie watch, isn't it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. And there is an allegation in there that the Ford Foundation is behind Muskie's candidacy. Could you elaborate on that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Which page is it?

Senator GURNEY. Page 7 of tab 10.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think it is; certainly some troublesome questions could be raised; yes. I think it is in a question form, Senator, are they behind his candidacy? Investigation should be done on this score. I don't have any knowledge, the evidence would be clearly circumstantial. I think Senator Muskie on several junkets that had been—or trips abroad that had been sponsored and funded by the Ford Foundation—I think Senator Muskie had been prominent on each of these or all of these, and I think this was available, I think, in Congressman Patman's hearings which I read in the Congressional Record. I think this is where that came from.

Senator GURNEY. You never found any direct evidence that that was so?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; no, sir. These are just ideas.

Senator GURNEY. You gave us some examples of some of Mr. Tuck's pranks and tricks this morning. Do you have any others; did he do anything in the 1972 campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No. I think he was at our convention, I believe. They were putting out a newspaper down there. Most of his pranks in 1972, I think, were directed at Senator Muskie. He did something at a tea in New Hampshire, I believe, but it was—I can't recall exactly. I think after the Watergate thing frankly, anybody who was involved in these kinds of pranks and things was probably drawn in.

Senator GURNEY. Do you recall any further the prank in New Hampshire?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Of his prank?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not, Senator.

Senator GURNEY. I wonder if we have settled the issue of the Quicksilver Times yet, Mr. Dash. Have you had an opportunity to read it?

Mr. DASH. Yes, but was there a question, Senator Gurney, that the Quicksilver Times was funded by the IPS, the Institute of Policy Studies, which is part of the Ford Foundation?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think, if I am not mistaken, that is in a public record in an article that was written on the Institute for Policy Studies, and I believe it was one of these small Washington magazines and in all this research going on, since I was familiar with the Quicksilver Times, I believe as a commercial venture it would seem to me this would be an illicit use of tax-exempt funds, and the IPS, of course, is Ford funded.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Rogovin, who is general counsel for the Institute of Policy Studies, has just contacted the committee and says it has never funded the Quicksilver Times, and the only money it ever received from—that IPS received from Ford was \$6,000 in 1964.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, as I say, this is my understanding of an article which I have read. It is a question of fact, and I would be happy to go back and find the research I did on this.

Senator GURNEY. Would you do that?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would, Senator.

Senator GURNEY. And submit that for the record. I take it the Quicksilver Times is in jeopardy at the moment; is that, Mr. Chairman—

Senator ERVIN. No, Senator, I looked at the thing. It seems to be what you call the sort of underground hippie paper, and I am—I would be glad to put it in the record if you want it there, but so that I may not remain in a state of ignorance, I would like to know what it has to do with what we are investigating.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, that is correct.

Senator GURNEY. I think it has. Although today I just glanced at it quickly, but it talks about people coming to San Diego. This has something to do with the Republican National Convention when we were going there before we went to Miami Beach and it also says some unflattering things about the Republicans, so I would say this was one of the dirty tricks department, I don't know who is responsible for it.

Senator ERVIN. Whose dirty trick?

Senator GURNEY. That is what I just said. I don't know who is responsible for it. Perhaps we had better make this part of our hearings and find out who is responsible for it.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I really suggest that we not get into a quarrel over this. I have sat here day after day and had stuff put in the record, much of it I not only did not know about or didn't see, but much of it I could find only the most tenuous connection with what we are investigating. I think we are pretty far down the road to start showing a causal connection between the allegation and source. I know here, for instance, that the Quicksilver Times suggests that demonstrations are a crucial part of the range of activities, what the political goals confronting the GOP are and there should be one massive legal demonstration past the sports arena and it gives a whole bunch of stuff.

I don't know who that is, but it is in fact in the mainstream of political activity and I suggest rather than argue about it we put it in the record for whatever it is worth.

Senator ERVIN. I will put it in the record accompanied by my statement that I can't see what it has got to do with what we are investigating.

Senator GURNEY. I agree with the chairman.

I don't want to upset the Democratic counsel so I will withdraw that and perhaps we can identify it further on in the dirty tricks department.

Senator BAKER. If the Senator will yield; since it is here, let's put it in the record and we will check it later.

Senator GURNEY. I don't want to embarrass the Democrats.

Senator ERVIN. Wait a minute.

It doesn't embarrass me. I am a Democrat and I didn't have anything to do with the Quicksilver Times or the demonstrations. [Applause.]

Senator GURNEY. I didn't either, Mr. Chairman. He happened to mention it and there happened to be a copy back here. So, I introduced it.

Senator ERVIN. In fact, I am a good friend—

Senator GURNEY. I think we had better turn to gold instead of silver.

Senator ERVIN. Wait a minute. Let's get it in the record if you want to. Put it in the record and also my statement of ignorance that I am ignorant about why it is in the record, but let it go in there.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, put it in the record and I don't know why it happened but it happens against the Republicans and not against the Democrats.

Senator ERVIN. Let the reporter mark it with the appropriate number.

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 160.*]

Senator GURNEY. I wonder if you could give us any advice, Mr. Buchanan, you certainly have been the most knowledgeable witness, I believe, we have ever had before the committee on the whole area of issues in the campaign, what the candidates stood for, the various candidates, attack plans and all that sort of thing, and you are also acquainted certainly with some of the other political campaigns in recent years, either actively participating on behalf of Mr. Nixon or I guess doing research.

Could you give us any idea how this campaign of 1972 stacked up against other campaigns in the sort of strategy and tactics done by all of the candidates?

Was it a fairly clean campaign? Was it a very dirty campaign? What about it, keeping out the Watergate thing now because we are talking about supposedly dirty tricks department?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I just could not testify with accuracy about what dirty tricks were played, what allegations are true, but I do have to concur with Theodore White's statement that these were—these really had the weight of a feather in the campaign of 1972.

I think what was unprecedented for us, Senator, was the fact that we were—that we controlled the Office of the Presidency, and this was the, frankly, some of the, innovations in terms of the offensive

*See p. 4107.

strategy in media ads, the attack group which has gotten, the 9:15 group which has gotten a bad name, the use of surrogates, and the orchestration of our political offensive, these had nothing to do with dirty tricks. It was one of the most effective operations and one of the most enjoyable operations I have been involved in.

When we first started out with Mr. Nixon back in 1966 and traveled to—

Senator GURNEY. May I interrupt, we are on a strict time limit here and I have used up my time.

I would like to come back to that because I think it is very important but I will come to it again.

Mr. BUCHANAN. May I make one point, Senator, in order to compare campaigns, Senator. I think what you really have to do in terms of strategies you would have to go back to President Johnson who had the power of incumbency in 1964, and compare his strategy and stratagems and institutions with ours because the others—the Democrats this time were going the primary route—in 1964 it was Senator Goldwater and Governor Rockefeller and the Republicans. So it would be a better comparison there that you would get between us and the Democrats.

Senator GURNEY. Thank you.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Buchanan, by your testimony and by your documents you have proven yourself to be a very effective and very scholarly political strategist, and some of the tactics you have recommended are time-honored practices in the American politics.

Now, whether they should be continued will be addressed in our final report.

I would appreciate your assistance in outlining appropriate limits of where ethics end and impropriety begins.

Now, first, do you feel that it is ethical or proper for campaign funds contributed to the candidate of one party to be funnelled into the campaign of a candidate running in a primary of the opposition party?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think a direct transfer of campaign funds from one party to the candidate of another is currently illegal, Senator. I may not be sure of that; that is in the funding legislation. I do not think it is illegitimate, for example, if we went to, say, one of our large contributors, given the fact that we had considerable financial resources—if we went to one of our large contributors and said: "The best thing you could do for the President would be to contribute to his campaign in the Democratic primary because that is a close race and he doesn't have any money."

That, it would seem to me, is—I don't know that it has been done in the past, with the idea of assisting candidates in the other party's primary, is not unprecedented at all.

Senator INOUE. Do you think it was ethical or proper to covertly transmit \$400,000 to the primary of former Governor Brewer?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not know the law on the \$400,000 contribution, whether that was legitimate or not. I think if we had told our financial contributors, if you will, that Governor Brewer can win that election down there, it is a very close one, he is lagging for funds and the best thing you could do for the President of the United States

in 1972 is to make a contribution of that amount to Governor Brewer's campaign; that to me would be proper and legitimate. I do not know the handling of the transfer of those funds whether that was it but I would think so.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Buchanan, do you feel it would be ethical or proper to place campaign spies in the camp of the opposition and—

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, as John Osborne wrote, this is a common thing done in American politics. Now, is it ethical? I would not sit in judgment of the ethics of an individual who took that assignment. I do not think myself if I were asked to do it I would want to insinuate myself into the confidence of an individual and then betray that confidence for cash. It would not be something I would do but I don't—I would not want to sit in the judgment of the ethics of others who volunteered or did those things, and I think you made yourself, Senator—go ahead, well—

Senator INOUE. Do you feel it would be ethical or proper to originate or distribute campaign literature which does not identify the source and which is designed to embarrass the opposition candidate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think the failure to identify, the failure to have a source named on the literature or sponsor is a violation of the law, I believe. It is a misdemeanor, I believe. This is somewhat—we referred to in the documents released by Mr. Meany and Mr. Barkin and the other one that was referred to this morning.

If you ask is it legitimate, to—let me give you an example, I would say yes on these grounds: Let's say Senator McGovern was running against the President of the United States. He is running from a position on the left of the spectrum. President Nixon, in our campaign of 1972, we had weaknesses on the right side of the spectrum.

Now, if Senator McGovern got, say, some conservative Democrats on the Hill and some conservative money raisers and they formed a committee which, say, was a committee for a balanced budget or something like that, and then they criticized the President of the United States for having spent, say, having run deficits in excess of x , y , and z , that would be a political criticism of the President of the United States from a separate vantage point of Senator McGovern's done by Democrats and that would be entirely legitimate even if Senator McGovern had knowledge of that. It doesn't seem to me there is any requirement there that this has to be a consistency in every argument you make against a candidate.

Senator INOUE. Do you think it would be ethical or improper or proper for campaign aides of one candidate to involve themselves in sabotage of the campaign appearances of the opposition candidate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would depend—let me see, the Washington Post uses the terminology "sabotage" for what we do and "pranks" for what they do.

It would depend precisely on what is done. The examples I gave you on what Dick Tuck did and there is room in American politics for pranksters and hecklers and the like, there is room on both sides. These things are part of the fun of politics but they can get to the point where they cross the line. I think they would cross the line in terms of numbers. In other words, you have one Dick Tuck or two Dick Tucks, or three Dick Tucks, OK. But suppose you feel, you know, you have in every field about a hundred of them out there, the cumula-

tive impact of these kinds of disruptions could have such an effect as to deny a candidate, not merely the right to communicate with the American people and so foul up his operations, as really to deny him his legitimate right.

So, I think you could probably cross the line in excess numbers, I think you could probably cross the line in the other direction in terms of the character of the prank and the stunt.

Senator INOUE. Well, when Mr. Tuck put on an engineer's cap and got the train to move, was that not a crime?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Impersonating an engineer? Senator, I just do not know. What would it be, disorderly—there are——

Senator INOUE. This was interfering with the orderly schedule of a train in interstate commerce.

Mr. BUCHANAN. In interstate commerce? It was a California train, I understand. It was just going up and down the California line.

I do not think he should be prosecuted—let me say this. If every time the President began a speech, that train pulled out of the station and it was his responsibility, I think somebody ought to put a stop to it. [Laughter.] But I do not think that that singular act was—we would all be in trouble if something like that—every time something like that happened, an individual was prosecuted.

Senator INOUE. Do you think it is ethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Doing that?

Senator INOUE. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not think it is unethical. I cannot speak to the ethics of Mr. Tuck doing that. That is his own judgment. I do not believe it is unethical. It does not strike me as unethical.

Senator INOUE. Do you think it would be ethical to encourage the voters of one party to participate in the political caucus of the opposition party?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The political caucus? I think that is next to impossible. I think you have to be a registered—I know in the Democratic Party, which has caucuses, I believe you have to be a registered Democrat to get into a caucus. But you raise a broader question.

Senator INOUE. Or a primary.

Mr. BUCHANAN. How about the primary, right. Now, there is a place where, on the State level, there could conceivably be reform, and that is crossover voting. I think the Republicans in 1968 in Wisconsin, when we were there—because they crossed over in droves for Senator McCarthy and the purpose was to inflict a defeat on President Johnson. President Johnson had withdrawn 2 days before. That is something that could conceivably be recommended. But you ought to know what you are doing. The crossover voters in my estimate, the percentage of Republicans moving into a Democratic primary or the percentage of Democrats moving into Republican primaries. These tend to have more of an effect to increase the chances, I think, of centrist candidates. You remove crossover voting and I think your candidates will tend to be more ideological in the sense that they will go to true believers of their own party who are on the left in the Democratic Party and the conservatives in the Republican Party, and you allow them to have sharper differentiations in the candidates. So I think before States do that—I think, my own personal feeling is that that would be a good thing, to rule out crossover voting, because I think

that each party should have the right, you know, to nominate its own candidates, and Republicans should have no business voting in Democratic primaries and vice versa.

Senator INOUE. Do you believe it is ethical or proper for a candidate to provide information to friendly press or media which would prove damaging to the opposition candidates without the source of that information being identified publicly?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, most of the individuals in the national press that I know would not print a story which did not have some substantive documentation. You mean to go to—make a false allegation against an individual? That is not ethical. That is a detraction, I mean against an individual. But none of your national press people are going to run with a story that is just based on the word, I think, of another individual, about a serious personal charge against someone else.

Senator INOUE. What about a reliable source?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, when they have a reliable source, they generally have a reliable source. Very few reporters—you are getting into the ethics of journalism now. I think generally when a reporter says he has a reliable source, he has got a reliable source.

Senator INOUE. So there are some good leaks and bad leaks?

Mr. BUCHANAN. And there are some good reporters and some bad reporters; yes, sir.

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much, sir.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker.

Senator WEICKER. I have read your opening statement rather carefully, Mr. Buchanan, and I would say that in many areas, I agree with you. I think some of the matters that you have raised needed telling; specifically starting on page 9 of your statement, where you say that it is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged campaign but an utter fraud, a political coup by the President of the United States. These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether untrue.

And I must confess to you that I think any political scientist looking at that election would at least give equal attention to the matter of the Democrats in their primaries being so split, or at least splitting up the center, that the outcome was fairly much assured. I cannot disagree, either, where you quote "Theodore White, that the dirty tricks of 1972, added together, the ultimate balance—at least as far as I know dirty tricks—had the weight of a feather."

And I would not disagree with those valid activities which you have set forth before the committee with letterwriting campaigns or issue-oriented speeches by Republicans, either the Senate or the surrogates around the countryside. And again, I cannot argue with you on a spoils system. Certainly it still has a certain hold on the American political scene. So I want to make it clear that in those respects, what I think all of us would agree is legislation, there is little argument.

But the problem is, of course, that the matters that you were engaged on, or rather, matters that you and other members of the administration were engaged on, go way beyond the admittedly legislation, hardnosed aspects of politics. And unfortunately, and I came here really expecting to do most of the listening this morning, I cannot let this stand insofar as your testimony is concerned. I would like to

get into certain of these activities and see just how we categorize them and how you would explain them.

Now, I would like to refer, if I might, to the memorandum which you wrote of September 13, 1972, to Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson. More specifically, it is at the end of the memorandum, the bottom of page 4.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Could I have the exhibit number of that?

Senator WEICKER. Yes, indeed; that is exhibit No. 194, I believe, the last exhibit.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The bottom of which page, sir?

Senator WEICKER. Let me read, if I might, the memorandum:

Again, the critical point is that just as McGovern ought to make "Nixon" the issue—so the issue this fall is McGovern. Will he and the hard core left winger radicals who took over the party take over America? That is the bottom line. If the country goes to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, thinking him vaguely anti-America and radical and proceed the left wingers and militants, then they will vote against him—which means for us. What we have done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President 34 points ahead—but McGovern 34 points behind.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. I find that a rather interesting statement coming from a man who is one of the spokesmen, certainly, for this administration and for the President. Did you feel at the time that you wrote the memorandum that there was not enough, sufficient, in the way of accomplishment by this administration that we could not put President Nixon 34 points ahead, that we had to take the other candidate and put him 34 points behind? Was there a lack of positive material?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, there was not a lack of positive material. As a matter of fact, the budget for the positive or pro side of the media campaign was far in excess of the anti side. But I am not presumptuous, Senator, and I am not foolish. We were not 34 points ahead of Senator McGovern simply on the basis of our record. I think we could have won on the basis of our record. As I stated earlier, once we moved up above 60 percent in the polls, toward 70 percent in the national poll, people who are voting there or voting for us are almost entirely Democrats. If you polled them, most of them would say they were dissatisfied with certain aspects of the President's economic program, certain aspects of his other programs, his personality. In a normal election, they would go for a Hubert Humphrey, they would go for a Senator Muskie, they would go for a Senator Kennedy. They were standing with us, Senator, for the reason that they were strongly opposed to McGovern.

Now, this goes to a point that you raised earlier in other testimony. You wanted to know, did we abandon other Republicans? The answer to that question is: No, we did not. In 1966, the President went out and worked for Republicans; in 1970, we worked. We were totally unsuccessful. We felt that the best way we could bring in a Republican Congress, that the best way we could bring in Republicans in the Senate and the House was to identify as President, to run as President, and win by a landslide and hopefully, they would then come in on the Presidential coattails, as they did in 1936 and as they did in 1964. That was unsuccessful for the reason that this new ticket-splitter phenomenon has taken over and candidates at the top of the ticket less and less can deliver for candidates down the line.

Senator WEICKER. Well, you have raised another issue which I will certainly be glad to get to, but let us just stick to the memorandum, if we can, for a minute. What is it in the course of a campaign that makes an incumbent President try to paint his opponent as anti-American? I do not quite understand that one.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Wait a minute.

Senator WEICKER. "If the country goes to the polls scared to death of McGovern, thinking many vaguely anti-American and radical"—What does that mean?

Mr. BUCHANAN. There were polls taken—Mike Wallace on election night said there were polls taken indicating that the people went to the polls and voted for the President as opposed to McGovern on two issues, as he said: "Patriotism and morality." Walter Cronkite got angry and said: "What do you mean, George McGovern is not anti-American and he is not immoral."

Then Mike Wallace said: "Wait a minute, what we are talking about is the American voter's perception of the candidates." When McGovern said he would go to Hanoi, he would crawl, if necessary, and beg for the release of American prisoners, for example, in the minds of the people, this is anti-American. I do not say Senator McGovern is anti-American, but the perception in the voter's mind was that Senator McGovern was not a figure whom they wanted to put in the Presidency of the United States because he did not share their views with regard to patriotism and things of that character.

Now, I do not say that Senator McGovern is that, but it would be false for me to stand up here and deny that that was the perception of millions of Americans.

Senator WEICKER. Why do you think this perception came about on their part?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think Senator McGovern contributed to it more than anybody else in the country.

Senator WEICKER. Do you think maybe now that you have heard the evidence of what happened during the campaign of 1972 that has come before this committee, with various members of the administration testifying, do you think that maybe you took that lawlessness, that restlessness, that violence which the American people were leery of, that you maybe took it out of blue jeans and put it into blue suits?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Are you referring to me, sir?

Senator WEICKER. No; I am asking on the basis of the testimony which you have heard, as has everybody else, before this committee, do you believe that the lawlessness, which, obviously, the American people were concerned with, was in fact taken out of blue jeans and put into blue suits?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, with regard to that, the individuals against whom allegations have been made have not yet been tried. There were errors, mistakes, misjudgment, and wrongdoing on the part of individuals with whom I have been associated, I believe, and perhaps some of them were within the White House. That is true. But I do not think that to take—I do not think that certainly, what we did—if these things were done, they were not justified and they certainly do not justify the things that were done in 1970 by the demonstrators. Both were wrong.

But I do not see the connection between this and the President of the United States and I do not see the connection between that and me.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me ask you a question. On page 10 of your statement before the committee, you made the statement that Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Muskie. And you made the statement that the Republicans were not responsible for the nomination of Senator McGovern.

And I agree with you. I agree with you. Now, let me ask you this question: Were Republicans—do you feel that Republicans in the sense of the party were responsible for Watergate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No; I think individuals have to be held accountable for what they did. Individuals who conceived and carried out the Watergate break-in, which, in and of itself, I considered wrong but not just grievously wrong—

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Those individuals are accountable, No; the political party is not responsible. The Republican Party is not responsible; no.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, it was just four Cubans sitting in a bar and doing a gratuitous act for the Republicans?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Whom do you want me to pass judgment on, Senator?

Senator WEICKER. I would like you to tell this committee as to whom you feel was responsible for the matter called Watergate and its attendant circumstances.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You mean Mr. Magruder has, I believe, testified before this committee that he was cognizant of it. There are seven individuals, I think, who have been convicted of it. There are other individuals who I do not believe have yet been indicted and I am in no position to sit up here and to say that these individuals were guilty. I just do not know. I am not in control of the evidence. I am not a judge. That is for a court to decide.

Senator WEICKER. I am not trying to judge individual guilt or innocence. I would like to know who was responsible for these acts, these things that were precipitated.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Men are responsible for what they do themselves.

Senator WEICKER. Let us keep on going relative to the matter of what was done, what has been testified to before this committee. I laughed along with the others as to the matters of Dick Tuck and trains pulling out of the station. But let us try and fit into one of your categories the following occurrences which happened in the campaign of 1972. Now, you have four categories: Utterly outrageous, dirty tricks, political hardball, and pranks.

The use of the Justice Department, the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, for political purposes by an incumbent administration: Which category would that fall into?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That reference to those categories is in reference to the so-called dirty tricks and not in reference to crimes, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. I am not saying they are. I am just asking you, the use of the Justice Department, the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, in behalf of an incumbent administration in a political way—what would that fall into? Is that pranks?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, it is customary in national politics that the Secretary of Defense, I believe, and the Secretary of State generally stay out of national politics, although that was not the case in 1964. And Secretary Laird, of course, made political speeches. I do not see anything wrong with that.

The use of the FBI in a political campaign to me would be an unjustified use of that agency, which should not be done. The Department of Justice, Senator Ervin and I would—it has been preceded that both in our administration and President Kennedy's, the Attorney General was a political figure.

Senator WEICKER. Let me say one thing right now, because I think I would like to believe that maybe the people elected Richard Nixon President in 1968 because they did not want any more of these things to go on. Maybe I am wrong, but I would like to go on that assumption. This is what I believed.

As far as I am concerned, Mr. Buchanan, let us restrict ourselves to matters of this election.

Mr. BUCHANAN. People have no reason to regret the election of 1968, in my judgment.

Senator WEICKER. I am saying to you let's restrict ourselves to matters of the campaign of 1972. In other words, the "everybody did it" theory which has been floated has no bearing in this hearing.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No one has suggested that the fact that things were done wrong before justifies doing them again.

Senator WEICKER. Why cite the examples?

Mr. BUCHANAN. You are the one citing the examples of Justice Department, State, and Defense and I am responding to them.

Senator WEICKER. In the 1972 campaign and you are responding to what went on in 1960 and everything else.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would beg to disagree with you. If the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State—I would think the Secretary of State should stay out of politics. But the Secretary of Defense—the defense budget is a national issue, as it was in 1964, when Secretary McNamara spoke out, as it was in 1972 with Secretary Laird. They are perfectly within their rights to speak out and defend the policies of the incumbent administration. That has a partisan connotation, I know, but I see nothing wrong with that.

Senator WEICKER. I was not referring to the Secretary of Defense, never made any mention. I said the Justice Department, use of Justice Department agencies in behalf of political campaigns, what category does that fall into?

Mr. BUCHANAN. They should not be used.

Senator WEICKER. CIA?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The CIA, I think, by law is forbidden and it should obey the law.

Senator WEICKER. FBI?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The FBI should have no role in any national political campaign.

Senator WEICKER. No. 2, the Ellsberg break-in coverup. What does that fall into? Is that pranks, political hardball, dirty tricks, or utterly outrageous?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The coverup?

Senator WEICKER. Yes, the Ellsberg break-in coverup.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You are asking me to talk about a matter for which individuals conceivably could be indicted in the next week. I don't know. I am not a lawyer. I don't know the responsibilities upon lawyers to—some of the individuals who are said to have known about this are lawyers, to report this to the trial judge at which point—these are matters with which I am not conversant.

Senator WEICKER. Well, of course, it was testified to before this committee by the former Attorney General that this was the most serious matter of all.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Ellsberg break-in?

Senator WEICKER. The Ellsberg matter and its coverup was absolutely essential to the campaign of 1972.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Ellsberg break-in took place in July of 19—I am sorry, September, I believe, of 1971.

Senator ERVIN. September of 1971.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would disagree with the Attorney General, frankly, to this extent. If after that thing had occurred, we had come forward and said so and explained it, I don't think it would have been a favorable element.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, you feel that was wrong?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Not doing it? I think that would be—

Senator WEICKER. Revealing all the facts as to the break-in.

Mr. BUCHANAN. If you look back in retrospect, I think certainly the thing to have done would be not to have waited until the 1972 campaign, but to have dealt with that problem at that particular time. I think that is right.

These have nothing to do, Senator Weicker, with the matter under discussion, which is things done during the campaign by political organizations. That had nothing to do with the political campaign, as I recollect.

Senator WEICKER. What?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Ellsberg break-in.

Senator WEICKER. Well, it had a great deal to do—maybe not the break-in, but the fact that it would be revealed, this was of deep concern, deep concern, to many individuals.

My time is up right now. I will get back to the list after I return.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Montoya.

Senator MONTOKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the end of your testimony this morning with Mr. Dash, you stated that the brochure, although rhetorical, correctly stated Mr. Muskie's position about blacks.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Did I?

Senator MONTOKA. That is the brochure—

Mr. BUCHANAN. If I did say that, that is in error. I believe I said it stated correctly his position with regard to gun control.

Senator MONTOKA. I will read you from the transcript, page 8062. These are your words:

The rhetoric is not left wing rhetoric, but the statements on Senator Muskie's position on gun control is accurate, on the statement with regard to black Americans—there is not an inaccuracy in terms of the writing . . .

Isn't that the same thing?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, if I did say that this is a—what this is is a combination, I believe, where the record is stated—I have only had an opportunity to read this once.

Senator MONTROYA. This is your testimony.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right. Well, let me just state, where the record is stated with regard to his view on gun control, it is accurate. As I stated, the rhetoric is something else again. This is not stating fact, this states basically opinion with regard to blacks. This is not—well, go ahead, Senator.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, do you say that the statement contained in the brochure is not accurate?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is exaggerated political rhetoric; that is correct.

Senator MONTROYA. Isn't that inaccuracy, then?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, it is—yes, right. Because an awful lot of political speeches, it is exaggerated political rhetoric.

Senator MONTROYA. Isn't exaggerated political rhetoric inaccuracy?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It can be inaccuracy; yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. All right. Now, let us examine that a little more carefully. You stated in this brochure—

Mr. BUCHANAN. I did not write the brochure, Senator. It is my recollection that I may have edited it because that is the testimony of somebody else.

Senator MONTROYA. Didn't you state this morning on the record that Mr. Khachigian had told you that you had prepared it and that you were not about to doubt his word.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No. Mr. Khachigian, when he came back from the committee hearing, he said that he had prepared it and that he had run it by me for editing. That was his recollection. And he is a truthful individual, so I stand on that recollection.

Senator MONTROYA. Right. Now, here's what the pamphlet reads, for the record:

Muskie has told black Americans that there is no room for them in his politics. Blacks are the backbone of the Democratic Party, and Mr. Muskie told them to go to hell.

Now, let us examine that against the context of what Mr. Muskie said in the press conference. I read from the excerpt from his press conference of September 8, 1971:

REPORTER. What was the purpose of your meeting with black leaders in Watts yesterday?

Mr. MUSKIE. The question was particularly of how we could move effectively to deal with the problems that concern black people, including the elections. So I was asked in that context whether a black candidate for Vice President could be considered for the 1972 election if I were a candidate for the Presidency. I said that in my judgment, such a ticket was not electable now. I said I regretted that; it should not be so. But my judgment was that such a ticket would be defeated and that if it were, it would be a setback to our efforts to implement our commitment to equality for blacks in this country. I think we must work to eliminate this wrong. I consider it a wrong, but I don't think we have done so yet. So this is the choice that faces blacks and those of us who are committed to the ideals of equality in America, how best we move effectively in the direction of equality, including political equality, which will make it realistically possible for blacks, Mexican-Americans, and representatives of any other minority to aspire to the Vice Presidency or the Presidency of the United States. That ought to be our goal.

Then the reporter asked a further question:

REPORTER. Senator, are you saying that it's the wrong time for a black man to run for Vice President, or are you saying that there isn't a black man qualified to run?

Senator MUSKIE. Oh, no, there are blacks who are qualified to run, qualified to aspire to the Vice Presidency. I know some of them and they ought to be eligible for consideration.

Now, do you think that the pamphlet has put the whole thing out of context?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, I think, if you ask me is this pamphlet, from what I have read of it, a fair or accurate reflection of Senator Muskie's civil rights position, I would say no. This is exaggerated, hyperbolic political rhetoric. If you ask me if it should have been published, I would tell you no to that. It is wrong to do this. The voting record is right on gun control, as I have said. Some of the rhetoric in here is wrong. It is unjustified about Senator Muskie. This thing should not have been published. It is lying oversight. If this thing went through, and in addition to that it failed to have on it the proper identification, then I am to blame and I should take the responsibility.

There were things done wrong. But this is not as bad as comparing the President of the United States to Adolf Hitler. It is not as bad as comparing American policy in Indochina to that of the Nazis in Germany. Now, both are mistaken.

Senator MONTOYA. One wrong does not justify another, is that right?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Precisely, Senator.

Senator MONTOYA. Let us go to the letter that was sent from Miami to Mr. Loeb of the Manchester Guardian under date of February 17, 1972.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Union Leader.

Senator MONTOYA. You know about that letter, do you not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Union Leader. Yes, the so-called Canuck letter.

Senator MONTOYA. Do you think that was a fair thing to do?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It was a political dirty trick.

Senator MONTOYA. Do you think it was unethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It was unethical.

Senator MONTOYA. There was another letter dated February 28 sent to the same editor in the same vein—

Mr. BUCHANAN. I was unaware of it. Which was the so-called Canuck letter?

Senator MONTOYA. Referring to the so-called, supposed Canuck statement made by Senator Muskie.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I did not know there were two letters.

Senator MONTOYA. Do you think that was unethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. The Canuck letter is the only one I have seen referred to. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator MONTOYA. Do you think that is a dirty trick?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir; it should be counted a dirty trick. But there is a myth—

Senator MONTOYA. Do you know who inspired this letter?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir. But there is a myth building up that this so-called Canuck letter was responsible for Senator Muskie's emotional moment outside the Union Leader Building and that is not true. As Senator Muskie himself has stated, the reason for that emotional moment, the primary reason, was a slur against his wife which was not made in any Canuck letter, it was made in Women's Wear Daily, was transmitted by Newsweek magazine, which happens to be a subsidiary of the Washington Post Co. So I think it is unfair to say that this emotional moment of Senator Muskie was a result of that Canuck letter. That is not to justify the so-called Canuck letter.

Senator MONTROYA. They were interconnected in a way, were they not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator Muskie himself says it was a slur on his wife, or what he conceived to be a slur on his wife.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, there was another letter that appeared in the New Hampshire primary campaign, on stationery of the United Democrats for Kennedy and signed by Robin Ficker.

You are acquainted with that letter, are you not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No; I am not. But I am acquainted that Ficker was running a write-in for Kennedy in New Hampshire.

Senator MONTROYA. In our investigation, it has been ascertained that some people contacted Mr. Ficker for a signature to this letter and the letter was designed to create a write-in atmosphere for Ted Kennedy in New Hampshire. This was not sponsored actually by United Democrats for Kennedy, although it appears under the signature Robin Ficker, Montgomery County, in Chevy Chase—in Silver Spring, Md.

Now, do you think that such a tactic, assuming that Mr. Ficker has disavowed the contents of the letter, do you think that was a proper campaign tactic in New Hampshire?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Is Ficker pro-Kennedy, do you know?

Senator MONTROYA. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. And somebody funded him to do this?

Senator MONTROYA. Somebody got him to sign the letter under false pretenses. That Kennedy people were urging him to sign the letter. He later ascertained that it was not so.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You mean to file it on an individual?

Well, that is a borderline case.

Let me just give you one example, Senator Montoya. In 1940—

Senator MONTROYA. If that is a factual situation on the assumptions I have made, would you say that that was unethical or improper?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Let me give you an example. When Harry Truman ran in 1940 in the State of Missouri against Governor Stark, he was in some difficulty, as I remember the story, because Governor Stark said he was the one who had put Tom Pendergast away and Harry Truman's friends got some individual named Morris Milligan, who apparently was the prosecutor in the case, and they ran him as the third guy in the race, the result of which was to put Harry Truman in the Senate. That is the same type of operation.

Whoever did this probably did this to draw votes off from Senator Muskie, I would guess, in New Hampshire or to lower his margin. It is something in the same vein as that, I would think.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, do you think it was proper?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would—I would have difficulty making a judgment on filing your opponent, your potential opponent, so you can beat him in the State or getting him. That is a tough call as far as I would be concerned, ethically.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, on tab 27 [exhibit No. 187], page 13, under item 40, is the following:

If Daley is booted out of the Democratic Convention, on his arrival at his Mayor's office in Chicago, some bearded types can be out front with signs, "Daley's through in 1972; vote McGovern."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Senator MONTROYA. Were these to have been paid demonstrators?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, you would just call the Republican committee up there and do it.

Senator MONTROYA. That was supposed to be volunteers, then?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Oh, sure, you would not pay somebody to picket. Our funds were not limitless.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, do you think that that was proper and ethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, this again, Senator, if I knew I were going to be up here explaining all my memorandums, this little item would not have been included. Whether it is proper—again, this is a case of identifying your opponent with an unpopular individual or figure.

Senator MONTROYA. I know what you are doing, but do you think it is ethical or proper?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Again, I would have to say I don't think this is unethical, to tell a guy to go out and get a sign. Mayor Daley comes back from that convention, angry as he can be, and there is a picket out there with a sign—

Senator MONTROYA. Do you think it is proper?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is not improper.

Senator MONTROYA. Then it is proper?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, the two are not the same.

Senator MONTROYA. Give me the differentiation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, by something that is not improper, you mean that it might be—well, let's classify when you get into the area of pranks. I think that is in the area of pranks. It is like carrying the sign, the "Nixon's the one" sign.

Senator MONTROYA. Would you say it is neutral?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would say it is in the same range with the "Nixon's the one" sign.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, on tab 21 [exhibit No. 181], page 9, item 4, you suggested "On all the black radio stations in the swing States, we should run ads on Muskie's statement about no blacks for Vice President."

Mr. BUCHANAN. Excuse me, Senator, this is the March—

Senator MONTROYA. Tab 21, page 9, item 4.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Tab 21, page 9, item 4.

Senator MONTROYA. And you follow that suggestion as follows—this is part of the radio plug:

If he does not think the time has come for one of us to be even considered for Vice President, then the time has come for black America to tell Ed Muskie we don't think it's time for him to be considered for President. Write in Shirley Chisholm.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, do you think that was ethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, I do, in this sense, Senator. There was a point in time in 1971 when Congressman John Conyers and Senator Eugene McCarthy each was considering a fourth party candidacy. In my judgment, that would have been, that would have helped us along to what I considered a goal for a long time, which is a realignment of political parties. In my judgment, it would not have been unethical or illicit to have made an alliance of convenience with a Democrat to the left of the National Democratic Party, because it would have been advan-

tageous to them, it would have been advantageous to us. Our objectives would have been served, their objectives would have been served. It was the same thing as I would think in the Senate, if you had a Senator on the—say on the left side of the spectrum get together with a Senator on the right side of the spectrum to support a bill that he wanted in exchange for support there. I think it would be in that category.

Senator MONTTOYA. Now, you are implying that this was politics as usual and, therefore, it was proper, that is what in effect you are saying.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I don't say everything that has been done, everything that is done regularly, is proper and ethical. You have to judge the individuals—I do think—this is, this would come in the area of what Senator Baker was reading, I believe he was reading.

Senator MONTTOYA. Let me go to another page.

Now, you, of course, know that Senator Jackson's headquarters in Florida were broken into.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; I did not know that.

Senator MONTTOYA. Well, and Senator McGovern's headquarters in Ohio were broken into, Senator Muskie's in Washington, D.C., were broken into.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator Muskie's were broken into?

Senator MONTTOYA. Yes, or I should say there was an infiltrator in there and files were stolen on two occasions from Senator Muskie's headquarters.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That was Fat Jack.

Senator MONTTOYA. Yes. And one of his agents, I think it was a young man by the name of Gregory.

Now, also there were paid infiltrators in Senator Jackson's campaign in Florida.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That would be unwise as well as—

Senator MONTTOYA. All right, Senator Muskie's in Washington, Fat Jack or John Buckley, and Senator McGovern's, that is Chotiner's friend, to cite some examples of the infiltration.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Chotiner's friend, it is my understanding, was a political or was rather a reporter who traveled aboard the various campaign planes and was two separate individuals; this is the way the reports have come out.

Senator MONTTOYA. Well, do you think that these were—that these things were ethical?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, Senator, I would ask, do you think it was ethical for Joe McGinnis to pose as a reporter and come into our campaign in 1968, find himself an office and aide, and steal my memorandums and publish a best-selling book and have it applauded in the Washington Post?

Senator MONTTOYA. No, sir; it was not.

Do you agree with me—

Mr. BUCHANAN. This sort of thing has been praised and applauded and cheered until it was done by Republicans against Democrats.

Senator MONTTOYA. Well, just because there was something wrong in the Democratic camp, I am not going to condone it.

I am asking you if these things were wrong. You ask me if other things that happened similarly in the Democratic campaign were wrong, then I will agree with you.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Which particular is it now, which particular infiltration; I have talked about political spies. It is not something I would do to insinuate myself into an individual's confidence and then betray that confidence. Now, other people have other standards on the question of being political spies. It is just not something I would do. I don't think I should sit in judgment on their ethics. I don't know that I could really—I would want to draw a line that this is thoroughly unethical to do this. I don't know that I would want to draw it.

Senator MONTOYA. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. I have nothing further.

Senator Baker says he has nothing further.

Senator Talmadge is not here.

Senator Inouye is not here.

Senator Gurney is not here.

Senator Weicker.

Senator WEICKER. All right, Mr. Buchanan, if you will try to continue down the list—I will try to shorten it—of various activities and your evaluation of them.

Perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, is this something that should form part of a campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, this is the famous Weicker litany of wrongdoings in the campaign. I know you have got the definition down of every illegal act and things like that but what—to me what they amount to and what I have seen is that people in our campaign made a grievous error and then they went and compounded the error and made mistakes. In the process of this thing, they even committed—I don't know, I don't want to state that they did, but conceivably they committed wrongdoing amounting to crimes and illegalities, but I think that, by and large, the sins were of the head and not of the heart. They thought that they wanted to make sure the President of the United States was reelected, and a lot of mistakes and bad things, and erroneous things were done; there is no question about that.

But these people, I think they have got a right to a fair trial and I don't think I am in a position to sit up and moralize or pontificate upon their ethics or their morality.

Senator WEICKER. Mr. Buchanan, it isn't a question of a litany of wrongdoing. The problem is that when these matters are equated with just another Dick Tuck type of operation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They have never been so by me.

Senator WEICKER. This is exactly the type—

Mr. BUCHANAN. I do not consider Watergate a prank; it is a crime.

Senator WEICKER. I see. This is all I am trying to find out from you since you have thrown Dick Tuck out as sort of the example to be followed by the Republicans in the campaign of 1972. I am trying to differentiate between those activities and these activities, which clearly you are as dead set against as I am.

What I can't have, I believe—I would hope, anyway, you would think the same way—I can't have these floated as legitimate campaign practices.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Nobody has floated Watergate as a legitimate campaign activity for the last 15 months.

Senator WEICKER. Well, then, certainly you would agree that really we are not talking in any manner, shape or form about the equivalent of a Dick Tuck operation so far as Watergate is concerned.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I did not know I was up here to discuss the Watergate break-in.

Senator WEICKER. You are here to discuss the matter called Watergate which encompasses a great deal of activity and again I have tried to be very specific with you as to what those activities are. Are they the same as Dick Tuck-type activities? Do you want me to continue down the list?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, I don't know that Dick Tuck did any break-in and burglaries; no, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Electronic surveillance?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No. Electronic surveillance was done on Adlai Stevenson at the Democratic Convention in 1960. They had electronic surveillance done, I believe, on the Vice President of the United States post-1968 before he was inaugurated. I believe that; I am not sure of that. Electronic surveillance for political purposes is wrong and should be outlawed.

Senator WEICKER. I think the last part of your answer is very significant. I would agree with you, that is exactly what the work product of this committee is all about.

How about putting out the story tying the Democratic Party to Communists and foreign money? Is this a legitimate type of activity of the White House?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't know any political reporter who is going to pick up a phony story like that and run it if you don't have any substantiation, and if you tell an individual to go do that, any individual who has contacts in the national corps or the political press corps will tell you to go fly a kite.

I don't know a single political reporter to whom I will say, "Well, Senator McGovern is getting Communist money," and he will say, "Is that right. Where is your evidence?"

Every single one—I don't know a single one who would go with a story like that based on hearsay.

Senator WEICKER. Well, of course, this was the subject of a memorandum within the White House, wasn't it?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have not been watching all the testimony on television but I believe it was, I believe, Mr. John Dean, though. But John Dean is not an individual who dealt with the press. My guess is—

Senator WEICKER. No, this memorandum was attested to by Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Haldeman sent a memorandum to Mr. Dean, but that sounded a bit fishy to me because John Dean was not an individual who dealt at all with the press, I don't know who he was going to call.

Senator WEICKER. I think what bothers me is in this discussion that you and I are having. I think both of us are fully aware that the President would have won this election. I, like you, voted for our President. Not only that, I thought I delivered some effective speeches against Mr. McGovern, but I get bothered with this continued reference to Communist and anti-American and radical and we go right down the list, what kind of politics is this?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, I will tell you this. What do we have here, you have confidential memorandums of mine to the President of the United States and to Mr. Haldeman and to Mr. Mitchell.

Now, they are, quite obviously, if I knew my confidential papers, dozens of them were going to be called up for inspection and I was going to be held to account for phrases and paragraphs that I used in a confidential communication with the President, I certainly would have written it differently, there is no question about that. But I am sure that if we went through your own files and got every political memorandum you were sent by staff aides there would be things that would horrify both you and your own staff aides, not in terms of wrongdoing, but simply because you would phrase things differently.

When I write a first draft of a column or a speech, some of the copy is extraordinarily hard and I would not want to make public. I would like to be held responsible for what I write as a final speech and for what I say publicly. But with my private communications, in effect, which are almost your private letters, to be called to account on national television for your phrases is not a very pleasant, altogether pleasant, experience and I don't think, Senator, you would find it any more pleasant than I find it, to have to go through there to see things I haven't seen in 4 years and find things that maybe were my own personal rhetoric in the memorandum was excessive. It is not an altogether pleasant experience.

Senator WEICKER. Well, number one, let me assure you that these files are totally available to you or anybody else and always have been and, to be honest, I am not going to have you sit here and tell me that the type of language that is used in these memorandums, the references and the rather consistency of the reference, to the far left, and the Communists and the foreign money and radicals and all the rest of it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. The far left is suggested by a term and there is no term that I have seen in my memorandum that connects Senator McGovern or suggests he is connected with the Communist Party.

Senator McGovern was the candidate of the far left in the last election. He was the candidate of the left. He was the candidate of the Democratic Party. Mr. Schmitz was the candidate I would say, of the far right. We had the right and the center. These have been customary terms ever since the French General Assembly in 1789, that phrase.

Senator WEICKER. How about anti-American? How about that phrase?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, there is a phrase in here that Senator McGovern was perceived by a number of people because of statements he made especially with regard to foreign policy, especially in regard to Vietnam in that vein. I don't say he was anti-American.

Senator WEICKER. Of course, that was your phrase, it is your memorandum.

Mr. BUCHANAN. What does the phrase say, he is perceived that way?

Senator WEICKER. Well, let's go ahead and see it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. What you are doing is you are precisely taking particular minor phrases out of memos written in the heat of a campaign and that statement, Senator, is far less offensive to me, even now in public, than is Senator McGovern's statement comparing the President of the United States to Adolf Hitler, and he is a senatorial can-

didate and he made that publicly, not in some confidential memorandums in the heat of a campaign.

Senator WEICKER. Well, of course, I think many people, myself included, held those comments against Senator McGovern.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Senator WEICKER. I think they are despicable.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think you should be held accountable for what you say publicly but I think a man is entitled to the privacy of his own views that he expressed in his own way in his private papers and, as I say, it is not an altogether usual experience to have your confidential papers, have to explain them on national television.

Senator WEICKER. In the matter of Mr. Ulasewicz, is that—and the subject matter of those investigations—is that proper politics?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I never heard Mr. Ulasewicz' name until he appeared on national television.

Senator WEICKER. I see. Now, that you know about Mr. Ulasewicz—

Mr. BUCHANAN. What did he investigate?

Senator WEICKER. Incidentally, Mr. Caulfield was a very close friend of yours.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, he is.

Senator WEICKER. Did he ever mention to you any of his activities?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, Mr. Caulfield's activities, in the 1968 campaign certainly, he was campaign security. He had conducted an investigation of the things that have come out subsequently, I have no knowledge of.

Senator WEICKER. You had no knowledge of the relationship between Mr. Caulfield and Mr. Ulasewicz?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I never heard of Mr. Ulasewicz' name until it was on national television but I know Jack Caulfield very well. He is very decent, in my judgment, even though mistakes were made, he is a very decent individual.

Senator WEICKER. The matters which Mr. Ulasewicz investigated, you feel now that you have heard about it—

Mr. BUCHANAN. Which ones are you referring to, Senator?

Senator WEICKER. Well, I can go right down the whole list, but basically I would say personal matters related to the various candidates, do you think that is a proper thing?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Senator, are you asking do I think that—

Senator WEICKER. I asked that question.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is not my end of the campaign business, as investigations are done. There was a story in the Atlanta paper where Senator McGovern sent out 100 people to investigate the President and asked, "Fellows, have we dug up any dirt?" And he said, "Well, we will let that out, too." There are these aspects to campaigns. I do not think I have been in a political campaign where I have not heard stories about the private lives and the personal habits of individuals, but that is not my stock in trade.

Senator WEICKER. So, in other words, you would say that should not be part of a campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. There is no way you can halt investigations. I think investigations of the background of candidates, going out, say, to his hometown newspaper and finding statements say, like Senator McGovern made in 1948—

Senator WEICKER. Fair enough.

Mr. BUCHANAN. In the course of that thing, what do you do when you come across, if you come across something that is personally damaging to the individual? Maybe it depends on how rough a campaign is being fought.

Senator WEICKER. Is basically your answer—and I am trying to be as fair as possible in this matter—that matters of public record are certainly eligible to be pushed out there during the campaign?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Senator WEICKER. That is a matter of the record?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right.

Senator WEICKER. But this was specifically asked of Mr. Ulasewicz and, of course, his investigations went way beyond what was a matter of public record. It went way beyond.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It went into personal—my own view is that the personal, private lives of candidates should not be part of the campaign; they should not be discussed by a candidate. But there are political muckrakers just like journalistic—and you can have this until—as long as you have got politics, people are going to go out and do these things. I am not involved in it and I would not do it myself, but I do not want to sit up here and assume that I am a judge of other people who do these kinds of investigations.

Senator WEICKER. But at least I want to thank you for saying that because you are a part of the administration.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And you have made a statement that was not made before. In other words, we have heard that: "Yes; these are proper matters of political campaigns," and it has not been said by any person but rather representatives of an administration, and to have the American people believe that personal dirt, for example, is a valid part of the political process, that type of investigation, not investigations that are matters of record, but that go into the types of thing that you and I both decry, it just is something that should not be allowed to fly in this country, you and I both agree on that point.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I do not think they have—I do not think they are a proper subject matter for campaigns; that is right.

Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. As I understand it, this morning, the exhibits that were obtained—the memorandums prepared by Mr. Buchanan that were obtained from the Committee To Re-Elect the President and from the Archives department were not admitted in evidence.

They will be appropriately marked as exhibits and received as such.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 194 thru 194.*]

Senator MONTOYA. I would like to present for the record, Mr. Chairman, and for identification and for filing for the record, the three letters to which I referred in my examination of the witness.

Senator ERVIN. Without objection, it is so ordered. They will be appropriately marked as exhibits and received as such.

[The letters were marked exhibits Nos. 195, 196, and 197.*]

Senator ERVIN. Do counsels have any further questions?

*See contents pp. iv and v for pages of individual exhibits.

Mr. DASH. I just have one that I want to clear up, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Buchanan, I know that Senator Baker, in referring to Mr. O'Brien's manual, referred to the letterwriting campaign. I think the letterwriting campaigns are well known, not only in politics but in civic associations and social organizations generally. What I would like to really get from you as we close this afternoon is: Is there a difference between what, in fact, is a genuine letterwriting campaign and—as I understood the reference in the manual—that certain women who would be volunteers would be asked to use their brains and their writing to write short letters and that they themselves would write the messages that they wanted to write to the editors? Is there a difference, Mr. Buchanan, between that and where the message, the irate feeling, is actually manufactured by the political campaign itself and that a signature is obtained so that the person who reads the letters-to-the-editor column believes that a citizen really wrote that when he did not?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do you have in mind that letter to the editor in Michigan?

Mr. DASH. Let me just turn to tab 33 [exhibit No. 193].

Mr. BUCHANAN. In Michigan?

Mr. DASH. Yes; the Michigan letter.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Let me tell you about that, I am a strong—I personally feel very strongly about the issue of abortion, and I am opposed to it, and I drafted that letter. We did get another person's signature on the letter, and the individual we went to, frankly, was in the Right to Life movement who believed in that, and in effect, I ghosted that letter for the individual who signed it and sent it to the papers, I believe, in Michigan.

Now to me that is on a par, I think, with, you know, my sort of passionate rhetoric in a political speech which is delivered by a candidate who believes as well as I do and I write the rhetoric and he delivers it. I think those things are analogous.

Mr. DASH. Would you say the same thing if you turned to tab 9 [exhibit No. 169], to the telegrams that are indicated as having been prepared by you? There is a memorandum which indicates that 10 telegrams have been drafted by Mr. Buchanan and sent to Time and Newsweek and—let me just read one of them, there are a number:

To the editor: The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President Agnew about the Nation's news media was their incredibly arrogant performance before the entire Nation last Thursday night. Who in the hell elected those people to stand up and read off their insults to the President of the United States and then ask that he comment.

Do you have tab 9?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do I have tab 9?

Mr. DASH. It is an attachment to tab 9. There are a number of Buchanan telegrams that were drafted and then sent.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't know that they were sent. Here is—I don't know—I have not read these memorandums and I don't know who signed them. I don't know who signed them.

Mr. DASH. What I am saying and what I am asking is for information. Isn't there again a difference—and I am talking about the tab—that a telegram of that nature which is prepared, and assume you do get someone to sign it, and it appears in the letters to the editor column of Newsweek, and is read as though a citizen thought of the idea

to send a telegram when, as a matter of fact, all of these had been actually manufactured in a political office, actually in the White House, and are sent out to news media——

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well——

Mr. DASH. Is there a difference?

Mr. BUCHANAN. There is a difference. But inspiring an individual to write a telegram and drafting a telegram for his signature, these are different things. I mean this seems to me to be a foolish exercise, I will be quite honest.

Mr. DASH. I am just asking, wasn't this signature requiring a pro forma kind of thing, you had pro forma volunteers?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No; I don't see a difference. They asked Buchanan, "Can you draft something like that?" Once it leaves my desk, I don't know what they do with my copy. I am not the one who is going to be——

Mr. DASH. You were drafting it not as Buchanan's statement but as a citizen's kind of statement?

Mr. BUCHANAN. But citizens signed them. I drafted them. I ghosted them.

Mr. DASH. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THOMPSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Thank you, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, October 3, 1973.]

[Subsequent to the hearing, a letter and affidavit of Mitchell Rogovin was received by the committee rebutting certain parts of Mr. Buchanan's testimony and appears on page 4369.]

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1973

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gurney, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Jed Johnson, investigator; David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels; Marc Lackritz, Ronald D. Rotunda, James C. Moore, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Howard S. Liebgood and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flanigan, assistant publications clerk.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel will call the first witness.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Donald H. Segretti.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Will you stand up, Mr. Segretti, and hold up your right hand? Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do.

Senator ERVIN. Let the record show that Mr. Segretti is testifying involuntarily pursuant to an order of Judge Sirica extending to him immunity as provided in sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18 of the United States Code. I make that statement in order to protect any future right you have arising out of that grant of immunity.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Thank you, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Segretti, do you have counsel with you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do.

Mr. DASH. Will counsel identify himself for the record?

Mr. SHERMAN. Victor Sherman. My address is 8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, Calif.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Segretti, do you have a statement you wish to read to the committee?

**TESTIMONY OF DONALD H. SEGRETTI, ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR
SHERMAN, COUNSEL**

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do. I do have an opening statement.

Mr. DASH. Would you proceed to read it?

Mr. SEGRETTI. In 1963 I graduated from the University of Southern California. I majored in business administration. I then attended the University of California at Berkeley and graduated from its law school in 1966. My first job was as an employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in Washington, D.C.

After a few months, I was inducted into the U.S. Army. That was in May 1967. Once in the Army, I applied for a commission in the Judge Advocate General Corps and was accepted. I was released from Army active duty in September of 1971, after serving 4 years and 4 months, a year of which was in Vietnam.

After my graduation from USC, I maintained infrequent social contact with two college friends, Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan; so, it did not seem unusual when I was contacted in early 1971 by these two friends about the possibility of doing some work for them after my release from active duty. I indicated interest although I had no concept of what they had in mind.

In the summer of 1971 I flew to Washington, D.C., and met with Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan. It was explained to me that I would be employed to perform certain political functions for the reelection of President Nixon. At that time I was aware that both men were employed at the White House. I considered the political functions we discussed to be similar to college pranks which had occurred at USC. The impression was given to me that these so-called pranks were performed by both parties in Presidential campaigns and that there was nothing improper or illegal in such traditional activities.

Subsequently, I was told to contact Mr. Herbert Kalmbach in Newport Beach, Calif., for the purpose of finalizing my employment. I met with Mr. Kalmbach in August 1971, and was offered a salary of \$16,000 per annum plus expenses for my activities. Mr. Kalmbach and I did not discuss the specifics of my employment, and I myself had no concrete ideas as to what work I was to perform. It was not even clear to me whether or not I would be working for Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Chapin, or others. However, I was happy to accept employment from people who held prominent positions in and out of the Government.

After meeting with Mr. Kalmbach, I met with Mr. Chapin, not far from the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif. During this meeting, Mr. Chapin gave me a list of cities in which I was to acquire acquaintances to assist me in my future endeavors. Mr. Chapin stressed the secrecy of my duties and stated that he would be my contact at the White House. He further explained that my duties would consist of various activities tending to foster a split between the various Democratic hopefuls and to prevent the Democratic Party from uniting behind one candidate. I was told that this was a common campaign strategy. Even though I had at one time been a registered Democrat and was apolitical during my Army tenure, I was in agreement with President Nixon's announced policies of ending the Vietnam war and the draft. Thus, it was on principle that I favored his reelection. It was this combination of factors, my lack of any concrete career plans, my friendship and respect for the individuals involved, my belief in

the reelection of President Nixon, the opportunity of working for the White House, and the change of pace from my Army duties which led me to accept the employment.

From September 1971 to the end of the year, I traveled to various parts of the United States attempting to line up political associates. Mr. Chapin had instructed me not to use the names of any persons at the White House or the name of any person associated with the Republican Party when making my contacts. I was also told not to use my real name so that I would never prove an embarrassment to the President or his campaign supporters. It was, therefore, difficult for me to explain to people exactly what I was doing, who I was working for, or what we would be doing together. During the initial period of my employment, I myself had no specific idea as to what I was doing or how I was to do it. I did indicate to people I "recruited" that their tasks would be to picket various Democratic candidates under the guise of working for a rival Democratic candidate, to ask difficult questions at news conferences, and, if possible, get someone to work in a candidate's headquarters. The purpose of planting so-called spies was primarily to obtain candidates' traveling schedules to assist in the planning of picketing activities. During this period I received \$5,000 traveling expenses from Mr. Kalmbach and the sum of \$667 every 2 weeks as salary.

Apart from the above, I did the following during 1971:

No. 1, I prepared a list of questions to ask Senator Muskie when he appeared at Whittier College in southern California. The questions were passed out among the audience, and I believe one of the questions was asked.

No. 2, I contacted an individual in California who provided three or four persons in San Francisco, who picketed a meeting of various Democrats, with signs saying, "Kennedy for President" or words to that effect.

No. 3, I had Senator Muskie followed for 2 days while he was in Los Angeles, Calif. This was the one and only time that I ever had any candidate followed, and it was done pursuant to an earlier suggestion from Mr. Chapin that I have a familiarity with how Presidential candidates traveled. To the best of my recollection, those are the only activities I performed in 1971.

In January of 1972, I received a second sum of \$5,000 from Mr. Kalmbach. This sum was paid following my request for additional moneys to cover my travel expenses. On or about January 15, 1972, I received my last biweekly check in the sum of \$667 from a trust account apparently maintained by Mr. Kalmbach. At about this time, Mr. Kalmbach explained to me that rather than receiving further moneys by check he preferred that we "switch to green." On or about March 1, 1972, I received the sum of \$5,000 in cash from Mr. Kalmbach's secretary, and on or about March 23, 1972, I received the sum of \$25,000 in cash from Mr. Kalmbach. This latter payment was made upon my request for the sum of \$5,000 which I anticipated was needed to cover my traveling and salary expenses. It was my impression at the time that the extra \$20,000 was given to me so that I would not have to contact Mr. Kalmbach on a frequent basis. I now believe that the new campaign law regarding the reporting of income and disbursements, had something to do with this payment. The funds referred to

herein are the only moneys that I have received. I did not at any time discuss with Mr. Kalmbach any of the specifics of my political activity and I have no personal knowledge as to whether or not he spoke with others about what I was doing. I should add to my statement that I did receive also the sum of \$400 in cash that summer to cover my expenses for travel to Washington, D.C., to meet with Mr. Kalmbach—meet with, pardon me, Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan.

All of the moneys received were spent for traveling and living expenses. A complete accounting, to the best of my ability, has been provided to this committee and to the Special Prosecutor's Office.

In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the purpose of seeking additional contacts. During my visit I met with a Mr. Robert Benz in Tampa, Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla.

Mr. Benz and Mr. Kelly seemed knowledgeable as to the inner-workings of a political campaign and expressed a willingness to assist me in my endeavors. In fact, both young men seemed to know much more about how political campaigns operated than I did. Therefore, I gave to each a modest sum and asked that they make contact with other persons who would be of future assistance. The intention was, as previously indicated, to line up pickets, recruit persons to ask hard questions at news conferences, and to obtain the travel schedules of the various Democratic candidates.

In early January 1972, I returned to Florida. At this time Mr. Benz had obtained two students to picket the opening of Senator Jackson's headquarters in Tampa, Fla., carrying "Muskie for President" signs or words to that effect. He also recruited approximately 10 persons to picket a Muskie rally with signs relating to Muskie's reluctance to consider a black American as a running mate. These activities of Mr. Benz were done pursuant to my suggestions. I also understand that Mr. Benz, on his own initiative, added a sentence to a Muskie press release, which announced the sending of 10,000 invitations for a Muskie rally to be followed by a \$1,000-a-plate dinner. This press release was sent to one or two newspapers.

In addition to the above, Mr. Benz and I collaborated in one way or another on the following matters:

No. 1, a letter on Senator Muskie's stationery alleging unauthorized use of Government typewriters by his staff. This letter was sent to various persons whom I do not recall at this time.

No. 2, the placing of posters stating, "Help Muskie In Busing More Children Now." The poster bore the legend "Mothers Backing Muskie Committee." Approximately 100 to 150 such posters were distributed or posted by me.

No. 3, the placing of stink bombs at a Muskie picnic and at the Muskie headquarters.

No. 4, the sending of a letter on Muskie stationery accusing Senators Jackson and Humphrey of sexual improprieties. I would like to make clear that this letter was my idea and was not suggested by any other person. I assume full responsibility for its contents. Each and every allegation in the letter was untrue and without any basis in fact. It was not my desire to have anyone believe the letter, but instead it was intended to create confusion among the various candidates. It is my belief that from 20 to 40 such letters were sent out, mainly to Senator Jackson's supporters. I deeply regret that I initiated this incident and

wish to apologize publicly for this stupid act. I can only hope that this apology will in some way rectify the harm done to these Senators and their families.

There were other activities performed by Mr. Benz and myself which I cannot fully recall at this time but which generally consisted of picketing candidates and distributing reprints from various daily newspapers and magazines.

Mr. Douglas Kelly assisted me in posting the aforementioned Muskie posters, and in placing an ad in a college newspaper stating:

"Wanted. Sincere gentleman seeks running mate. White preferred but natural sense of rhythm no obstacle. Contact E. Muskie."

He also helped me place an ad in the classified section of the Miami Sunday Sun-Reporter stating:

"Senator Muskie, would you accept a Jewish running mate?" and another ad in the same newspaper stating:

"Senator Muskie. You wouldn't accept a black or an American Indian, would you accept a Jewish running mate?"

There was also an ad that was placed in a local Cuban newspaper and on a local radio station which stated:

"Muskie believes all people have a right to choose any type of government that they want. The Cuban people are no exception and the United States should not interfere. If elected, Muskie will attempt to ease the tensions between the United States and Cuba. He was born in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie."

We also distributed some fliers inviting the public to a nonexistent open house at Muskie's headquarters in Miami. Mr. Kelly and I performed other activities of a minimal nature which I have disclosed to this committee by way of staff interviews, to the best of my recollection. I also understand that Mr. Kelly did other things about which I am not totally clear, since he also operated to a great extent on his own.

At this time, it is my best recollection that I paid Mr. Kelly and Mr. Benz a total of approximately \$5,500.

In February of 1972, a man called me, identifying himself as Ed Warren. From a prior conversation with Mr. Chapin, I had been informed that a person would call me who would give me assistance. In Miami, Fla., I met with Mr. Warren and another individual who was introduced to me as George Leonard. I now recognize Ed Warren as being Mr. E. Howard Hunt. I have been unable to identify Mr. George Leonard; however, it is my understanding that he was probably G. Gordon Liddy. Mr. Warren provided me with the name of a printer in Miami whom I subsequently used for various purposes. I recall meeting Mr. Warren a second time in June 1972 at the Sheraton Four Ambassadors Hotel in Miami, Fla. During this meeting Mr. Warren suggested that I put together a group of peaceful demonstrators to picket the Doral Hotel during the Democratic Convention, at which time another group of pickets was to join in the demonstration and act in an unruly manner. It was explained to me that the bad conduct of the crowd would be blamed on Senator McGovern. It was never my intention to create, nor did I ever participate in, any kind of physical violence, and Mr. Warren's plan was something in which I did not want to get involved. As fate would have it, the Watergate burglary preceded these plans, and they were never carried out.

At this point I would like to state to the committee that at no time did I ever have any knowledge of, nor did I participate in, the Water-gate burglary or any activity involving electronic surveillance.

It is possible that I may have met Mr. Warren on a third occasion, but I am unsure at this time.

On April 1, 1972 (April Fools' Day), in Milwaukee, Wis., Mr. Benz and I distributed a flier advertising a free all-you-can-eat lunch with drinks at Hubert Humphrey's headquarters. I have given the committee and the Special Prosecutor's Office a copy of the flier. There was, of course, no such party.

Also in April of 1972, in response to a telephone call from Mr. Warren, I flew to Washington, D.C. I had Mr. Kelly meet me there. Senator Muskie was to have a fundraising dinner at the Washington Hilton Hotel, and Mr. Kelly and I, ostensibly acting for Muskie organizers, ordered flowers, pizzas, and liquor for the campaign workers. In addition, we invited certain foreign guests and provided for their delivery to the dinner by chauffeured limousine. A magician was also hired to attend the dinner and to entertain. We also made inquiries about renting an elephant, but were unable to make the necessary arrangements. The purpose of all this was to cause confusion at the Muskie dinner. Mr. Kelly and I also distributed a flier stating, "Come. Protest the Fat Cats With Signs." This was in reference to the Muskie dinner. Mr. Kelly and I constructed various protest signs, but no one showed up to protest.

During 1972, I performed activities of a similar, but less extensive and significant nature, in other States. I have given a full statement to this committee's staff regarding these events. I believe my activities in these other States produced little, if any, commotion, and do not need to be elaborated on in this statement. I also feel that many innocent persons would be hurt if I were to disclose the names of all persons I contacted in my travels. Most of these persons are completely innocent of any wrongdoing, and to publicly disclose their names would be a great disservice to them. I have given the committee's staff a complete list of all persons whose names I can recall. I understand that both the committee's staff and the prosecutor's office have investigated my activities in an intensive manner. I would, therefore, beg the indulgence of this committee that I not be forced to publicly disclose the names of innocent persons, which could only damage their reputations unduly without serving any legitimate legislative purpose.

In July of 1972, Mr. Kelly and I made arrangements for a small plane to fly over the Democratic Convention center with a trailer reading: "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity. Vote McGovern." This was my last political activity of the 1972 campaign.

After newstories began mentioning my name, I sought legal counsel from Mr. John W. Dean. I met Mr. Dean through Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan. Over a period of months, Mr. Dean acted as my lawyer, and I confided in him in this capacity. At Mr. Dean's request, I made a tape recording explaining my activities in 1971 and 1972, and gave it to him. I also prepared a written statement and gave it, along with many documents, to an attorney in Los Angeles, Calif., who was suggested as counsel by Mr. Dean. It is my understanding that this attorney sent to Mr. Dean copies of the material left with him, and that Mr. Dean subsequently turned over said material, which were obviously

intended to be confidential and part of the attorney-client privilege, to this committee. Although I feel that Mr. Dean betrayed my confidence, I do wish to state that at no time did he tell me to be anything but honest and truthful with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. attorney's office.

This general statement was prepared with the advice and assistance of my present counsel, Victor Sherman of Los Angeles, Calif., and was not intended by us to be a complete statement of all my activities during the months in question. I am sure that this committee is now aware that my activities have been blown out of all proportion by the news media. I accept the fact that most of my present problems are the direct result of my own conduct. However, I cannot help but feel that I have been abused by rumor, character assassination, innuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my friends, and my family. I have literally had to avoid the onslaught of the media during the past year, and their attempts to get a story at all costs. I understand that under various guises, some of the news media illegally obtained my telephone, bank account, and credit card records, and generally conducted their investigations without any concern for my rights. Nevertheless, this in no way lessens my sincere belief that my activities were wrong and have no place in the American political system. To the extent my activities have harmed other persons and the political process, I have the deepest regrets. I am now ready to answer the questions of this committee.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Segretti, your statement has been quite full. You have already indicated how you first came to know Mr. Dwight Chapin and Mr. Gordon Strachan. As you have indicated in your statement, you knew them as college classmates at the University of Southern California.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Now, at the time Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin were in touch with you while you were in the Army in 1971, and also during the period of July 1971 to June 1972, do you know what Mr. Chapin, Mr. Dwight Chapin's position was?

Mr. SEGRETTI. He was employed at the White House and I believe his position at that time was Presidential appointments secretary.

Mr. DASH. And do you know what Mr. Strachan's, Mr. Gordon Strachan's position was?

Mr. SEGRETTI. All I knew at that time was that he was employed at the White House.

Mr. DASH. Did you come to know that he was an assistant to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did, but that was much later into 1972.

Mr. DASH. Now, after the series of contents you have included in your statement, you did in fact come to Washington on June 23, 1971, to meet with Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Mr. Dash, I am not quite certain of the exact date on that, but it is approximately that period of time.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall where you met Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I had dinner with Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan at Mr. Strachan's residence.

Mr. DASH. And it was at that time that Mr. Chapin began to discuss with you the job opportunities that he had been talking to you about on the telephone?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; it was.

Mr. DASH. Now, is it not true that Mr. Chapin told you that what they were looking for was someone to do some undercover work for the reelection of President Nixon and to engage in political tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't recall if the term "undercover" was used, but secrecy was stressed.

Mr. DASH. Well, is it a question of semantics? I say undercover—Mr. Chapin did tell you at a later time that you were to use secrecy, that you were not to reveal your identity and much of your work was undercover, was it not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. And although you use the term of what you had engaged in with them as college pranks, actually what they wanted you to engage in was political tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right.

Mr. DASH. You were interested in this job, were you not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was.

Mr. DASH. In your statement, you have already given us for the record the information received from Mr. Chapin to contact Mr. Kalmbach and the meeting you had with Mr. Kalmbach in which your salary was arranged.

Could you tell us, how much did you receive from Mr. Kalmbach totally for your work during 1971 and 1972?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I can give you an approximate figure on it, Mr. Dash. I have it in my financial records somewhere. I think it is in the neighborhood of around \$45,000. That included salary and moneys for expenses, total.

Mr. DASH. Now, on the same day that you arranged this with Mr. Kalmbach, and I think the date is July 9, 1971—do you recall that date?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I place that date a little bit later, Mr. Dash, but it is in the summer of 1971.

Mr. DASH. Did you on that day also have a meeting with Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did.

Mr. DASH. And where did you meet with Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I met Mr. Chapin near the San Clemente White House and we went to a small restaurant in the local area.

Mr. DASH. Now, what information and instructions did Mr. Chapin give you at that meeting?

Mr. SEGRETTI. At that meeting, Mr. Chapin, in addition to describing the general background of the political situation, gave me a list of States to concentrate on in making future political contacts.

Mr. DASH. And were these States primarily the primary States?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Primarily; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And it was at this meeting that he indicated to you that you were to act in secrecy so that there would be no trace back to the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't recall specifically if that was discussed at that meeting. That was discussed several times.

Mr. DASH. But I take it, it was fairly early in your discussions with Mr. Chapin that he emphasized secrecy?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And that there should be no tracing back to the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. And that you were not to use your own name?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. What, if anything, did Mr. Chapin tell you about the importance of the use of news media and news media impact in your assignment?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was related to me in relationship to pickets that, for example, at a Muskie rally, if you were to have a Humphrey for President sign or two, it should be placed in proximity to where the media could take a photograph of it.

Mr. DASH. Well, was he emphasizing to you that you should use, as best you could, news media impact?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir. At that period of time and in relationship to that type of activity, yes.

Mr. DASH. Now, did he also talk to you about the candidate you should spend most of your time on in terms of your political activities?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. DASH. Who was that candidate?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was Senator Muskie.

Mr. DASH. Did he indicate why?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is difficult to recall any exact conversation at this time—that was some time ago. But Senator Muskie at that time was certainly the forerunner, shall we say, of likely prospects to run for the Democratic nomination.

Mr. DASH. He was the front runner at that time, was he not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I believe he was.

Mr. DASH. Now, also at this meeting, and I think you have indicated some of this in your statement, Mr. Chapin gave you some of the strategy that you were to use in your activities. Let me state what I believe you have indicated to the staff, both here and in executive session. I think what you have indicated in your statement, and tell me if this is not true, as to what the strategy was—that you were to engage in activities to weaken the leading candidate, Senator Muskie, and to carry out political tricks to set one Democratic candidate against the other so that after the convention the staffs of these candidates would still be bitter and would not be able to rally behind any chosen candidate. Would that be a fair statement of the strategy?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That would be fair except the statement you made about weakening Senator Muskie. I think you attribute a little more emphasis than at least was conveyed to me at that point in time.

Mr. DASH. But your emphasis was on Senator Muskie and your political tricks and the use of your agents during that period of time was directed toward him and to confuse the candidates and his campaign, was that not true?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think that could be stated, yes.

Mr. DASH. And, therefore, it is not too strong a statement to say that it was an effort to weaken Senator Muskie's primary campaign. It was not to strengthen it, was it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; it was not.

Mr. DASH. By the way, when you were first approached you were in the Army, were you not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was.

Mr. DASH. While you were still in the Army did you recruit some persons to work for you in this political project?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I contacted some individuals.

Mr. DASH. Now, following your release from the Army, which I understand was on September 15, 1971—

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that was September 13.

Mr. DASH. What?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that was September 13.

Mr. DASH. September 13. Did you go to Washington to meet with Mr. Chapin some time toward the latter part of September?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did.

Mr. DASH. And did Mr. Chapin tell you at that time that Mr. Strachan would no longer be involved in the project?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I tend to believe that that statement, or a statement to that effect, was made a little earlier than that, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Well, about when, would you say for the record?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Prior to my release from Army active duty.

Mr. DASH. And thereafter you had no further contact with Mr. Strachan in your activities?

Mr. SEGRETTI. The only contact I can remember with Mr. Strachan, from my release from active duty until June 1972, was Mr. Strachan called me once on the telephone in late September or November 1971.

Mr. DASH. Did it have anything to do with these activities?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Pardon?

Mr. DASH. Did it have anything to do with your assignment?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; it did.

Mr. DASH. Would you tell what the discussion was about?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Senator Muskie was traveling in southern California and some individuals threw some eggs at his staff or at Senator Muskie, and it was broadcast on the news media. Mr. Strachan called me up to ask me if I had anything to do with that. I told him I did not, which is the truth.

Mr. DASH. Did he sound disappointed?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I just do not recall. I do not believe so.

Mr. DASH. What arrangements—at the meeting now that I think we have established that took place some time in late September after you left the Army when you met with Mr. Chapin in Washington—what arrangements did Mr. Chapin make with you for the purpose of contacting each other during the course of the project?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, I was instructed at some point in time that I would—I was given his home telephone number. Generally speaking, I was to call the White House switchboard and I was to use another name.

Mr. DASH. All right. What name were you to use?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was to use and did use—

Mr. DASH. Do you recall the name Don Morris?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was the name that I did—M-o-r-r-i-s—that was the name that I used, although at the very first it may have been another name very similar to that, Bob Morse, M-o-r-s-e, but I believe the first time I called up the operator said “is that spelled M-o-r-r-i-s”, and I said yes.

Mr. DASH. Was Mr. Chapin to have a code name?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was instructed to get an answering service on my home telephone number in California, which I did. Mr. Chapin, if he were to call, and I was not in, and if he left a message, he used the name Mr. Chapman, C-h-a-p-m-a-n.

Mr. DASH. Have you heard the name Bob Duane? Have you ever heard that as a code name?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That, I believe was mentioned—at least was in one of the notebooks that had been—that I had given to the attorney in Los Angeles and eventually went to Mr. Dean. That name was never used to my recollection, and it was probably just part of the discussion at some point in time.

Mr. DASH. Were you also to open up a post office box so that you could receive mail?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And did you receive mail during that period of time from Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did receive some mail from Mr. Chapin.

Mr. DASH. And some instructions or recommendations?

Mr. SEGRETTI. At one time I did; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. In order to help you select agents or contacts?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Contacts, I would prefer, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Well, I know we may be dealing with semantics but they were in fact agents of your work, were they not? They were following your directions and were acting under your supervision in some cases and sometimes on their own but they were carrying out the project and the assignments you had been given by Mr. Chapin.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir; they were carrying out the assignments, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Chapin, in order to help you find such persons, give you a list of the 1968 advance men of President Nixon?

Mr. SEGRETTI. At one point in time he did. I don't know whether it was a 1968 advance man's list or not but it was a White House list of advance men.

Mr. DASH. Did you use this list to make contacts?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did use that list to some extent.

Mr. DASH. I think you have mentioned that at one time Mr. Chapin did send you a memo containing suggestions. Would you turn to—you have before you some memorandums and other exhibits and they are tabbed and will you turn to tab 2 [exhibit No. 200]. Would you look at that? It is a memorandum, for the record, dated September 28, 1971, 4 p.m.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Yes. Is this a memorandum you received from Mr. Chapin at your post office box?

Mr. SEGRETTI. This is a memorandum I received. I do not believe I received it at my post office box but at my home address.

Mr. DASH. At your home address.

The memorandum for the record states:

From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in among demonstrators who are demonstrating against the President. It should be MUSKIE FOR PRESIDENT in big letters and should be held in a location so that it is clearly visible.

At Muskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, there should be a sign or two which goads them. For example at a Muskie rally there should be

a large WHY NOT A BLACK VICE PRESIDENT or perhaps WE PREFER HUMPHREY or something else that would goad him along.

At Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies, there should be Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be well placed in relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get.

Did you follow that recommendation?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To some extent I did, yes.

Mr. DASH. That was the general, one of the general, strategies you used, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, did Mr. Chapin, also in September 1971, ask you to fly to Portland, Oreg., and stay at the Benson Hotel where the President and his party were staying?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Tell the committee why he asked you to do that.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, some of it is conjecture or speculation and I hate to really engage in that but perhaps it is not too speculative. I think perhaps one reason was to get me enthused about the job, but I think more of a primary reason was to let me get familiar with the Presidential advance and how a Presidential party was put together in traveling and in that type of thing.

Mr. DASH. Did he give you at that time an advance man's manual?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I am not certain whether it was given to me in Washington, D.C., or Portland.

Mr. DASH. But he did give you one?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did receive one.

Mr. DASH. Did he at that time tell you to contact Mr. Kalmbach to get you the first check?

Mr. SEGRETTI. My first recollection was that it was told to me by telephone a little bit prior to that. However, my notes regarding that meeting do mention, I think, the term operating capital of \$5,000 so apparently it was discussed at that point then.

Mr. DASH. Well, shortly after that you did go back to Los Angeles and you did meet with Mr. Kalmbach and did receive a \$5,000 check and expenses?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't believe I did. I received a check in the mail of that sum.

Mr. DASH. Now, when you started out on your work, how did you make your political contacts; how many States did you actually visit, approximately?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is really a guess, to some extent, and requires my going over my records thoroughly. Some were very sporadic. For example, I remember one trip I flew. I was flying down South and I happened to know a friend that was living in Albuquerque, from my period of time in the military. So, instead of flying direct to Florida or wherever I was flying, I stopped off in New Mexico and it was a combination of both social visit and you might call it a political visit.

Mr. DASH. About how many States did you actually—

Mr. SEGRETTI. Maybe 12.

Mr. DASH [continuing]. Make contacts with, is what I am really getting at, Mr. Segretti. I know you traveled quite a bit throughout the country.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Right.

Mr. DASH. In how many States did you actually place, either on the payroll or for serious business—people who were going to follow up and do work in the area of political tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would say half a dozen.

Mr. DASH. And were these primarily the States that Mr. Chapin had talked to you about—to emphasize your work in?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; they were.

Mr. DASH. When you made these contacts with these various people throughout the country, what name or names did you use?

Mr. SEGRETTE. At first, I believe for a short period of time, I used the name Don Durham and the balance of the time I used Don Simmons.

Mr. DASH. You have already in your statement indicated that you were asked or you did put under surveillance, Senator Muskie, when he was out in Los Angeles?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall that Mr. Chapin asked you to do this?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Specifically?

Mr. DASH. Or told you that Senator Muskie was going to be out in Los Angeles and that you should arrange pickets and things in that area?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. DASH. And that came from Mr. Chapin.

When you did have him placed under surveillance, and I am not asking you now for the name of the individual——

Mr. SEGRETTE. I appreciate that, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH [continuing]. But was this just a friend or what was his occupation?

Mr. SEGRETTE. This was an individual whose name I had gotten on a list from a friend that I knew in the Army, that I had worked with to some extent in the military service, who was assigned to the CID and the military which is really—stands for Criminal Investigation Division, and this individual was a retired CID individual and at that time he was working for a detective agency.

Mr. DASH. A private detective?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would classify him as that at that time; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, as your statement has indicated you went out to Whittier College, I think, in November of 1971?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Chapin inform you that Senator Muskie was going to be appearing at Whittier College?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe that is how the scenario went. It is possible that I called Mr. Chapin to inform him of that fact, finding out from a local paper or a news release that I read in the paper, but my best recollection is that I received a phone call regarding that.

Mr. DASH. All right, your activity at that time, I think you have indicated in your statement, was that you distributed a list of some hard questions or questions to be asked Senator Muskie?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Will you turn to tab 3 [exhibit No. 201] of the exhibits that are before you, and would you identify that exhibit as the hand-out that was given at the appearance of Senator Muskie?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Some of the questions that you were asking to be put to him were:

Do you refuse to even consider a black or Chicano as a running mate?

Your public answer that they do not yet have political equality only fosters any bias that exists and avoids the question.

Do you speak in terms of equality for minority yet send your children to all-white private schools?

That was the tenor of your question, was it not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right.

Mr. DASH. During your operation at Whittier, did you receive any communication from Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did.

Mr. DASH. What was the form of that communication?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I received a Xerox copy of what I now believe to be a page from the White House press summary.

Mr. DASH. Will you look at tab 4 [exhibit No. 202] I think——

Mr. SEGRETTI. We have it.

Mr. DASH. On tab 4, if you have that before you, there appears on page 10, of what appears to come from the White House press summary that goes to the President, a reference to Mr. Muskie's appearance at Whittier. I just want to read a couple of lines from there:

Reynolds said that he had come prepared for conservative questions, but the Chicanos gave him no chance and Big Ed proved that he can keep his cool. Muskie reported that he was pleased by the reception he received from those willing to listen. But more importantly, said Reynolds, he proved he can keep his temper under stress.

Now, does there appear on that news summary some handwriting addressed to you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. And is that handwriting Mr. Chapin's?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe it to be Mr. Chapin's.

Mr. DASH. Would you read what the handwriting says with reference to the item I just referred to?

Mr. SEGRETTI. It states: "Don—note we really missed the boat on this. Obviously, the press now wants to prove EM"—I believe that——

Mr. DASH. Ed Muskie, I believe?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes. [Continues reading:] "Can keep his temper. Let us prove he cannot."

Then there is another little notation and there is one more little comment that says, "Your Q," which I take it to mean "My question."

Mr. DASH. And does that refer to the fact that in the news summary there is a statement that Muskie favored abortions for therapeutic reasons and one of the questions you had in your handout referred to abortions. Is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is true.

Mr. DASH. And he was giving you credit for the fact that your question got into this news summary?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you do any work in the New Hampshire primary?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did not.

Mr. DASH. What happened in New Hampshire?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was instructed to go to New Hampshire. I did. I met with an individual whose name was given to me. I found him to be a very personable and likeable gentleman—very knowledgeable in poli-

tics. He seemed very receptive to my ideas. I felt so much at ease with him that I gave him my true name.

Mr. DASH. Then what happened afterwards?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I received a phone call and was told to leave New Hampshire.

Mr. DASH. Who called you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Chapin.

Mr. DASH. And what was his problem? What was your problem?

Mr. SEGRETTE. My problem was that I had used my real name, and apparently, this individual had called around Washington to find out who I was.

Mr. DASH. I guess in that sense, you had blown your cover in New Hampshire?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Chapin then indicate that you should stay out of the New Hampshire campaign and go to another State?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir, he did.

Mr. DASH. What State did you next go to and spend most of your time at that point?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, the next primary schedule was Florida and that is where I went.

Mr. DASH. Now, I think you made, in your statement you have indicated that you recruited two agents in Florida, Mr. Benz and Mr. Kelly. How did you contact Mr. Benz?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Benz was quite by accident, really. When I arrived in Tampa, I called a local Republican office and asked whoever answered the phone if he knew of any individual that might like to do some part-time work and I was given the name of Mr. Benz.

Mr. DASH. And Mr. Kelly?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Kelly's name I received from Mr. Benz and I received it from another individual when I went to Miami, whose name I got from the White House advance list. The name of Mr. Kelly came up both times, so I subsequently called Mr. Kelly.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you instruct Mr. Benz and Mr. Kelly to engage in various activities, to create great confusion among the Democratic candidates in such a way that they would blame one another?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Were they also to infiltrate the Muskie campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTE. They were not. People associated with them were to.

Mr. DASH. I did not hear your answer.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not believe they personally were to.

Mr. DASH. Were they given the independence to recruit other persons?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir, they were.

Mr. DASH. And did they have other persons infiltrate the Muskie campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe they did.

Mr. DASH. What was the purpose of infiltrating the Muskie campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Primarily to obtain campaign schedules.

Mr. DASH. But while they were there, were they to take anything else they could find?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Anything else they could come across that would be information would classify as a bonus; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. You had contacts in California at that time as well, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Any contacts I had in California at that time really were rather minimal, but I believe I did.

Mr. DASH. But you did develop contacts in California?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To some extent, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And they also infiltrated, both in Los Angeles and San Francisco, the Muskie campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, during the time you were recruiting and traveling, you have indicated that you maintained contact with Mr. Chapin. Is it true that Mr. Chapin actually received periodic reports from you, that you sent Mr. Chapin copies of material that you had distributed and a list of things that would reflect your conduct?

Mr. SEGRETTI. As a general practice, I would.

Mr. DASH. Now, did there come a time when you received, at your box in Los Angeles, copies of a Muskie pamphlet?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Would you turn to tab 6 [exhibit No. 158*]. This is a pamphlet that the committee has already received in evidence.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; this is the pamphlet; yes, sir, a copy of it.

Mr. DASH. Purported as being issued by a group called Citizens for a Liberal Alternative?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Which has a picture of Mr. Muskie with a large cigar out of his mouth, identifying him as a person who is no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Connallys, we have now. The committee has already had this exhibit introduced during the time Mr. Buchanan was a witness.

Were you aware, by the way, that that pamphlet was prepared by Mr. Khachigian, Mr. Buchanan's assistant, was edited by Mr. Buchanan, and was printed by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President with the approval of Mr. Magruder, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I have absolutely no idea.

Mr. DASH. How many copies of the pamphlet did you receive?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I can take a guess; 500 to 1,000.

Mr. DASH. What did you do with the pamphlets; these 500 to 1,000 copies?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I read it. Upon reading it, it appeared to be somewhat out of date by the time I received it. It was after the Florida primary. I have no clear recollection of where it was distributed, but I believe some were sent on either to a friend of mine in Chicago or perhaps someone else. I have no real clear recollection, really, what was fully done with it.

Mr. DASH. All right. I think you have covered fairly fully your relationship with Mr. Warren who—did you know, by the way, at that time that he was E. Howard Hunt?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I had no idea.

Mr. DASH. I think you now know that he was?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, I do.

Mr. DASH. I think you fairly fully related your relationships with Mr. Hunt at that time, but did he also suggest to you, at one point, that you could be of assistance to the President's policies in Vietnam by having certain telegrams sent?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. What did you do in that respect?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I called my associates, I believe, making—just primarily repeating the suggestions or requests, and I believe some of those were followed up on.

Mr. DASH. Do you know how many names you had put on the telegrams?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I personally sent two telegrams, a total, perhaps of 200 names.

Mr. DASH. About 200 names.

Where did you get those names?

Mr. SEGRETTI. A number of them I made up. Another group of names I took from a list that I had from the California Shirley for President delegates—Shirley Chisholm for President.

Mr. DASH. And on that list of names that you did not make up, that were real names, did the persons' names appear—

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Chairman, apparently, we have a live quorum.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until 1 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1973

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Segretti, you have already given the committee information that Mr. Benz, through various people that he had employed, placed some infiltrators in Muskie's and also in Jackson's campaign; is this not right?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Now, was there an occasion when one of these infiltrators in Senator Muskie's campaign in Tampa leaked to the press that there was to be a secret \$1,000 plate fundraising dinner?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that is correct.

Mr. DASH. Do you know what happened as a result of that leak?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I understand that the dinner which was to be attended by 17 individuals was subsequently canceled.

Mr. DASH. Yes, and, therefore, the dinner was canceled as a result of that information becoming public.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I heard that, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, you have stated in your statement that you had various schoolbusing posters printed up involving Mr. Muskie.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Would you look at tab 8 [exhibit No. 198]. You will find at tab 8 in your series of exhibits, because of the size of the poster, it is somewhat broken up, but I think the poster read: "Support busing now, support more children now." I think I have a copy of this and you can see it. It says: "Help Muskie support busing more children now." Is this the poster you are referring to?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. And the reference in the bottom "Mothers backing Muskie committee," was that a committee that you made up?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir. There is no committee by that name, to my knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. SEGRETTI. This, you could say was my committee.

Mr. DASH. Your committee?

Mr. SEGRETTI. One of them.

Mr. DASH. You were one of the mothers backing Muskie?

Senator ERVIN. Counsel, pardon me. That was a committee which existed only in your contemplation?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Senator.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, although I am going to be asking that the various exhibits be introduced, this particular exhibit is one that does not appear very clear in our collection of exhibits and I would like to have this reconstruction of the poster marked for identification and admitted in evidence as part of our record.

Senator ERVIN. That will be done. It will be marked as an exhibit and admitted as such.

[The poster referred to was marked exhibit No. 198.*]

Mr. DASH. Do you know how many posters of that kind that you had printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe the total was 300.

Mr. DASH. Where were they distributed?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Primarily in Florida. My best guess is 100 to 125 in Florida. Perhaps a dozen or so were posted in and around Chicago. I believe some were sent to an individual I knew in Indiana. However, they were never used, to my knowledge, and that is the total.

Mr. DASH. Did you send copies or a copy of the poster to Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To the best of my recollection, I did.

Mr. DASH. And this was in keeping with your sending him, regularly, various copies of things that you were distributing?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Now, did your Florida agent distribute anti-Wallace cards purporting to be backing Mr. Muskie?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe Mr. Benz had some printed up and they were so distributed.

Mr. DASH. Would you take a look at tab 18 [exhibit No. 214]. You will notice that part—I only direct your attention to the printed card: "A vote for Wallace is a wasted vote; on March 14th cast your ballot for Senator Edmund Muskie." Is that one of the cards?

If you turn the page, again looking at the printed part, the printed card: "If you liked Hitler you'll just love Wallace." Under this was "Vote for Muskie." Was that one of the cards?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, sir. I understand that the one—this was the same card printed on two sides?

Mr. DASH. Printed on two sides?

Mr. SEGRETTI. There was only one card, to my recollection.

Mr. DASH. Then, what I just read was on two sides of one card?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right.

*See p. 4267.

Mr. DASH. I think you have also testified that you were aware, in fact participated in, sending out false letters on Mr. Muskie's campaign stationery.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. And you referred already to one of them. Now, there is one particular letter you referred to in your statement which was especially scurrilous and accused Senator Jackson and Senator Humphrey of, serious accusations of, sexual and drinking misconduct. I think in due respect to Senator Jackson and Senator Muskie and Senator Humphrey, against whom this letter was used, that it would not be fair to read the actual language of the letter into the record.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I agree, Mr. Dash. That letter is untrue. I sincerely regret that any copies of that were sent out.

Mr. DASH. Would you agree with me without my reading it into the record, to demonstrate this for the record, that it was an especially vicious and scurrilous letter?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I will agree it was a scurrilous letter.

Mr. DASH. How much did it cost you to print that letter and distribute it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe \$20 was sent to Mr. Benz to do that.

Mr. DASH. Did you send a copy of that letter to Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe I did, yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did you get a response from him?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall Mr. Chapin telling you that for your \$20 you received \$10,000 to \$20,000 worth of free publicity but to be careful next time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, or words to that effect.

Mr. DASH. Were stink bombs used against Mr. Muskie's campaign in Florida?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There were three instances when a substance, which name I do not recall now, were either attempted or were placed in places involving Senator Muskie.

Mr. DASH. Was one of them Senator Muskie's headquarters in Tampa?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I understand that did take place.

Mr. DASH. Do you know who placed that particular bomb?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Dash, excuse me, I think it should be made clear these were not bombs in the sense of exploding bombs or anything of that nature. It was more to create a smell rather than explode to damage other persons, that should be made clear.

Mr. DASH. Its purpose was to create such an odor that people could not occupy the place when the bomb did whatever it was supposed to do, is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, perhaps that states it a little strong but certainly to make it unpleasant.

Mr. DASH. Do you know what was—where the particular substance was placed in the Muskie headquarters in Tampa?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; I do not.

Mr. DASH. Do you know how they were able to place the substance in the headquarters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I have understood, after the fact, that it was put in through a window or screen.

Mr. DASH. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that they had to break into that window to do it?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, I do not.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Benz did not report that to you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. If—my recollection is that a screen was pried open and a window lifted, something to that effect.

Mr. DASH. Well, would you then say that the prying open of the screen is breaking into the headquarters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. It certainly was an unauthorized entry.

Mr. DASH. I won't take you back to your law school burglary days but—not your act of burglary but your definition of burglary—as to what the breaking in would require but, in fact, it was a breaking in of that headquarters; was it not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't know the complete facts of what occurred there. I was told after the fact that the substance was placed in Senator Muskie's headquarters in the Tampa area. Now my recollection as to the details of how it was put in is somewhat vague. I do, however, remember that it seems to me a screen was pried open and a window lifted.

Mr. DASH. Was this on the primary day itself?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't recall that, Mr. Dash. It could very well have been.

Mr. DASH. And if it were on the primary day, would you agree that would be quite disruptive of the activity of the headquarters that day, that important day?

Mr. SEGRETTI. It could very well be, yes.

Mr. DASH. Who did you hire to work for you in the Pennsylvania primary?

Mr. SHERMAN. Could we have a moment? [Conferring.]

Mr. SEGRETTI. I had a young man in the Philadelphia area who was given, I believe, the sum of \$100.

Mr. DASH. We have some exhibits which have his name on them and what was his name?

Mr. SEGRETTI. His name is Mr. Zimmer.

Mr. DASH. Did he pass out literature and organize anti-Muskie pickets at Muskie rallies?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe he did some of that.

Mr. DASH. All right. Now, will you turn to tabs 16, 17, and 18 [exhibits Nos. 212, 213, and 214]. Start at 16. Do you recognize what appears to be a clipping from the Pennsylvania Voice, of Wednesday, April 19—an article called Points of Order by a journalist whose name is Blair Stobaugh?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do.

Mr. DASH. Without reading the article—specifically that article refers to Senator Muskie's effort in Philadelphia to speak in the presence of demonstrators and hecklers during the course of his speaking, is that not true?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is true.

Mr. DASH. Now, all around—by the way, how did you receive this clipping?

Mr. SEGRETTI. By mail.

Mr. DASH. Is it true that you received this clipping from Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To the best of my belief, it came from Mr. Zimmer.

Mr. DASH. Do you notice around the clipping some handwriting?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Which refers to the clipping itself, and could you read that for us?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, I will, Mr. Dash.

Left-hand side toward the top it says, "This whole article is about, and by one of my people. Pennsylvania Voice, circulation"—I believe that says 10,000, I am not sure. This may be a student newspaper up there, a student-oriented paper, I am not certain of that. It says, "Don: great! I didn't think that we could get this in print. Protesters, counter-protesters, us"——

Mr. DASH. There are three, "us, us, us" underscored, quite bragging.

Mr. SEGRETTI. "Blair"—I can't read the last name, I can't pronounce it—"Stobaugh was one of my own henchmen."

Mr. DASH. He is the writer of the article?

Mr. SEGRETTI. His name is on the article; yes.

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Mr. SEGRETTI [continues reading]: "I didn't think that this would make the paper so I forgot to tell you about it. I didn't see it until Thursday night right after I talked to you."

The rest of it is a little difficult on this copy.

Mr. DASH. Can you make it out on the bottom? "These are all my 'protesters'" and the word "great" underneath.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That seems to be what it states.

Mr. DASH. Will you turn to tab 17. Actually as you have them, I think, Mr. Segretti, they are put in the wrong order. If you will turn to the next page, and do you see at the top where it says, "Skip—Philly April 23, 1972."

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Who was Skip?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was Mr. Zimmer.

Mr. DASH. Was that his nickname?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I imagine.

Mr. DASH. He was known as Skip Zimmer. Could you just read—can you read his note to you at that time?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; it says: "Don, talked to Jack Cannon, Senator Humphrey's deputy press secretary, tonight about the paying of demonstrators by M's people"—I assume that means Senator Muskie's people.

Mr. DASH. Muskie's people.

Mr. SEGRETTI [continues reading]: "Gave him names, places, et cetera, told him I was reporter Bob Schmidt of the Daily News, and that our paper had received calls and letters about it. He said the Senator had no comment for publication but they said 'off the record' were in fact——

Mr. DASH. If you turn over to the next page it follows "aware"——

Mr. SEGRETTI. It looks like "Aware this had been going on and there were hecklers"——

Mr. DASH. "And they were checking further," I think it says, could you read that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. "Checking further into the matter and that the Fair Campaign Practices Committee had been contacted but that"—his writing is a little difficult—"but that further proof might be needed to make the charge stick for publication purposes," et cetera. He also said 'off the record' that the H people"—I assume Humphrey people—"were very disturbed and planned to complain to John English about it personally on Monday."

Mr. DASH. Wasn't that a case, Mr. Segretti, where Mr. Zimmer had employed hecklers against Muskie?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe Mr. Zimmer ever employed any hecklers, Mr. Dash, to my knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Well, apparently posing as a reporter he contacted Senator Humphrey's headquarters, and told them that Muskie's people had placed the hecklers.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Mr. DASH. And this was part again of the strategy of playing one candidate off against another?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Mr. DASH. To create divisiveness?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Mr. DASH. Do you know the signs that are drawn underneath the last statement in red which Mr. Zimmer gives you as illustrations of the signs they used during the Muskie rally?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Right.

Mr. DASH. And one says, "Muskie, Florida; 9 percent, Wisconsin, 10 percent; Pennsylvania, 11 percent (with luck)" in parentheses.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. And then the next one says "M-u-s-k-i-e spells loser, H.H.H. is the man."

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Another one says "probusing Ed's kids go to private school."

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. I will read, down at the bottom there appears to be in handwriting—"Muskie looked right up at these two"—meaning the first two—"right in front of him as he left, and scowled perceptibly,"—so apparently, Mr. Segretti, what you were doing had some effect as being reported back to you by your Philadelphia agent, that you were getting Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Muskie pretty upset.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes. However—

Mr. DASH. Is it true?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would like to state that Mr. Zimmer at times did have a tendency to perhaps embellish a little bit, so I think to some extent, such as the term "henchman" and so forth, was embellishment upon the language.

Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Segretti, turning to the California campaign, did you have copies of the headquarters stationery, campaign stationery, from Mr. McGovern, Mr. Yorty, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Humphrey, printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Did you have them printed up by a printer?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Through a printer given to me by Mr. Warren, now Mr. Hunt.

Mr. DASH. Did you also have anti-Humphrey bumper stickers printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did have some.

Mr. DASH. Would you look at tab 20 [exhibit No. 216]? I will just hold this up.

Humphrey; he started the war; don't give him another chance; Democrats for Peace Candidate.

Is that one of the bumper stickers that you had printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. By the way, that Democrats for Peace Candidate, what organization was that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was me again, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. That was Donald Segretti.

How many of those did you have printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I really do not recall, without looking into my records, the number. I would guess perhaps 1,000.

Mr. DASH. Where were they distributed?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe some were distributed in California. My guess is the number would be 100, 150.

Mr. DASH. Apparently, now, this is an attack on Humphrey, where the emphasis had been Muskie in the past. It shifted to Humphrey. Can you explain why now the emphasis has shifted to Humphrey?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I would not want to characterize the emphasis as switching to Humphrey at all.

Mr. DASH. Well, maybe I can put the question another way.

Did Mr. Chapin, after the Wisconsin primary, tell you to stop focusing upon Senator Muskie and to begin driving a wedge between the leading candidates?

Mr. SEGRETTE. He mentioned two candidates.

Mr. DASH. Which candidates?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator Humphrey and Senator Muskie.

Mr. DASH. And was this an effort to do that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes. These bumper stickers primarily, perhaps 75 of them, were mailed to Humphrey delegates.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you also have a pamphlet printed up and distributed in California with regard to Mr. Humphrey? If you look at page 23, you can identify this pamphlet—tab 23 [exhibit No. 219].

Now, that pamphlet shows a photograph of Senator Humphrey holding a billfish, does it not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. And underneath the photograph is printed "A fishy smell for the White House"?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. And did you actually—this pamphlet looks very much like the earlier pamphlet that you identified, which was against Muskie, which had come out of the White House. You testified that you did not know it did, but it had been mailed to you and copied in about 5,000 copies.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Mr. DASH. Was this dummied up from that pamphlet?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I thought the pamphlet I received relating to Senator Muskie was, seemed to be well done. I took that pamphlet and I

patterned this pamphlet after it. The pictures I took from Time or Newsweek magazine.

Mr. DASH. And you have a picture inside of a UMW president, Tony Boyle, and a picture of Senator Humphrey, "Memories of 1968—stop the bomb—end U.S. aggression."

Is that correct? If you will turn the page, you will see those photographs.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. And this particular pamphlet again repeats pretty much the language that was in the Senator Muskie pamphlet. "Hubert H. Humphrey would be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Reagans, we have now."

"He is the 'boss-candidate'," et cetera, and it is pretty derogatory of Senator Humphrey, is it not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is pretty much a copy of the same language that was in the pamphlet regarding Senator Muskie.

Mr. DASH. Well, this one seems to make Humphrey kind of a war-monger, does it not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I do not know if I would term it "warmonger."

Mr. DASH. Well, also, it refers to him as a Democratic boss-candidate, does it not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, it does.

Mr. DASH. Apparently, the sponsor on this particular one—different from what appeared on the Muskie one, which said "Democrats for a Liberal Alternative," says "Democrats Against Bossism, T. Wilson, Chairman"—is that again you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That, again, is a committee of one—me.

Mr. DASH. And who is T. Wilson—chairman? Is that a phony name?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not know. That is just a name.

Mr. DASH. How many of these pamphlets did you have printed up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I had printed up, I believe, 3,000, something along that line.

Mr. DASH. And where were they distributed?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There were some distributed in northern California. I would say the number distributed up there were 100, 150. A few were mailed. I would say the total distributed perhaps, I would guess perhaps 300. Somewhere along that line.

Mr. DASH. What impression were you attempting to create with this kind of pamphlet with the Humphrey supporters?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That another Democratic camp was distributing such leaflets.

Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, did you know that Senator Humphrey was quite stirred up and actually believed that Senator McGovern or Senator Muskie had printed this pamphlet?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did not know that.

Mr. DASH. Now, using the stationery of the various candidates that you had printed up—now known as bogus stationery—did you send out a false letter on McCarthy campaign stationery over the signature of Barbara Barron?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; I did.

Mr. DASH. Who is Barbara Barron?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I am not really sure who she is. I believe she was a campaign worker in McCarthy headquarters.

Mr. DASH. Is that her signature that appeared on that letter? If you will look at the tab, tab 21 [exhibit No. 217] is it?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe a facsimile.

Mr. DASH. This actually was a forgery of her signature, was it not? Or somebody signed her name?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Somebody signed her name, yes.

Mr. DASH. Now, the contents of the letter essentially is on McCarthy 1972 headquarters stationery.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Right.

Mr. DASH. It is addressed to McCarthy delegates, is it not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right.

Mr. DASH. And does it not ask that McCarthy delegates switch their support to Senator Humphrey?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Also, if you just turn the page, was there not a similar letter on McCarthy stationery, also purportedly signed by Barbara Barron, sent to Shirley Chisholm supporters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; essentially it is the same letter.

Mr. DASH. The same letter?

Mr. SEGRETTI. With a few minor changes.

Mr. DASH. And the letter essentially says, if they were interested in Senator McCarthy, they should switch their support to Senator Humphrey, even though Senator McCarthy's ideology is more closely associated with Senator McGovern. Is that the gist of the letter?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I would say so, essentially.

Mr. DASH. Who got these letters, the McCarthy delegates and Chisholm delegates, is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Some McCarthy delegates and some Chisholm delegates did receive these. At the same time the others were mailed, some were addressed, but intentionally, no stamp was put on so that they would go back to the McCarthy headquarters so they would be aware of it.

Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Segretti, did you compound this and send a form letter on Mayor Yorty's campaign stationery, purported to be written by a disgusted Yorty worker, blaming Yorty for these McCarthy letters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe there were four or five such letters typed and sent.

Mr. DASH. Look at tab 24 [exhibit No. 220].

This appears to be a full page display of May 26, 1972, of the Los Angeles Free Press. The headline is: "Is Mayor Yorty Involved in a Plot To Sabotage McGovern?" And there is—as you will see—a photograph of the bogus Yorty letter, which was your production, which purports to be written by a person who just says they thought that politics was dirty, but this is the last bit, that they were going, they were going to quit the Yorty campaign because of it, and it attaches copies of the two letters just referred to on the McCarthy stationery, one to a McCarthy delegate and one to a Chisholm delegate, is that not true?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is true.

Mr. DASH. And all of this was your handiwork?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. What was the purpose of all this?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Just to confuse the candidates.

Mr. DASH. I take it you were quite successful in this?

Mr. SEGRETTI. It is hard for me to categorize success or not. The Free Press is an underground newspaper out there.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you have knowledge of false press releases sent out on Humphrey press release stationery?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; I did three of these.

Mr. DASH. You drafted them yourself?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Did one of them say that Lyndon Johnson favored Hubert Humphrey?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Or words to that effect.

Mr. DASH. And did one of them state that Shirley Chisholm was at one time confined to a mental institution in Virginia?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. And you made that all up?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. And in effect, you made a false charge?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is not correct.

Mr. DASH. It is not correct?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I mean the charge is not correct.

Mr. DASH. These all came out of your imagination?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Were these sent to the newspapers, false press releases on Hubert Humphrey stationery?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And were they printed?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe they were mimeographed, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. Did the newspapers pick up the story?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. DASH. Did you send copies of these false press releases to Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. And what was his reaction to that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. There was a comment that he laughed for a period of time regarding the press releases.

Mr. DASH. He thought it was funny that you sent a press release saying that Shirley Chisholm was at one time confined to a mental institution in Virginia?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Did you have an anti-Muskie ad distributed outside Muskie's fundraising dinner in Los Angeles? Look at tab 13 [exhibit No. 209].

Mr. SHERMAN. May we have a moment, Mr. Dash. [Conferring.] Thank you.

Mr. DASH. If you will look at tab 13, you will see an advertisement which is under the name of Stewart R. Mott, chairman of the Committee for Honesty in Politics. And it is headed "Disgusting, the Secret Money in Presidential Politics." There is a reference to Senator Muskie's failure, according to the ad, of making a full disclosure, financial disclosure. Now, did you take this ad out of a New York newspaper and

reproduce it for this particular Muskie fundraising dinner in Los Angeles?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe I took it out of a New York newspaper. I saw it in some newspaper. It was an ad. I clipped it out thought it was quite good, and——

Mr. DASH. Did you add the printed language at the bottom?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I did add that.

Mr. DASH. The language at the bottom says: "Now he says he will disclose"——

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is where it starts.

Mr. DASH. "Now he says he will disclose the fat cats behind him (after he lost badly in Florida and cried in New Hampshire). Why is he waiting for full disclosure—is it to fix up his books?"

Then you have at the bottom: "The committee will look for your names as part of Muskie's fat cats. They better be there."

You and your operatives were giving this ad to people who were attending that Muskie dinner at this time and they were being told that their names better be there. Is that not true?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe some of those were passed out; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. And I take it the purpose of passing that out was to put them in fear that there was some——

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't think the purpose is to put them in any fear.

Mr. DASH. You don't think the language carries a threat of some sort?

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, there is a great difference between fear and a threat.

Mr. DASH. Would you accept a change of the question to saying you feel that that language poses some threat?

Mr. SEGRETTE. The purpose of that language was to irritate people rather than to actually frighten or threaten them. I take this language now and I took it then to be, to some degree, political rhetoric or puffing, in a sense.

Mr. DASH. I think you have also given us one of your final acts. You have said that during the Miami Democratic Convention, your agent, Mr. Kelly, had a plane fly over carrying a sign against McGovern saying "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity—Vote McGovern."

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was a trailer, I believe.

Mr. DASH. A trailer.

What caused your own activities to come to a halt?

Mr. SEGRETTE. At one time, I had been visited by the FBI and I think that sobered me up a great deal. I started to think about these activities. A little bit later, I was instructed to cease.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Montoya—excuse me. Mr. Thompson, pardon me.

Mr. THOMPSON. I will yield to the Senator if you prefer to go ahead.

Senator ERVIN. No, go ahead.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you.

Excuse me, Mr. Segretti, let me direct your attention to document No. 22 [exhibit No. 218]. I believe you have it there. The sheet entitled "George McGovern's Real Record on the War." It deals chronologically with how Senator McGovern voted on various issues pertain-

ing to the war. Down at the bottom, it says: "Don't believe it. Check the record. Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government."

Was that another one of your committees?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, it was and it wasn't, Mr. Thompson. I think this would be the correct way to give you an answer. Perhaps I should explain that.

This flier was obtained, I believe, by Mr. Kelly in the Miami area. I can't recall exactly, whether it was told to me it came from either Senator Muskie's or Senator Humphrey's campaign; in other words, people working with him. It was picked up. I subsequently had some reproduced and distributed those or had those distributed myself.

Mr. THOMPSON. This document was picked up at either Muskie's or Humphrey's headquarters?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I don't want to say that. It was picked up in the areas being distributed by those individuals. Whether it was actually picked up at their headquarters, I have no knowledge.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Kelly could testify to that, I assume.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I imagine he could.

Mr. THOMPSON. You redistributed it, is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Pardon?

Mr. THOMPSON. You redistributed this document?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I did.

Mr. THOMPSON. I notice at the top there is a signature that appears to be that of Mr. McGovern?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know how that came about, who signed that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was related to me that Mr. Kelly attended a rally somewhere in the Miami area. Mr. Kelly folded this document up and as a souvenir—after the talk Senator McGovern was giving autographs, and as a personal souvenir of his, he went up and Senator McGovern signed this document.

Mr. THOMPSON. So Senator McGovern signed his autograph on this particular document?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Segretti, you have related, I believe, just about all of your activities, some amusing and some not amusing at all.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I agree with you, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me ask you this; generally speaking, how were these ideas thought up? Were they planned out in advance? Was there a game plan, so to speak, as to what you would do at one time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; to be very frank with you, a number of them were just thought up over a beer or two.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thought up over a beer or two?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. By whom, usually?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Myself, perhaps one or two other individuals assisting me.

Mr. THOMPSON. Such as who?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Kelly or Mr. Benz. Sometimes I would think them up and suggest them to them. No set pattern.

Mr. THOMPSON. How long were the sessions in which you would discuss these?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Some were longer than others, none very long.

Mr. THOMPSON. How many of the people you were operating with knew about what you were going to do before it was done?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Specifically?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Generally, I would have to say no one.

Mr. THOMPSON. Generally you would have to say what?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No one.

Mr. THOMPSON. No one else?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There were a few examples, minor examples, earlier, however.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, who would know about it beforehand—anyone at the White House, for example?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe possibly Mr. Chapin.

Mr. THOMPSON. In what sense?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Some pickets at the Democratic dinner in San Francisco that had "Kennedy for President" pickets—I think there were three or four pickets. There may have been one or two other minor examples such as that.

Mr. THOMPSON. But that is the nature of the activity that was known beforehand at the White House by Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. THOMPSON. I believe you said you reported to Mr. Chapin on some regular basis what you were doing?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Would that be all of your activities, or could you give us a certain percentage of your activities that were reported to him?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is hard to recollect a percentage. I would say as a general matter, of course, I would send what was done to Mr. Chapin.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Segretti, you, as I stated, listed several activities that you were involved in. Were there activities in the dirty tricks area or the prank area during the campaign that you were aware of that you have gotten credit for which you did not in fact do?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe there are, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Could you relate those to us?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, the Canuck letter is one that stands out in my mind. I am sure there are others.

Mr. THOMPSON. Are you saying that you did not write the Canuck letter?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did not write the Canuck letter. I have no idea who wrote the Canuck letter. What more can I say?

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you in fact run a spy school?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No.

Mr. THOMPSON. Was that not reported?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was reported, I believe in the Washington Post and perhaps other newspapers, that I was running a spy school in the Midwest.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know how that story came about?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; I believe that came about from a story given to the Washington Post by Mr. Lawrence or Larry Young in California.

Mr. THOMPSON. Who was Mr. Young?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Young was an individual that I knew at the University of Southern California. I believe he knew Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan also. The Washington Post or one of their reporters

went to see Mr. Young and subsequently obtained a story in which it contained, among other things, an allegation that I was running a spy school in the Midwest.

Mr. THOMPSON. What about the allegation that you prefaced your grand jury performance by having been shown FBI 302's. Is that part of the same story?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe that was in the same story and I believe that came from Mr. Young, too, and that is false.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know why Mr. Young would state these things that have been related to you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is very hard for me, sitting here—at other times, I have thought of it a great deal why Mr. Young, whom I had considered to be a very close individual to me for a number of years, would do such a thing. I think part of it was plain politics. He was a liberal Democrat and I guess I didn't term my friendships in terms of Republican or Democrat. Perhaps that was sort of my problem with Mr. Young. But after the November election, he did send to my parents, who he knew, and to myself a card stating to some degree, the election is over with, it is water under the bridge now, and let's get together again.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know whether or not he submitted a letter to the Special Prosecutor, Mr. Cox, with regard to these allegations?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I have no idea.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Thompson, we did have a copy of that letter and we did make it available to the Special Prosecutor's office. I believe we showed a copy of the letter to Mr. Lenzner, too.

Mr. THOMPSON. I am just reminded, I think you probably did. I would like to know a little more about it if you remember the contents of the letter.

Mr. SEGRETTE. As far as I could remember or recall—off the top of my head now—that letter effectively said, essentially said, he was visited by individuals from the Washington Post, and that they told him that they were going to print a story that tens of thousands of dollars of campaign funds were channeled through his law firm for various and sundry activities. In response to that he felt, along with that and the fact that he was not—

Senator ERVIN. There is a vote on in the Senate and I expect we may have a short roll call and maybe we had better go over there and vote immediately.

[Recess.]

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Thompson, will you resume interrogation of the witness?

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I believe the witness was in the middle of an answer, and if he recalls the question and his initial response, I would just like for him to pick up where he left off. We were referring to a letter Mr. Young had written explaining the reason why he had told newspaper reporters that you had run a spy school and had done various other things which you say you did not in fact do. Would you pick up on that and tell us what Young related as his reasons for his actions?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, essentially, he related to me the fact that if he did not give the press a story they were going to print a story regarding him that was untrue. To a great degree it was a letter saying to let bygones be bygones and to be friends again.

Mr. THOMPSON. The newspaper reporters told him they were going to print a story that was untrue unless he gave them that information?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was the thrust of the letter written to me.

Mr. THOMPSON. What information was untrue?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That large sums of money were channeled through him to be used in the reelection of President Nixon.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you know if there is any factual basis for that at all?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not believe there is any factual basis.

Mr. THOMPSON. Young was not for Nixon, was he?

Mr. SEGRETTI. So far as I know, he was not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did a story subsequently appear in the Washington Post setting forth these allegations?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes; that is correct, Mr. Thompson. I think that is right.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think that article was dated October 10, 1972.

Mr. THOMPSON. October 10.

I think I will pick that up on another round. I will not take time to read the entire letter right now. You say you were shown FBI reports—FD-302 forms—before your grand jury appearance in August?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. I will ask you whether or not you have, at any time since the Watergate breakin, been shown by anyone other than the FBI any FBI FD-302's?

Mr. SHERMAN. At this point we would ask for a ruling from the Chair. We had discussed this previously, I think, with both you, Mr. Thompson, and Mr. Dash, that this does go into a matter—another matter, we do not feel has any relevancy to these hearings at all, and has been disclosed to the special prosecutor in this case and I would ask, unless the question is framed in terms of resolution 60, we would say it has no relevancy now. We would ask for Senator Ervin's understanding on the issue. I explained it fully to Mr. Dash in private and also Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, if I understand it correctly, and I do not want to state counsel's case for him; I really would prefer for him to state his own case. My own feeling is that any time subsequent to the break-in—pursuant to the break-in, if he was shown an FBI report by anyone dealing with the Watergate investigation——

Mr. SHERMAN. We would object to that unless the question was framed within terms of the resolution having to do with the 1972 campaign and it would be irrelevant, and I can state for the record, if any reports were shown it was certainly after the election was over and was not part of any coverup and does not involve any persons in any way that are under investigation by this committee.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I would simply state so far as relevance is concerned, we are talking about the investigation of the Watergate matter. I will not belabor the point by referring to witness after witness after witness who have related similar matters concerning all aspects of the Watergate investigation. This pertained to the Watergate investigation. Anybody in possession of an FBI report, especially if he shows it to a person who is a subject of the investigation, I think the facts should be brought out. I am not necessarily asking for a name

of an individual. If that individual is the object of an investigation by Special Prosecutor Cox, while it is not a courtesy we have shown other people involved in this case, for my part, I do not necessarily care to have a name if the source can be identified.

Senator ERVIN. I think it would have to be somebody who would be competent. I cannot see, if some third party that is not involved in any of the transactions that are authorized to be investigated by the committee, how it would be admissible. I do not know exactly what the evidence is but we are not investigating the FBI particularly.

Mr. SHERMAN. The problem is, if I may be more specific and indicate the exact ground of the objection, that in effect we told you anyhow. But as I say, we told Mr. Lenzner and Mr. Dash quite sometime ago and I think I indicated to you yesterday and it certainly is a third party to this investigation having absolutely nothing to do with it.

If the chairman feels we must answer the question, then, of course, Mr. Segretti will answer it, but certainly I do not think it is within the Senate resolution.

Mr. THOMPSON. If the chairman please, I am not really sure that I understand the nature of the objection as it pertains to Mr. Segretti or what the objection is.

Senator ERVIN. Counsel says that it is not germane to what the committee is authorized to investigate. I cannot tell whether it is, not knowing what the answer would be.

Mr. SHERMAN. Of course, if I tell you the answer then, in order for you to make an intelligent judgment, we have answered the question but I told Mr. Dash and maybe Mr. Dash can tell you.

Mr. THOMPSON. I would suggest that Mr. Dash inform the chairman now in private and let the chairman make a ruling.

Senator ERVIN [conferring]. I frankly cannot see where this throws any light on what we are investigating.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, if you rule that it is not relevant, then, of course, I won't pursue it.

Senator ERVIN. Well, on the information supplied to me by Mr. Dash, I will so rule.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Just so it is clear, however, that Mr. Segretti is in no way protecting any person, is not being forthright with this committee, he has fully disclosed this information months ago to Mr. Lenzner and to the special prosecutor and is cooperating fully in their investigation into this matter.

Mr. THOMPSON. Of course what we are trying to do is lay out all the facts of this investigation, which have been repeated many times, before the American people; to have all aspects of it made public, past Mr. Lenzner or the prosecutor or myself, so we have a ruling on it. You understand my concern; I am not interested in dragging up anyone's name even though you seem to have firsthand facts regarding that situation, even if that person is innocent, but I thought, based upon prior testimony we have heard and matters which have been considered relevant by this committee, dating back sometime before the election, sometime after the election, that it was relevant; but the chairman has ruled and I won't pursue it any further.

Let me refer to document No. 25 [exhibit No. 221], if I might, Mr. Segretti.

Mr. SEGRETTI. All right, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. It appears to be a copy of a daily register of the Towne Motel in Miami, I believe, dated June 10, 1972?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. I have noticed this since our interview, frankly, in reviewing the documents. There is listed a Mr. Simmons, No. 7, I assume that is you; is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was me, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. What were you doing in Miami that particular time? What was your reason for being there?

Mr. SEGRETTE. To talk to Mr. Kelly and to talk to another individual that I knew at that time under the name of Mr. Warren; in other words, Howard Hunt.

Mr. THOMPSON. What were you discussing at that time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. The conversation with Mr. Hunt related to a proposed activity at the Democratic convention.

Mr. THOMPSON. What was the proposed activity?

Mr. SEGRETTE. The proposed activity related to creating a peaceful group of demonstrators ostensibly for Senator McGovern. Mr. Hunt was going to have another group merge with the peaceful demonstrators and act in an unruly manner and the unruly demonstration would be blamed on Senator McGovern.

Mr. THOMPSON. I direct your attention to this particular document because I see there listed No. 11—Mr. Martinez. Have you ever met the Martinez who participated in the Watergate break-in?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I have not; not to my knowledge.

Mr. THOMPSON. Have you seen him or were you aware he was there if, in fact, he was the same man?

Mr. SEGRETTE. As a matter of fact, this was the first time I ever noticed this and I have no idea. It could be a coincidence—no idea.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, if it is, it occurs more than once with regard to another official, Mr. Gonzales. If you will check over the next couple of pages, on June 11 you have Mr. Simmons listed again under No. 7, and in No. 12 you have an entry of Mr. Gonzales. Do you know whether or not that was Mr. Gonzales who participated in the Watergate break-in?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I have no idea.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is June 11, and again on June—

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Thompson, I might point out the spelling may be different but there also is another Gonzales staying there on the same day, No. 23, which indicates a fairly common name.

Mr. THOMPSON. I was wondering about that or whether or not the same man checked back in.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is a different spelling for the name Gonzales, however.

Mr. THOMPSON. It appears to be the same to me.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I might state, Mr. Thompson, perhaps this may or may not explain it, that this motel—it is in close proximity to where I was told to meet Mr. Warren. It is within a few blocks, perhaps that would account for it, but if those were the same individuals involved in the Watergate escapade it is pure coincidence.

Mr. THOMPSON. On the next one, June 12, No. 23, Mr. Gonzales again. You have Martinez on the 10th, Gonzales on the 11th and 12th, and you were there from the 10th through the 12th.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Mr. THOMPSON. But you were not aware that these people were there if these were the people involved in the DNC break-in.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I am not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Hunt did not discuss their presence with you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. He did not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Montoya.

Senator MONTOKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Segretti, prior to your indoctrination into these practices, what did you conceive to be the preelectoral process under our constitutional system in the United States?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I conceived the electoral process of the United States to be, one, where hopefully the best candidate for the office would obtain that office. That is essentially through the political process.

Senator MONTOKA. Well, did you conceive as part of that thinking that he should obtain the office honestly and by open, free, and undeceptive discussion on the campaign trail with the American people?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, that is correct.

Senator MONTOKA. And what led you to change?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is a difficult answer for me to give. I have thought of that myself many times, Senator.

Senator MONTOKA. Give me the genesis of it, or the transformation, the gradual transformation, if it was gradual.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I have never come up with an adequate answer to myself for that.

Senator MONTOKA. What ingredients can you supply us with that led you to transform yourself from that type of thinking into what you actually did?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I think there were a combination of factors, Senator. I think—No. 1, I think it was the individuals who contacted me; the fact that they were old friends; the fact that I had—still have—respect for them, even though a lot of water has gone under the bridge. I think the fact of, in a sense, working for high officials, that is, the White House—I think that was a factor. I think the fact that it was at a particular stage in my life; the Army was not a career that I wanted to pursue. I was in it for the period of time that I was obligated to do the best job I could in the military but after that I wanted to go out and do something else. There was a change of pace from that and it sounded like a great deal of travel, and I think those are all factors that must be listed.

Senator MONTOKA. Did you understand your mission to be in the area of pranksterism or dirty tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I heard perhaps a different—or an attempted delineated difference by Mr. Buchanan. It is very hard for me to draw the line between the two. I think you can draw the line between extremes. When it was first approached to me I certainly looked upon it as in the category of pranks.

Senator MONTOKA. You mentioned in your own statement on page 3, that one of the reasons why you agreed to accept the position was the fact that you were now being given the opportunity of working for the the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Senator MONTAÑA. Did you, during all this time, think that you were working under the umbrella of the White House, so to speak?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe in a sense that would be a correct statement; yes, sir.

Senator MONTAÑA. And I notice from the record of communication with Mr. Chapin, who was an employee of the White House, that you were in quite frequent contact with him from the time that you began your employment until after you ceased as a result of the investigation that began in 1972.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Senator MONTAÑA. Now, it stands to reason that during all this time, in addition to the initial contact that you had with Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan, that you were receiving quite a bit of instruction from these people as to how to conduct yourself and what to do in the different State primaries in Florida, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, and the other States. Is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator MONTAÑA. Now, how extensive was the instruction that you received from these two individuals which I have mentioned and other individuals? And please name them if you can?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I had very little contact with Mr. Strachan; I wish to make that clear. Since the time of my, shall we say, employment up until post-Watergate, and even then, my contact, I believe, was one meeting—one brief meeting. Other than that, my contact at the White House, excluding Mr. Dean, was Mr. Chapin. My instructions from him, if you can call them instructions, were to a very great extent very passive, rather than do this or do that or any specifics.

Senator MONTAÑA. You were reporting to him what you intended to do, say a day or two from now and you were reporting, also to him, what you had done previous to the time that you were calling him. You were in constant communication with him, were you not, and relating all these things to him?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Pretty much, Senator. There were periods of time later on when Mr. Chapin was out of the country. There was no regular schedule of contacting him. One week it may be several times and then perhaps, there may be a 2-week period that there would be no contact.

Senator MONTAÑA. Were you submitting written reports to him, too?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There may have been one or two very brief; nothing formalized.

Senator MONTAÑA. Were you sending him copies of the different files and pamphlets that you were putting out?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I was.

Senator MONTAÑA. And, of course, you were getting communications from him in return as to whether they were in proper taste or very proper within the orbit of the mission that you were performing?

Mr. SEGRETTE. At times; yes, sir. Many times, there was no response that I can really recall.

Senator MONTAÑA. Now that you look back on what you did and now that you have reflected quite a bit, would you say that what you actually did, and especially those things about which you have testified this morning, fall into the category of being pranks rather than dirty tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would say they cover the whole gamut, Senator.

Senator MONTAÑA. Then, is it your testimony that they would be classified also as dirty tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Some were; yes, sir.

Senator MONTAÑA. Well, would you not say most of them were?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I have never really sat down and categorized them. But I agree with you.

Senator MONTAÑA. You do agree with me?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator MONTAÑA. All right, fine.

Now, in view of this, would you say that you were actually subverting the free electoral process as you envisioned it when you were a young lawyer fresh out of law school and fresh out of the Army, and before you were contacted by the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I never really analyzed it in that term, but looking back at it, certainly during the time that I was doing it, I had no thought along that line. I think if I had the wisdom at that time to look at it in that light and with some degree of perspective and objectivity, which I really did not have—hindsight is a very valuable thing at times—I think I would have been long gone from these activities.

Looking back on it, it is not a—none of these activities, I believe, are ones that should be included in the American political system.

Senator MONTAÑA. Now, you mentioned on page 10 of your statement, and I quote you as follows:

However, I cannot help but feel that I have been abused by rumor, character assassination, innuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my friends, and my family.

Well, this observation leads me to extend my sympathy to you. Now, do you not think that you were practicing that very same thing on Presidential candidates and also practicing deception on the American people when you were engaged in this mission?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I agree. And I regret it very much, Senator.

Senator MONTAÑA. And you also submitted some deceptive statements to the press, ostensibly ascribing them to the different Presidential candidates. Now, do you think that this was proper and within the free press guarantees of the Constitution?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think it is improper and I do not think incorrect distortions, untruths, or anything of that nature should be disseminated by the press or by any individual.

Senator MONTAÑA. In other words, Mr. Segretti, do you not feel that by virtue of what you did, you have disappointed many people in the United States, especially young people in your age group?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator MONTAÑA. And do you not feel that if we are to have a free electoral process, there should be not only a rededication on the part of both political parties to insure to the American people the free electoral process and to exhort the press to disseminate as much information on each candidate on its pages untainted by things such as you did in the last campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe that both political parties and all candidates should run in the future—that may run in the future—should look at themselves in a very critical light and any activity such as what I was

engaged in, or others may have been engaged in, should not take place.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, you have testified that you feel that you were done a disservice by those whom you trusted, those friends with whom you attended college, in that they recruited you to perform this task and it degenerated into something that was very distasteful to you as you look back—in retrospect. Do you have the same feeling with respect to those young people that you recruited yourself to carry out some of these missions?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator MONTROYA. And is it now your feeling that there should be an alertness on the part of youths throughout the United States that they should not lend themselves or permit themselves to be used for this kind of a mission?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think I should answer it in these terms: I heard Mr. Strachan testify when he was asked whether young people should come into politics. Mr. Strachan's statement was: "Stay away." I can certainly understand that statement. There is many a morning that I have waked up and I have said to myself, I wish I had stayed away, or I wish I had had that advice myself somewhere along the line, or have somebody sit down with me and say, Don, do you really want to get involved in things like this, rather than just by law?

Then, I heard another individual—I do not recall who it was—perhaps Mr. Haldeman, in a call for young people to come into politics.

My own feeling is that I think our country would be a lot better off if young people, particularly young people, were to get involved in the political system, but not blindly. I think when they come into it, they should come in with a very critical eye. They should go into it very carefully. I think there are some good things that have come out of this entire—the entire events of the last year and a half. I do not think it is—it has been a tragedy for, certainly, the people involved and also for our system. But I think the good thing that could come out of it would be that young people or people that are presently involved, young or not, would really be very critical of their activities in regard to the political process.

Senator MONTROYA. Thank you very much. My time has run out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker.

Senator WEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few very brief questions.

On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Segretti, you say at the top:

In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the purpose of seeking additional contacts. During my visit, I met a Mr. Robert Benz in Tampa, Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla.

How did you come across these two individuals? Were these persons that had been referred to you? How did you find them?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I came across Mr. Benz somewhat by chance after I arrived in Tampa. I really had no one to call there. I did call a local Republican headquarters and asked the individual who answered the phone if he knew of a young man who might be interested in doing some political work of some type, part time. He gave me the name of Mr.

Benz. I talked to Mr. Benz. Mr. Benz seemed knowledgeable about politics and seemed to be interested in getting involved in the type of activities I had in mind.

Subsequent to leaving Tampa, I was going to go down to Florida in conformity to the list that was given to me earlier of places to get acquaintances to help me out with my endeavors.

Senator WEICKER. What list was that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was a list of States that I was supplied earlier in my employment by Mr. Chapin. Mr. Benz mentioned the name of Mr. Kelly.

Upon arriving in Miami, I happened to call an individual that was on the White House advance list that had been supplied me and that individual gave me the name of Mr. Kelly. So I had Mr. Kelly's name from two sources and I subsequently called him.

Senator WEICKER. Let me just be clear on this. You got Mr. Kelly's name from Mr. Chapin's original list?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, no, sir. I got a name from the White House list supplied me by Mr. Chapin of an individual in Miami. I called that individual—

Senator WEICKER. Who was that individual?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, he is an individual that, other than my contacting him that one time—

Senator WEICKER. All right, could you supply his name to the committee, then?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe I have, and I would be happy to supply it to you off the public light, shall I say, without any problem.

Senator WEICKER. Fine.

Mr. SEGRETTE. He mentioned the name of Mr. Kelly.

Senator WEICKER. Then you also were in touch with the White House advance man?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That was the—

Senator WEICKER. That was the advance man?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes. He was not currently working as an advance man. He had at one time, I believe, performed functions as an advance man.

Senator WEICKER. I see.

When you called Mr. Chapin, were these calls to the Committee To Re-Elect the President, or were they calls directly to the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. They were calls to the White House switchboard.

Senator WEICKER. I gather from the statement which you made earlier, or your opening statement—I beg your pardon. Let me correct myself. I gather from the statement you made before the staff of the committee that there were occasions when apparently, your operation was conducted simultaneously, and I am now talking about protesters, et cetera, with another Republican operation. Were you aware of this?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, sir, I was not. I had no idea that anybody else was operating.

Senator WEICKER. Well, the reason why I am asking this is, and let me have you respond any way you want to. It seems to me that there might have been sort of two dirty tricks operations going on in water-tight compartments. Am I correct in assuming that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, it is difficult for me, because I have no personal knowledge of that from my position, but certainly watching the hearings and from what I have read in the press, it is very possible.

Senator WEICKER. But your operation, then, I gather, received its direction from the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Senator WEICKER. And the other operation seemed to have its direction out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. You have no personal knowledge of that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not.

Senator WEICKER. And there is no time that you came into conflict with each other?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Not to my knowledge. The only cross there may be—well, I was thinking about that one pamphlet that was mailed to me and where that came from, I really don't know. But from testimony, that apparently originated in the White House also.

Senator WEICKER. Then lastly, in the course of your activities during that period of time that the Democratic primaries were going on, were you ever assisted in your task by Democrats, in other words, supporters of any one of the Democratic candidates who might have shared a similar goal, to put the other candidate under? Was that a field for recruitment as far as any of your activities were concerned?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Not really.

Senator WEICKER. Or any information supplied to you by—

Mr. SEGRETTI. By other Democrats?

Senator WEICKER. Yes.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Not to my knowledge. I believe the one individual I knew in Philadelphia used one of the Democratic—some Democratic workers at a rally. He had printed up some fliers that the large print was "Trust Muskie" or "Trust Senator Muskie." He went to the rally and I believe he gave a few of those—I think we are talking in terms of 50, 60, 70—leaflets to some of the local staff workers who then took those and passed them out themselves. Beyond that, it would be that type of, it would be extremely minimal, if at all.

Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator INOUE.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

During the latter part of September, Mr. Segretti, you visited Portland, Oreg., and stayed at the Benson Hotel.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator INOUE. Of the many people you communicated with, there must have been some involved in your special activities.

Who were these people?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I beg your pardon, sir?

Senator INOUE. Did you communicate with anyone in Portland relating to your sabotage activities?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I called two individuals. They were essentially, to some extent, social calls. Nothing came of those contacts. They never did anything for me. That was the extent of it.

Senator INOUE. What was your conversation with the district attorney?

Mr. SEGRETTI. He was an individual whom I knew from the Army. He was a reservist and he was the only individual I knew in Portland.

I called him up and I asked him if he knew of anybody that might want to get involved in political activity. He gave me the name of an individual, and I called him up and he said he was not interested. That was the extent of it.

Senator INOUE. Did you describe to the district attorney the scope of your political activity?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; I did not.

Senator INOUE. Before the election day, besides Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan, and Mr. Porter, were there others in the White House who were aware of your sabotage activities?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, I did not know Mr. Porter. I have never met Mr. Porter. As a matter of fact, before all this publicity, I did not even know the name of Mr. Porter.

Senator INOUE. Besides Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan, and Mr. Dean, were there others who were aware of them?

Mr. SEGRETTE. If there were, I have no knowledge of that.

Senator INOUE. Besides Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, were there others in the Committee To Re-Elect the President who were aware of your special activities?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't know whether Mr. Kalmbach was at any time. So far as Mr. Hunt, his knowledge of what I was doing was extremely limited. Mr. Liddy's knowledge of what I was doing or Mr. Leonard, if that is Mr. Liddy—and I assume at this time that it was—was also extremely limited.

Senator INOUE. In mid-November of 1972, Mr. Dean is supposed to have offered you a job in Montego Bay for about \$35,000.

Mr. SEGRETTE. What was that date again, Senator?

Senator INOUE. Mid-November 1972.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is about the time frame; yes, sir.

Senator INOUE. What was the purpose of this?

Mr. SEGRETTE. The purpose of him offering me a job?

Senator INOUE. Was this to get you out of town?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It could have been. It was not communicated to me as such, but that could very well have been the reason.

Senator INOUE. Do you know a Mr. Alex Shipley?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I do.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Shipley has indicated that you said the following: "Nixon knows that something is being done. It is a typical deal. Don't tell me anything and I won't talk."

What did you mean by this, sir?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am not really sure, Senator. For one thing, that statement is attributed to me and it occurred 2 years ago, practically. Mr. Shipley at that time when I—I knew him in the military service. At the time I contacted him, he apparently, as soon as I contacted him, contacted a friend of his who was on the Democratic staff committee or something, and subsequently contacted the Washington Post to tell them that somebody had contacted Mr. Shipley. So it is really hard for me to really say what I meant by that, for the reason that I don't really recall saying that.

Senator INOUE. Weren't you trying to recruit Mr. Shipley?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I was, but I had no knowledge whether Mr. Nixon or President Nixon knew anything that I did.

Senator INOUE. You have indicated that Mr. Hunt suggested that you disrupt Senator Muskie's April 17 fundraiser in Washington. Mr. Hunt has denied this. Which version is correct, sir?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, all I can tell you is Mr. Hunt called me on the telephone and told me about a Muskie dinner in Washington, D.C., and asked me if I would be willing to come back to Washington, D.C., and do some activities in relation to that dinner.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Hunt has also denied meeting you in New York City and giving you a copy of the Newsweek article on Mrs. Muskie.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I never met, to my recollection, Mr. Hunt in New York City.

Mr. SHERMAN. I don't believe that his part of any statement or part of any staff interview that was ever given, that Mr. Segretti met with Mr. Hunt in New York City.

Senator INOUE. These documents that you received from Washington, were you made aware of the offer of these pamphlets?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Are you talking about the pamphlets relating to Senator Muskie?

Senator INOUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, I was not. And, Senator, I am not at this time clear that they were mailed from Washington to me. I don't know where they were mailed from.

Senator INOUE. Did Mr. Chapin tell you where they were mailed from?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, sir, he did not.

Senator INOUE. And to the best of your recollection, you did not recruit anyone in Portland to work for you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, I did not; no, sir.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Gurney.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Segretti, I think in your statement it says that you started your political activities in college, University of Southern California; is that right?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To some degree, I would say that is correct.

Senator GURNEY. Campus politics?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. What did you do there in campus politics?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, I ran for an office there but I think many people ran for offices there. It was not that unusual.

Senator GURNEY. Is this prank business the sort of thing that goes on in campus politics?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Certainly not of this magnitude; no.

Senator GURNEY. What do they do in campus politics that is anything like this?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, it is really hard for me to recollect that. For one thing, I was not that involved in campus politics there. I was involved but I had other interests at the same time. I was not a political science major, I was a business major and I think much has been made of the fact that I was a great activist as far as politics at USC. I think many people were much more involved in politics at USC than I was. I think the type of thing that may have been going on there would be

that you could plant a friendly individual in an opponent's camp to find out what was going on.

Senator GURNEY. At least some of your activities in the 1972 campaign was somewhat of an extension of campus politics; was that it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. To some extent, I would say that is correct.

Senator GURNEY. In your statement on page 3—and I quote from it—you say: "During the initial period of my employment I myself had no specific idea as to what I was doing or how I was to do it." Is that not really pretty much the whole operation, really?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Looking back on it I would say that is true, Senator.

Senator GURNEY. Because as I recall your testimony in answer to questions by Mr. Thompson, you thought these things up on the spur of the moment; is that right?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. You had no real guidance out of Washington?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Just general—just a general theory to work from.

Senator GURNEY. I am curious about the Florida primary which, of course, was the first big political primary in the 1972 campaign. Anybody who knew anything about Florida politics, of course, knew what was going to happen and that was that Gov. George Wallace was going to take that race going away, as, indeed, he did. He got more votes than the next three people next to him in line, Humphrey, and Muskie, and Jackson. Why waste time on the Florida primary; everybody knew that Wallace was going to win.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, I could not agree with you more. As a matter of fact, I would even like to extend that and why waste time with any of this?

Senator GURNEY. I would agree with that, too. [Laughter.] But Florida especially, since that was so evident as to what was going to happen.

This McCarthy letter, I am also interested in that.

Mr. SEGRETTE. In what, sir?

Senator GURNEY. The McCarthy letter.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. In California. So help me this would seem to boost the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, was that what it was intended to do?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was not really intended for that purpose.

Senator GURNEY. If I got it I would as a McCarthy supporter, I think I would view it as that. My observation there is why promote Hubert Humphrey's candidacy in California when everybody on our side wanted George McGovern to win?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, as originally—

Senator GURNEY. It was a pretty hot, close race right down to the wire. Republicans were really trembling in their boots for fear Humphrey might win it. Why help out Humphrey?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I think there are two ways to think of that. I think the more realistic and politically astute thinking would be, that Senator McGovern would certainly be the best choice the Democrats could make for the Republicans in the 1972 race for the Republican campaign in this sense.

Perhaps another line of thinking would be, that if the Democrats went into the campaign without any clear choice, that they would fight

a little harder at the campaign and it would be more difficult for them to unite. But I think that is not really a very viable theory, certainly not in the context of 1972.

Senator GURNEY. Well, I must say it is too subtle for my political mind. It seems to me to be a pitch for Humphrey.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Certainly it is way over my head, too.

Senator GURNEY. As I understand you—how many people did you have engaged in your operation?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, do you mean at any one time or how many people?

Senator GURNEY. No, the whole bag.

Mr. SEGRETTE. You say, "engaged in your operation." Does that mean people who actually went out and did something affirmative, or just people that I talked to and nothing came of it?

Senator GURNEY. People who did something affirmative.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, primarily I would say there would be two others, perhaps three others. There were other individuals that did perhaps one or two activities, one or two small activities, and I would place their number at another six, seven, perhaps eight.

Senator GURNEY. Three principals and about eight others?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Senator GURNEY. The reason why I am asking the question, if you read in the media about the Segretti operation, you would get some idea there were about 5,000 spies in America and some kind of a great big political operation was about to sink the country?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. I am glad to know you only had 11 in this "rinkydink" operation.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, even 11, I think, is perhaps overemphasizing.

Senator GURNEY. It is true, and this answers some of the colloquy you have had with others that there were thousands and thousands of young people on the Republican side working for Richard Nixon in a legitimate way, is that not a fact?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right, and I cannot help but think at this point in time that there would be a heck of a lot more benefit to channel my energies and the energies of others on an aboveboard, legitimate way.

Senator GURNEY. Well, I am very glad you think that, and I believe your sincerity. But the point I wanted to make is, that this was a very tiny operation involving 11 people where thousands of other fine young people in this country were working hard for the reelection of Richard Nixon.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I agree.

Senator GURNEY. In retrospect, do you think this \$45,000 spent on this operation really influenced any votes? It really mattered?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I think Theodore White in his book, I think, assessed it correctly.

Senator GURNEY. What did he say?

Mr. SEGRETTE. He said something to the effect that the Chapin-Segretti operation, if it could be determined that, had the weight of a feather.

Senator GURNEY. Well, I think I would agree with that, too.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Talmadge.

Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Segretti, will you tell us what your activities were following the breaking and entering of the Watergate complex?

Mr. SEGRETTI [conferring with counsel]. Very briefly, Senator, I was in California when that occurred. I heard it over the news. I really—I don't believe I did anything about it. Subsequent to that, I was contacted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I contacted Mr. Chapin and subsequently was put in touch with Mr. John Dean—

Senator TALMADGE. Will you pull the mike a little closer to you? I cannot hear your voice.

Mr. SEGRETTI [continuing]. And subsequently met Mr. John Dean in Washington, D.C.

Senator TALMADGE. Then what happened after that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I talked with—I met Mr. Dean—I talked with him very briefly the day I met him, and then I talked to him the next day at his office, and then I flew back to Los Angeles, Calif., and met agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, do you mean what were his activities over a long period of time or—

Senator TALMADGE. I wanted to know whether or not your activities of subversion and sabotage continued following the breaking and entering of Watergate. Just exactly what you did after that.

Mr. SEGRETTI. The only thing that I can recall after that was the plane that flew over the Democratic convention with the trailer relating to Senator McGovern.

Senator TALMADGE. Was your advice subsequent to that to lay low, hide, go to a foreign country, or what?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, I was advised later on—

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, this raises a problem that I had also discussed with Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson. The question is broad enough that it might refer to conversations Mr. Segretti had with attorneys and an attorney-client relationship, and if the question is asked excluding conversations that may be within the attorney-client privilege, then, of course, he will answer it, but if it is intended to include conversations with an attorney employed in that capacity, then, of course, we would raise that as an objection.

Senator TALMADGE. If you want to assert that privilege, I will not pursue it; but I read a synopsis of the staff report, and it indicates exactly the same coverup operation was pursued with Mr. Segretti as was pursued with the Watergate, and I wanted to bring that out if Mr. Segretti wanted to go into that area. If he wants to plead attorney-client privilege in that area, I shall not go into it. If he wants to invoke the fifth amendment rights, I shall not go into it; but if he wants to voluntarily discuss it, I am prepared to ask him questions about it.

Mr. SHERMAN. First, he has no fifth amendment rights, I assume, because he has been given immunity. Second, it was part of the synopsis because, at all times, Mr. Segretti has cooperated fully with the staff of this committee, and has disclosed every single conversation he ever had with anybody in the world about his activities, because he wanted to cooperate fully. But it was cooperation with the under-

standing that there were certain attorney-client privileges that existed, and as an attorney himself, and we both feel as I explained to Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson yesterday.

Senator TALMADGE. If you or Mr. Segretti want to extend or invoke the attorney-client privilege, I won't go into that area.

Senator BAKER. Will Senator Talmadge yield on my time, not on his?

Senator TALMADGE. Certainly I yield.

Senator BAKER. Do I understand you are discussing now the possibility of claiming attorney-client privilege with relation to conversations between Mr. Segretti and John Dean?

Mr. SHERMAN. That is correct, and other lawyers.

Senator BAKER. And other lawyers.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is correct. We have fully disclosed to the committee staff and told them exactly the basis of the claim, who he talked to and what was said, but with a clear understanding that was not to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

Mr. DASH. Senator Baker, it is true we have had that discussion with regard to Mr. Dean and Mr. Segretti. It would be my position consistently with counsel that I do not see any attorney-client relationship existing.

Senator BAKER. Was there any fee paid for instance to John Dean for this service?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No; there was not, Senator.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Senator Talmadge.

Mr. SHERMAN. Possibly to clear that up just a little bit, the committee is in possession of a tape in which I believe the tape fully indicates—

Senator ERVIN. I think if he claims Mr. John Dean was his attorney, frankly, the evidence in this case indicates to me Mr. John Dean was a messenger boy. But if he, if an attorney conspired with a client to obstruct the course of justice, I don't think it would be covered by the attorney-client privilege.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I don't think Mr. Segretti did anything to obstruct justice in any manner, shape, or form. I think the staff is aware of that, too. But he did seek Mr. Dean and Mr. Dean agreed to represent him as an attorney at some period of time, and we feel it is covered by the attorney-client privilege. I mean we are not trying to obstruct the committee in any way at all.

Senator ERVIN. Maybe if Senator Talmadge would modify his question, if he wants to ask about any conversations Mr. Segretti had with anyone except his attorney, why he certainly is at liberty to do so.

Senator TALMADGE. I will pursue it in another way and if, at any time, you think you ought to assert the attorney-client privilege, or any other immunity that you may have, don't hesitate to do so.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Thank you, Senator.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you engage in any so-called dirty tricks or espionage following the Watergate break-in?

Mr. SEGRETTI. The only thing that I can recall is what I related to you regarding the plane with the trailer flying over the Democratic convention.

Senator TALMADGE. Were you advised by anyone to maintain a low profile?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Other than an attorney?

Senator TALMADGE. By anyone.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I thought we just had a discussion that the question implies any person other than Mr. Segretti was communicating with.

Senator TALMADGE. I didn't ask him if the lawyer advised that; I asked him if anyone advised him to maintain a low profile.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Perhaps this will answer that question or a part of it. I did have lunch with Mr. Chapin in the summer of 1972, between my grand jury appearance, and, I believe, the period of time when news stories started coming out about me, which was in October, and at that time I was certainly told to cease all activities, although they had pretty much ceased prior to that.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you check out of a hotel under the name Segretti and register in another hotel under an assumed name?

Mr. SEGRETTE. When was this, Senator?

Senator TALMADGE. Shortly after the Watergate break-in in Washington, D.C.

Mr. SEGRETTE. When I came to Washington, D.C., and met with Mr. Dean, I was staying at the Mayflower Hotel; staying there under my own name. After I talked with Mr. Dean, I checked out and flew back to Los Angeles and met with the agents.

Senator TALMADGE. Before you left Washington, though, didn't you register in another hotel under an assumed name?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did not.

Senator TALMADGE. You did not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did not.

Senator TALMADGE. Now, were you advised that the Grecian Islands were pretty that time of the year and you might want to take a trip there?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, I think I now know what area you are talking about. That period of time was after the news stories about me started to come out. At that time I was instructed to fly to Washington, D.C., I did check into a motel under my own name. I was then instructed to check out of that motel because I was there under my own name. I had a meeting with Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding and I was instructed to check into another motel under another name.

Senator TALMADGE. Were you advised that the Grecian Islands were beautiful at that time of the year and it might be nice to take a trip there?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There was a discussion of that but I took it more on the social level. [Laughter.]

Senator TALMADGE. Were you offered a job in Jamaica?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I was—subsequent to, it was after the election—I was. It certainly sounded nice. [Laughter.]

Senator TALMADGE. Were you advised to get on a train and travel around the country? Did you subsequently do so?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I was advised—[Conferring with counsel.] Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. And you did?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did.

Senator TALMADGE. Where all did you travel?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I took a train from Washington, D.C., up to, I believe, Philadelphia, I am not sure, and I was, to take a train—I had never

taken a train before and I was going to head back home, out West, and from Washington, D.C., to go to the west coast you must take the train, I believe up to Philadelphia, transfer to Chicago and then take another train from Chicago to the west coast and that is what I did.

Senator TALMADGE. By way of Houston, Tex., also, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't know that that train goes through Houston or not.

Senator TALMADGE. Washington, D.C., to Philadelphia, and from Philadelphia to Chicago, and from Chicago to Houston.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe I went to Houston.

Senator TALMADGE. You did not go to Houston?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe it was some other town.

Senator TALMADGE. Did you have a code name at the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't know. My code name when I called Mr. Chapin, I would use the name Don Morris.

Senator TALMADGE. Do you know how many contacts that you had with Mr. Chapin from the time of October 5, 1971, to September 1, 1972?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would have to guess on that, Senator. The records would reflect that better than my memory.

Senator TALMADGE. Would 47 calls from you to Mr. Chapin, not including the Chapin calls to you, seem about accurate?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That could very well be. Although many of those calls were to his office and he was not in, and I would leave a message, and sometimes I would get a return call, and sometimes I would not right away, and perhaps there would be two or three phone calls along that line.

Senator TALMADGE. Do you have the folder in front of you that includes tab 28 [exhibit No. 224]?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. I ask you to look at that and see if you think that is probably correct.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. Then, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that that be appropriately numbered and marked as an exhibit in the record at this point.

Senator ERVIN. I believe that will be received in evidence as an exhibit appropriately marked. My understanding is that all of these exhibits were identified.

Mr. DASH. Can we do that now, Mr. Chairman, since I have used the exhibits? In addition to tab 28 that Senator Talmadge has identified I would like all of these exhibits entered into the record at this time.

Senator ERVIN. Am I correct in assuming that Mr. Segretti has identified all those exhibits?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I will do that on the record, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Let the record show that all of the exhibits identified in the testimony of this witness will be received in evidence as exhibits and will be appropriately numbered by the reporter as such.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I might say that Mr. Segretti has obviously not been asked about each of these exhibits, and I don't even know that we have looked at each and every one of these exhibits. I am sure if Mr. Dash says that at some point in our interviews, he has

identified them, that is fine; but I wouldn't want him to say that it is his exhibits.

Senator ERVIN. I believe he just stated, though—

Mr. DASH. He has had an opportunity this morning.

Senator ERVIN. He identified them?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes. I went through those exhibits briefly this morning and prior to appearing before this committee and I am familiar with most of those. There are one or two that I—that were done by people that I had contacted, but I am familiar with them now.

Senator ERVIN. You do identify them?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 199-226, inclusive.*]

Senator TALMADGE. Mr. Segretti, in your opening statement, you stated: "I was happy to accept employment from people who held prominent positions in and out of the Government."

You also said a factor in accepting your duties was the opportunity in working for the White House. Would you have accepted those duties if they had not been proposed to you by your friend in the White House; but a local campaign organizer?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not believe I would, Senator.

Senator TALMADGE. Would you have accepted your duties if you had received much less compensation or had been asked to do those things without pay?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I certainly did not have funds of my own to travel around the country and expend large amounts of money, and I certainly would not have done that for these type of activities. So certainly, that is a very important factor in this.

Senator TALMADGE. Am I correct, then, in saying that the reason you accepted those duties that you have described in detail during the day, was because, first, of the glamor of working for the White House, friends in the White House, plus the fact that you needed a job and the job was attractive?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think they were certainly some of the factors.

Senator TALMADGE. Several times, you have stated that your activities were to cause confusion. Just exactly what did you mean by confusion?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is a little hard to define. I would say the best way I could describe that is the word confusion to some extent speaks for itself. Perhaps to perplex the staff of the particular candidates where these were coming from.

Senator TALMADGE. You concluded your opening statement by saying, "that you have been abused by rumor, character assassination, and innuendo." Is it not rather ironic that the same effect that you complain about was vested, in abundance, I may say, on Senators Muskie, Jackson, and Humphrey, by you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It certainly is and I know how it feels.

Senator TALMADGE. You have had a career in college, graduated from one of the best colleges in the country. Then you served your country with responsibility during the Vietnam war. Why would you, as a bright, young, attractive, articulate fellow, get involved in something

*See pp. 4268-4350.

that you got into, where you were running around the country, falsifying documents, falsifying letters, falsifying press releases, and doing all the things that you did, Mr. Segretti? You had a very bright future. Yet, you let these people persuade you into getting into something of this nature.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Very honestly and candidly, Senator, I have not been able to give myself a satisfactory answer to your question.

Senator TALMADGE. You never had any previous criminal record of any kind before?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Absolutely none.

Senator TALMADGE. No involvement with the police, no falsification no forgeries, anything of that kind?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, sir.

Senator TALMADGE. Thank you, Mr. Segretti.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Baker.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Segretti, I do not have many questions. I think most of the principal areas of your testimony have been covered and covered rather exhaustively, but to continue the line of questioning that Senator Talmadge initiated—that is, why did you undertake this—I have pursued that line of questioning with other witnesses and I will not press you on it now. But let me suggest a hypothetical situation.

If you were approached to do the same sort of job that you did in 1971 and 1972 now, after these hearings and after a full and thorough public ventilation of the facts and circumstances, would these hearings, would this record, would this experience have any impact on your willingness or unwillingness to do that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I think the answer, certainly to me, is very obvious, Senator.

Senator BAKER. Well, what is the answer?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I would not.

Senator BAKER. Well, this has been a painful experience and, I am sure, an unpleasant experience for you—your interrogation, your indictment and arraignment, your testimony before this committee, I suppose. It has really been, I would expect, an unpleasant personal experience. But if you can, lay that aside and put yourself in the role of a young man who has served his country in the armed services, who is a graduate of a distinguished law school, someone who had not suffered the scars and the wounds of this hearing and these investigations. Do you think that same thing would apply? Do you think these hearings and this public ventilation of these circumstances may in fact have a deterrent effect on others undertaking what you did undertake?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I really believe that they would, and I hope that they will. I think that is one of the benefits that these hearings have accomplished.

Senator BAKER. What do you think about the possibility that these hearings or this testimony of yours or other testimony may have another effect? It may have the effect of disillusioning young people, young men and women, will, instead of accepting this as a deterrent to such conduct in the future, just simply decide, well, that is politics and just drop out of the whole political system? How do you evaluate that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I think that is a very important factor to consider,

and I think that is one of the dangers of this committee. Very honestly, I feel that to some extent, the committee has done its job in this regard, insofar as a deterrent, in cleansing the political system. I think if it were carried on for a great length of time, I think it would create a great deal of disillusionment in the country. And I think that is dangerous.

In other words, I think it is a balancing situation and it is very difficult to make that decision, and I do not think I am the one that should make that. I think it is up to you Senators to do that.

Senator BAKER. Well, I thank you for that information. Sometimes I hear men and women, particularly young men and women, say, well, after all, that is politics. And that is not politics. That is not politics as I know it, and I would even venture the estimates that that is not politics as you know it, except for the situation that you have testified to.

What is your concept—is this your concept of what American politics is all about, that is, a bag of dirty tricks over a period of time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Not now.

Senator BAKER. Was it then?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think as it was explained to me, and I think you should realize that I had no great background in politics, practical politics, that some of these things were somewhat traditional in American politics.

Senator BAKER. How widespread do you think that point of view is?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I really do not know, Senator.

Senator BAKER. What about your experience in campus politics? Did that have some impact on how you viewed the propriety of these activities?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am sure it was a factor, yes, sir.

Senator BAKER. One or two other questions, Mr. Segretti. I know you have touched these matters in previous questions and answers, but tell me briefly, who gave you your instructions? Who was your boss?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I would, I guess you would say Mr. Chapin.

Senator BAKER. All right, who thought up your dirty tricks, if that is the right word for it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think to a great extent, I did.

Senator BAKER. Pardon?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think to a major extent, I did.

Senator BAKER. In other words, you initiated it, you carried forth your project on your own?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Right.

Senator BAKER. Did you have any comment from Chapin or anyone else on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of what you were doing?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. By whom and on what occasions?

Mr. SEGRETTE. By Mr. Chapin, I believe. It is hard to recall specific instances at this time.

Senator BAKER. What I am driving for is to what extent were you a free agent or what control did some responsible political official have on your conduct and activity?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I believe at any time, I could have been told to cease and I would have ceased.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Segretti, we have a vote in progress and I understand we are on 10-minute rollcalls, Mr. Chairman, so I would like to suspend.

Senator ERVIN. We will recess until we can return and resume the hearing.

[Recess.]

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.

You were a college mate at the University of Southern California with not only Dwight Chapin, but also Gordon Strachan and Ron Ziegler, weren't you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I understand that Mr. Ziegler was at USC at about the same time, although I do not recall Mr. Ziegler at USC. I believe he was there 3 years prior—in other words, I would have been a freshman and he would have been a senior. I don't recall ever meeting Mr. Ziegler.

Senator ERVIN. Now, Dwight Chapin and you were very close friends, weren't you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. As a matter of fact, you were his roommate and he was your campaign manager when you were elected to the student senate there.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't think that is exactly correct, Senator. Mr. Chapin was involved in politics there. One evening, a list was being made of people that were going to run for different offices. A very good friend of ours was going to be running for student body president. We were short several people that we were going to put on the slate for student senate, and just because we were short of names, my name was put on that list. I had no real campaign manager, shall we say, and there was no real campaign that I conducted.

Senator ERVIN. Well, Chapin was a leader of the group which placed you on the ticket and elected you to the student senate, was he not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. He was one of those that was involved; yes, sir. But I was involved, to some extent, in that also.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. So you and he had formed a close friendship before he became an employee of the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Do you know what his office was in the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe it was Presidential appointments secretary.

Senator ERVIN. He was the man who made the President's appointments day by day?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I really don't know the duties of the job, but the title was Presidential appointments secretary.

Senator ERVIN. Now, did you fly to Washington before you began this?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, I did.

Senator ERVIN. And had a conference with Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And in that conference, Chapin indicated to you that he wanted you to engage in what he called dirty tricks?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't think he used the term "dirty tricks" at that time, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Well, he indicated to you that he wanted you to engage in a course of action which he did not want you to expose under the full glare of the noonday sun, didn't he?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. He told you to keep secret what you did?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. And to act in such a way that your activities would never be traced to him, didn't he? Or the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Now, was he the man who arranged for you to be paid by Mr. Kalmbach?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is a question that is difficult for me to answer. I believe Mr. Strachan called me and gave me Mr. Kalmbach's name to contact in Newport Beach, Calif. So who made the real arrangements there, I really don't know.

Senator ERVIN. Well, anyway, you were told by Mr. Strachan, who was also a White House aide, to contact Mr. Kalmbach.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe it was Mr. Strachan; yes. It could have been Mr. Chapin.

Senator ERVIN. Did he tell you why you should contact Mr. Kalmbach?

Mr. SEGRETTE. To finalize my arrangements on my prospective employment.

Senator ERVIN. To make financial arrangements?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And you did contact Mr. Kalmbach, and he made financial arrangements which continued for a period of about 12 or 14 months?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes. My last contact with Mr. Kalmbach relating to financial matters was the latter part of March 1972.

Senator ERVIN. Now, during this period of time, how often did you talk by telephone to Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, we ran into the same problem, Senator. I think the records would reflect more accurately my recollection. To give you a total, I think it was mentioned, 40-some times during the entire period. That could very well be.

Senator ERVIN. During a period from about August 1971 and extending at least up to July 1972, you had at least 40 telephone conversations with Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That could very well be; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And each time you had a telephone conversation with him, when you called the switchboard and were asked for your name, you gave the name of Don Morris?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. And you made rather complete reports to Mr. Chapin of what you had done, the things you have told us about here?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, not necessarily. I certainly didn't tell him all the details.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you indicated to him, didn't you, what you had done?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; but most of that was done by mail.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. You sent copies of various documents which you concocted?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. So Mr. Dwight Chapin knew all the time what you were doing, what was going on?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I imagine he must have.

Senator ERVIN. And he told you on most of these 40 phone calls he was very much pleased with your good work, as he put it, didn't he?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I don't recall any intercorrespondence relating to that because I don't really recall the content of those phone calls.

Senator ERVIN. Well, you called him to tell him what you had been doing. You didn't call to talk about the weather, did you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think many times—we did talk on a social level. We talked on a variety of matters, but many of the matters related to my political activities.

Senator ERVIN. Well, when you did talk about your political activities, he knew what you were doing; at least you told him what you were doing?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. And you sent him the posters. Did you send him a copy of the letter that you prepared to circulate about Jackson and Humphrey?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe I did, and I believe I sent him the newspaper clippings on that.

Senator ERVIN. You sent him the newspaper clippings about that. And he sort of brightened on that, didn't he?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am sorry, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. When you sent him the newspaper clipping about the letter that was written on Muskie's letterhead, he commended you on that and said you had gotten \$10,000 worth of good work out of an expenditure of \$20?

Mr. SEGRETTE. There was a comment to that effect.

Senator ERVIN. In your conversations with Chapin, didn't Chapin tell you that Muskie was the front runner among the Democrats and the polls showed that he would make the best race against President Nixon and that he wanted to do as much as he could to discredit Muskie's campaign?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am trying to recall any specific conversation and I can't pin any date on such a conversation. However, that was the general background of many conversations. Unfortunately, they tend to merge, because it covered such a period of time.

Senator ERVIN. Well, what he said, regardless of what the specific words were, created in your mind the impression that Chapin wanted you to do all you could to discredit Muskie and to promote the candidacy of McGovern, didn't he?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe McGovern was ever mentioned, but focus on Muskie.

Senator ERVIN. Wasn't it the strategy, as outlined by Chapin, that your efforts would be directed to discredit Muskie because he was at that time the front runner?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. And didn't you know at the time that you were engaged in these activities that it was the strategy of Chapin or the Republican Party, as outlined to you by Chapin, to promote the nomination by the Democrats of McGovern because they considered him the weakest candidate?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, sir; that was never really conveyed to me. In fact, during the period of time that I was engaged in any activities, I don't think I, or others, such as Mr. Chapin, believed that Senator McGovern would ever win the nomination.

Senator ERVIN. But you did all you could to see that he did win it, didn't you?

Can you tell me a single thing you ever did to place an obstacle in the path of McGovern obtaining the nomination?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, we had the plane fly over Democratic headquarters—

Senator ERVIN. That was after he had the nomination, wasn't it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; I think it was the day before. He had it locked up.

Senator ERVIN. Well, it was after he had gone to the Democratic National Convention in Miami with enough delegates to insure his nomination, wasn't it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am sorry. I was thinking of another example and I didn't hear the question, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. I was just asking you, now you have told us about things that you did to discredit—which were calculated to discredit Jackson, Humphrey, and Muskie and to create confusion among them. My question was, did you do anything to discredit the campaign efforts of Senator McGovern prior to the time that he was nominated?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir. I had the flier, "McGovern's real record on the war," that was obtained in the Miami area and that was reprinted and distributed.

Senator ERVIN. When was that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was distributed in the California primary. Some of it was distributed in the Florida primary. That is the only instance I can remember.

Senator ERVIN. Well, in fact, you didn't do much to impede the nomination of Gov. George Wallace, did you, in your Florida activities?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, sir.

Senator ERVIN. The only thing you ever said about him was that he was sort of like Hitler?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Senator ERVIN. Now, I want to invite your attention to exhibit No. 206.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. You stated in your opening statement, that it was not your desire to have anyone believe this letter.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Well, now, how can you reconcile that statement with the fact that you say in the sixth and seventh lines of that letter, "However, if you have not made your decision, you should be aware of several facts."

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is difficult for me to reconcile that at this time. All I can tell you is my intention at that time—and it is true that the way this was written—my intentions, I don't think, were as clear as they should have been. In fact, this letter should never have been written, obviously.

Senator ERVIN. It says, after you have set out statements which you admit constituted scurrilous attacks on two Democratic candidates for

the nomination, you close the letter with this: "These are not pleasant facts, but they should be considered by you before you vote on March 14."

Now, I don't understand how a person can assert twice in a letter that certain things are facts and then say he didn't intend anybody to believe what he said were facts to be true.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, this letter was put on Citizens for Muskie stationery and it was really aimed toward Muskie, rather than the other two individuals involved; although I agree that it was done very poorly and there was a great deal of misjudgment, it certainly didn't work out the way I intended.

Senator ERVIN. Well, it looks like to me you were trying to kill three Democratic birds with just one stone. You issued what was a scurrilous libel, manufactured out of the whole cloth you admit by yourself, against Senator Jackson; you circulate what was a libel against Senator Humphrey, and you say you did that also for the purpose of creating dissension and discord among the three candidates.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Senator ERVIN. At least, those two candidates with McGovern—with Muskie.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. So you were really—your shaft was directed at three different people, and calculated to hurt three different people and that is what it was intended for, was it not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; I will say this. Perhaps you can better understand, that this letter was not done with a great deal of forethought in mind.

Senator ERVIN. Well you admit there is not a word of truth in the whole letter, do you not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is true.

Senator ERVIN. And you attempted to deceive people into thinking that it emanated from Muskie's headquarters or from his campaign organization?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Senator ERVIN. Now, you invented the names of these women who are mentioned here, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. You invented the names of the Mary Ann Cramer out of the whole cloth, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, the letter is made out of the whole cloth. The facts in the letter are made out of the whole cloth. I attempted to make this letter so outrageous that nobody would really believe it.

Senator ERVIN. Why, if you did not want—

Mr. SEGRETTE. I did not know what to say.

Senator ERVIN [continuing]. If you did not want anybody to believe it, why did you not put at the head: "You must not believe anything that is said in this document."?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I should have.

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, I think Mr. Segretti has made clear that it was to create dissension among the candidates and not for the contents to be believed and, of course, if it would have said that they would have known it before.

Senator ERVIN. If I take the words that he set out—the only inference I can draw from it is that he wanted the people who saw it, or heard about it, to believe the most reprehensible things about Senator Jackson and Senator Humphrey.

Mr. SHERMAN. That may appear on the face of it. However, he told you what his intention was and that was the intention.

Senator ERVIN. I am constrained to say that I, as a lawyer, do not undertake to say what a man intended when he wrote a document; I determine that by the words of the document, rather than what he says many months after that.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, all I can tell you is what my intention was.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is, of course, not to excuse the letter and he is not attempting to do that at all.

Senator ERVIN. Well, he admits that he composed a libelous letter and mailed it out. Every word he said in the letter referring to reprehensible conduct on the part of Senator Jackson and Senator Humphrey is untrue and without any foundation whatever.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. That he even invented some nonexistent women?

Mr. SHERMAN. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. To be named, to make the letter specific.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. Well, so much for that. [Laughter.]

My time is up, I will come back, I have more questions. I want to find out how John Dean got such a big law practice. [Laughter.]

Mr. SHERMAN. I might just comment if he is relying upon fees made by Mr. Segretti, he must not have a very successful law practice.

Senator ERVIN. I was not asking about you, I was not asking about your law practice.

Mr. SHERMAN. I was not commenting upon mine.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I am sure Mr. Sherman is quite successful.

Senator ERVIN. I was just wondering how Mr. Dean got spread out so fast. [Laughter].

Senator Weicker.

Senator WEICKER. During the course of your conversation with one of the Senators, I cannot remember which, Mr. Segretti, you mentioned your meeting with Fred Fielding.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator WEICKER. Is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. What was the occasion of your meeting with Fred Fielding?

Mr. SEGRETTE. OK. I talked to Mr. Dean by telephone. Mr. Dean, I believe, was in Miami or that area at that time, and he informed me of a forthcoming article concerning me in the Washington Post. He wanted to meet with me as soon as possible regarding the allegations in that article. This was around October 10, I believe, 1972. Mr. Dean told me to fly to Washington, D.C., and that he was going to fly from Florida up to Washington and meet me there. He said that in case I arrive prior to him to call his assistant, Mr. Fielding, and he gave me Mr. Fielding's telephone number. I did so, I called Mr. Fielding, and I told him where I was staying. Mr. Dean, I believe, had not yet arrived. I was subsequently contacted by, I believe it was, Mr. Field-

ing, although it may have been Mr. Dean, and then told to check out of that hotel and come and meet with them.

Senator WEICKER. Where did you meet?

Mr. SEGRETTE. We met in Mr. Dean's office in the Executive Office Building.

Senator WEICKER. How was your entry into that building? Was it the normal routine of signing in?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, it was around 8 or 9 in the evening. I took a cab, after I checked out from where I was staying, to within a block of the Executive Office Building. I called Mr. Dean's office. He told me to wait where I was and that an individual would come and meet me and that would be Mr. Fred Fielding.

That was done. When we entered the Executive Office Building, as you know, there is a check point there, and you are to produce identification and perhaps sign in. I am not sure of that. Mr. Fielding stated something to the effect, "This was the individual who lost his wallet," and I was just ushered in. This was around 9 or 9:30 at night.

Senator WEICKER. How long did this meeting last?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is hard to really guess now. An hour perhaps. I was pretty exhausted. I had been up really, that night on the airplane, and it was certainly a shock to me to see my name and picture on the front page of the newspaper, so I was exhausted.

Senator WEICKER. What was the purpose of this meeting?

Mr. SEGRETTE. To go over the Post article, to see what allegations were true and untrue.

Senator WEICKER. In the course of the meeting did you discuss in general the matters which you brought to the attention of this committee?

Mr. SHERMAN. The problem, Senator, with that question is that it does ask for privileged communications between an attorney and a client, and if he answers a question yes or no, then he has told you the contents, particularly if he answers yes.

Senator WEICKER. Would you care to characterize the meeting?

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, that, of course, does the same thing. I mean, there is no way to talk about the meeting, the contents in the light of that question. Just 1 second. [Conferring with witness.]

As we have indicated, however, previously, preserving the privilege, we have discussed these matters in detail with Mr. Dash, Mr. Lenzner, and Mr. Lackritz, and we would be perfectly willing to answer any questions, any general questions, in private about this but we feel an obligation to maintain the attorney-client privilege.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

And I know you have, I think that point should be made clear, you have cooperated fully with the staff of the committee.

Senator ERVIN. Senator, on that point, I have difficulty accepting the view that there is any relationship of attorney and client between the witness and Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean was allegedly the White House lawyer at the time, and furthermore, when he had a conversation with Chapin and the witness, a third party was present and you cannot have a confidential communication between an attorney and his client when third parties are present. It is not confidential. And furthermore, Mr. Dean's testimony before this committee indicates that Mr. Dean was engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, and communications.

If anything transpired in that meeting that had anything to do with obstructing justice then it is not covered by the confidential lawyer's relation, if it existed, because it only can refer to past activities of a criminal nature or supposedly criminal nature. That is my understanding of the law of attorney-client privilege.

Mr. SHERMAN. That is also my understanding of the attorney-client privilege. The point about Mr. Chapin being present, I do not—questions have been asked about that particular conversation, and I think that was only an introduction and the questions about the introduction, Mr. Segretti might be willing to answer the question.

Senator WEICKER. May I ask a question as to who was present at the meeting?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, which meeting are you talking about?

Senator WEICKER. I am talking about the meeting at the Executive Office Building at 9 o'clock on the evening of October 10.

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was Mr. Dean, Mr. Fielding, and I.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, of course, Mr. Fielding—

Senator ERVIN. I don't believe a confidential communication can be had between—a communication can be had which is confidential in nature within the purview of the rule when it takes place in the presence of two outside parties.

Mr. SHERMAN. Unless the third party also happens to be another lawyer who also in the conversations does maintain an attorney-client privilege, which was done during this conversation.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, I think this has been the claim counsel has made. It is my position as chief counsel, and I have stated this to counsel that this was a fictitious relationship of attorney-client privilege. Mr. Dean, who was counsel to the President, certainly could not in any way serve as counsel to Mr. Segretti. Certainly Mr. Fielding could not, and cannot create a fictitious attorney-client relationship in order to shield these conversations, and I think the position that the committee really should have is there was no attorney-client relationship established.

Mr. SHERMAN. However, whatever Mr. Dean's purposes were to shield anything I have no knowledge of. From Mr. Segretti's point of view, there was a good faith relationship of attorney and client, and he reasonably believed there was an attorney-client privilege and had specific conversations with Mr. Dean on that particular point, and only confided in Mr. Dean because Mr. Dean assured him that that was the relationship and he was representing him in that capacity.

Senator ERVIN. Are you asking him about a conversation that he had with Mr. Dean at the time Mr. Fielding and Mr. Chapin were present?

Senator WEICKER. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. I will rule that is not covered by attorney-client privilege at all.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chapin was not present, sir, during that meeting and I think, Senator, if you were to make a ruling—

Senator WEICKER. I specifically asked Mr. Segretti to give to this committee the contents of the conversations held with Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding, in Mr. Dean's office on the night of October 10 in the Executive Office Building.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think if the chairman is going to make a ruling as to whether or not there was an attorney-client privilege, a founda-

tion ought to be laid as to whether there was or was not an attorney-client relationship and the only way to lay the foundation is to ask Mr. Segretti what was said.

Senator ERVIN. I don't think we have a scintilla of evidence in this case that Mr. Dean was practicing law generally and was counsel for this man.

Mr. SHERMAN. You haven't asked the questions of Mr. Segretti as to what Mr. Dean told him so how can there be any evidence? If you want to ask those questions, you should do that first before arguing.

Senator ERVIN. I was on the verge of asking him when my time expired a while ago.

Mr. SHERMAN. Of course, we are always—and we have discussed all of these conversations in private, so we are certainly notwithstanding any information.

Senator ERVIN. You can proceed, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. I would like to have Mr. Segretti discuss conversations held with Mr. Dean in the presence of Mr. Fielding in Mr. Dean's office and on the night of October 10.

Mr. SHERMAN. Can I then request a foundation be first laid as to whether or not there was an attorney-client relationship in questions asked of Mr. Segretti in this regard, what was told to him and what did he reasonably believe?

Senator ERVIN. Let me ask him a question or two on that point. Did you make any agreement with Mr. Dean to pay him a retainer fee?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, sir; I did not.

Senator ERVIN. Did you expect to pay him a retainer fee?

Mr. SEGRETTI. If he had asked for one, I would have paid one.

Senator ERVIN. Well, he didn't ask you for one and you didn't offer to pay him one?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No.

Senator ERVIN. And you didn't tell him that you had committed any violation of the law for which you were seeking legal counsel?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I asked Mr. Dean whether anything that we said would be privileged and under the attorney-client, otherwise I would not discuss any matters with him.

Senator ERVIN. What did you say about Mr. Fielding being there?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I asked the same question about Mr. Fielding.

Senator ERVIN. You had two lawyers there?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I asked Mr. Fielding whether he was a lawyer because, otherwise, I was not going to talk or say anything to him.

Senator ERVIN. But Mr. Fielding, was he a lawyer?

Mr. SEGRETTI. He assured me he was.

Senator ERVIN. Do you know whether he was practicing law?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I really don't know.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Segretti, don't you know that neither one of these men were acting in the capacity of lawyer for you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I thought they were.

Senator ERVIN. Didn't you ask him to get you a lawyer, isn't that what happened?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was much later on, Senator, when I was going back to Los Angeles and I asked him if he could suggest a counsel

in Los Angeles, in the area. Mr. Dean was back in Washington, D.C.

Senator ERVIN. You asked him to get a lawyer out in California for you.

Mr. SEGRETTE. If he could recommend a lawyer to me.

Senator ERVIN. Recommend one. You already had a lawyer in Washington, why did you want one out of town?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Because I was in Los Angeles, Senator.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a qualifying question in that respect?

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Segretti, can you tell this committee under oath that at the time you talked to Mr. Dean that, and Mr. Fielding that, one, you knew they were attorneys?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. That they were qualified to practice law?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. That you expected to employ them as counsel to advise you on your rights and prepare you for whatever legal proceedings might be in prospect?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. That you intended to compensate them for those services?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe that was—I really considered that at that time, Senator Baker.

Senator BAKER. That you asked for and received assurances of the privileged nature of the communication?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator BAKER. Now, the final question I would put to you in that respect is this: Did you ask for that assurance of privileged communication for the purpose of assuring your legal defense, or for the purpose of concealing the substance of what you were about to communicate?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I will tell you why that is difficult for me to answer, Senator Baker, because I felt that the privileged nature of any communication would be necessary in my defense.

Senator BAKER. The point I am trying to—

Mr. SEGRETTE. So the answer would be, yes.

Senator BAKER [continuing]. The point I am trying to reach is whether or not you are trying to obtain an assurance of confidentiality for the sake of protecting the confidentiality of that information, or for the sake of assuring your representation by counsel in any proceeding that might be brought against you.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think the latter would be true, Senator.

Mr. SHERMAN. Of course, Senator, obviously when you seek an attorney you also expect it to be confidential so it is kind of a dual purpose.

Senator BAKER. Yes, but the law is well settled that you cannot cloak yourself in a claim of confidentiality or attorney-client privilege simply for the sake of concealing information. It must be a legitimate intentment of employment for the purpose of advancing the legal defenses that may be available to you under the Constitution and statute.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think if the question was asked, did he intend to cloak it, not to disclose part of the coverup, then the answer would be no.

Senator ERVIN. My understanding is, and I am not able to say this as a fact, there is a regulation for anybody who is a lawyer for the Government to engage in private practice, and the inference is that Mr. Dean at least had the title of counsel to the President. That means a lawyer for the executive branch of the Government.

Mr. SHERMAN. As Mr. Dash, of course, raised the same point yesterday, and my response was, even if that is true, which I asked for such regulation, he could not. So to me I don't think that would affect what Mr. Segretti's good faith belief was, and the example, of course, I gave him yesterday, if you went to somebody who told you he was a lawyer and he was not a lawyer and you communicated with him in the good faith belief he was a lawyer, he would be protected.

Senator ERVIN. Isn't it a fact that you went to see Mr. Dean at Mr. Dean's instance?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. At his request?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. You didn't go to him to employ a lawyer? [Conferring.] What did Dean tell you? Mr. Dean wasn't soliciting employment as an attorney, was he, at the time he invited you to come and pay him a visit?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't believe so, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Mr. SEGRETTI. However, if Mr. Dean had informed me there was such a prohibition against him acting in that capacity and he could not so advise me in that capacity, that would have been the end of it right there.

Senator ERVIN. Did Mr. Dean ask you to claim the lawyer-client privilege?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No; he did not.

Senator ERVIN. I do not know what it is that you would testify to, but his testimony here indicated that after this time, you sort of vanished from sight.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I did what?

Senator ERVIN. Did Mr. Dean give you advice to trust your two good legs rather than a bum lawyer? Is that what you claim to be—

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, we are not trying to hide any of the facts, because Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson are in possession of all of the facts. The whole point is we maintained from the outset that there is an attorney-client privilege and he is an attorney, and upon my advice, if he has this privilege, and we feel very strongly about the attorney-client privilege, as all the lawyers on this committee feel, he ought to claim it, not to hide anything.

Senator BAKER. You mean to claim it just for the sake of claiming it?

Mr. SHERMAN. No; because there is a legitimate attorney-client privilege here that ought to be recognized.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is.

Mr. DASH. Even if there were an attorney-client privilege, if Mr. Segretti were the client, he could waive it. If an attorney were sitting there, he would have no right to waive another's privilege.

I do not see any principle involved if Mr. Segretti in fact wants to tell us the facts, because he is the client, if he is the client, and could

waive it by telling us the facts. He has already told us the facts. In my own view, there is no attorney-client privilege, but I do not see any principle, if there were, if Mr. Segretti wants to tell us something that he wants to tell us.

Mr. SHERMAN. We are claiming the privilege, and I think the facts make it clear that there is an attorney-client privilege, and if the chairman wants to rule there is not and instruct him to answer it, I will advise him to do so, of course.

Senator ERVIN. The evidence just does not satisfy me that there was any attorney-client privilege, and Mr. Segretti admits that he did not go there for the purpose of employing Mr. Dean, that he went there in response to a request from Mr. Dean, because Mr. Dean wanted to get some information from him.

Mr. SHERMAN. I do not think that is the tenor of the testimony, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Is that not true, Mr. Segretti?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not think that is absolutely correct, Senator. I knew Mr. Dean was an attorney at that time, and from the brief discussion I had on what was told to me regarding the Post article, I certainly was desirous of receiving some legal advice at that time.

Senator ERVIN. Well, now, did Mr. Dean call you at the instance of Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe I called Mr. Dean at that point, and he informed me about that article.

Senator ERVIN. Well, how did you know about the existence of Mr. Dean? Who did you get information from that there was such a person as John W. Dean III?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I was introduced to Mr. Dean in June 1972 at the Mayflower Hotel by Mr. Strachan.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Strachan?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. In 1972?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. When did this meeting occur that Senator Weicker was asking you about?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was in October, I believe, 1972.

Senator ERVIN. And Dean set up the meeting? Is that not a fact? Did you not tell me that?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, I often call my clients and ask them to come into the office. That does not destroy the attorney-client privilege.

Senator ERVIN. You do not call your clients to come into your office before they become a client? He says he has no reason to believe Mr. Dean was soliciting legal business. I just hold as a matter of fact that the attorney-client, the evidence is insufficient to show that the attorney-client privilege existed between this witness and Mr. Dean.

Mr. SHERMAN. Might I ask the Senator to look at, I think a transcript of the tape, which makes it clear that that, in fact, was a discussion between the participants—that, in fact, there was an attorney-client privilege.

Senator WEICKER. If I am not mistaken, the tape which is being referred to, however, is a tape that was done on November 10, and I am referring to a meeting of October 10.

Senator ERVIN. And Mr. Dean has testified before this committee that at that time he was engaged in efforts to cover up the so-called Watergate affair, that he was engaged in an effort to obstruct justice.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might, in referring to this transcript that counsel referred to, part of it reads as follows:

Mr. DEAN. I consider anything said in this conversation is completely privileged by reason of the fact that I serve as general counsel over at the White House. I am looking at this as it relates to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White House staff. To our understanding, I will make no copies.

et cetera.

Mr. STRACHAN. OK, let me clear that such that I will feel confident in speaking truthfully and freely at this point.

He says something to the effect that it will not be divulged unless I give my consent.

I think it is clear from here that at least in Mr. Dean's mind, he was talking about executive privilege at that point and not attorney-client privilege.

Mr. SEGRETTE. My recollection is on that tape. I put a statement regarding attorney-client privilege. I have not seen a transcript of that interview and neither has my attorney, Mr. Sherman.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I hold it is a matter of fact that you do not produce enough evidence to sustain the privilege. The burden is on you to show that at the time of the conversation Senator Weicker asked you about, the attorney-client privilege existed between you and John W. Dean, and the evidence does not satisfy me and I do not believe it satisfies the other members of the committee to that effect.

Dean says here:

I served as general counsel over at the White House and looking at this as in relation to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White House staff. To our understanding, I will make no copies of the transcript of this other than one for myself and one I will send you for any use you may want to make of it personally or to turn over to your attorney so that he has got a record of exactly what we have talked about.

In other words, there is Mr. Dean's testimony to the effect that he was not your attorney, that he would give you a copy of the transcript so that you could turn it over to your attorney.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I never received a copy of that, and very honestly, I do not remember that being said on the tape.

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, in addition, Mr. Segretti did employ a Los Angeles counsel who I talked to just in the past few weeks. He told me that when he turned over certain documents to John Dean—which apparently, John Dean without authorization turned over to this committee—he considered John Dean cocounsel for Mr. Strachan and Mr. Segretti. That was another attorney in Los Angeles who advanced this idea after I asked him why documents were turned over.

Senator ERVIN. This is a transcript of the tape and here is Dean talking. He says: "He will give Mr. Segretti a transcript of the conversation so Mr. Segretti can turn it over to Mr. Segretti's attorney."

Now, if Mr. Dean had been Mr. Segretti's attorney, he would not have said he was going to give it to him, he would have just kept a copy.

I am going to hold that there is not sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that any attorney-client relationship existed between Mr. Segretti and Mr. Dean. I am going to instruct you to answer the question.

Mr. SHERMAN. Then just for the record, because we feel there are other reasons which I have explained to Mr. Dash why this point is extremely important, because we feel Mr. Dean, without authorization and in his relationship, obtained information from Mr. Segretti and Mr. Segretti's Los Angeles lawyer and turned it over to this committee, and we feel there were violations on his part. If you are forcing the witness to answer under penalty of contempt of Congress if he doesn't, I would like to make an objection. And, of course, if he doesn't want to answer, he has no choice.

Senator ERVIN. I hold that there's no privilege for several reasons. He certainly didn't ask Mr. Fielding and Mr. Dean both to be his witnesses.

Mr. SHERMAN. He is testifying that when he met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding, he asked at that time if there was an attorney-client relationship because he wouldn't speak with Mr. Fielding present unless it was told to him that there was such a relationship.

Certainly if there is a secretary present in my office, that is part of the privileged communications, because she is an agent of the attorney at that time, which Mr. Fielding was.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, do I understand it to be the Chair's ruling that the witness and counsel have not made out a case to support attorney-client privilege?

Senator ERVIN. Yes. I direct the witness to answer the question.

Senator BAKER. And that the witness is instructed to answer Senator Weicker's question.

Is that the state of affairs?

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I would be very happy to answer your question, Senator Weicker. However, I have really forgotten what it was.

Senator WEICKER. Why don't you just go ahead and describe to the committee discussions held in the office located in the Executive Office Building on the night of October 10, at which place, Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding and yourself were present?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To the best of my recollection, the meeting lasted perhaps a half hour, perhaps an hour. He had a copy of the Post article that had just come out relating to allegations by Mr. Young. Mr. Dean read through that to me, line by line and paragraph by paragraph, and we discussed the truth or falsity of that article. At the end of that period of time, there was a brief discussion about me making a statement or writing up a statement to be considered the next day for release.

At about that point, to the best of my recollection, the meeting ended and Mr. Dean drove myself, and I believe Mr. Fielding was in the car, over to a hotel or motel in Crystal City here in Washington, at which time, I went in and checked in under another name. They waited in the car while I did that. Then I went back, got my luggage, and went to sleep.

The next morning—well, that is—

Senator WEICKER. Just go ahead in narrative form as you are doing now.

Mr. SEGRETTE. The next morning, I prepared a brief statement—I believe the next morning. I was pretty tired that evening. Mr. Fielding came by—it is hard for me to guess the time—9 o'clock, 10 o'clock in the morning. He had another statement that had been prepared by someone else—I don't know whether it was Mr. Dean or Mr. Fielding or others—essentially, that was a denial of most of the allegations.

Something was said to the effect that he wanted me to go over it and he had to take it back to a meeting at the White House. I don't believe I was ever told what the meeting involved or who was involved in the meeting, that type of thing, and he said, read over the statement, there was time pressure. He read over my statement at the time and he thought that my statement I had prepared was better.

I read over the statement, I made some corrections on it. There was some pressure of time, that is certainly clear in my mind, and he left.

Later on, Mr. Dean, I believe, came by where I was staying and stated something to the effect that the media people decided that things will die of their own volition rather than making any statement whatsoever.

Then there was a brief discussion at some point—I don't know whether it was then or later by phone—it is hard to recall fully; it was just a few weeks prior to the election—discussion about what I should do in the meantime, and there was a social discussion regarding how nice the Greek islands were at that time of the year. But I took it at that point to be more of a social discussion than anything else.

Then there was a discussion at some period about going back out West. I told him I wanted to go back to the Los Angeles area and decided for me to travel by train, and I did.

Senator WEICKER. During the course of the meeting on October 10, did you give essentially the details of your activities to Mr. Dean as you have given them to this committee—in essence?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Not in as much detail, but certainly the general outlines, yes.

Senator WEICKER. The broad outlines.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Now, may I read to you testimony which was given before this committee by Mr. Richard Moore. He is now referring to a meeting that took place on October 15.

I can perhaps summarize very quickly. We had that meeting on Friday. The story appeared Sunday and of course it was a major story. Monday morning, Mr. Ziegler would be subject to press, a lot of queries at his press conference (a); (b) I rather think Mr. Ehrlichman was going on one of the Sunday interview shows and there was a meeting in the Roosevelt Room to discuss both those things, how do we respond to this and frankly, Senator Weicker, we did think, I did, and most of us, that the thrust of it as far as the White House was concerned, Chapin's role of hiring his old college chum is what he called it, was wrong, is wrong but we thought the meaning of it is apparent since to get it closer and closer on the Presidency required that there was a political thing in the story right in the political season and required, of course, as honest an answer as we could make but also one that takes into consideration the charge was rather political so we met and discussed how it could be properly handled.

Now, the response, as I understand it, the brief denial by Mr. Ziegler that came forth on your story was as follows:

I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, characterization, innuendo, or guilt by association. That is the White House position.

Do you feel that that was an honest response in light of the information which you had given to Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding in the previous days?

Mr. SEGRETTI. The trouble with giving an answer to that question is that the Post article did contain many allegations that were in fact not true. There were many truths in that article, however. That is the best I can do to answer that.

Senator WEICKER. But at that time, John Dean, counsel to the President, had essentially—essentially—the story that you have told to us here today?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe he did, yes.

Senator WEICKER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Thank you; sir.

Mr. Segretti, the city of Washington is a city of rumors and there is a very persistent one floating around involving you. I would like to give you an opportunity to respond to this rumor.

Do you know Mr. Arthur Bremer?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not.

Senator INOUE. What does the Greek symbol or letter, delta, mean to you?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Are you referring to my notes, Senator?

Senator INOUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that means Mr. Nixon, President Nixon.

Senator INOUE. Who is delta 1?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe that was, in those notes, Mr. Chapin. Those were just my own shorthand way of making notes.

Senator INOUE. And delta 2?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe in that context, it was Mr. Kalmbach.

Senator INOUE. And delta 3?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't know whether I had a delta 3 or not. It would be Mr. Strachan, I would imagine.

Senator INOUE. At the time of your unusual activities, were you aware that you were breaking the law when you forceably opened a window and placed a stink bomb in headquarters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Senator, I was not aware of how that stink bomb was going to be put in that headquarters. I did not at any time envision that the—that it would be done in that manner.

Senator INOUE. Were you aware that it was a violation of the law when a political radio commercial was placed under false sponsorship?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I didn't believe I really thought of it at that time, but I certainly know it was wrong.

Senator INOUE. Were you aware that it was a crime to falsely order flowers, limousines, pizzas, liquor, without any intentions to pay?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I didn't think of it in those terms at that particular time. I know it is wrong and I certainly regret it.

Senator INOUE. Were you aware that it was unlawful to send salacious and libelous letters?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I am certainly aware of it now.

Senator INOUE. And the fraudulent use of U.S. mails?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes; although very honestly, Senator, at that time, we just didn't think of those things. I think to a great extent, we got caught up in the zeal of the activity and the zeal of the campaign and these things were not done with any great forethought or foresight.

Senator INOUE. Throughout all that time, none of you discussed the possible criminal involvement of these acts?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't recall doing that until, really, after the fact.

Senator INOUE. Now that you look back, wouldn't you say that just about everything you did was a crime of one sort or another?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; I don't believe I can really characterize it in those terms. Certainly, many of the things were improper, but things such as putting a picket at a rally or something, I don't believe that is illegal.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator ERVIN. You don't call forgery or libel a mere prank, do you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, I don't call any of the things I did at this point in time pranks. I have stated many times before this committee today that they have no place in the American political system. I don't believe there should be pranks as such or dirty tricks, or however you want to term it, in the American political system.

Senator ERVIN. Well, it appears here from your testimony that you did in effect forge several letters, that you uttered libelous statements, and I am glad that you say you don't classify those things as pranks or mere dirty tricks.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, you know, it is really hard to draw the line between a lot of these things. Many people have said that pranks in the American political system have been traditional and in some quarters, humorous and acceptable, and it is a good thing. Well, certainly, there should be some light and humor in life and I am the first one to say that there should be. But I don't believe many of these things so classified in other contexts as humorous and funny should be present.

Senator ERVIN. You testified under examination by Senator Talmadge that you traveled from Washington to, I believe Philadelphia—

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN [continuing]. And then to Chicago and as you traveled—you went by train?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. What were you trying to do, hide your whereabouts?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Senator, at that time, I was subject to many newspaper stories regarding me. I remember getting off, changing trains in Philadelphia and seeing my picture on the front page and going up to Chicago and seeing my picture on the front page up there. And I certainly did not want to talk to any reporters at that period of time, that is correct. It would have been difficult for me to honestly deny all the questions put to me and I didn't want, really, to be put in that position. Plus the fact that it would have been extremely embarrassing to President Nixon, obviously.

The election was upon us or upon the scene, and I thought it would just be best for all concerned to stay out of sight until after the election.

Senator ERVIN. Did you talk to anyone about staying out of sight before you did stay out of sight?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Dean.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Dean?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And he was not your counsel at that time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I disagree with that. I think he was, but in any case, he agreed.

Senator ERVIN. Well, one time down in North Carolina, there was an accused in a case that had no lawyer. He had no lawyer, so the judge asked him—asked this lawyer if he would represent the accused. He said, "Yes."

The judge said, "Well, take the accused out to the side room and give him the very best advice you can."

He went out to the side room with the accused. In a few minutes, the lawyer came back without the accused and the judge told the sheriff to look out in the side room and bring the accused in. The sheriff came back and reported that the accused was not there.

The judge asked the lawyer, "What does this mean?"

The lawyer said, "You told me to give him the very best advice I could, and I did."

So Mr. Dean—assuming that he was your lawyer—seemed to have given you what you considered good advice, because you followed it.

Mr. SEGRETTE. It certainly sounded like good advice at the time.

Senator ERVIN. And didn't you adopt similar tactics after the election was all over?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, I proceeded to my residence about 2 days after the election.

Senator ERVIN. Weren't you sort of out-of-pocket here about the time this committee was set up? We had a little difficulty finding you, or so I am informed by the staff.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't believe so. I was always living at my places of residence under my name and I don't believe—many newspapermen found me. They didn't seem to have much difficulty.

Senator ERVIN. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Dash?

Mr. DASH. I just have a few questions.

Senator Gurney asked you about the number of people that you actually had working for you and I think you said something about 11.

Mr. SEGRETTE. I just made a guess.

Mr. DASH. Actually, your expense record that we have shows that you actually paid 22 people and that counting those who worked for some of the others, would bring it to 28. Following a request that you have made to us, I won't go down the list and name them.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Fine.

Mr. DASH. Now, even if there were only 28, which I take it is not necessarily a large number when one speaks of thousands working in the campaign. Nevertheless, isn't it true, Mr. Segretti, that only one agent acting in the kind of arena that you were acting in, doing the kind of work that, say, Mr. Benz was doing, or the work that was being done in California, could be quite destructive of a candidate's opportunities? It doesn't take very many to do it?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It is possible; yes, sir, assuming that that is correct.

Mr. DASH. The particular letter that we have spoken about, the very scurrilous letter about Senator Humphrey and Senator Jackson under Senator Muskie's campaign stationery—Mr. Chapin thought

that for very little money, one person got quite a bit of return out of it. So you got quite a bit of pack for one person.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is the danger for the type of activities that I engaged in.

Mr. DASH. Well, I would like the record to show, so that we are not misled by numbers, that the fact that there were only 28, that that does not minimize the impact that 28 may have had on the election.

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. Now, when you were informed that you were going to be called before the grand jury, you did have a meeting with Mr. Dean in Miami, did you not?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I did.

Mr. DASH. Did the question come up concerning whether or not certain parties should be dealt with if it should come up to the grand jury?

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, again we are going to raise—he went back specifically, I think, to discuss with Mr. Dean his legal rights. If the Senator makes the same ruling, we will answer the question. We think this conversation is particularly within the attorney-client privilege and I believe Mr. Segretti will testify that he was consulting with Mr. Dean in that capacity.

Senator ERVIN. I think I would hold that the evidence totally fails to show any attorney-client relationship between Mr. Segretti and Mr. Dean.

Mr. SHERMAN. And that would include this latter meeting?

Senator ERVIN. Yes, I would think that is evident.

Mr. DASH. Following that, did you testify before the Senate—did you talk to representatives of the Senate Committee on Administrative Practices in November of 1972?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I never discussed any substance with them, no, sir.

Mr. DASH. No, but did you tell representatives of that committee that because you had not consulted an attorney, you did not have an attorney?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe my statement was to the effect that I did not have an attorney in Los Angeles at that time and I wished to consult with one. At that time, I was in the process, I believe, of obtaining counsel in Los Angeles, which I did, based on Mr. Dean's recommendation.

Mr. DASH. Well, relying on the chairman's ruling, and I will again ask the question: In Miami when you went to see Mr. Dean prior to your being called before the grand jury, was there a discussion concerning certain names of persons you had dealt with during your operations coming up before the grand jury?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is correct.

Mr. DASH. What names were there concern about?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan and Mr. Kalmbach.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Dean indicate that he might be able to do something about those names not being—coming up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Could you elaborate a little more on that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. He said something to the effect that he might be able to put parameters on the inquiry. He seemed to be particularly concerned about Mr. Kalmbach's name coming up.

Mr. DASH. All right. Then when you actually went to testify before the grand jury, did you have a meeting with Mr. Silbert?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, I did just prior.

Mr. DASH. At that time he was acting as the principal Assistant U.S. Attorney and in charge of the Watergate investigation?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I don't know his exact role but I believe that is essentially correct.

Mr. DASH. During his questioning of you, or preparation with you, before your testimony before the grand jury, did a discussion come up concerning Mr. Kalmbach?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Brief reference was made; yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. How was that reference—how did Mr. Silbert in any way refer to Mr. Kalmbach?

Mr. SEGRETTE. He said something to the effect, "Were you receiving funds from Mr. K?"

Mr. DASH. He used the letter "K"?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Did that seem strange to you at the time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. DASH. What impression did you get?

Mr. SEGRETTE. The impression I had was that there was something going on behind the scenes.

Mr. DASH. Did you believe then that you were really not being asked full questions concerning your knowledge of these facts?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, I have to look upon it, upon my perspective now. I believe the questions they asked relating to the Watergate burglary and wiretap were full and complete. I think they did an adequate job in that regard.

Mr. DASH. There was no effort to ask you any questions concerning Mr. Kalmbach or how you were paid?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Well, there was that very brief prior discussion with Mr. Silbert which did not go into any detail, and during my testimony before the grand jury nothing was asked by the U.S. attorneys regarding that.

Mr. DASH. The only references Mr. Silbert made were to a Mr. "K" and not to Mr. Kalmbach to you?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right. That was not in front of the grand jury.

Mr. DASH. No, no, not in front of the grand jury, before you went before the grand jury?

Mr. SEGRETTE. That is right.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Silbert ask you any question concerning Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. In the prior meeting?

Mr. DASH. In the meeting prior to—

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. How full was his inquiry on that?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I think I gave him the general outline that I was first contacted by Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin.

Mr. DASH. When you appeared before the grand jury, did he ask you any questions concerning Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Chapin?

Mr. SEGRETTE. To the best of my recollection he did not.

Mr. DASH. But did you in fact mention Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Chapin and, if so, under what circumstances?

Mr. SEGRETTI. A grand juror asked me questions relating to those individuals, and I believe I answered all of them.

Mr. DASH. Specifically to those individuals, did the grand juror know of those individuals?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. DASH. How did it come up?

Mr. SEGRETTI. It is very hard to remember, Mr. Dash. That was a long time ago.

Mr. DASH. Weren't you asked how you were paid and how you got involved?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Let me give you my best recollection of that. I have not seen a grand jury transcript of that, of course, but there was a question by a grand juror regarding my financial arrangements, who they were with and when was the last money received, and I told them—I told them it was Mr. Kalmbach and the last sum I received, I gave them the date as best I could recall it, and I told them the sum.

Mr. DASH. And actually at that time you were really following what Mr. Dean had suggested to you in Miami, not to answer questions or volunteer anything that was not asked but to try to keep Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Chapin's names out, but if the questions were put, to tell the whole ball of wax.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Certainly.

Mr. DASH. All right.

Mr. SEGRETTI. I had no intention to perjure myself before the grand jury.

Mr. DASH. But if that juror had not asked that question, Mr. Chapin's and Mr. Kalmbach's names would not have gone before the grand jury?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't believe they would have.

Mr. DASH. I have no further questions.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Segretti, when the question was asked as to who was paying you, was the question also asked what you were being paid for?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I don't recall exactly, Mr. Thompson. There were some things said that I was engaged in getting pickets, rival pickets, in other words a Muskie picket in a Humphrey rally or what have you, that type of thing, but no details were ever gone into, just very general.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you discuss that in the grand jury?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe so.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you discuss that with Mr. Silbert?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Beforehand. You have testified about what might be described as two different categories of activities, things that might be what have been referred to as Dick Tuck type of activities, perhaps—amusing things—and things that were possibly violations of criminal law and not in any way amusing.

What are we to understand about Mr. Silbert? Are we getting the correct impression now? Did he understand the full scope of your activities or, to the best of your knowledge, did he only think you were engaged in the prank-type things which we have heard testified about here for several weeks?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not really know. It is hard to guess; but to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Silbert had no knowledge of all the activities that I engaged in, and probably thought, although this is pure speculation, that I was engaged in, shall we say, the prank-type activities.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did he ask you what you were being paid for?

Mr. SEGRETTE. He may have. I really do not recall.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did he ask you how much you had been paid?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not believe he did.

Mr. THOMPSON. Getting back briefly to who knew what and when, I understand in your meeting of October 10, Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding were both present, and did you discuss the Humphrey-Jackson letter with them at that time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I believe that was mentioned.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you discuss Mr. Chapin's involvement with them at that time?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I cannot say whether I did or not. I just do not recall.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you have a recollection as to the scope of their knowledge when you left that meeting with regard to what your activities had been?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I certainly had the general outline of it. I was very tired that evening; I had been up the night before traveling.

Mr. THOMPSON. You talked about the Humphrey-Jackson letter and you talked about some of the hard stuff anyway?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. The question is whether or not you mentioned other individuals, Mr. Chapin and other people, who you had dealt with in setting this up?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I do not know whether that was brought up at that time or not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you have—

Mr. SEGRETTE. Mr. Dean, so far as I know, knew about those individuals at that time. I had been introduced to Mr. Dean by Mr. Strachan so he knew about Mr. Strachan, and he knew that Mr. Strachan knew me.

Mr. THOMPSON. You assumed he knew what you were doing—what Mr. Strachan had done?

Mr. SEGRETTE. I just—I do not believe I made any assumption at that point.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you have any subsequent meetings, say that month, the month of October, with anyone at the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No, I did not; not to my recollection.

Mr. THOMPSON. Fielding, Strachan, Dean, Chapin, anyone?

Mr. SEGRETTE. No; none.

Mr. THOMPSON. Was your next meeting with anyone at the White House—with Mr. Dean?

Mr. SEGRETTE. It was Mr. Dean in Palm Springs, Calif.

Mr. THOMPSON. Is that when he taped the conversation that we have alluded to?

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Going back to October 10, I believe he suggested that you keep a low profile.

Mr. SEGRETTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Is he the one who suggested the train trip?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I believe he did.

Mr. THOMPSON. Senator Talmadge referred to someone asking you whether or not you thought the Greek Islands were pretty at this time of year, something to that effect; was that Mr. Dean?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes. I had the impression that he had taken such a trip at one time and he said they were.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did he ask you if you needed any money?

Mr. SEGRETTI. There was a reference to that, I believe, that evening around October 10 or whatever, whether I had sufficient funds to sustain myself until the election, and I told him I did, and that was about the end of that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Did he, at any time, offer to get you a job or indicate that perhaps he had a job for you out of the country?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was after I returned to my residence after the election.

Mr. THOMPSON. About mid-November?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. When you met in Palm Springs with him again, did he indicate that he had discussed this matter with anyone else in the White House?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not recall that; no, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Just to make sure the record is straight, I understood your previous answers, after the meeting of October 10, as I understand it, you went to a hotel over in Crystal City; is that correct?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is correct.

Senator WEICKER. And you did meet with Mr. Dean again on October 11?

Mr. SEGRETTI. If those dates—I believe it was the next day he came by to the motel room; yes.

Senator WEICKER. With a form of denial?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No; I believe that was Mr. Fielding who came by with that, and Mr. Dean came by later in the day, if my memory is correct on that.

Senator WEICKER. On October 11?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Did you stay in the motel past the 11th? When did you leave the motel?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not know whether I left later that day or the next day; it was rather soon then.

Senator WEICKER. So it was Mr. Fielding who came by first?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is my best recollection, and then Mr. Dean.

Senator WEICKER. Right; and then Mr. Dean?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. What was the nature of this denial? Was this something that you were supposed to sign?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That was my impression; yes.

Senator WEICKER. Was it in affidavit form?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No; just seemed to be a statement.

Senator WEICKER. A statement which they attempted to get your signature on?

Mr. SEGRETTI. I do not recall if there was a signature line on that or not, but certainly my approval.

Senator WEICKER. I see. I have no further questions.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to extend the hearing but I think I want to make sure our record is clear. I think, as our record from a prior phase of this hearing already shows, that the only reason the FBI gave, and the U.S. attorney gave, for not pursuing this particular matter is there was a belief that dirty tricks did not involve criminal behavior.

Mr. Segretti, you now have pleaded guilty, have you not?

Mr. SEGRETTI. That is right.

Mr. DASH. In the U.S. district court. To what have you pleaded guilty?

Mr. SEGRETTI. To three counts of 18 U.S.C. 612, which is distributing or causing to be published unauthorized campaign literature, in other words, not properly attributed to the source.

Mr. DASH. And if, in fact, Mr. Silbert had pursued all of the questions he could have pursued concerning your activities, your testimony before this committee is you would have told him everything that you have done. You would not have withheld anything from Mr. Silbert?

Mr. SEGRETTI. Well, I do not know how I would have acted—reacted to that. I may have taken the fifth amendment at some point. I just do not know.

Mr. DASH. But you did not have that opportunity because Mr. Silbert did not pursue all these questions with you; did he?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No, he did not.

Mr. DASH. I have no further questions.

Senator ERVIN. I understood you to say you told Mr. Silbert you had engaged in certain activities for which you had been paid by Mr. Kalmbach, and you outlined in a general way what the nature of those activities were.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Very general, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. Yes. And there was nothing to prevent him from asking you any further questions if he had had any desire to learn any more?

Mr. SEGRETTI. No. I believe that is correct. The door may have opened at that point.

Senator ERVIN. Any further questions?

Mr. Segretti, I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for the cooperation that you have given us—the full cooperation. You have answered all our questions freely, including those where you relied on the attorney-client privilege that existed between you and John Dean, and it has been very helpful to the committee. You apparently made a frank disclosure of things, and you have not tried, so far as I can tell, to evade answering any question you thought we were entitled to have answered.

Mr. SEGRETTI. Thank you, Senator. I would like to say it certainly has not been easy for me or anybody in my position to make some of these disclosures because, certainly, I regret sincerely many of the acts I was engaged in. However, I do feel it was necessary, and hopefully this will, to some extent, in the future prevent other individuals from getting in the posture that I am today.

I do feel a benefit from these hearings, at least in this area, will more or less cleanse the system for some time to come. Thank you.

Mr. SHERMAN. Senator, I think I would also like to thank both Mr. Lenzner, Mr. Lackritz, in particular and, of course, Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson, because they have been very kind to us over the past few months. Thank you.

Senator ERVIN. Thank you.

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, October 4, 1973.]

EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

EXHIBIT No. 158

WAKE UP LIBERALS!




**IS THIS THE MAN YOU WANT
IN THE OVAL OFFICE ?**

Ed Muskie would be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Connallys we have now.

He is the candidate of the Democratic Right. His victory would be a victory for the old-line reactionary elements in the party.

Will we sit on our hands again until Muskie locks up the nomination in the cigar-filled back rooms at Miami? Or will we work for a New Politics? He's a sell-out, and we know it.

Let's do something about it.



Muskie has always voted against gun control. (He violated the law in 1965 by hunting in a baited field in Maryland and was fined.) He sits cheek-by-jowl in with the rancid National Rifle Association lobby.

Muskie is the only of the so-called Liberal Democrats who crawled into bed with racist-supercop Frank Rizzo when Rizzo beat liberal Thatcher Longstreth for Mayor of Philadelphia and now plans a meeting with Rizzo in December to sell out Liberalism for "law 'n order".

Muskie added himself publicly to the list of political opportunists in opposing abortion reform -- denying the right of a woman to have control over her own body. He is a sexist.

Muskie has told Black Americans that there is no room for them in his politics. Blacks are the backbone of the Democratic party, and Mr. Muskie told them to go to hell. This is Muskie's way of playing on Southern Strategy. We don't want a racist to represent Democrats in 1972.

WHAT KIND OF MAN IS ED MUSKIE ?

He's a wheeling-dealing, ward-healing politician who will fit right in with the Daley, Meany, Johnson gang in the Democratic party.

He's sold out. Let's not be fooled.

We blew our chance in 1968; let's not blow it again.



CITIZENS FOR A LIBERAL ALTERNATIVE

EXHIBIT No. 159



DALEY AT 1968 CONVENTION IN CHICAGO
The silence was ominous.



MEANY IN MIAMI BEACH HOTEL LOBBY
The distrust was deep.

services. Both Meany and Daley have made it clear that they have been mortally offended, and neither is one to forgive or forget an insult, much less a public humiliation.

"This man's ideas aren't liberal," growled Meany last week. "This man's ideas are crazy." Meany's anger has been building up. It is not just that he objects to McGovern's positions on such issues as pot, abortion and the Viet Nam War. He has also developed a distrust of the candidate that aides feel can never be dispelled. The antagonism dates back to 1962, when McGovern ran for the Senate from South Dakota. Hard-pressed for cash in a tough campaign, he asked the AFL-CIO for a \$30,000 loan. The request came to Meany, who ordered: "Give him the money." With that, Meany concluded that he had another Senator who was safe for labor.

That turned out to be only partly true. McGovern dutifully voted the labor line much of the time, but he flunked one crucial test. He voted against cutting off a filibuster that was preventing a vote on repeal of the right-to-work provision of the Taft-Hartley Act—a sacred matter with labor. He subsequently cast many other votes that were considered anti-labor. To Meany, he was an ingrate. He made no notable effort to conciliate the labor chieftain. Typically, he said that since he had made a mistake on right-to-work, Meany should confess that he had been wrong about the Viet Nam War. By convention time, Meany was mad enough to have the AFL-CIO distribute a 46-page attack on McGovern's legislative record—as if McGovern were the Republican presidential candidate. Most of the rest of big labor is following Meany's lead. Unless he relents, they will not yield, either. It could cost McGovern help at the polls as well as \$5,000,000 in labor campaign funds.

Initially, Daley was not as angry at

McGovern as Meany was. McGovern did not encourage delegates to file in his behalf in Chicago; he wanted the mayor's support if it was at all possible. But he forfeited it when Daley's delegates were replaced at the convention by the challengers, including some of the mayor's sworn enemies, among them Alderman William Singer. Watching the proceedings from a distance at his summer home in Michigan, the mayor maintained an ominous silence while his supporters vowed that they would never back McGovern. Said Chicago Alderman Vito Marzullo: "Only the Lord or Mayor Daley could activate me for McGovern."

At this point the Lord would be the better bet. "To Daley," says an aide, "McGovern is the classic Methodist—the kind of guy who doesn't sweat. No one is more difficult for an Irish Catholic to get along with than one of those non-sweating Methodists." As devout a Democrat as he is a Catholic, Daley would agonize over abandoning the presidential nominee. But short of that drastic step, there is plenty he can do to express his displeasure with McGovern. He can cut off Cook County funds to McGovern or hamper the distribution of his literature or harass his workers. On Election Day, Daley's precinct workers will be strategically stationed at polling places. Conceivably, Daley's services may not be as indispensable as they once were—at least so the McGovern forces hope. A group of reformers called the Independent Pre-

THE NATION

cinct Organization, led by Bill Singer, have developed a grass-roots organization that has proved as effective as Daley's in some local races. If it can be mobilized for McGovern, it might do the work that Daley seems likely to shun. Then, too, Daley might eventually be moved to help McGovern—a little.

If Meany and Daley remain hostile to McGovern in the campaign or are at least neutralized, President Nixon has an advantage he would not have dreamed possible before the convention. Spokesmen for the Old Politics though they may be, the two bosses have enormous appeal for a large part of the electorate—the "ethnics," the kind of voter that was underrepresented at the Democratic Convention and is likely to resent McGovern. If these voters switch to the Republicans in large numbers, a sizable chunk of the Democratic coalition will disappear. Would Meany and Daley, loyal Democrats all these years, welcome such a development? In the past, they have taken exception to the President. Yet they have also learned to live with him, though not very comfortably. They are not sure they would be as comfortable with McGovern, who so far has made life distinctly troublesome for them. They might be willing to wait out another four years of Republican rule in order to get the kind of Democrat they want. It is Candidate George McGovern's task to convince them that it is not worth the wait, that even if he is not their kind of Democrat, it is still in their interest to support him in the coming campaign.

THE DELEGATES

Eve's Operatives

Gazing around the convention through her blue-tinted glasses, Gloria Steinem pronounced with satisfaction: "We've changed the population here. It almost looks like the country." What she meant was that women are 52% of the nation's population, and last week close to 40% of the convention delegates were women—a dramatic jump over their 13% representation at the 1968 Democratic Convention. Decorative as the women were in their bell-bottom trousers, miniskirts, jeans and hot pants, they were not there to be on display but to seek power. Except for a couple of setbacks, they got enough to satisfy and even surprise them.

The National Women's Political Caucus had worked hard to get women elected as delegates under the liberalized McGovern-Fraser Commission rules. At the convention, they turned up everywhere in positions of power—on the Credentials Committee, the Rules Committee, the Platform Committee. They came in all sizes, ages and accents. They ranged from Katherine Harjo, 17, a Seminole Indian from Oklahoma to Jessie Sanders, 79, a political pro from South Dakota. The con-

[From the Chicago Daily News, July 11, 1972]

IRKED BY LOSSES, MEANY SHUNS CONVENTION HALL

(By William J. Eaton)

MIAMI BEACH.—The 77-year-old president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, has stayed away from the convention hall.

But Meany's top political adviser, Al Barkan, and about 50 officers of AFL-CIO unions, watched glumly Monday night as roll call votes registered major victories for Sen. George S. McGovern.

Meany let loose an across-the-board blast Monday at the foreign and domestic record of the South Dakota senator, in a last-ditch effort to prevent McGovern's nomination.

A 23-page "white paper" was released by a Meany aide during the McGovern camp's successful fight to seat all 271 of his California delegates.

The paper is certain to make good ammunition for President Nixon if McGovern is nominated.

"Senator McGovern has adopted the 'new populism' as a key campaign slogan," the AFL-CIO document says. "Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted wrong on legislation affecting working people and the trade union movement."

The "white paper" attacks McGovern's votes dating back to 1957 and scores his views on civil rights, amnesty, marijuana, crime, violent protests, Vietnam, Israel and defense budget cuts.

In general, McGovern is pictured as weak on such key labor issues as minimum wage increases and federal union shop legislation. The document implies that McGovern has been indifferent on civil rights and is pro-Arab in the Middle East dispute.

Jerry Wurf, pro-McGovern leader of the AFL-CIO State, County and Municipal Employees Union, shook his head in dismay over the labor opposition to the apparent winner.

"Labor cannot dictate to the Democratic Party and now Meany and the others are painting themselves into a corner," Wurf lamented. "It's sickening."

Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers, has been a behind-the-scenes McGovern supporter. His union is expected to endorse the South Dakotan against Mr. Nixon.

A labor leader backing Sen. Edmund S. Muskie on the convention floor, William Du Chessi, secretary-treasurer of the Textile Workers Union of America, said several AFL-CIO unions, including his own, probably would endorse McGovern before November.

But the AFL-CIO attack raised new doubts about whether federation leaders would give their traditional allegiance to the Democratic presidential contender.

The AFL-CIO Executive Council is scheduled to meet Aug. 30 to decide whether to make an endorsement in the presidential contest. No one expects an AFL-CIO endorsement of Richard Nixon but federation neutrality would be a plus for the President.

Meany at one point said he would favor any Democratic contender except Alabama Gov. George Wallace and New York Mayor John V. Lindsay. But as McGovern's chances improved on the primary trail, Meany's attitude apparently changed.

I. W. Abel, president of the Steelworkers, is reported to be behind Meany's action. Abel is a fervent Humphrey supporter.

THE McGOVERN RECORD

A Critical Appraisal

PART I

DOMESTIC ISSUES

- * Labor
- * Civil Rights
- * Amnesty and the Draft
- * Marijuana
- * Crime
- * Violent Protests

LABOR ISSUES

Senator McGovern has adopted the "new populism" as a key campaign slogan. Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted wrong on legislation affecting working people and the trade union movement.

In 1959, McGovern voted for the Landrum-Griffin bill, which was opposed by organized labor. The overwhelming majority of non-Southern Democrats voted "no" - among them such Democrats from neighboring states as Senators Anderson and Metcalf of Montana and Senator Burdick of North Dakota, as well as four Democrats from Minnesota and five from Wisconsin. (26)

In 1960, McGovern voted against raising the Minimum Wage to \$1.15 and extending coverage to 1.4 million retail workers. He was one of only five non-Southern Democrats to vote "no." (27)

In 1966, McGovern was one of only 5 Northern Democrats who voted to deny minimum wage coverage to some 1,000,000 workers in retail and service firms with gross sales of less than \$500,000 annually. McGovern also voted against raising the minimum wage to \$1.55.

Also in 1966, McGovern voted against a Long (D-La.) amendment requiring states to provide eligible workers a minimum of 26 weeks of unemployment compensation coverage for 20 weeks of employment. Only five other Northern Democrats voted "no."

In the same year, McGovern was one of 6 Northern Democrats to vote for a Dirksen amendment to cut the appropriations for the Departments of Labor and HEW.

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In 1968, the man hailed as the candidate of the young, voted, along with Republicans and Southern Democrats, to table a Javits amendment which would have provided \$52.1 million in appropriations to the Labor Department for summer jobs.

McGovern and 14(b) ... or the Case of Great Plains Wheat, Inc.

After the Democratic sweep in 1964, President Johnson and pro-labor Senators made an all-out effort to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The conservative forces mounted a filibuster to prevent the repeal bill (H.R. 77) from coming to a vote in the Senate. On October 11, 1965, Mansfield moved to invoke cloture. McGovern voted against cloture -- and the motion failed.

Two more cloture motions were made -- on February 8 and 10, 1966. McGovern voted for cloture the first time, against it the second time -- the only Senator to switch his vote. He explained that the first vote was to indicate his opposition to filibuster in general, while the second vote indicated his opposition to the repeal bill.

McGovern is quoted as saying:

"It was a straight political decision. It was the only time in the United States Senate I voted against my conscience." (28)

More recently, on May 13, 1972, McGovern told the New York Times that, just as he had conceded he had made a mistake on the 14(b) vote, George Meany should acknowledge that he had made a mistake in supporting the Vietnam War. The implication is that the AFL-CIO position on the war was, like McGovern's position on 14(b), a "straight political decision," a violation of "conscience."

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What was the politics of McGovern's decision to vote "against my conscience?"

In February, 1964, President Johnson had helped to end a maritime union boycott of wheat shipments to the Soviet Union by pledging that fifty percent of such shipments would be carried in U.S.-flag ships. This had been the original understanding when President Kennedy had approved the wheat program, but several giant wheat export companies sought to increase their profits by seeking a reduction in the 50% requirement.

The wheat companies continued to press for a reduction. On May 19, the companies' views were expressed in a memorandum from Great Plains Wheat, Inc. to the Special U.S. Maritime Advisory Committee. Meanwhile, Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers Union, had sent Senator McGovern a statement of the Union's position. Mr. Hall received a reply from Senator McGovern dated May 24. It was word for word, page after page, identical to the statement of Great Plains Wheat, Inc. Senator McGovern was clearly serving as a mouthpiece for an organization founded to promote foreign and domestic wheat sales.

Three months later, on August 24, Senator McGovern was interviewed by Sander Vanocur on NBC's Today show. The following exchange took place:

Vanocur: Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on the Senate floor, have you not, that there's a possibility the Democratic Senators from farm states may not support the union movement on 14(b), an attempt to wipe out the right-to-work laws. Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get your way on this?

McGovern: Well, I can't speak for other Senators, but what I had said on the Senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm personally for a crusade to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley law, the so-called Right-to-Work law that exists in some of our states, at a time when the same labor leaders who are urging this repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on my wheat farmers....

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At issue here was not the well-being of Senator McGovern's farmers -- their wheat had already been sold -- but the profits of the wheat export companies as measured against the jobs of maritime workers.

McGovern went with the companies -- not only against the maritime workers but against all workers who do not enjoy the benefits of unionism because of Right-to-Work laws.

CIVIL RIGHTS

The 1957 Civil Rights Act was the first civil rights law to be enacted by Congress since the days of reconstruction. McGovern was absent on the votes leading to passage of this bill in the House. (29)

In 1959, when the House passed the Rooney Amendment to the Justice Department Appropriations bill (H.R. 8385) to extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission for 2 years and appropriate \$500,000 to it, McGovern was absent -- and did not pair. (30)

When the Civil Rights Act of 1960 was up for final House approval, McGovern was absent -- and did not pair. (31)

In 1960, McGovern voted against the McDonough Amendment (to the Housing bill) which would prohibit the Federal National Mortgage Association from purchasing housing where discrimination was involved. (32)

One month later, McGovern voted against the Powell Amendment to the School Construction bill requiring that facilities built under the Act be open to all students without regard to race, color, creed, national origin or religion.

On June 15, 1964, Senator McGovern joined 22 other Senators -- 18 of them from Southern and Border states, in supporting a last ditch effort to

emasculate the voting rights provisions of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. The McGovern supported amendment was defeated 62-23.

On May 13, 1968, Senator McGovern joined in supporting punitive legislation that sought to disqualify anyone convicted of participating in a riot from Federal employment for a period of 6 years. This legislation was a thinly veiled effort to punish blacks who had participated in the disturbances that followed the King assassination.

The Atlanta Constitution of June 7, 1972, reported that McGovern offered two major concessions to the South in meetings at the Democratic governors' conference in Houston. One was to discourage frivolous challenges to delegations to the national convention. The other was a promise "to push for a change in the 1965 Voting Rights Act which requires Southern states including Georgia to submit state reapportionment plans to the Justice Department." (Portions of Georgia's 1972 plan were turned down.)

When McGovern's stands on these issues are combined with his votes on minimum wage, youth employment and other economic issues of concern to working people, the result is a record that, with regard to the needs of minorities, can only be described as ambiguous at best.

AMNESTY AND THE DRAFT

McGovern has promised that if elected he would grant amnesty to people who have gone to jail or left the country to avoid serving in the army in Vietnam. (This has since become one of the most frequently-repeated McGovern pledges.) He added:

"It may very well be that statements of this kind will lead some people to hold out against the draft, but it is a position on which I feel very strongly." (33)

McGovern also said he would extend amnesty to those who are accused of leading America into the war by war crimes trials on college campuses:

"I think no useful purpose can be served in the effort to pin on a few men the responsibility for the war in which millions of Americans have shared." (34)

In a "Meet the Press" interview on February 21, 1971, David Broder referred to a McGovern statement that at his age and with his convictions he could not participate in the Vietnam War. Broder asked McGovern if that would be a conviction that he thought would serve as an example to the young people of the country if he were President. He replied:

"I made very clear that I wouldn't offer advice to any young man faced with the draft or with a decision not to respond to the draft. I have an 18-year-old son who is in that situation and I wouldn't advise him. That is a matter of conscience...What I said the other day that you are referring to is that George McGovern, at the age of 49, feeling the way I do about this war, I could not conscientiously support it. I am not recommending that course for anyone else but I regard this war as the most barbaric and inhumane act that our country has ever committed."

In a speech at Ohio State University on May 2 McGovern suggested, to the delight of his student audience, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff precede the troops into any future war. McGovern added that if he were writing new draft laws, "nobody under 30 would be drafted." (35)

LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA

In a speech at a drug counseling center in Boston on February 16, 1972, McGovern said that

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"experience, along with limitations on enforcement personnel and the grave costs involved in imposing severe sentences and prison terms on usually law-abiding young people and young adults, suggests that a more promising route might be to regulate marijuana along the same lines as alcohol, while continuing and expanding educational programs aimed at discouraging its use." (36)

On February 17, McGovern sent a qualifying statement to UPI:

"I have not in the past, nor do I now advocate, the legalization of marijuana. Our knowledge of the possible harmful effects of marijuana is insufficient to allow us to conclude that it should be legalized. However, I believe that no person should be sent to jail for the mere possession or use of marijuana. This has been my position for some time."

CRIME

Senator McGovern has called for the "decriminalization" of marijuana. And he denounced J. Edgar Hoover as "a menace to personal citizens" (sic) and "a chief obstacle to law enforcement." But at a time when millions of Americans are deeply and rightly concerned about rising crime rates, Senator McGovern has largely ignored this issue in his campaign.

In his mass mailing fund appeal of 1971 -- 8 pages of McGovern's positions on the issues -- the only specific item that deals with crime control is this:

"We must upgrade the quality of our local police and improve the understanding and communication between the police and the community. My policemen's G.I. bill would enable policemen to get a college education for self-improvement. They would not only gain in sociological understanding of community problems but would mingle with students as equals in a way that could bring better communication and mutual respect."

To be sure, McGovern has spoken, in generalities, about the need to eliminate poverty, slums, and the other conditions that are conducive to crime,

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but in the absence of statements dealing with the need for immediate crime control, the implication is that the victims of crime can expect no relief until our larger socio-economic problems are solved. And it is doubtful that better communication between police and college students will significantly reduce the crime rate.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Senator McGovern's statements on violent demonstrations repeatedly convey the impression that it is not violent demonstrators who are to blame but government policies.

Thus, on March 1, 1971, McGovern deplored the bombing of the Capitol as a "barbaric act" but related it to "our Vietnam madness."

"The massive bombardment we are continuing year after year against the peoples of Indochina has its counterpart in the mounting destruction of human values in our land. It is not possible to teach an entire generation to bomb and destroy others in an undeclared, unjustified, unending war abroad without paying the price in the derangement of our own society." (37)

On March 30, 1971, McGovern extended his support to the upcoming April 24 "peaceful protest" against Vietnam in Washington and San Francisco. Then, on May 3, in a statement on the violence that followed the peaceful demonstrations, McGovern had this to say:

"I regret deeply the events that are taking place in Washington today. I cannot condone illegal acts by those who seek an end to the Indochina war. These acts undermine the efforts in Congress to bring about a withdrawal of our forces by the end of this year.... As much as I regret the confrontation between demonstrators and police, I believe it is the direct result of the failure of the Administration to listen to the American people. What we see today is just another sign of the frustration felt by so many people. I hope it will not bring further confrontations this week. But even more, I hope that the Administration will finally listen to America and end the war." (38)

That same day, McGovern told an Ohio State University audience:

"It's a mistake in terms of one's effectiveness to engage in disorderly and violent tactics that interfere with the rights of others." (39)

Thus, McGovern's criticism of violent demonstrations seems mainly tactical: they don't work--they drive people over to the other side. One cannot find a McGovern statement indicating that violent protests are inherently wrong, no matter what the protestors feel about government policy, and that those who engage in them must bear full responsibility for the consequences.

Indeed, in urging that the Administration respond to the violent demonstrations by ending the war, Senator McGovern in effect helps to legitimate such demonstrations as an effective pressure upon government policy.

PART II

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

- * Basic Assumptions
- * View of the Cold War
- * The Soviet Union
- * Czechoslovakia
- * China
- * Vietnam
- * Israel and the Middle East
- * Proposed Military Cuts

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FOREIGN POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

"It is not enough merely to favor withdrawal from Vietnam. If we are truly to reverse our national priorities and restore sanity to our national life, we must have a President whose thinking is completely free from the last vestiges of the cold war paranoia which led to our Vietnam involvement in the first place." (1)

In the view of Senator George McGovern, our presence in Vietnam is the outgrowth of an overall foreign policy which has been fundamentally wrong because it has been based on a paranoid attitude toward Communism.

"This is what I mean by cold war paranoia--the thinking which dictates that 25 years after World War II, we must keep half a million American troops in Europe to defend the 250 million people of Western Europe from 200 million Russians, who meanwhile have to worry about 700 million Chinese at their back door!"

"Keeping our NATO forces in Europe alone costs us \$14 billion. Yet many Senators who voted for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment calling for total withdrawal from Vietnam by the end of this year voted against the Mansfield proposal to cut our NATO forces in half." (2)

Senator McGovern would replace our "paranoid" anti-Communism with a different attitude.

"Speaking for myself, I think Communism is another economic system that doesn't happen to fit my view of how society ought to be organized, but I'm willing to live in a world of diversity and I think we can get along with the Communists. If people want to be organized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact that this is their judgment to make." (3)

And Time reports McGovern as saying:

"I don't like Communism, but I don't think we have any great obligation to save the world from it. That's a choice other countries have to make." (4)

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The Time article continues:

"Going beyond the Nixon Doctrine, McGovern says that he would prefer that nations like Brazil and India not turn Communist, but that if they did, it would not fundamentally affect our interest."

Thus, Senator McGovern sees Communism as just "another economic system" which some people "want to be organized under"--a "choice" they have made. Presumably, the people who live under Communist regime have freely made that choice.

By contrast, Senator McGovern has a less benign view of what he calls "the so-called free world":

"The establishment center has persisted in seeing the planet as engaged in a gigantic struggle to the death between the free world and the Communist world. The facts are that much of the so-called free world is not free but a collection of self-seeking military dictators financed by hard-pressed American workers. And most of the Communist nations are far more obsessed with their own internal divisions than they are with Washington, London, Bonn or Saigon." (5)

HENRY WALLACE AND THE COLD WAR

In 1948, McGovern was an avid supporter of Henry Wallace and went as a delegate from Illinois to the Progressive Party Convention which nominated Wallace for President. McGovern, according to a biography, was "bewildered at the 'fanaticism' of some of the people closest to Wallace, and dropped out of the campaign. Nonetheless, McGovern continues to defend Henry Wallace's basic foreign policy outlook.

"I felt then, as I do now, that U.S. foreign policy was needlessly exacerbating tension with the Soviet Union and that we were wrong in

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our support of Chiang, the French in Indochina, and Bao Dai. I wasn't happy with the direction the Democratic Party was taking in those times. I liked what Wallace had to say about foreign policy. I still think he was essentially right." (6)

At issue is not whether McGovern supported Wallace in 1948 -- so did many others: The issue is: how does he feel about it now. Most others had second thoughts later on. McGovern did not.

"I'm not at all ashamed that I campaigned for Henry Wallace in 1948. He was a great Secretary of Agriculture and a great Vice President. I'm very proud of it.

"If we had listened to some of the things that Henry Wallace said, we might have avoided the Korean War and the Vietnam War." (7)

"I think my judgment was pretty good for a 25-year old." (8)

"So what? I am rather proud of it." (9)

THE SOVIET UNION

There is an echo of the Henry Wallace attitude in some of Senator McGovern's statements on the Soviet Union and the Cold War.

"...we're going to have to abandon our paranoia about Russia's ambition to dominate the world. I think if the Russians had messianic views at one time, they've largely subsided. The Soviets are interested in a security zone to protect them from another invasion from the West, from revived German militarism, and they see American policy in Western Europe as reviving German power and building a nuclear cordon around them. I've always felt that's the real reason they wanted a cushion of Communist states on their western border, from Poland to the Mediterranean." (10)

"The enormous American buildup after World War II almost guaranteed that the Soviets would attempt to offset it. If we had moved with less ambition in trying to encircle them with nuclear power, they might have been less fearful and therefore, less belligerent than they've become." (11)

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But if Soviet imperialism has subsided -- if indeed, it ever existed -- how does Senator McGovern explain the Soviet role in the Middle East? It is, he says, an exception:

"But the Middle East is different. There's an old czarist carry-over involved there, I think, of wanting to have access to the eastern Mediterranean. I suppose they're concerned about the oil in the Middle East, although perhaps not as much as we are. But they're going to be a force in the Mediterranean whether we like it or not; they're going to increase their sea power in that area." (12)

Apparently, the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union are confined to the Middle East, and these are rooted not in Communism but in czarism. Even so, the Russians' interest in the region's oil supply is less than our own.

Moreover, although McGovern sees an inevitable Soviet military build-up in the Middle East, his proposed defense budget would preclude an appropriate American response. (See pp. 12-14.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

If any event of modern times has underscored the imperialist character of the Russian regime, it was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But even on this occasion, McGovern found a way to blame American policy.

In a speech at the City Club of Cleveland on August 23, 1968, McGovern said that, while the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was in "blatant disregard of international order," the

"Government of the United States, the foreign policy of this Administration, also bears a considerable part of the blame." (13)

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According to McGovern, we had so "squandered American military might in the futile war in Vietnam" that the Russians did not feel deterred. Moreover, the Johnson Administration "has helped to establish the claim of large nations to intervene in small nations." Finally,

"...in bypassing the U.N. in our own unilateral intervention, we have weakened both international law and the influence of world opinion. The brave people of Czechoslovakia have paid the price." (14)

Thus, Senator McGovern adopted the line of the New Left that Vietnam is America's Czechoslovakia -- and that the Johnson Administration had to bear the responsibility for what the Russians did to the people of Czechoslovakia! So blind was McGovern to the meaning of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that less than a year later, he could say:

"International conditions have changed so radically that I doubt whether the policy-makers of 25 years ago could find today the political landmarks most prominent in the world affairs of their day...Moscow does not and cannot control the action of such diverse Communist groups as those in China, or Vietnam, or Czechoslovakia, or Cuba, or Albania."

In the same statement, McGovern also said:

"It is unclear to me how we can expect the Soviets to loosen their grip over the eastern half of Europe so long as the western half remains militarily dominated by the United States."

It is apparently Senator McGovern's view that the American military presence in Western Europe is comparable to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe.

CHINA

"The primary responsibility for the people of Taiwan is in the hands of the Chinese government. You have to express the hope that it would deal with its people peacefully." (16)

"China is incapable of any expansionist design." (17)

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VIETNAM

Senator McGovern has been critical of only one side in the Vietnam War -- ours. While frequently condemning American policy and the Saigon government, he has looked upon the North Vietnamese as the bearers of authentic Asian nationalism. He has denounced successive South Vietnamese regimes as corrupt dictatorships while ignoring the totalitarian character of the Communist regime in Hanoi.

In a "Meet the Press" interview, Robert Novak reminded McGovern of an earlier statement he had made (Jan. 28, 1971) that we were "on the wrong side of national aspirations throughout Asia." Novak asked whether the North Vietnamese troops invading Cambodia and lodged in Southern Laos without the consent of the Laotian government represented the right side of national aspirations in Asia. McGovern's response:

"They are a lot closer to the nationalistic aspirations of their people than the American troops who are there." (18)

This view was expanded in the interview with Playboy:

McGovern: "I think that Ho Chi Minh has copied our Declaration of Independence. He was really trying to throw the French out, not invite the Chinese in. And, as Eisenhower said: 'If there had been an election after they threw the French out, he would have had 80 percent of the vote, at least, in both North and South Vietnam.' Similarly, George Washington was overwhelmingly elected once he kicked the British out of the country."

Playboy: "I suppose that Nixon would like to make the late Ho Chi Minh into the Vietnam Hitler. Are you suggesting he might be the North Vietnam George Washington?"

McGovern: "That's right." (19)

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In the same interview, McGovern was asked: "Do you sympathize with the aspirations of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies?" He replied:

"In that they are striving for national independence, yes... (although) I can scarcely condone the terror the Vietcong and Hanoi have adopted as a military tactic."

In Bedford, New Hampshire, on August 9, 1971, McGovern charged that

"the real war criminals are the people that deceived the Congress and the American people about this war."

When asked if he meant the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, he replied:

"No question about it at all--I think they were very much in error." (20)

In a magazine interview, McGovern was asked if he agreed with Gloria Steinem's thesis that the causes of the Vietnam war can be traced to the "masculine mystique" which requires male leaders to pursue aggressive politics. He replied that the thesis "might be correct." (21)

McGovern's proposals for ending the war rest on an indifference to the fate of South Vietnam and an enormous confidence in the good will of Hanoi.

In an interview with the Washington Post on January 9, 1972, McGovern criticized President Nixon's November statement on Vietnam, and said that in November he would have announced a specific withdrawal date. But, he added, now that the Vietnam elections are over, the South Vietnamese are "now ready to chart their own future." Asked if he would have gone a step further and said that it no longer matters, how it comes out in Vietnam, McGovern replied:

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"Well that's what I would have thought privately. I don't know whether I would have said that. I've said that as a candidate, if I were in Nixon's place, I don't know what I would have done."

In a nationally televised debate (June 4, 1972), he explicitly stated that he would withdraw all American aid from South Vietnam before securing agreement for the release of American POWs. He said he would depend on the power of world opinion to induce North Vietnam to release the prisoners.

Then, on June 28, McGovern told a meeting of South Carolina delegates to the Democratic Convention:

"Begging is better than bombing. I would go to Hanoi and beg if I thought that would release the boys one day earlier, but begging won't help if we bomb and aid the Thieu Government." (22)

The notion that an American President should go begging to Hanoi will make sense only to those who believe that in the Vietnam war all right is on one side -- Hanoi's -- and all wrong on the other -- ours. It is doubtful that such people will constitute a majority of the electorate in November.

ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

In 1957, McGovern was one of a small minority of Congressmen to vote against H.R. 117 authorizing President Eisenhower to undertake a program of military and economic cooperation with Middle Eastern states in order to counteract Communism. The Resolution passed overwhelmingly, 355-61. (23)

In May of 1970, Senator McGovern signed two letters, one to President Nixon and another to Secretary Rogers, supporting the sale of aircraft to Israel. Two months later, in a position paper on the Middle East, McGovern qualified his stand. "The United States," he said, "should clearly express its will that the aircraft sold to Israel should not be used for incursions" across the Suez Canal.

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"Such a declaration would signal to the Arab leaders the American intention to seek directly some restraint on the part of Israel. This would help restore credibility in American policy. Though it would cost them nothing in strategic terms, the Arabs should reciprocate by ending the formal state of war between the two sides, which might have an important psychological effect." (24)

Thus McGovern demanded concrete concessions from the Israelis in return for Arab expressions of good faith. He was either unaware of or indifferent to the fact that Israel's air raids over Egypt were a direct and necessary response to the War of Attrition which Egypt declared in April, 1969, when she announced her unilateral abrogation of the June, 1967 UN cease-fire. Israel's efforts to knock out the Soviet missiles and other sophisticated military equipment were basic to her defense. If Israel stipulated that she would not use her aircraft over Arab territory, Egypt would be able to wage war against Israel at virtually no cost to herself. Egypt would have no incentive to maintain a cease-fire.

Despite his protestations that his general "dove" position does not prevent him from taking a strong position on maintaining Israel's military strength, Senator McGovern is obviously uncomfortable with the issue of providing U.S. arms to Israel. Thus, while he voted for the Jackson amendment authorizing \$500 million for Israel, he voted against the final bill because it also contained military aid for Laos and Cambodia and what McGovern objected to as "a sustained high level of defense spending."

In July, 1971, when the Administration was withholding a reply to a long-standing Israeli request to buy more aircraft, McGovern told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that he was at that time "not active" in efforts to persuade the Administration to answer the request because he was "not aware of any Congressional initiatives." (25)

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In the same interview, McGovern said explicitly that he did not believe freedom of Israel shipping through the Straits of Tiran meant continued Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh.

On March 2, 1971, in a Washington speech, Senator McGovern registered his approval of the Rogers Plan. He said Israel's borders should be guaranteed by pledges from the Arab states and possibly also by the United States and the Soviet Union. McGovern's statement was prominently featured in the press and drew an avalanche of criticism from both Jews and non-Jews in the Democratic Party.

McGovern issued a statement on March 5 "expanding on his views." He said that "I feel the basic thrust of the Nixon Administration policy in the Middle East is correct," that "no solution can or should be imposed on the Middle East by outside powers," that borders and other issues must be resolved by "negotiations between the Middle East governments," that "Israel will never accept a settlement that does not assure her of defensible borders," and that "our government should not seek to predetermine the outcome of negotiations." He did not acknowledge that the Nixon Administration was, in effect trying to impose its border plan on Israel through Jarring at that very time; he did not qualify his previous endorsement of the Rogers plan -- in fact, he indicated his belief that the borders outlined in that Plan were consistent with "defensible borders."

On May 8, 1972, in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Senator McGovern said he thought Senator Frank Church "would make a great Secretary of State." Senator Church voted against legislation providing military credits for Israel in both 1970 and 1971. He was among only seven leaders who opposed the legislation in 1970 and among only fourteen who opposed it in 1971.

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In the same interview, McGovern said that Richard Stearns -- who was in charge of the Senator's campaign in the non-primary states -- would have a key role in the inner core of a McGovern administration. Stearns, formerly International Affairs Vice President of the National Student Association, was one of the signers of a viciously anti-Israel ad published in the New York Times (November 22, 1967) under the sponsorship of the Cambridge Committee for Respect and Humanity. The ad bore the signatures of such anti-Semites and Arab propagandists as Arnold Toynbee and Mohammed Mehdi and solicited funds for Arab "relief" organizations such as American Middle East Rehabilitation, which sponsors anti-Israel rallies and disseminates anti-Israel propaganda.

On June 19, 1972, McGovern received the endorsement of Mohammed Mehdi. Dr. Mehdi, an official of the Action Committee for Arab-American Relations, an Arab propaganda group, said in an interview on WNEW-TV:

"There is of course, a matter of contradictory positions between the Senator's position on the Far East...but in our opinion this is just for political purposes...In our opinion, positions given tomorrow are more important than the talks today, and that is why we are supporting him because we believe essentially in his integrity and independence of mind, which is more important than any pressure group can hope to withstand the Zionist pressures."

NATIONAL DEFENSE

On January 19, 1972, Senator McGovern released, under his own name, a paper entitled "Toward a More Secure America--An Alternative National Defense Posture." The paper contained proposals designed to reduce Defense Department expenditures over the next three years, so as to result in a defense budget of \$54.8 billion in fiscal year 1972. According to McGovern, the current defense budget -- given inflation -- would amount to \$87.3 billion in fiscal 1975. Therefore, he projects a saving of \$32.5 billion in fiscal 1975. This is the origin of the phrase: "McGovern will cut the defense budget by \$33 billion." These savings would be achieved by cutbacks in various areas:

(1) Reducing the number of aircraft carriers from 15 to 6. This would cripple the ability of the U.S. to react simultaneously to widely separated crises. A major crisis, say, in the Mediterranean, would require denuding vast areas of the oceans of American naval strength. At present, for example, there are five carriers off the coast of Vietnam alone and only two carriers on station in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Soviets are increasing their naval strength in the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Indian Ocean.

(2) Cancelling the Navy's F-14 fighter and the Air Force's F-15 fighter. These two aircraft are so-called "air superiority" fighters, i.e., they are designed for air-to-air combat rather than for support of ground operations. They are our answer to the MIG-23, currently the "hottest" fighter in the Soviet inventory. Cancellation of F-14 and F-15 will mean that we will have nothing to match the MIG-23. The F-14 is carrier-based. Its mission in a place like the Mediterranean, say, would be to guard the air over a carrier that might be attacked by land-based aircraft. There are already some MIG-23's

with Russian pilots stationed in Egypt. Their role in some future crisis might well be to help neutralize the air cover for our carriers. The consequences of allowing this to happen are easy to imagine.

(3) Reducing U.S. garrison in Western Europe from 300,000 to about 130,000. This would tilt the balance of conventional military strength in favor of the Warsaw pact, as well as call into question the strength of American commitment. It would create all sorts of opportunities for the Soviets to apply pressure. It would deprive us of a "conventional option," in the event of war, leaving us a choice between using nuclear weapons and capitulating.

(4) Withdraw remaining U.S. troops from South Korea. The U.S. presence in Korea is symbolic, but is not merely symbolic. Such a U.S. withdrawal, at the time when discussions between North and South Korea have been initiated, would deprive the South Koreans of an important bargaining point. The Japanese would be forced to reconsider their own position, since they would no longer be sure of what the U.S. would do to keep the Korean peninsula out of hostile hands.

(5) Reduce U.S. bomber force from about 600 to 200. The efforts would be felt at both the tactical and strategic level.

(6) Removing all U.S. ground and air forces from Southeast Asia including air bases in Thailand. Taken together with the suggestion of cutbacks in aircraft carrier strength, the results could be severe. The current situation in Vietnam indicates that, in the absence of all U.S. air power, the North Vietnamese army would overrun South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, plus, over the long-term, create serious security problems for Thailand.

(7) Scrapping the Safeguard ABM system. Had this proposal been implemented before the recently concluded round of SALT talks, the Russians would have had

little incentive to limit their own ABM as part of a strategic arms limitation agreement.

(8) Reducing overall U.S. military manpower from 2.4 million men to about 1.7 million. This would be the lowest number of men under arms since 1950, i.e., since immediately before the Korean War.

(9) Reduce funds for military research and development from \$8 billion to about \$5.5 billion. This, at a time when Soviet expenditures for military R & D are increasing. In the last 25 years, the breakthroughs in military technology have revolutionized warfare. There is obviously a need to see that we do not fall behind in these areas.

(10) The McGovern budget also fails to provide for significant naval modernization in any area except submarines (increasing the number of nuclear attack submarines by 15 - from 69 to 84.) The fact is that the U.S. Navy has a disproportionately large share of older vessels. Something close to two-thirds of the U.S. active fleet is more than 20 years old, whereas only about 10% of the Soviet active fleet is more than 20 years old.

THE SPACE PROGRAM

Senator McGovern has underlined his opposition to the space program by voting to cut back appropriations for NASA every year he has been in the Senate.

NOTES

- (1) From McGovern's mass-mailing fund appeal letter, 1971. No specific date.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Playboy interview, July, 1971.
- (4) Time, June 26, 1972.
- (5) Speech to Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Detroit, April 1972.
- (6) Quoted in McGovern, a biography by Robert S. Anson, 1972.
- (7) The Washington Daily News, April 27, 1972
- (8) The Washington Post, May 1, 1972.
- (9) The Washington Evening Star, May 1, 1972.
- (10) Playboy interview, July 1971.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) The New York Times, August 24, 1968.
- (14) Ibid.
- (15) Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1969.
- (16) Playboy interview, July 1971.
- (17) Washington Post interview, January 9, 1972.
- (18) "Meet the Press", February 21, 1971
- (19) For some reason, this passage from the Playboy interview never appeared in the magazine, but it did appear in Robert Anson's biography, McGovern.
- (20) Manchester Union Leader, August 10, 1971.
- (21) New Republic interview with Paul Wieck, October 29, 1971.
- (22) Remarks to South Carolina delegates in Columbia, S.C. Reported in New York Times, July 1, 1972.

- (23) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 318.
- (24) McGovern position paper on the Middle East, July 20, 1970.
- (25) Interview with Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 8, 1971.
- (26) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 382.
- (27) 1960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 460.
- (28) McGovern, Apson. p. 143.
- (29) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 306, 348.
- (30) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 396.
- (31) 1960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 434.
- (32) Ibid., p. 436.
- (33) News Conference, Washington Press Club, September 23, 1971.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Columbus Dispatch, May 3, 1971.
- (36) Quoted by United Press International.
- (37) Quoted in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat by special writer, Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane.
- (38) Statement issued by Senator McGovern's office, May 3, 1971.
- (39) Columbus Dispatch, May 3, 1971.

APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL U.S. MARITIME ADVISORY COMMITTEE

GREAT PLAINS WHEAT, INC.,
Washington, D.C.

Until November 1963, all commercial U.S. wheat exports (that is all wheat exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt from the 50 percent provisions of the Cargo Preference Act. When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy wheat in the fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in authorizing such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirements in connection with the issuance of "validated" export licenses required under the Export Control Act. This was done even though the business transactions were strictly commercial, and were in no way related to Public Law 480 or involved any credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the first time, the provisions of Cargo Preference Act was applied to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction.

During the confusion that followed the application of U.S. shipping preference to Russian wheat purchases, it was discovered that no branch of the government had authority to absorb U.S./foreign freight rate differentials on commercial exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping requirements was to have been borne by the buyer—in this case the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the Russians refused to accept the additional cost. The issue was finally solved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of an extra high bid for export subsidy on durum wheat included in the total sales contract. Only half of the total sales volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originally mentioned by the Russians was realized. The remaining two million tons of potential wheat sales went on the shoals of the 50 percent shipping requirement.

The U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of its business from Public Law 480, with three-quarters of that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. While the U.S. merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent of total U.S. exports it is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. wheat exports. The American wheat economy is already providing substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public Law 480. Commercial wheat exports should not be impeded by non-competitive U.S. flag shipping requirements.

Certainly the effect of the 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirement implemented in 1963 on validated licenses to export wheat to Russia and other Eastern European countries has turned out to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1, 1964 Russia has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million metric tons of wheat in addition to what she imported the previous year. These purchases have been 1.4 million tons from Australia, 125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand tons from Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have been made by the Russians from the United States.

In addition, the other East European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1,740,000 tons of wheat since July 1, 1964, from these same countries as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again has not shared at all in these sales.

U.S. grain exporters and market development officers have testified that U.S. wheat sales could have been made, and indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc buyers if our delivered price can be competitive with other exporting countries.

[Copy illegible.]

Such a subsidy proposal might be patterned after the principles involved in the direct subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The proposal might include the provision that the 50 percent rule of the Cargo Preference Act could still continue on Public Law 480 shipments, but should not be applied to commercial transactions regardless of credit arrangements. A direct subsidy should enable the U.S. non-liner shipping companies to capture a fair share of U.S. commercial export transportation without preferential guarantees.

Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9 percent of the total U.S. export business, as compared to over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a strong appeal to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping in working out the new merchant marine policy mentioned by the President in his State of the Union message.

The immediate elimination of 50 percent U.S. shipping from commercial agricultural exports would not in any way adversely affect our merchant marine because no such business can now be done where the requirement is in effect. In fact the following benefits would accrue to our over all economy:

(1) Improvement in our balance of international payment from increased competitive commercial exports—particularly grain including primarily wheat. Any freight payment to foreign ships in connection with such possible exports would be vastly more than offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported commodities.

(2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for our docks, from increased exports; as well as for interior transportation via railroads, trucks and barges.

(3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses and for farm production adjustment programs.

We wish to heartily support a new policy and program for our bulk cargo merchant fleet. Government aid for construction of modern vessels, better able to directly compete with foreign shipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long ways to [copy illegible].

MAY 19, 1965.

WILLIAM L. JENNINGS, JR.,
 GERRARD L. WILSON, FLA.
 JAMES D. BARTLAND, MISS.
 HEARSH E. TALMADGE, GA.
 B. FLETCHER JORDAN, N. C.
 EUGENE J. MCCARTHY, MINN.
 GEORGE MCDOVERMAN, S. CAR.
 ROSS BAKER, TENN.
 JOSEPH M. HUNTLEY, N. MEX.

WILLIAM L. JENNINGS, JR.,
 MILTON B. THUND, N. DAK.
 JOHN SHEKMAN COOPER, N.Y.
 J. CALVERT COOPER, DEL.
 JACK MILLER, IOWA

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
 AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

COTYR M. HOUSER, CHIEF CLERK

May 24, 1965

Dear Mr. Hall:

Thank you for sending me your May 17 submission to the Maritime Advisory Committee. In order to further clarify my position, which involves commercial sale of agricultural commodities only, permit me to review the matter and offer a suggestion.

Until November 1963, all commercial U.S. wheat exports (that is all wheat exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt from the 50 percent provisions of the Cargo Preference Act. When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy wheat in the fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in authorizing such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirements in connection with the issuance of "validated" export licenses required under the Export Control Act. This was done even though the business transactions were strictly commercial, and were in no way related to Public Law 480 or involved any credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the first time, the provisions of Cargo Preference Act was applied to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction.

During the confusion that followed the application of U.S. shipping preference to Russian wheat purchases, it was discovered that no branch of the government had authority to absorb U.S./foreign freight rate differentials on commercial exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping requirements was to have been borne by the buyer -- in this case, the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the Russians refused to accept the additional cost. The issue was finally solved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of an extra high bid for export subsidy on durum wheat included in the total sales contract. Only half of the total sales volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originally mentioned by the Russians was realized. The remaining two million tons of potential wheat sales went on the shoals of the 50 percent shipping requirement.

File - Cargo Pref. - Russian Wheat

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May 24, 1965

The U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of its business from Public Law 480, with three-quarters of that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. While the U.S. merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent of total U.S. exports, it is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. wheat exports. The American wheat economy is already providing substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public Law 480. Commercial wheat exports should not be impeded by non-competitive U.S. flag shipping requirements.

Certainly the effect of the 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirement implemented in 1963 on validated licenses to export wheat to Russian and other Eastern European countries has turned out to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1, 1964, Russia has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million metric tons of wheat in addition to what she imported the previous year. These purchases have been 1.4 million tons from Australia, 125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand tons from Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have been made by the Russians from the United States.

In addition, the other East European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1,740,000 tons of wheat since July 1, 1964, from these same countries as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again has not shared at all in these sales.

U.S. grain exporters and market development officers have testified that U.S. wheat sales could have been made, and indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc buyers if our delivered price can be competitive with other exporting countries. This has not been possible because of the dramatically higher ocean freight rates associated with 50 percent use of U.S. flag "tramp" ships compared with open market rates. As you know, our bulk cargo "tramp" rates range from 50 to 100 percent higher than comparable foreign rates.

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May 24, 1965

The unfortunate effects of 50 percent shipping in connection with the licensing requirement has been:

- 1) Lost opportunities in making wheat export sales for dollars to these destinations in relief of our imbalance of payments,
- 2) increased pressure of unsold wheat stocks on our wheat producers and government agencies, and
- 3) the result that the requirement has yielded our Merchant Marine 50 percent of no business.

Expanded trade with the Soviet bloc has been expressed as being in our national interest. Effective support for expanded agricultural exports to Eastern Europe should be directed toward general export licensing of commodities not on the "Positive List" of strategic materials required under the Export Control Act of 1949.

It is essential that the U.S. develop means of supporting the U.S. non-liner merchant fleet without requiring U.S. flag shipping to be an impediment to any agricultural exports financed under U.S. government credit guarantees.

We wish to outline our general views on a new policy for U.S. shipping of all future commercial exports. One first part of this policy should be to immediately exempt by executive order all agricultural exports outside of Public Law 480 from U.S. shipping requirements. This should also exempt such exports involving government-insured short-term commercial credits.

An additional step in this new policy should be to provide a direct subsidy to the U.S. non-liner fleet to enable them to match foreign freight rates in competing for expanded commercial export business. Such a subsidy proposal might be patterned after the principles involved in the direct subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The

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May 24, 1965

The proposal might include the provision that the 50 percent rule of the Cargo Preference Act could still continue on Public Law 480 shipments, but should not be applied to commercial transactions regardless of credit arrangements. A direct subsidy should enable the U.S. non-liner shipping companies to capture a fair share of U.S. commercial export transportation without preferential guarantees.

Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9 percent of the total U.S. export business as compared to over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a strong appeal to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping in working out the new Merchant Marine policy mentioned by the President in his State of the Union message.

The immediate elimination of 50 percent U.S. shipping from commercial agricultural exports would not in any way adversely affect our Merchant Marine because no such business can now be done where the requirement is in effect. In fact the following benefits would accrue to our overall economy:

- 1) Improvement in our balance of international payment from increased competitive commercial exports -- particularly grain including primarily wheat. Any freight payment to foreign ship in connection with such possible exports would be vastly more than offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported commodities.
- 2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for our docks, from increased exports; as well as for interior transportation via railroads, trucks and barges
- 3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses and for farm production adjustment programs.

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May 24, 1965

We wish to heartily support a new policy and program for our bulk cargo merchant fleet. Government aid for construction of modern vessels, better able to directly compete with foreign shipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long ways to strengthen the economic position of our shipping firms and seafarers unions. Perhaps more could be done as well.

Unfortunately, the 50 percent requirement of U.S. flag shipping on wheat and other grain exports licensed to the Soviet bloc is making no contribution toward this objective. In fact, it appears to be hindering us in arriving at a more rationalized and practical solution of the problems of our maritime industry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "George McGovern", written in a cursive style.

George McGovern

Mr. Paul Hall
President
The Seafarers International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO
675 Fourth Avenue
Brooklyn, New York 11232

Program : The Today Show.
Network : NBC Television.

SENATOR GEORGE S. McGOVERN

FRANK BLAIR. The recent purchase by the Soviet Union of Canadian wheat has caused a stir among Democratic and Republican senators from wheat producing states. They're seeking to have the White House change the requirements set during President Kennedy's Administration that 50 per cent of such U.S. wheat exports be shipped in United States vessels. This requirement, the senators believe, so raises the cost for the Soviets that they will no longer buy our wheat.

One of the senators who is leading the fight against the requirement is George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota. He is in our Washington studios this morning with Today Show's Washington correspondent Sander Vanocur. Sander?

SANDER VANOCUR. Senator McGovern, since the Soviet Union has recently purchased almost a half a billion dollars worth of wheat, mostly from Canada, and are likely to continue purchasing western wheat for the next few years, why can't the American wheat farmer get a share of this market, since the principle of selling wheat to the Soviet Union was seemingly approved in 1963?

Senator GEORGE S. McGOVERN. Well, the American wheat farmer should have a share of this business. We have about 800 to 900 million bushels of wheat in surplus in this country, in our reserve stocks, a good part of which we ought to sell. We have another big crop coming on this year, and as you say, we made a policy decision two years ago that it was in our national interest to sell wheat to the Soviet Union, and to the countries of Eastern Europe, then, very mistakenly, in my view, we put on an administrative ruling that required that 50 per cent of any wheat that we sell to the Soviet Union, or to the countries of Eastern Europe, must move in American ships, and that simply raises the price, anywhere from eleven to fifteen cents a bushel, to the buyer, and as a consequence, the Soviet Union and the other countries in Eastern Europe are not buying any American wheat. They're going to Canada, Australia, France, or Argentina, and completely by-passing the American market, and as long as that shipping restriction exists, we're not going to sell any wheat, in my view, to the Soviet Union.

VANOCUR. Senator, was this an administrative decision by President Kennedy's Administration, in 1963, or did Congress have to do it?

McGOVERN. The Congress had nothing at all to do with it. It was a decision that was reached by the Kennedy Administration at the time of the Russian wheat proposal in 1963. My understanding is that that restriction was placed on the deal as a means of winning support from some of the maritime unions. Actually, it hasn't helped them in any way at all, because the net result of that restriction placed by the Administration, it's been continued by the present administration, has been to deny us any opportunity to sell wheat in Eastern Europe, so when we talk about requiring 30 per cent of the wheat and other grains that might move into that part of the world going in American ships, we're actually talking about 50 per cent of nothing. We're not helping the maritime unions; we're not helping anyone, and we're depriving the wheat farmers of this country of an opportunity to sell hundreds of millions of dollars of wheat and other grains to the Soviet Union, and to the countries in Eastern Europe.

VANOCUR. Senator, tell me first, what is the size of the potential market, given Soviet agricultural difficulties?

McGOVERN. Well, I would estimate that this year, the Soviets may be in the market for as much as 14 or 15 million tons of wheat. Now, they have recently completed arrangements with the Canadians, and a smaller deal with the Argentinians, and a somewhat smaller deal with the French, to purchase somewhere around seven million tons, but every indication is that before the end of this year, they're going to need another six or seven million tons. Now, the Canadians have just about exhausted their capacity to meet that need. Their port facilities are strained to the limit; their shipping opportunities are almost fully utilized, and they're contracted now for almost the maximum amount of wheat they can deliver.

VANOCUR. Put this in dollar figures on a yearly basis.

McGOVERN. Well, I would say somewhere around a billion dollars this year. Now, last year, the Russians purchased something over a half a billion dollars in wheat from the western world, and they're going to be in the market this year for an even larger amount, from all indications. The evidence we have is that this year, their crop is no better than it was in 1963, which was a bad year.

They had a somewhat better crop in 1964, although it was not particularly a good harvest. Now, from what we can learn, they're back to the level of about 1965, in terms of production, so that I would think there's still a half a billion dollars worth of potential business that has not yet been completed in this calendar year.

VANOCUR. And for the foreseeable future?

McGOVERN. Well, every indication is that for the next few years, they're going to be in the market for several billion tons of wheat each year, in the western world. There's no reason that I can see why we wouldn't get at least half, and maybe more than half, of that business.

In other words, we're talking about perhaps as much as 280 million dollars in wheat sales that the United States could make, were it not for this restriction on shipping, what I referred to as a self-defeating restriction; it's a restriction that doesn't help anyone.

The maddening thing about it is that it applies only to grain. This is not a restriction that is applied to machinery. We can sell automobiles, steel, tractors, industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, and move it in any ships that we want to. There's no restriction at all on the shipping, but when it comes to wheat, something that people can eat and that they can't shoot back at us in the form of ammunition, we apply this restriction that in effect just takes us out of the market.

VANOCUR. I want to get back to 1963. It is commonly assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the Administration did this at George Meany's behalf, the President of the AFL-CIO. Now, if that is so, who made Meany do it?

McGOVERN. Well, I think probably the pressure came from the maritime leaders, the labor leaders of the various maritime unions, who thought that this would be helpful to their workers and to their members. They thought that if they could put a restriction on the arrangement that would require at least half of the wheat to move in American flag vessels, that this would provide greater employment for the American maritime industry, for the dock workers and the shippers and the various people who are involved in our ocean shipping industry. But as I have indicated, it didn't work that way. But I do think that's where the pressure came from.

VANOCUR. And persists from?

McGOVERN. Yes, my understanding is that the labor leaders who originally applied the demand for the 50 per cent shipping requirement are still holding out. I can't understand why, because it isn't providing one additional job for any member of the maritime unions. Quite the contrary, it's hurting them. It's preventing the movement of wheat through our ports, that would provide additional work for the dock workers, the shipping industry, the railroads, and the people who work around our ports. It's actually working against the interests of the maritime industry. It's certainly working against the interests of the United States as a whole.

VANOCUR. Senator, you're leading a group of Republican and Democratic senators in the senate on this question. Have you made your views known to the White House, and if you have, what has been the White House reaction?

McGOVERN. Yes. Last spring, a number of us sent a letter to the White House, in which we expressed our views on this subject, and that letter was signed by members of the senate, from both political parties, primarily senators who come from the states that grow a great deal of wheat. We tried to point out to the Administration that a policy decision had been reached two years ago, that it was in the interest of the United States to sell wheat to the Soviet Union, to take advantage of this opportunity to improve our balance of payments position, to receive gold in payment for something that we have in surplus, and that we're storing at great cost to the taxpayers; we outlined all of those views in a letter to the White House, and we've been in further contact with the White House officials since that time. They expressed great interest in our views, and advised us that they are under active consideration. I still hope, and hope very strongly that the Administration is going to lift this restriction. We haven't yet had any such assurance.

VANOCUR. Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on the senate floor, have you not, that there's a possibility the Democratic senators from farm states may not support the union movement on 14-b, an attempt to wipe out the right-to-work laws. Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get your way on this?

McGOVERN. Well, I can't speak for other senators, but what I had said on the senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm personally for a crusade

to repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley law, the so-called Right-to-Work law that exists in some of our states, at a time when the same labor leaders who are urging the repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on my wheat farmers, that is doing a lot more damage to the American economy than any damage that results to us because of Section 14-b. I think we have to look at our country as a whole. We can't think in terms of the labor interest or the agricultural interest or the business interest; we're all in those issues together, and the United States is faced with a very serious problem in its balance of payments, in the outflow of dollars and gold. Here's an opportunity to correct that situation to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year.

We're faced with a very serious agricultural problem—depressed income for farm producers all over this country, and surpluses that have accumulated in government stocks. Now, I think the same labor leaders that are concerned about a restriction on the economy as they see it, in the form of 14-b, ought to be concerned about the restriction that they've placed on the economy, that's hurting all of us, in the form of restrictions on the sale of American wheat.

VANOCUR. Senator, let me put to you a not so hypothetical possibility. Senator Dirksen has said he is going to try to revive the Dirksen amendment on reapportionment and attach it to 14-b when it comes to the senate. If you don't get your way on this wheat shipping business, is there a possibility you might support Senator Dirksen when he tries to attach this to 14-b?

McGOVERN. Well, I really haven't reached any judgment on that but I think it's quite clear that farm state senators have to be concerned first about those issues that directly affect their own people. I come from a state that's more dependent on agriculture than any other state in the union. There's no other state that derives such a large percentage of its income from agriculture. We're a great wheat state. But it's very difficult for us to oppose proposals such as the Dirksen amendment and to support proposals such as the repeal of the Right-to-Work law at the very time when the people that are urging us to take that position then turn around and insist on a foolish and self-defeating restriction that deprives the agriculture of America of an opportunity to increase its income, of an opportunity that the highest officials in this government decided two years ago was not only in the interests of the wheat farmer, but in the interests of our country as a whole.

VANOCUR. Thank you very much. Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, talking about the difficulty of selling wheat to the Soviet Union, with the present restriction of shipping half of it in American vessels. And now, back to Today in New York.

FRANK BLAIR. Thank you, gentlemen. That was live from Washington. . . .

The McGovern Positions on the Arab-Israel Conflict:
 Contrast between the information given in McGovern's Jewish newspaper ad
 and the information from McGovern's record

| The AD: | The RECORD: |
|---|--|
| <p>Senator McGovern knows that there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East until the democratic state of Israel is recognized by her Arab neighbors--neighbors that still deny her right to exist.</p> | <p>"The feeling of the Palestinians that they have unjustly lost their homes and property is perhaps the most important source of tension and conflict in the Middle East. A unilateral act of Israel recognizing this to be the case could be the greatest single step toward peace." (From McGovern's major position paper on the Middle East, delivered on the Senate Floor on July 20, 1970, and hereafter referred to only by date.)</p> |
| <p>And McGovern is firm and clear on what the American posture must be:</p> <p>"America must do whatever is necessary to ensure the survival and independence of Israel. This is in the American interest and is in the interest of justice, democracy and humanity."</p> <p>Senator McGovern has repeatedly pointed out the vast difference between the corrupt regime we have backed in Saigon and our need to assist the democratic State of Israel.</p> | <p>"The United States is committed to aid in the preservation of the State of Israel. This has been American policy for more than two decades. At the same time, the United States is committed to the preservation of all Arab states in the area." (July 20, 1970)</p> <p>On the one hand, McGovern stresses that the United States should have a commitment to Israel but not Vietnam because Israel is a democracy; on the other hand, he says that the U.S. commitment to Israel is equally applicable to all Arab nations, none of which except Lebanon are democracies in any sense of the word.</p> <p>It is difficult to understand what McGovern means by a U.S. commitment to Israel and all the Arab states in any event because he also calls for reducing our commitments all over the world--cutting our NATO strength in half, slashing our Mediterranean fleet which President Johnson used successfully to deter Soviet intervention in the June 1967 war, and chopping \$30+ billion from our defense budget would make it impossible for the United States to fulfill any commitment to any nation abroad, especially to Israel, which is now threatened directly by the massive Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean and in Egypt.</p> |
| <p>"I am for negotiation between Israel and the Arab states in direct face-to-face discussions."</p> | <p>"Both sides should be willing to negotiate in any way feasible--directly, through intermediaries, in the open or in secret. The unfortunate 'Goldmann affair' in which Israel missed the opportunity for informal direct contacts with the Arab leaders should not be repeated. If both the Arabs and Israelis make it clear that they are sincerely ready to talk about any problem, that would represent a powerful impetus toward negotiations. Should the Arab nations so desire, representatives of the Palestinian Arab organizations should be permitted to participate in the negotiations....</p> <p>"[A]s a token of its willingness to negotiate an agreement with the Arab nations [Israel] could allocate</p> |

McGovern's Jewish Newspaper Ad vs. McGovern's Record

The AD:

The RECORD:

a specific sum of money for compensation and place it in an escrow account for the Palestinian Arabs." (July 2, 1970)

McGovern thus denies Israel not only the right to insist on direct negotiations with Arab officials, but also the right to choose her own negotiators. Nahum Goldmann, to whom McGovern refers, is not even a full-time resident of Israel, no less an official of the Israeli Government. Premier Meir, responding to some press reports that Goldmann had been invited to negotiate with Egyptian officials, merely stated that Goldmann did not represent Israel; as it turned out, the press reports were just rumors--there was never even an invitation from Egypt.

McGovern also ignores the fact that Israel has been pleading with the Arab nations for 24 years to negotiate on all issues, while the Arabs have refused to negotiate with Israel on any issue. It is not Israel that should be required to give a "token of its willingness to negotiate." Furthermore, McGovern never suggests that the Arab states offer compensation to the more than 600,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands who fled to Israel since 1948; Israel believes this would be a fair exchange for compensation of Arab refugees.

"There must be acceptance of the premise that no nation or group of nations can legitimately impose an outside settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

"Secure and defensible and peaceful borders are essential ingredients of any settlement."

"Israel must be prepared to yield much of the territory gained in that [1967] war....

"[I]n the spirit of mutual concessions to bring about a peaceful settlement, Israel as well as the Arab states should be willing to accept the presence of the UN forces on their territories. In the past, Israel has not welcomed UN troops....

"The present proposals [Rogers Plan] are limited to tactics for getting both sides to negotiate. They appear to be running into tough obstacles. I submit that if the United States made known the kind of equitable solutions of the major issues in the Middle East it would be prepared to support, chances would be markedly improved for acceptance of our suggested steps for opening the talks." (July 20, 1970)

McGovern was asked after a speech in Washington on March 2, 1971, if he supported the Rogers Plan calling on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 boundaries with only "insubstantial alterations" in territory. McGovern replied: "Yes. Generally, I do." (NY Times, March 3)

In an interview on July 7, 1971, McGovern proposed that rather than Israel remaining at Sharm el-Sheikh in Sinai to guarantee her free access through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, the U.S. and other "interested nations" could safeguard access through the waterways, perhaps under UN auspices. (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 8)

McGovern's Jewish Newspaper Ad vs. McGovern's Record

The AD:

In May 1970, McGovern was one of only 7 Senators who first urged the Nixon Administration to stop delaying shipment of Phantom jets that the Israeli Government needed.

The RECORD:

The May 23rd letter to President Nixon, initiated by Senator Alan Cranston and signed by McGovern and 5 other Senators, was far from the first Senatorial appeal to the Administration on jets. Throughout the first half of 1970 the Administration was bombarded with such appeals from Senators of both political parties, including the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate. Seventy-three Senators, many of whom had been speaking out on this matter for months, signed a letter urging jets which was delivered to Secretary of State Rogers on June 1st. The most significant and successful effort to expedite the sale of jets to Israel was Senator Henry M. Jackson's amendment authorizing unlimited arms credits for Israel, which was in its final stages of completion in May and which was reported out favorably by the Senate Armed Services Committee in June.

McGovern distinguished himself from other Senators who had participated in these efforts by qualifying his advocacy of jets for Israel with a proposal that the U.S. restrict Israel's use of the jets:

"Such aircraft should not be made available for forays over Arab territory for the purpose of sustaining the limited but real war which has persisted since the six-day conflict in 1967....

"The United States should express clearly its wish that the aircraft sold to Israel should not be used for such incursions. Such a declaration would signal to the Arab leaders the American intention to seek directly some restraint on the part of Israel. This would help restore credibility in American policy. Though it would cost them nothing in strategic terms, the Arabs should reciprocate by ending the formal state of war between the two sides, which might have an important psychological effect." (July 20, 1970)

The "incursions" to which McGovern refers--Israeli flights across the Suez Canal--were the direct and necessary response to Egypt's unilateral abrogation of the 1967 UN cease-fire and declaration of the War of Attrition against Israel in April 1969. Egyptian officials publicly declared that since Egypt was unable to deal a knock-out blow to Israel, Egypt was pursuing this War of Attrition to deplete Israel's manpower and weapons supplies. This would be a no-cost war for Egypt, which she could maintain indefinitely. But unlike Egypt, Israel does not have an unlimited supply of manpower, nor does she regard her war casualties as mere statistics; and unlike Egypt, Israel must pay for all her weapons and must suffer delays in the approval of her weapons requests. So Israel refused to fight the Egyptian-imposed war o

McGovern's Jewish Newspaper Ad vs. McGovern's Record

| The AD: | The RECORD: |
|--|---|
| | <p>Egyptian-imposed terms. Israel raised the cost for Egypt by flying bombing missions across the Canal. McGovern asks Israel to give up this strategic necessity while he asks the Arabs to give up "nothing in strategic terms."</p> <p>Furthermore, America has not been pouring billions of dollars of arms into nations whose avowed purpose is to destroy another nation, a member state of the UN. America is not the nation with a massive troop deployment in the Middle East. And it was not America and Israel but the Soviet Union and Egypt which violated the new cease-fire standstill agreement less than a month after McGovern made his speech. McGovern's concern about credibility and restraint would more properly be directed toward the Soviet Union than the United States.</p> <p>Finally, the Phantom Jet is by definition a bomber. Flying it up and down over Tel Aviv would not serve Israel's defense needs.</p> |
| <p>McGovern voted NO on amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Bill in 1970, which would have placed severe limitations on arms to Israel.</p> | <p>The votes to defeat these amendments were routine and virtually unanimous, with one of the amendments receiving only the vote of its sponsor.</p> |
| <p>McGovern voted YES to amend the Military Procurement Act in 1970 to provide open ended extension of funds for Israel.</p> | <p>McGovern was one of only 5 Senators who voted NO on the Military Procurement Act which contained the unlimited authorization amendment--the Jackson amendment--and thus made his vote on the amendment itself meaningless. Moreover, there was no occasion to vote YES on the Jackson amendment; the amendment had been approved by the Armed Services Committee and was therefore already in the Military Procurement bill when it reached the floor of the Senate. McGovern was merely among the 87 Senators who voted to defeat an amendment by Senator J.W. Fulbright which would have delayed action on the Jackson amendment.</p> <p>On July 7, 1971, McGovern said in an interview that although he would not favor repealing the Jackson amendment, "we don't want to give anyone a blank check on the U.S. Treasury." McGovern also said that he was "not active" at present in efforts to persuade the Nixon Administration to answer Israel's pending arms request because he was "not aware of any Congressional initiatives." (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 8)</p> |
| <p>McGovern voted YES on a 1971 amendment to authorize additional credit sales of arms and jets to Israel.</p> <p>In 1971, McGovern introduced a new foreign assistance bill to guarantee economic aid and military sales to Israel.</p> | <p>McGovern voted NO on the entire foreign aid bill in 1971, which included \$300 million in military credits and \$50 million in grant supporting assistance for Israel.</p> <p>McGovern made no effort whatsoever to bring his foreign aid proposal to the Floor for a vote or to enlist cosponsors.</p> |

UNITED STATES NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION

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July 30, 1965


Rabbi and Mrs. Elmer Berger
912 E. 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Rabbi and Mrs. Berger:

I am writing on behalf of the participants in the United States National Student Association's Arab Student Leadership Project to thank you for having us in your home during our stay in New York. Your speech, Rabbi Berger, made the largest single impact of any we heard, particularly among our Arab guests. It affirmed very graphically in their minds the distinction Arabs, I believe, have attempted to maintain between Zionism on one hand and the Jewish people on the other. Agreement with your position on Palestine, I think is 100%.

Our best wishes to you and your wife.

Sincerely,



Richard Stearns
Seminar Director

RS/kwh

THE WASHINGTON POST
B10 Wednesday, June 23, 1957

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY MIDDLE EAST SPECIALISTS*

Dear Mr. President:

As Americans concerned with the grave consequences to our country which Soviet ascendancy in the Middle East would entail, we the undersigned voice our alarm that recent events have caused an unprecedented deterioration in America's relations with a vital area of the world where the United States hitherto enjoyed friendship and prestige. There is a real and present danger of America's losing the Arab world by default. We have lost China. We cannot lose the Middle East.

In order to avoid this impending disaster, we respectfully urge, Mr. President, that in facing the realities of this crisis, the United States Government recognize that:

1. Peace talks between the antagonists will never occur until there is total military withdrawal from areas occupied by force of arms. Such withdrawal need invite no repetition of the recent conflict if simultaneously accompanied by a strengthened United Nations presence, which we join Britain in recommending. However, contrary to the situation in 1957, this strengthened United Nations force must be present on both sides.

2. There can be no just and lasting solution of the refugee problem while the world countenances the creation of new refugees daily in a territory held by a belligerent.

3. Arab provocation cannot be condoned, yet historical perspective, we believe, will show with fearful clarity that it is no favor to Israel to allow her in the flush of short-term military victory to deepen the divisions and antagonisms which separate her from those neighbors admits whom she must dwell. This is not the road to peace.

4. Our commitment to the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the area, recently reaffirmed by yourself and previously enunciated by President Truman, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, will lose its meaning unless it is made unmistakably clear *now* to all the world and the nations of the Middle East in particular that the United States will not tolerate territorial aggrandizement. We recall President Eisenhower's warning of February 20, 1957:

"Israel insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion . . . If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. We will have countenanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences and gaining national advantages . . . If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope for establishing a real world order."

5. There are, indeed, areas of dispute which can be resolved through negotiation in a climate of clear impartiality. These include questions relating to recognition, maritime rights, borders, refugees and water distribution. But we reiterate, it is vain to hope for peace talks and settlements deriving from them as long as any antagonist enjoys the fruits of military conquest.

The loss of the Middle East would be a disaster of the first magnitude. It would open a new path to ultimate confrontation of the super powers and a graver threat than ever of universal nuclear holocaust. Pressure groups, wherever they may be and however vocal, cannot be permitted to obscure America's larger interests and transcending issues of world imperatives.

The United States, Mr. President, can assure this does not happen.

Professor John Ruddy
Department of History
Georgetown University

Professor Christine P. Harris
Department of Political Science
Stanford University

Professor Alan R. Taylor
School of International Service
American University

Professor Willard G. Oxtoby
Department of Religious Studies
Yale University

Professor Herbert B. Huffman
Department of Near Eastern Studies
Johns Hopkins University

Professor Lucette Mowry
Department of Religion
Vassar College

Richard H. Tetlis
Founder of USIS in Israel

Freda Uley
Author

Ronald G. Wolfe
American Friends of the
Middle East

Erich W. Rothmann
American Friends of the
Middle East

Richard C. Stearns
International Affairs Vice President
United States National Student
Association

Frank C. Sakran
Lawyer, Author

Joseph O. Thompson
Past Director
Lutheran World Federation in the
Middle East

The Rev. Charles R. Hulac
Prairie Village, Kansas

Rabbi Elmer Berger
New York City

Professor Karl Stowasser
Department of Arabic
Georgetown University

Professor Barbara Stowasser
Department of Arabic
Maryland University

George Mardikian
Author, Lecturer, Humanitarian

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Boulder, Colorado

Professor Millar Burrows
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Acting Chairman, Political Science
Dept., Lincoln University

A. Willard Jones
Past Secretary, American Friends
Mission, Ramallah, Jordan

K. Brooke Anderson
Formerly Near East Christian
Council for Relief Work

Thomas J. Abercrombie
Writer, Lecturer

Professor Ernest McCarus
Dept. of Near Eastern Art
University of Michigan

Professor Oleg Grabar
Dept. of Near Eastern Art
University of Michigan

Professor L. Emmett Holt
Dept. of Pediatrics
New York University

The Rev. L. Humphrey Waiz
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A CALL FOR RESPECT AND HUMANITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

1. We the undersigned appeal to all men for compassion for the Arab refugees increased in number by this war—a compassion which includes respect for the refugees as well as material assistance to be given them freely and non-politically, and to be given as quickly as possible.

2. We appeal to the Israeli Government to respect the mosques and shrines of Islam which are at present under Israeli authority and to make them freely available for worship and veneration to all Muslims.

3. We appeal to the member states of the United Nations to keep the welfare of the peoples involved foremost in mind in their deliberations on the Middle East crisis and to refuse to abandon this world forum to Cold War digressions and intrigues.

4. Our appeal is, on behalf of the peoples of the Third World, especially and is a fraternal one made by individuals who identify intimately and respectfully with their traditions and creative goals.

The Cambridge Committee Calling for Respect and Humanity
P.O. Box 128, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Partial List of Signatories:

Dr. Martin Swartz,
Chairman, Beirut.
Prof. George Hissig,
Harvard.
Prof. Noam Chomsky,
MIT.
Prof. Mohammed Chahly,
Boston University.
Prof. W. Staley Towner,
Yale Divinity School.
Prof. Arnold Toynbee,
Royal Institute for
International Affairs,
London University.
Prof. Marshall G. S.
Nickerson, Univ. of
Chicago.
Prof. Henry P. Van
Dusen, President
Emerson Union
Theological Seminary,
France.
Robert A. Lipp,
American Friends
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Prof. Phillip Morrison,
Calif.
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Harvard.
Sofia and Henry R.
Altenberg, Brooklyn,
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Catholic Worker, NYC.
Mohammed Ali,
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Yale Medical School.
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P.E.U. Cercle
Litteraire Inter-
national, Sec. Gen.
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Lillian Dwyer,
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California.
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Univ. of Wisconsin.
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Schrederade.
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Kenosha, Wisconsin.
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Mahmoud T. Mahdi,
Austin, N.Y.C.
Robert A. Dyer, presi-
dent, Graduate Stu-
dent's Refugee
Relief, Washington.

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The Cambridge Committee may be contacted for bibliographies and other scholarly information concerning the Middle East and the Third World. Contributions for refugee relief may be sent to the following organizations:

Comité Français d'Aide aux Victimes
Arabes du Proche-Orient 12 Rue Cha-
pelette, Paris 2, France.

United American Arab Appeal
P.O. Box 401, Quincy, Mass. 02269.

American Middle East Rehabilitation
277 United Nations Plaza, N.Y., N.Y.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1970.

D. B. GELLHAUS,
Yankton, S. Dak.

DEAR MR. GELLHAUS: I appreciate knowing of your opposition to Section 222 of the President's Postal Reform Bill, H.R. 17070.

It has been my feeling that public employees should have the right to join a union, but that membership should not be a mandatory incident of their employment.

I have other serious questions about this legislation and I am glad to have your views on it.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

(s) GEORGE MCGOVERN.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 1968.

REED LARSON,
Executive Vice President, National Right To Work Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LARSON: Thank you for your letter of September ninth, and for enclosing the materials on the right-to-work issue.

As you know from my vote in 1966, I favor retention of Section 14-B of the Taft-Hartley Act. While I have not made a final judgment on the Federal Employees Freedom of Choice Act my inclination is to support it.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

(s) GEORGE MCGOVERN.

EXHIBIT No. 160



The people are coming to San Diego

The following communique is from the San Diego Convention Coalition, a group of people developing an election year strategy focusing on the Republican National Convention to be held in San Diego August 21-24.

AUGUST 21st - 24th, 1972...

The establishment of the city of San Diego (but not its people) will play host to the Republican National Convention. This present executive committee of the ruling class will meet in the 6 1/2 million dollar Sports Arena.

At the same time, people of San Diego, through the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), will play host to the people of the United States. The people will gather in the streets and parks of the city.

THE MILLION DOLLAR CIRCUS

How It Ended Up In San Diego

News that the Republican Convention was coming to San Diego was met with objections from the people of the city and even some officials (the most vocal of whom are out of office now). By far the strongest objections were about the cost of hosting such an event. The city had to come up with an initial bid of 1.5 million dollars, and estimates for the total cost are running between 2.5 and 4 million dollars. Despite assurances by pro-convention Republicans that no city money would be spent, San Diegans realized that it would be the people who eventually pay.

The same motive, money, is what's bringing the convention to San Diego. Sheraton Inc., a subsidiary of I.T. & T., came up with \$400,000 to round out the initial bid. Sheraton owns two hotels in San Diego and is building a third. I.T. & T. has gained valuable tidbits to build cable factories in San Diego through the local Port Commission, which is supposedly controlled by C. Arnhoth Smith. Smith was Nixon's largest campaign contributor in 1968. The clincher is Harold Geissen, I.T. & T.'s President, who was co-fund raising chairman with Smith in 1968.

There's more. Eight days after the announcement that San Diego would be the site of the Convention, the Justice Department dropped an anti-trust suit against I.T. & T. The out-of-court settlement allowed I.T. & T. to acquire the 1 billion dollar Hartford Insurance Company. C. Arnhoth Smith got the prestige of hosting Nixon and his convention (as well as substantial income through his local business), the Republicans got 1.5 million dollars, and the people of San Diego will eventually pick up the bills.

Because of this there is a better chance than ever before that many of the local citizens will become involved in, or be sympathetic with, demonstrations.

What's At Stake?

The Coalition isn't planning demonstrations at the Republican Convention just so we can have a liberal Democrat for president. (We know enough history to know that it was Kennedy who first sent large numbers of U.S. ground troops to Indochina.) We're moving against Nixon and the Republicans because they are the present guardians of the interests of the American establishment. They are the most visible, tangible proponents of U.S. imperialism, sexism and racism, and of the repression 'at home'.

Demonstrations in San Diego are a crucial part of the mass of people who are beginning to wake up and act. If we don't act in San Diego we will give Nixon a free rein in his escalation of the war and increasingly repressive domestic policies. Through massive demonstrations here we can shatter the illusion of domestic pacification that is so essential to Nixon's program.

Demonstrations in San Diego, a major military center, also give us a unique opportunity to develop a resistance movement within the armed forces. Organizing for massive demonstrations can help turn the military apparatus into a Trojan horse by consolidating wide-spread internal dissatisfaction and accelerating instability within the military.

The present crises in the U.S. are opening up many people to alternatives from the Left, and the San Diego activities can give many of them a first chance to express their dissatisfaction publicly. Massive, nonviolent demonstrations with diverse constituency representation will have important effects, both directly on the participants, giving them a new sense of strength and unity, and indirectly on the millions who will watch on TV. If people from all over the U.S. pour into San Diego to join local people in massive, nonviolent protest, using creative tactics that show our seriousness, we will provide an instructive contrast to the Republican rubber-stamp renomination of Richard Nixon.

WHO WE ARE

The San Diego Coalition is made up of people from a wide variety of local community groups, including G.I.'s, students, anti-war groups, collectives, professionals, and underground newspapers. We are also working with people across the country who share our political goals,

including the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Lawyers Guild, Peace Action Council of L.A., and Anti-Imperialist Coalition of the San Francisco Bay Area.

SDCC has evolved a very flexible structure so it can meet rapidly changing conditions. Anyone who agrees with our goals and principles and who is active in one of its component parts (committees, task force, or member collective) is a member of the Coalition. At present, general membership meetings are held every week to consider policy questions and do internal education. A Coordinating Committee, made up of representatives selected by each of the component parts, meets more frequently. There are also Third World and women's caucuses in SDCC.

Our political goals in confronting the G.O.P. are:

- 1) To demand an immediate end to all aspects of the war in Indochina. Specifically to expose and stop the barbaric, escalating technological air war and to demand acceptance of the Peace Plan of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.
- 2) To expose and struggle against the increasingly unpopular domestic policies forced upon the people of the U.S. by the existing economic and political structure.
- 3) To mobilize a massive array of people united in their opposition to the war and in their determination to take control of their own lives.
- 4) To accelerate the growth of ongoing movements capable of leading and sustaining peoples' struggles both locally and nationally.

We in the Coalition have agreed to work together according to the following principles:

- 1) We will form the broadest possible coalition to nonviolently and openly oppose and confront the Republican Party leadership. We seek to build a strong radical movement that cannot be used or absorbed by the Democratic Party and which will include: Third World people, G.I.'s and veterans, working people, the unemployed, gay people, women, students, and blacks.
- 2) In this coalition and in all the work we do we will reject and struggle against all forms of domination based on race, sex, and class exploitation. We will try to bring about in ourselves and in our manner of working with one another those human changes which must accompany political and economic changes in order for our revolution to succeed. We will struggle against racism, sexism, and class chauvinism in ourselves as well as in all others with whom we work, and will seek continually to isolate and understand the root causes of the tendencies in each of us to dominate, manipulate, and control. Skills and experience will be shared broadly among members of the coalition and a conscious effort made to provide opportunity for those less experienced to grow stronger in revolutionary skills, understanding, commitment, and confidence.
- 3) Because much of our strength will depend on massive numbers of people coming to the city, we will make contact and work with groups and individuals throughout the U.S., especially in the western region.

We are engaged in an experiment with a new model for national actions based on deep roots in the host community. As members of San Diego groups we feel a responsibility to coordinate activities taking place in San Diego during the Republican Convention. But our commitment to San Diego does not end in August. It lasts far beyond. A local movement is taking the initiative to organize a national action, an action of international significance. The challenge will be two-fold: for the local movement to be flexible and be able to incorporate new people from other areas into the decision making process in a democratic manner and for the people from other areas to have a great sensitivity to the local situation, the work that has gone on before they arrive and that will continue after August.

WHAT'S HAPPENING?

Coalition plans for the Convention have two thrusts: 1) to demonstrate our dissent against the existing system, and 2) to demonstrate alternatives as a concrete indication of the kind of society we are determined to create for ourselves.

All of us in the Coalition (and we cover a broad spectrum of radical politics) are convinced that violence will prove counter-productive at this time and place. The more disciplined and together we are, the more likely it is that we will be able to get our message across straight, without it either being used to their advantage by the Right or co-opted by liberal Democrats.

SDCC has begun planning some projects to build towards August and for the time of the Convention itself. At this point, we are also keeping time open for specialized actions around targets of various constituencies' choosing. Other actions could range all the way from continued massive marches to small constituency actions to civil disobedience.

Our plans to date include:

Demonstration

There should be at least one massive, local, demonstration near the Sports Arena to demonstrate our dissent against the existing system and to demonstrate alternatives as a concrete indication of the kind of society we are determined to create for ourselves. It would be good to have a few giant floats that present the major issues in graphic form.



Exposé '72

Demonstrating dissent is just one thing we want to do during the Convention. We also want to create a setting in which people can learn from each other about the specific nature of our country and the world we live in, and the state of the movement.

We will create a humanized People's World's Fair, called Exposé '72. This will be a large exposition about the victims of injustice and their liberation struggles; the institutions, and ideas which perpetuate this injustice, and some visionary but practical alternatives to the oppressive system we live under.

Groups and individuals coming to San Diego are invited to send us their ideas for Exposé '72 between now and August, and to bring films, programs, exhibits, etc., with them. There should be exhibits by Black, Chicano, Native American, Asian, poor, gay people, women and youth in this country, as well as international exhibits on China, Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine, Africa, and Latin America. We could have workshops, films, and a video net that would link all the people together. The art forms and architecture we use would be an important part of our cultural experience.

We could use Exposé '72 as a base from which to go into the community. We can plant things, build things (playgrounds, reconstructing condemned buildings, etc.), teach school, etc. People might want to canvas door-to-door, inviting all San Diegans to Exposé '72 and our other activities.

The People's Platform

The People's Platform is the unifying political statement of the demonstrations. It draws together the demands for action against imperialism, racism, sexism, exploitation of labor, police and judicial repression, and poverty.

The People's Platform is seen as an organizing tool that can be used throughout the country, particularly in states that hold primaries. A nationwide People's Platform campaign would raise basic issues rather than merely focusing on candidates. Candidates could be confronted with the platform and forced to take stands on it, hopefully at both the Republican and Democratic Conventions.

If broadly based enough, the Platform could be used as a means of uniting the efforts of the Left to relate to new constituencies and help to bring about a considerable degree of unity with already committed groups.

Finally, we see the Platform as a tool to help mobilize people around the country and point the way to San Diego.

SDCC is moving ahead to gain support of national organizations and coalitions for the idea of a People's Platform. If the response is favorable enough, we hope to bring together a national conference to ratify it.

The Petition

SDCC is circulating a petition in San Diego County opposing the holding of the Republican Convention here. The petition attacks the Republican's policies of war and repression and points out that the people of San Diego will be taxed to pay for the Convention even though they had no say in bringing it here. The petition is both an educational tool and a way to create a public climate for the demonstrations that is as favorable as possible.

Logistics and Governance

Besides tactical planning SDCC is taking responsibility for the logistics of August. This includes getting permits for marches and unusual land use, making sure that water, food, and sanitary facilities are available, and care is organized, and that legal and medical assistance is mobilized.

While we can do the preparatory work in these areas, most of the real work will have to be done by the people coming here. SDCC is not offering hotel services to the movement.

The most important demonstration during the Convention will simply be ourselves. How we act in the encampments and during actions will be the critical message conveyed. Contingents will have to find ways to govern themselves, lead themselves, and provide for themselves from the resources available. The sense of social responsibility we show towards ourselves maybe more important than our speeches and written documents.

AND IN THE OTHER CORNER . . .

San Diego '72 is not Chicago '68. Local officials, hoping for a boost in convention trade for San Diego, don't want a repeat of the 1968 Democratic Convention demonstrations. Nixon wants a quiet convention to show the world he has nailed the coffin shut on dissent in America. While massive security arrangements are being developed, the master plan seems to rely more on co-optation than violent repression.

Instead of discouraging white youth from coming to San Diego in August, the city has taken a conciliatory line. It has announced its willingness to "give" demonstrators Fiesta Island during the Convention. It has announced that demonstrations can take place along Sports Arena Blvd., paralleling the Convention site. Chief of Police Ray Hoobler has called the Convention the "greatest experience" of his life as a police officer and said he realizes certain laws may have to be bent to accommodate a large influx of demonstrators. Rumors of rock concerts and festivals to be held concurrently with the Convention are abundant and at least one promoter has approached the city already with his plans for a festival 30 miles out of town.

City officials perhaps realize that a large number of youth involved in a dope and music festival during the Convention will actually be good press instead of having an adverse effect. The gut issues will be clouded and smothered by the media portrayal of a scene that is fast becoming a television re-run — the love and peace Woodstock scene.

Despite the city's sickness there seems to be a rift developing between it and Washington. A recent article in the *N. Y. Times* quoted a city official as saying the Republicans are unhappy with the way things are being handled here. Nixon's camp wants there to be no demonstrations at all. To apply a bit of subtle pressure to the city, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) sent San Diego's request for funds back to the media portrayal of a scene that is fast becoming a television re-run — the love and peace Woodstock scene.

In case the cooptation route fails, San Diego is making extensive preparations for potential trouble. Security task forces have been formed by the city and county. Between the two, a total of 1,800 uniformed police will be on duty on 12-hour shifts. Using the state-wide mutual aid plan, police can be brought in from 4 surrounding counties. Upon request, all available California Highway Patrol officers will be sent to San Diego. Local National Guard Units have already received Civil Disturbance training. Also involved in the planning are the F.B.I., Secret Service, and Naval Intelligence.

The police are working on plans for a computerized radio relay system that will allow them to process mass arrests in a short time. The police are also looking into Balboa and San Diego Stadiums as mass detention sites, should that prove necessary.

The county purchased three new helicopters with an LEAA grant. These will be used as airborne observation platforms. While the police can survey any demonstrations, demonstrators will be unable to survey the cops if the \$920,000 LEAA grant goes through. The city is planning to use part of it to join with Miami in the purchase of a radio system which operates on frequencies that citizens cannot monitor.

The fact that there is a split developing between the city and the feds' make it impossible to know for sure what the final policy towards demonstrators will be. It is obvious that they are trying to be prepared to handle any violence that occurs. What they may not be able to handle are demonstrations of discipline in conduct, diverse in participation, uncompromising in content, and beyond their power to either co-opt or intimidate.

GETTING IT TOGETHER

We feel that the San Diego Convention Coalition represents a creative effort to arrive at a new model for relating local organizing and national action. SDCC members have travelled around the country in the past few months, talking with many different people. We do not expect the August actions to be one-shot actions detrimental to local organizing efforts. Rather, we think that our overall program of local initiative combined with tools like the People's Platform can aid people's organizing efforts wherever they are. In San Diego, the coming of the Convention has given us the incentive to reach out to the entire city and to unify our movement.

We need people to move here to work with us for the period between now and August — and hopefully beyond. It would be ideal if collectives could send one person now, to work with us and create links with their home community, with the rest of the collective following in August.

If you are interested in moving here now, get in touch with us. Bring all your creative ideas, your innovative skills, as well as cars, money, typewriters and other tools.

If you can't come now, come in June. If you can't come in June, come in August. And if you can't come at all, you can still help. Let us know:

- Your name, if you want to be on our mailing list.
- If you will distribute literature and posters.
(How many? 10, 25, 50, 100, 500 pieces?)
- If you can help us financially.
(25c, \$1, \$5, \$25, \$100, those old postage stamps you have lying around?)
- If you can assume responsibility as a regional contact. This means you will do educational and publicity work around the issues outlined here and bring people to San Diego.

This is a crucial historical period. The job is great, but so are the possibilities.

Don-Dee with Justice,
SDCC

SAN DIEGO CONVENTION COALITION
P.O. Box 8287 San Diego, CA 92103
Phone (714) 234-8281

EXHIBIT NO. 161

10/13

Status Report on P's Requests

1. Canfield report on student demonstrations

a. Buchanan - has planted story with N.Y. Daily News (they are verifying & probably will confront Goodill with the story) & Nick Turmes is writing a story.

After something appears in print Buchanan will have March programmed to make loud noises about how awful it all is.

b. Wetzig - is moving the story with Scripps - Howard & the Chicago Tribune - also with Congress.

2. Gen Hershey Removal - Klein & Flanigan (I've talked to both) are working on it's outrage at this being linked to student demonstrations.

3. Success Story on Espionage Intercept -
 Klein & Kleindienst working on this.
 (I've talked to both) the story
 on how much was stopped will
 be a little difficult - I understand
 from KL they only got 96 pounds - they
 have to speculate on how much was prevented.

4. Inflation Ltr. - revised draft due at noon.
 Release of Ltr planned for Thurs
 Mailings also - Total list 2550
 personally addressed to
 Business Council, Bus Leaders
 Labor Leaders, Top Contributors.

21 256

1084

EXHIBIT No. 162

October 28, 1969

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: The President

On the PR side, I think it might be well for you to see how Buchanan, Safire et al could have columnists, television commentators and others prepare the way for the Lindsay victory in New York. Buchanan correctly estimates a substantial Lindsay sweep due to the Procochino collapse. The press, of course, will try to interpret this as a referendum on Vietnam. It is vitally important that this be nailed prior to the election and, of course, be nailed immediately afterwards as strongly as possible. Set a task force to work on this. It occurs to me that Buchanan and Safire could be logical members. For example, if some of the conservative columnists like Buckley could hit it and better still if some more in the center were to do so it would be helpful. What I am suggesting primarily is to predict in advance a Lindsay victory based on these major political factors. And then also be ready for the counter-attack when they try to build it up as a Vietnam referendum.

EXHIBIT No. 163

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER

HIGH PRIORITY

A couple of points that I did not want to cover in the general meeting, but that you do need to move ahead on quickly.

First, I'm sure you have studied that TV summary done by Buchanan, which is a devastating indictment of NBC, especially of David Brinkley.

Specifically, Brinkley was completely off base factually on his budget criticism, and we need to get that one straightened out.

The need, probably, is to concentrate on NBC and give some real thought as to how to handle the problem that they have created in their almost totally negative approach to everything the Administration does. I would like to see a plan from you; don't worry about fancy form, just some specific thinking on steps that can be taken to try to change this, and I should have this by Friday. Get Klein and Ziegler both involved in the thinking on this, and I would suggest also Nofziger, who could be very helpful, and perhaps get Pat Buchanan in. In fact, I think definitely you should get Pat Buchanan in to work with you on it; but move quickly.


Another area is the mobilization of the Silent Majority, which we touched on briefly in the meeting today. We just haven't really mobilized them, and we have got to move now in every effective way we can to get them working to pound the magazines and the networks in counter-action to the obvious shift of the establishment to an attack on Vietnam again. Concentrate this on the few places that count, which would be NBC, TIME, NEWSWEEK and LIFE, the NEW YORK TIMES, and the WASHINGTON POST. Don't waste your fire on other things.

Next point, and this is also highly urgent priority. The State of the Union evoked a tremendous number of very strong editorials praising the content, delivery, etc. Now we need, very quickly, a well-edited, well-packaged, compellingly-presented mailing piece that summarizes the highlights of those editorials, especially the ones from surprising

sources like Reston of the TIMES, so that we can get out to our people especially the reaction that the country's newspapers have had to the President's address.

This is something that should have been automatically done immediately, and perhaps it is underway. The point here is that delay makes any action much less effective, since it should be an immediate response and get out while the speech is still alive. Our main failure in this whole area is dullness, and let's not let this effort fall into that category. Get it done on good paper in interesting style, rather than just a mimeographed glob of editorial excerpts.

This is the kind of thing our Outside Group should automatically pick up for us once we get them; but until we have them, we have to fill the gap ourselves, and it's terribly important to move quickly on this. Perhaps the National Committee can help you with editorial and layout facilities, but hold them to very high standards and make it come out good. Leonard over there is probably the best guy for this kind of thing and maybe would be the one to get working on it, but give him about a one-day deadline, so that we get it done instead of talked about.



H. R. HALDEMAN

*Note: See Action Memo P191 for copy of memo
to H re this subject*

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT No. 164
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

The President directed several of us to give thought to how to combat the institutionalized power of the left concentrated in the foundations that succor the Democratic Party.

Following are recommendations both of an offensive and defensive nature -- the major one being the creation of a counter-vailing power outside the Federal Government.

1. The President should direct an in-house group of people preferably outside the Administration to quietly undertake a study of the top twenty-five Foundations in this country; to identify both their leadership and power structure, and to indicate which are friendly, which are potentially friendly, which can be co-opted to support projects the President supports; and which are hostile to us; which are arms of our political adversaries. In addition, an inventory should be taken of all smaller foundations (AEI and Stern), which are ideologically and clear pro or con.

2. The President should direct the Budget Bureau to come up -- within one month -- with a listing of all Federal moneys, from each Department that goes to Foundations for studies and research. We should have totals and breakdowns on each Foundation.

3. We should bring together those inside and outside the White House with knowledge and interest in the field to determine if one of the huge Foundations -- like Lilly or Duke Endowment -- can be convinced to operate on a pro-Administration basis; or whether we need to create a new institution. Among those I would include in the discussion would be Harlow, Anderson, Huston, Wheelan, Buchanan, Dr. Burns, Jeffrey Hart (he wrote some articles on the issue), Glenn Campbell, Bill Baroody, Sr., Frank Barnett -- and other individuals familiar with the world of the Foundations.

4. This group would be charged with reporting to the President specific options on how we could either influence, take over or create a major institution to accomplish Administration objectives.

5. The Administration should begin -- once this information is gathered -- to initiate a policy of favoritism in all future Federal grants to those institutions friendly to us, that want the work -- and we should direct future funds away from the hostile foundations, like Brookings.

MACARTHUR INSTITUTE

However, I think there is a clear national need for a Republican Conservative counterpart to Brookings, which can generate the ideas Republicans can use, which can serve as a repository of conservative and Republican intellectuals, the way Brookings and others do for the Democrats.

Depending on the size of the structure, I can conceive of it undertaking the following political objectives:

a. Serving as a "parking place" for Administration and other Republican-conservative intellectuals, where they can work at ideas we can use politically, where they can take their sabbaticals at the same time they are communicating regularly with the Republican Establishment in the White House.

b. A talent bank -- building an inventory of conservative-Republicans in each of the following institutions -- locating the best and most brilliant in the college system and graduate school system; identifying the best conservative reporters and editorial writers around the country; locating the conservative intellectuals and academicians -- stockpiling all these names in a talent bank, to be made available to the Administration, when job openings occur; and to be used by the President to fill up future task forces and the like.

c. Foreign Policy. The President was committed to clean house at State; we have gotten heat on this. The new foundation could conceivably -- as it developed -- build a talent bank of individuals in every area of foreign policy -- five deep -- who might be ready to be moved into the State Department the day after the 1972 victory.

d. Judicial inventory. A small group of attorneys and law students could -- via phone calls to States, via research in local and regional papers, and study of important decisions, prepare for the President a national ranking of the most brilliant and most conservative of all Federal Judges, and State Supreme Court judges as well. The list could be used to move the best of our judges up through the judicial ranks.

e. The Institute could provide \$15,000 to \$20,000 fellowships to individual writers and reporters -- to have them expand articles into books, which books would be promoted by the Institute. Example -- a Møllenhoff is digging up facts on McNamara and the waste in the Pentagon; or a Jeffrey Hart has done a splendid indictment of foundations in general; or someone else has done a series of articles on the networks the Institute could give them these fellowships with the sole stipulation that they come up with a book which the Institute could then push out.

d. The Institute might bring together experts -- on the networks for example -- to discuss and produce a book of papers on their lack of objectivity and need for reform. The whole Paul Simpson operation in Nashville could be brought up and put under the Institute.

g. Through a monthly newsletter the Institute could keep conservatives and key Republican thinkers informed of the finest in thought that was being generated -- and what the institute was up to. You could have associate memberships for \$25 a year to pay the cost of this communications apparatus.

h. In addition to identifying the top conservative students, the Institute could keep in touch with them through its communications, provide perhaps assistance in tuition, and scholarships for summer work -- to bring them in touch with the best in ideological talent on our side of the fence.

i. The Institute could undertake the kind of routine studies for the government -- going now to other foundations -- which could provide a regular income, and keep some of the resident intellectuals working and earning their keep.

WHAT ABOUT THE MONEY?

The funds could come as I see it from three sources?

1. The money men who are behind the Administration could provide the seed money needed for the initial operations which would get it underway. Rather than work on an annual commitment, an endowment would be the best route.

2. It could be pointed out to all the Big Contributors to other Institutions, and all the Big Contractors who get Federal money that the Institute that should not be lacking for their support is the MacArthur Institute, as that is one of the President's favorites.

3. All Federal contracts now going to institutions which are essentially anti-Administration would be shifted to this new baby and to other pro-Administration foundations. Anti-Administration foundations should be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the Cabinet would be all that would be required to get cooperation here -- and Budget could be on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets any more money.

4. Federal Agencies would be on notice to think if some of their functions might not better be farmed out to the private sector, in particular, to the Institute.

5. All the high rollers we know would be passed the word that of the charities the President prefers, this one is the best. The Big Supporters would find themselves on White House Guest Lists, while the friends of Brookings would stay in outer darkness.

OTHER NEEDS

One of my primary concerns about this is that it required a strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division; and an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax-Exempt office. Am not sure we have this right now.

Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of our Internal Revenue to engage in combat with some of these lesser anti-Administration institutions like the Stern Foundation.

Third, this Institute would rapidly attract a host of investigators from the Times; it would provoke stories and articles; and we would have to be prepared to take some real initial political heat as a spin-off. Also, word of precisely what the Institute was doing would leak out eventually.

Fourth, it would entail great wrenching for the established Institutions like Brookings; and we would have to expect a good many fights; and some outraged and adverse publicity on the left. We would be striking at the heart of the Establishment -- and we could expect a response in kind.

Fifth, some of the essential objectives of the Institute would have to be blurred, even buried, in all sorts of other activity, that would be the bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that would provide the cover for the more important efforts.

Every menial task of government possible should be sent over to the Foundation to carry out at cost plus ten.

Sixth, the Board of Directors would run from right to center of the political spectrum; no kooks but unquestioned Pro-Nixon people would have to have a complete lock on it; we would have to have people there who knew what was up and agreed to it; and then let the hand-picked staff run the thing.

Seventh, the name MacArthur Institute was taken, rather than Eisenhower Institute to prevent the co-opting of part of it by a number of liberal Republicans of the Scott variety.

Eighth, the crucial job here is Executive Director. We would need someone knowledgeable, willing to work all hours, loyal to me, an anti-Establishmentarian, broad-gauged, who knew this business and its purposes intimately. Wrong fellow here, a soft-liner or a hustler, and forget the whole thing.


Ninth, we would have to lock it into the White House with probably two individuals at the top level -- who had the ear of the President at all times -- and who were intensely familiar with the Institute and its working. Harlow and Haldeman should do for this. Maybe they should be on the Board of Directors -- though this would be a red light.

Tenth, because of the nature of the Talent Bank, we are going to run into conflict with the White House Personnel Shop; but that seems to me to be unavoidable; this would be a professional on-going job of locating, indentifying and filing the names of pro-Presidential people in every area of importance around the country.

Eleventh, one major problem: if by chance we should be evicted from the White House, one can bet that the new incumbent would put a sword to this operation, through IRS, as the first official act on arrival. Those involved in the operation would have to carry heavy political insurance. At any time, there might be a sudden distribution of assets to the stockholders.

Finally, to make something like this go you need the right people with the right frame of mind, and a willingness to work. If we get the wrong people on the Board, or the wrong individuals running it, we would be pouring money down a sewer.

Can the White House get some moneyed individual to provide the wherewithall to bring the aforementioned people to Washington to discuss this and propose something if the President agrees?



PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

EXHIBIT No. 165

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : MR. COLSON
 MR. BUCHANAN
 MR. COLE,
 MR. MAGRUDER ✓

As you know, the Student Mobilization Committee and the Young Americans for Freedom have jointly announced a national spring referendum on Vietnam. It is important that we take the lead in making sure that the Administration's position is clearly understood and not just leave it up to YAF. Also, any effort that we can undertake to support YAF and other groups who are actively supporting our position on this referendum should be explored and developed to the fullest.

April 13-14

Phil Lue

Ron Dean

Dave Keene)

Randall Seagr

H. R. HALDEMAN

Call Pat
 when mtg
 set

IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY

Vote NO

On the Question of IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIET NAM

Stop the killing? ... End the fighting? ... Peace and freedom for Asia? ... These are the objectives all Americans should be advocating. But they will never be accomplished by an immediate withdrawal.

From the beginning of the war until the present time, untold atrocities have been committed by the Communist forces in the name of "liberation." These Communist massacres are planned and organized. They are an integral part of Communist war policy rivaling in brutality the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis in World War II. THE PERPETRATORS ARE REWARDED AND PROMOTED, NOT TRIED BY COURTS MARTIAL.

Whatever America's mistakes have been in Viet Nam, they cannot be remedied by the horrible consequences of immediate withdrawal.

"I think it would be a major mistake to unilaterally withdraw."

ROBERT F. KENNEDY
Wisconsin State Journal
March 28, 1958



"While immediate withdrawal would end the war, it would lose the peace."

EUGENE McCARTHY
CBS News,
March 12, 1955

"The first consequence, as anyone can foresee, (of immediate withdrawal) will be the cold-blooded massacre of a couple of million South Vietnamese who have put their faith and confidence in the United States."

JOSEPH ALSOP, October, 1959

Most students support the policy of continued training and arming of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. Most students do not advocate the dangerous policy of "peace at any price."

RESPONSIBLE VOICES MUST BE HEARD ... **VOTE NO** APRIL 13-14

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JEB S. MAGRUDER

On March 12, you asked, in a memorandum to Colson, Buchanan, Cole, and Magruder, that we aid the student groups who are supporting a "no" vote on the April campus referendum which poses the question "do you support an immediate withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam?"

We called in the various groups (College Republican National Committee, YAF, etc.) to find out what they were doing and what we could do to help. We found YAF and the College Republicans were doing quite a good job, and we could help by (1) having 100,000 copies of the attached throw-away sheet printed, and; (2) making the RNC's "WATS" telephone lines available to the College Republicans and YAF for generating support on campuses throughout the country. This has been done.

In the event you are aware, or wish to become aware, of some of the problems in this area, the effectiveness of the College Republicans and YAF in battles such as this is substantially diminished by the opposition which these groups encounter from the Young Republican National Federation leadership. For example, even after we met with the YRNF's executive director and explained to him the White House's interest in supporting those groups which opposed a "yes" vote, he attempted to have Jimmy Allison turn down our request to print the throw-aways.

I do not believe we should become involved in the fighting among the three youth groups; however, it should be made clear to Allison and the others at the Committee, as it was

Yeb
Good.
H

in this case, that White House requests are not to be sabotaged by any of these groups.

The Young Republican leadership does not want the White House to work with the College Republicans or YAF, and yet on issues such as the referendum and the President's forthcoming message on the draft, the College Republicans and YAF have offered to help. They can do much good on the campus for us on issues such as this and we must be in a position to call upon them.

On the broader issue of youth, it has become apparent that there are some things we can do to support those student groups which generally support us. In this regard, Messrs. Buchanan, Cole, Colson, Magruder, and Odle will meet Wednesday noon to discuss what we can do to help groups such as the United Student Alliance and the Association of Student Governments. Both of these groups have offered to distribute materials for us, and the former may have potential as an alternative to SDS.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JEB S. MAGRUDER

I think you should see the attached report from Young Americans for Freedom on the April national campus referendum question, "Should the U.S. Immediately Withdraw All Its Troops From Vietnam?" Although we lost, 43,000 to 25,000, the margin was much better than it would have been had we not acted. Also, the vote represents less than 2% of the college student population in the United States.

As the attached blue-colored sheet shows, YAF did much to support us - at our request. Do you think it would be inappropriate for us to draft a letter for the President's signature thanking the organization?

cc: Mr. Buchanan
Mr. Colson

*Yes it would be —
Let's thank them
some other way.*

1098

*Yonell
young Kiering*

STUDENT REFERENDUM

WASHINGTON (AP)—A RECENT NATIONWIDE COLLEGE STUDENT REFERENDUM ON IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS FROM VIETNAM LISTED 62 PER CENT OF THOSE VOTING AS FAVORING IT, THE SPONSORS SAID TODAY.

THEIR FIGURES SHOWED THAT SOME 71,000 STUDENTS OUT OF ABOUT 4 MILLION VOTED.

THE REFERENDUM WAS CONDUCTED BY THE STUDENT ASSOCIATION OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HERE. IT WAS HELD DURING THE WEEK OF APRIL 13-19, WHEN OTHER GROUPS SPONSORED ANTIWAR PROTESTS IN VARIOUS CITIES.

SID SCHWARTZBERG, A COCHAIRMAN OF THE REFERENDUM COMMITTEE, SAID AT A NEWS CONFERENCE AT AU THAT THE RESULTS WILL BE SENT TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW "AND I GUESS THAT'S ABOUT ALL WE CAN DO."

CZ432PED 4/30

1099

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

July 9, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. MAGRUDER

In the Harris poll done for the ACE on students' attitudes, there is a question that says in effect, "do you agree or disagree that America will be in trouble as long as it continues its arrogant imperialist policies" - 70% agreed.

Let's figure out a way to get some mileage out of this and some similar questions in the Harris poll and use them as a way of discrediting the Harris poll. Maybe give the stuff to Human Events or some of Buchanan's friends and get them cranking on it. There is a lot of dirty work that could be done here and should be. Get a copy of the poll and figure out what you can do and let me know.


H. R. HALDEMAN

EXHIBIT No. 166

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1970

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER

FROM: L. HIGBY *L*

As I indicated to you the other day, we need to get some creative thinking going on an attack on Huntley for his statements in Life. One thought that comes to mind is getting all the people to sign a petition calling for the immediate removal of Huntley right now.

The point behind this whole thing is that we don't care about Huntley - he is going to leave anyway. What we are trying to do here is to tear down the institution. Huntley will go out in a blaze of glory and we should attempt to pop his bubble.

Most people won't see Life Magazine and for that reason I am asking Buchanan to draft a statement for the Vice *Ford* President to give. We should try to get this statement on television. Obviously there are many other things that we can do, such as getting independent station owners to write NBC saying that they should remove Huntley now; having broadcasting people look into this due to the fact that this is proof of biased journalism, etc.

Let's put a full plan on this and get the thing moving. I'll contact Buchanan and forward copies of my correspondence with him to you so that you will know what the Vice President is doing.

EXHIBIT No. 167

September 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR :

MR. MAGRUDER

Please try to develop an ad that can be run hitting the radical liberal theme of the Vice President's speech with specific focus on Cambodia.

Even the Lou Harris poll now shows that the public reaction is 2 to 1 favorable regarding Cambodia so we have a real asset if we figure out how to use it.

The thing to do is to make an asset for us out of those who took a position against Cambodia. The ad should talk about the radical liberals and then probably list them by name - that is, those candidates that we're trying to defeat this fall - pick up some of the quotes as the Vice President did in his speech of things that they said at the time about the Cambodia operation and then make the point ~~that~~ how wrong they were.

You probably ought to get Buchanan to give you some guidance on how to put this thing together. It should be a very tough ad and could be very effective if done right. Let's see a draft on it within a week or so.

H. R. HALDEMAN

EXHIBIT No. 168
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUCHANAN
MR. KEOGH
MR. KLEIN
MR. NOFZIGER

FROM: H.R. HALDEMAN *HH*

SUBJECT: Attached memo to you of
November 25, 1970

Instead of going ahead with the project of developing an in-House columnist whose work we would then use as the basis for general mailings, it has been suggested that we could do better by using Victor Lasky in this regard.

Because Lasky is already an established, syndicated columnist and, because of his willingness to cooperate, we can accomplish the same objective by providing him with the kind of things that we want to use for distribution - ask him to do columns on them, and then get reprints of his column to use as mailing pieces to the people we want to direct the information to.

Will you please proceed on this basis, instead of on the basis of the original suggestion.

Attachment

EXHIBIT NO. 169

December 11, 1970

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

Based on this morning's meeting we have begun moving on the following:

1. Ten telegrams have been drafted by Buchanan. They will be sent to TIME and NEWSWEEK today by 20 names around the country from our letter writing system. Copies are attached.
2. Letters to Osborne and Sidey will be sent tomorrow. The letters, as drafted, follow the line of the samples delivered to us.
3. Letters to the editors of the TIMES, POST, STAR, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH are being prepared and sent.
4. Nofziger is having statements placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Once they appear, they will be printed and distributed together with favorable columns to editors, publishers, business leaders, and other opinion leaders.
5. Nofziger has contacted Victor Lasky, who has agreed to run a column. Nofziger will also contact Lawrence, Kilpatrick and Paul Martin.
6. The NEW YORK TIMES Op Ed page statement is being drafted by Keogh. Nofziger is also preparing a draft. Klein is probably the best signatory. A call is in to Salisbury concerning placement of the piece.
7. In reviewing the comments of the editors and publishers contacted last night, it is our view that most will run favorable editorials, and that it might be counter productive to exert White House pressure.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

8. An attempt is being made to get a resolution from Sigma Delta Chi condemning the pre-press conference meeting by 25 commentators to set strategy to embarrass the President.

JSM:GS:ger

JSM Chron

JSM Name file

JSM Subj file ✓ (*President's Press Conf (12/10/70)*)

bcc: Gordon Strachan -FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN S

SUBJECT:

President's Press Conference

Dwight Chapin called last night and asked me to work with you on "follow-up on the President's press conference."

He described the procedures as fairly standard - telephone calls, individuals' assessment of his performance, etc.

Is the plan any different from the follow-up that Rob did following the President's October peace proposal speech?

(Buckanan)

To The Editor:

The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President Agnew about the nation's news media was their incredibly arrogant performance before the entire nation last Thursday night. Who in the hell elected those people to stand up and read off their insults to the President of the United States -- and then ask that he comment?

(Buchanan)

To The Editor:

Where does the press come off demanding that the President have press conferences on call. The choice of methods and means for a President to communicate with the people who elected him is his own -- and he answers for it to the American people. You people have gotten too big for your britches.

(Buchanan)

To The Editor:

Last Thursday night, the President of the United States handled that pack of wolves gathered in the White House with a great deal more gentility and generosity than their conduct deserved. When will you people recognize that he was elected President -- and he is entitled to the respect of that office -- no matter what you people think about him.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Joseph Pulitzer must be turning over in his grave. He believed in an honest journalism. Instead, at the President's latest news conference, we got the spectacle of reporters falling over themselves in their attempts to put down the President.

Their silly, slanted questions were so obvious that it was laughable. Three cheers for President Nixon's mastery over the Warlocks of Washington.

11/16

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

With regard to the President's recent news conference,
score it: President Nixon, 100 - Media, 0.

----- (Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Anyone who saw the President's recent news conference must have bridled in disgust at the blatant attempts by reporters to embarrass the President. Instead, the President held back these wolves and showed them a thing or two.

Every honest reporter ought to hang his head in shame at the grandstanding of his colleagues before the President of the United States. I used to wonder why anyone criticized the press. Now I know.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Thank goodness this country has President Nixon. At least he has the guts to stand up before the media and give the news straight.

At his December 10th press conference, President Nixon was faced with questions planted by a cabal of the liberal press. While the media tried their best to embarrass him with their inane histrionics, Mr. Nixon answered all questions with candor and honesty.

Why don't you fellows spend more time on good questions and less time on wondering why the President doesn't have more press conferences.

1113

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Joe McGinnis ought to write another book: The Selling of The Press Corps. At the President's press conference of December 10th I couldn't believe my eyes and ears. There they were in all their pompous splendor editorializing on virtually every question they asked of the President.

If the media want to take positions on public matters, they ought to run for public office and leave to honest reporters the asking of sincere questions. In view of the new role of the media, I am personally sending all members of the White House Press Corps jars of pancake makeup. They need it more than the President.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

We are told by those of you in the media that Presidential press conferences are held to inform the public. Maybe I tuned in on the wrong show.

The press conference I witnessed on December 10th looked like a programmed attack on the President. It is incredible that prime time has to be given over to glorify a bunch of prima donna reporters. It's the President's job to inform and the media's job to transmit. Let's keep it that way.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

We citizens depend on the media of this Nation to give us the news honest and straight. We also expect that they will at least show respect towards the President of the United States.

Yet, at the President's last news conference, the press were out like hatchet men -- seeking neither to show respect nor to inform. The glamour boys of the media seem to think that someone elected them to high office.

The President's spirited responses to bad questions have earned my deep respect.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Heaven forfend that humility be the last refuge of the media! Why, it would be asking too much that they stick to informing the public instead of preening before the television cameras.

However, I join the media in asking that the President hold more news conferences. I rather enjoyed seeing the press make jackasses out of themselves on December 10th.

(Khachigian)

To The Editor:

Recently, Vice-President Agnew deigned to propose that newsmen submit themselves to periodic questioning by government officials. The Press was outraged. How dare Old Spiro think that the press was partisan?

From what I could tell at the President's last news conference, Larry O'Brien must have planted all the questions. Our free, non-partisan press must be suffering from double hernias from carrying around all of those loaded questions.

Congratulations to President Nixon for showing the media that he can stand up to them with honest and forthright answers.

December 11, 1970

Dear Jack:

Press irritation at the lack of press conferences seems to me understandable. But there are some questions involved here that go beyond that. (1) The President has the right to choose his form of communication with the American people -- just as he will answer for it. (2) Should the national press be meeting privately or secretly to thence come to coerce the President into having more press conferences --- by the vehicle of damaging his political interests via concerted television and newspaper attacks on him by the participants in the meetings. (3) When does the questioning of the President, the interrogation of the President go beyond sharp, tough, incisive questioning and become occasion for fulminations and the presentation of hostile viewpoints and hostile questions. (4) My own view is that the Old Man kept the animals at bay with deftness and skill and some gentility, and that the press conference was clearly a plus. But, in talking about the institution of the press conference, one wonders whether it is legitimate to turn it into a baiting session; one wonders whether it is wise for the national press corps to allow itself to become something of an anti-Nixon partisan cabal as it seemed to do last week before and in the course of the President's press conference. Am enclosing copies of RN's press conference and Ziegler's meeting with the press --- for your reflection in Central Virginia.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Patrick J. Buchanan
Special Assistant
to the President

Mr. James J. Kilpatrick
412 Princess Street
Alexandria, Virginia.

EXHIBIT No. 170

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: THE MUSKIE WATCH

From the Evans-Novak Newsletter:

"Muskie: He has been deliberately lying low, which is smart politics except when carried too far. Instead of traveling to Nigeria, he might have done better to go to New York, to California, and Texas where HHH has been making inroads with Establishment Democrats. Still, Muskie remains by far the strongest possible candidate against Nixon, according to the Quayle Poll trial heats: Muskie 48%; Nixon 42%; Wallace 10% compared to last month's Muskie 46%; Nixon 44% Wallace 10%."

Mr. Muskie seems to have recognized the political peril in his high visibility strategy of December and January -- and revised it. The highly publicized trips to California and Moscow -- with the press pack aboard -- have been discontinued. They did little to strengthen him, and exposed not a few weaknesses in personality, in foreign policy. He seems to have arrived separately at the same conclusion; and his profile is now perceptibly lower than it was in the first months of the year.

However, if Muskie does not come out into the open again, if he stays in relative hibernation, it is difficult to see what it is that is going to diminish his standing in the polls on which he now depends. The country has a good impression of him; he presents to millions an attractive alternative; he is not the subject of the kind of attacks which would force a response.

Should he maintain his present posture, more or less, for eight months, he will enter the primaries, relatively unscathed; and as Brothers Evans-Novak write:

"If Muskie does win most of the primaries, he will be nominated with ease on the first ballot.

If Muskie does not win, he will not even be a factor at the convention."

And if Mr. Muskie is not cut and bleeding before he goes into New Hampshire, he will very likely do massively well there, building up irresistible momentum for the nomination. This scenario is not in our interest -- as Muskie today is a figure ideally situated to unite the warring factions of his party, and if they are united that is bad news for us.

Our interests thus dictate smoking him out now; and keeping him out in front as long as we can. His performance to date when out front does not argue well for his capacity to survive the kind of pressures and harassments that go with being front runner, pressures and harassments he is not getting today.

One recalls that Nelson Rockefeller had phenomenal ratings in the Gallup and Harris polls by the end of 1967 -- so long as he stayed in Albany. When he emerged, half the nation said, "Hey, it's him again," and his ineffectual active campaigning actually cost him votes from the time it began until Miami, when we finally surpassed him in the Gallup Poll. The same was true of Goldwater. As Mr. Conservative, unknown to the country, he was an enormous attraction; as Barry Goldwater, campaigning in New Hampshire, he was a disaster. Both he and Rocky dropped in the polls from beginning to the end of the New Hampshire Primary.

The more specific stands a political figure takes -- on divisive issues -- the more people he alienates. This is as true for Mr. Muskie as it is for us; and thus he should be forced to take more stands on more controversial issues. The free ride for Big Ed Muskie must be terminated.

It seems not in our interest to let him choose his topics, to wander the land talking about saving our environment which everyone from Robert Welch to Abby Hoffman supports. It is in our interest -- and in the interest of the liberal Democratic challengers for the nomination -- to prevent Mr. Muskie's uninterrupted march to the nomination.

The Sears November argument was that we should leave Muskie alone -- attack and respond to other Democrats, like HHHH, to elevate them. That doesn't seem realistic now, as Muskie is already "elevated." He is already at the top, so far as Gallup and Harris and the Democratic Party are concerned.

There is a danger in going after Muskie, making him the martyr and spokesman of the Democratic Party, and thus insuring his nomination, and even enhancing his chances of election. But the risk should be taken. If we don't do it now, we shall have to play hurry-up football in the two months before election -- and people tend to disbelieve political charges made in that kind of partisan environment.

Who should we get to poke the sharp stick into his cave to bring Muskie howling forth? More important, what kind of stick is most effective.

Frankly, Muskie cannot be effectively assaulted from the Right -- i. e. he is a Big Spender; he doesn't stand behind the President in time of conflict abroad. An attack on Muskie from his right, by a Senator Dole or Vice President Agnew, would only rally all Democrats, who are all to the left of us, around him.

The attack then should come between the center and the left of the Democratic Party. It should focus on those issues that divide Democrats, not those that unite Republicans. It should exacerbate and elevate those issues on which Democrats are divided -- forcing Muskie to either straddle, or come down on one side or the other.

Many such issues come to mind.

THE WAR. Less and less is this an issue dividing Democrats; more and more is it a unifying issue as conservative Democrats begin to adopt a "let's get the hell out" stance. This would explain what it was inexpensive for Muskie and Humphrey to move dovish politically in recent weeks on this issue. The price they are paying for that move is not so great as it once was; and their need to mollify the peacenik Democrats is greater than it has ever been.

THE MUSKIE PERSONALITY. There is fertile ground here. Muskie is short-tempered; he regularly rebuffs reporters who ask hostile questions; he has a reputation, which disturbs him, of being unable to make a decision, to take a stand. Political criticism of Muskie as a Democratic Hamlet with his finger to the wind and his nose in a Gallup Poll would be the kind of attack that would be credited by the Democratic Left. It is their greatest suspicion of Big Ed. Statements by Liberal Republicans such as "At least McGovern has the courage of his convictions, silly though they may be, but who the hell knows where Mr. Muskie stands and what he stands for other than Mrs. Muskie."

THE RACE ISSUE. There are possibilities provided here in that the 1950s Liberal, Abe Ribicoff, has come up with a beautiful "forced integration" program -- involving a Federal requirement that every school in the entire metropolitan area have within the student body not more than twice and not less than half the minority population in the entire metropolitan. That of course would necessitate massive bussing of whites into the cities and blacks into the suburbs. We ought to look closely at the details of this legislation, and if it is as radical a piece of "social engineering" as it appears, then the way might be smoothed for its advance; it could be given considerable publicity; and we could denounce it as inconsistent with our principles of freedom of movement -- and force Mr. Muskie to take the kind of stand that would either alienate the suburbanites and ethnics who would bear the brunt of this -- or appear again as an appeaser of the Right in the eyes of the professional liberals.

REVENUE SHARING. Muskie has stepped in it up to his ankles on this one. His vigorous opposition to RN's program met with silence and disagreement from the mayors and city officials to whom he spoke -- most of whom want it and most of whom are democratic. This ground should be cultivated. Public statements by Democrats, preferably liberal Democrats, calling on Muskie to change his view, and lead the Democratic Party in defense of the cities should be made. We can portray this as a "dog-in-the-manger" stance toward urban problems by a Senator, who is playing the reactionary toward a progressive proposal simply because he did not come up with it himself. Moderate and liberal Republicans should be able to find in this matter a political area where they are comfortably supporting the Administration and opposing Muskie, and they should do so publicly.

ABORTION. This is, as we predicted months ago, a rising issue and a gut issue with Catholics. Time this week had a major piece on the rising clerical opposition, not only Catholic. Buckley has called on Catholic Bishops to lead a political offensive up to the point of civil disobedience. It is not unlikely that one of these abortion centers, such as D.C., could be targeted with a bomb -- so fiercely do conservative Catholics feel on this matter. The President's stand against the Defense Department should be made public and strong, would be happy to write it. Let us take the far-left losses we would get on this -- and then send the ball into Mr. Muskie's Court. After all, he is a Catholic, and one recalls that in liberal, but Catholic, Massachusetts, Senator Edward Kennedy echoed his ultra-liberal Republican opponent on every major issue but one -- abortion. He opposed abortion. If the President should publicly take his stand against abortion, as offensive to his own moral principles, while his President, not interfering with the decision of States; if we should publicly reverse DOD, then we can force Muskie to make the choice between his tens of millions of Catholic supporters and his liberal friends at the New York Times and the Washington Post.

PAROCHIAID. Again, this is the big winner for Northeast Republicans, who support it, such as Rockefeller. For while GOPers may be neutral or opposed, it is not life or death to them -- while to Democrats, it is a divisive gut issue separating Conservative Catholic Irish and Italians from Do-Gooder, liberal, Jewish Democrats who adamantly oppose it. The Supreme Court is moving to decide this issue as it is to decide the abortion issue -- and before those decisions come down, we should be on the side of the angels. If the Court decides in favor of liberalized abortion and no Parochaid, then we will have lost two of the gut issues that can make inroads into the Catholic Democrats of the Northeast and Midwest, and Mr. Muskie will have two political problems of some magnitude resolved for him by the Supreme Court. The President has, I understand, the preliminary report of the non-public school task force. Why not make it public with an RN endorsement -- let the Catholics know they have a friend in the White House, concerned about their problems. Some Southerners are going to complain, but where will they stand in a showdown between the President and a liberal Democrat. Indeed, should Muskie push too hard against parochaid -- to move between us and our Southern friends, he will pay an intolerable political price in loss of support in the Catholic Community.

A man is defined by the positions he takes; and Mr. Muskie does well, because his image is fuzzy; people on opposing sides of bitter questions do not know that he is either opposed to one of them, or the other. On this matter, we must become the midwives of the people's right to know -- if the press does not do the job for us, which it is not doing today.

THE SST -- Every worker in Seattle, every union man in the aerospace industry, should be made aware of Mr. Muskie's position on this issue. He should be targeted as the prime liberal responsible for the cutbacks in defense and space which have cost their jobs. RN should be pictured as the one fighting to save their jobs from Democrats who would put an end to the space program. In the last campaign we took the heat for jobs lost because of cutbacks -- cutbacks which the complaining liberal Democrats voted and themselves would have increased.

THE ENVIRONMENT: Mr. Muskie has recognized and moved to solve his political problems here -- well before we did. He is traveling the country, holding hearings on the impact of the environmental decisions on industry and jobs. He is effectively neutralizing our best issue here -- the tactic of telling communities and companies, "if Madman Muskie's environment bill goes through, this industry shut down and this burg becomes a ghost town." The old scare tactics, on military closings, were used against us to a fare-thee-well last fall -- and we should have moved to use this against Muskie. We did not. He seems to be getting well on this -- but he remains vulnerable.

A research team should go over what the Muskie original proposal would have required -- before any compromises -- and then have our party people in the affected areas say publicly that had the Muskie bill gone through, unemployment here would be ten percent. This environmental issue titillates the liberals, but the trade-offs in jobs and income and community recession have not been reckoned, and not made public.

That new Government-Ford Foundation project -- thank God Enthoven has departed -- would seem the ideal instrument, with the right man at the top, to cost out, in jobs and factories closed, the impact of all of Ed Muskie's major environmental legislation. "If Ed Muskie's bill is passed," should become the customary prefix on predictions of economic doom.

THE FORD FOUNDATION. When Whitney Young passed away, one saw a picture of Ed Muskie in the surf with Young, and one learned that they were gathered in Nigeria on a Ford Foundation financed trip. Now, in my research on Ford, this is the third such trip. Muskie was the only Democrat who made both junkets to Japan (some of our Republican friends went also on one) financed by Ford. Certainly some troublesome questions could be raised about Muskie's connection with McGeorge Bundy's giant institution -- and are they behind his candidacy. Investigation should be done on this score. This could go hand-in-glove with the Foundation speeches.

THE MUSKIE ADVISERS. Certainly, Harriman and Clifford, two of those responsible for the present situation in Vietnam, have little or no appeal to the young who oppose the war. They are old war horses, who were deeply involved in all the failures of Vietnam. The failures would return to power with Muskie -- and Harriman, "who sold Poland down the River," is apparently Muskie's leading candidate for Secretary of State. How would that read on the front page of the Chicago Polish-American?

These are a few of the areas that could be explored. These are some of the issues that can be developed -- to the immense discomfort of Mr. Muskie. This has been a hayride for him thus far; we cannot rely upon the press to do this work for us. We are going to have to poke Big Ed with some sharp sticks to see how he performs. And from what I have seen, it is not all that remarkable or impressive. He is riding two things right now -- his Vice Presidential candidacy in 1968 where an indulgent press slobbered all over him as the great alternative to Spiro T. Agnew -- and his televised show the night before the election, which was a good performance, but hardly a trial-by-fire.

We ought to go down to the kennels and turn all the dogs loose on Ecology Ed. The President is the only one who should stand clear, while everybody else gets chewed up. The rest of us are expendable commodities; but if the President goes, we all go, and may be the country with us. My view.

Anyhow, the attacks should not be name-calling -- they should be thought out. They should have a specific purpose; they should be designed to injure Mr. Muskie with a specific group where he now has support. They should be framed to force him to howl a bit.

Again, the fellow in his bungled trip to the Soviet Union, in his short temper and testiness, in his botching of revenue sharing -- to me does not seem to have it. The individual who called him the "Romney of the Seventies" may not be too far off the mark.

We will not be, in this enterprise, without allies among the Silent Majority in the Democratic Party in the Senate. Some of them see us as vulnerable; they see the future as the "Democratic Years," I cannot believe they view with any enthusiasm eight years of President Ed Muskie telling them what is good for America. No, I think some of these fellows would not be disappointed to see Big Ed unhorsed and lying in a ditch by the side of the road. They will shed the same crocodile tears as that splendid little band who put it to his Whipship, Ted Kennedy, in the secret ballot.

My recommendation, then, is for creation of THE MUSKIE WATCH, an operation working perhaps within the Republican National Committee, which may even be a publicized operation, doing constant research on Ed, and putting the materials out to the interest groups, and to the press. The operation should be tied in with Mort Allin's Shop; he can provide a steady stream of all commentary on Muskie. It should be tied in with Colson's shop which can provide the names of the proper contacts in each community. The group should focus for now exclusively in Muskie and not get bogged down on a dozen other little projects. It seems an interesting idea; one that, if RN approves, the general approach, should be tied in with Senator Dole, and moved on rapidly.

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

EXHIBIT No. 171

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: The Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey

One emerges from a perusal of our "Humphrey file" with a grudging regard for Old Hubert. Since November, with but a few notable exceptions, the ex-Veeep has conducted himself remarkably well. He receives an excellent press. He has maximized his assets, and minimized his deficiencies. The result is that today, unlike six months ago, the man is a serious contender for the Democratic nomination.

Gallup has charted the comeback. The following represents the shift from November to March in Democratic voter sentiment, about their preference of nominees.

| | 1970 NOVEMBER | 1971 MARCH |
|---------|---------------|------------|
| MUSKIE | 33 | 26 |
| KENNEDY | 31 | 25 |
| HHH | 16 | 21 |

Thus, in four months, Humphrey gained a net of 12 points on Muskie, and 11 points on Edward M. Kennedy -- a not insignificant advance. One reason is surely that, in this period, it is difficult to find any bad press on Hubert Humphrey. The stories -- many of them on women's pages -- are invariably straight or favorable.

Following are some reasons for the Humphrey resurgence, which underscore elements of his present strategy, a strategy that appears to be working as well today as that of any man in political life.

Agriculture

First, Humphrey has moved rapidly to fill an issue vacuum -- in the farm regions. He had himself named to the Agriculture Committee; has perceived our weakness in this area; has made himself unofficial Democratic champion of rural and farm America -- without ignoring the "cities" issue he shares with the Eastern-oriented candidates. Press people tell me HHH promised to stump rural America declaiming that, first, "Mr. Nixon took away your prosperity and now he's trying to take your Department away from you." "I think that'll sell right well out there in farm country." So, HHH has been quoted. Here Humphrey can pick up support in an area others ignore, and is well-positioned to corral rural delegates to the Democratic convention.

The Muskie Decline

Secondly, on analysis, Humphrey's new support is coming directly out of Muskie's hide.

Here is what seems to have happened in four months. McGovern's wild accusations, his far-out positions, have thrilled the Far Left of the Democratic Party, causing McGovern to rise from the infinitesimal two percent to the insignificant five percent. McGovern seems prevented from rising into the teens or twenties, at this point, because he is appealing to voters who already have a popular, first-line, left-wing candidate in Edward Kennedy, a candidate who gives them near all the positions McGovern does -- at the same time Kennedy offers the realistic hope of winning, with those positions -- and returning Camelot as well.

But McGovern's candidacy may be having a secondary effect -- on the fortunes of Mr. Muskie.

To hold his bridge position in the Democratic Party, Muskie must equivocate on divisive issues; he cannot adopt the Far Left positions, and remain viable nationally. McGovern, having no such problem, assumes all these stances and so contrasts himself, as decisive and moral and unequivocal, with Muskie who comes off indecisive and equivocal. Thus, Muskie fails to "turn people on," and in his glaring publicity as front-runner, this is enervating to this candidacy. And as he goes down in the polls, his supporters,

generally centrist Democrats, looking for a winner, drift off to the next best thing -- Hubert Humphrey.

Muskie still has broad support among Democrats and Independents; and he cannot be removed as a factor. But a collapsing Muskie campaign, it seems to me, would lead to an almost inevitable Kennedy-Humphrey, left-center confrontation for the nomination -- an altogether satisfactory development.

The Humphrey Positions

Humphrey's attacks on the Administration have been of a scatter-gun nature; he is a single issue man as Kennedy is the health man, and Muskie, the environmentalist. He criticizes the Administration on a much broader front -- in essence appealing, with his old politics, to the constituency of the New Deal.

1. As mentioned, he has moved early and hard to become the Democratic champion of the American farmer -- a good move, considering there are 37 other candidates contending for champion of the cities, and LHHH is among them.

2. He is back on the arms control, missile freeze, "risks for peace" nonsense. While, one imagines this would help a bit with the left and the intellectual community, to most people the issue is too complicated to comprehend.

3. He is making prodigious efforts to get well on the Vietnam issue. Having decided there is no more to be gained by a "peace with honor" position, he has all but confessed his sins from the Johnson years, and daily attempts to extricate himself from that record.

4. He is taking a strong pro-Israeli stand, a stand duplicated of course by most Democrats -- all of them looking to Jewish money and backing at the convention and, hopefully, in the election.

5. He repeatedly attacks the White House for "public relations gimmickry" and "intimidation of the news media," even though HHH's past quotes show him massively vulnerable on the latter. (Have some thoughts on the former problem, forthcoming later.)

6. He is coming down very hard -- perhaps hardest of all -- on the bread and butter issues -- the problems in the economy, the unemployed, poor people out of work, etc. This is, again, the old politics, which Mr. Humphrey continues to mix effectively with the new.

The Humphrey Assets

Within the Democratic Party, these are not inconsiderable. He is solid with the blacks, more than acceptable to Big Labor, a friend of the farm bloc; he has party strength in the South, and Texas (especially) and California; he remains a "centrist" Democrat; unlike Muskie, he pays his respects to party regulars. Old Democrats from New Deal days have nothing against him. In every publicity encounter with fellow Democrats, he steals the show as he did at the big pie-eating contest on the Hill and the A.S.N.E. session last week. He is ebullient and likeable -- very strong with Democratic women. He is a politician of the old hand-shaking, baby-kissing school; not a total disadvantage with many simple people. He came within an eyelash of winning the last time out.

The Humphrey Liabilities

These are very serious. He is a loser; an Old Face whose resurrection has "produced boredom and horror among Democrats, except for some of HHH's big money friends." (Evans and Novak) He is tied up inextricably with LBJ and Vietnam; he remains anathema to the intellectuals and far left of his party, despite his best efforts to heal the wounds. He generates no great excitement of enthusiasm. His nomination would alienate all the "idealistic" McCarthy kids who would have waited four years -- and gotten Old Hubert again. His nomination could even produce a fourth party. While he has traveled all over the nation speaking to youth, it is safe to say his nomination would produce ennui among the activist liberal peace groups and disinterest in an RN-HHH election.

By way of a balance sheet then, it seems Humphrey would have a number of the traditional strengths and supports that go automatically to national Democrats -- but no more. And he would carry into a general election serious deficiencies -- which seem to make him a thoroughly acceptable candidate from our point of view.

The Humphrey Strategy

In December, Humphrey volunteered that Democrats should look over the field in 1971, and by the end of this year, settle upon a candidate, rally about him -- and avoid the divisive primaries. This has been, I believe, his sole significant political error since election. Liberal Democrats pounced upon the scheme as wholly out of spirit with the new wide-open convention concept they have been promoting.

But, when Humphrey advanced that proposal in December, it would appear that he did not, then, seriously consider himself a potential candidate. For who would have predicted then -- including Mr. Humphrey -- that HHH could possibly be the national favorite by this next December.

Since then, however, Humphrey's fortunes have risen; he is clearly a potential candidate; and sees himself as such.

His strategy seems relatively clear: move about the country, attacking the Nixon Administration on a broad variety of issues; seize all the publicity possible; do the party chores; attack no fellow Democrats; stress one's availability -- and wait for events to develop.

Humphrey must, it seems to me, avoid the early primaries. And his derogatory remarks about primaries themselves indicate that he intends just this. Let the other contenders fight it out with one another, the more the merrier, to an indecisive conclusion in the early primaries -- and then emerge with broad party acceptance, as the strongest centrist unifying man around, the fellow who came within 500,000 votes, and can now go over the top.

The strategy is working. Humphrey has risen at Muskie's expense; he is now within range of both Kennedy and Muskie -- although of the three he continues to run weakest against the President.

Because Muskie is the front-runner, it is Muskie who is up in New Hampshire, being covered by reporters, as he apologizes for his role in Vietnam, and attempts to exonerate himself before the college young. Mr. Humphrey is getting no such intensive, critical

coverage from the press. He would be well advised to stay away from the student Q and A session -- and stick to speeches attacking one shortcoming, speeches which net good coverage and little or no contradiction in the media. Further, so as not to alienate any segment of his party -- he should consciously avoid any criticism of other party hopefuls, anticipating in the end that they will thus find him an acceptable if not an exciting alternative. Only if, well down the road, Muskie is running strong out front and needs some chopping, would Humphrey have any cause to start laying down policy differences with the front-runner. Right now, he should hang back a bit and let the front-runner Muskie weary himself, setting the pace.

Counter-Strategy

As noted in the "Humphrey Liabilities," his nomination would engender great anguish on the left at a Democratic convention, and might trigger a fourth party -- thus, his nomination is not something we should, at this point, look upon with great apprehension. Further, a continued HHH rise in Democratic polls would be helpful -- as it would likely come at Muskie's expense, and force Muskie to re-accelerate his timetable, and make the kind of precipitous decisions he is making now -- viz, the near unqualified endorsement of the upcoming demonstration.

However, at the same time we want to see Humphrey rise with Democrats, we should be associating him with minority positions that alienate Independent and Conservative Democrats and cannot stand the test of a general election.

The following come to mind:

Catholics. Humphrey does not have the affinity with this primary Democratic bloc that a Muskie or Kennedy might -- the latter being co-religionists. We would thus start with only a minimal handicap with Catholics. Therefore, again, I would argue the President associate himself, publicly, with the report he already has -- from his sub-committee on non-public education, headed by Dr. Walton. We have done the abortion thing. But, just today, the Archbishop of Detroit announced the closing of 56 Catholic schools, dropping 23,000 Catholic students into the Michigan public school system. If the President forces this issue with the Democrats, again, it is an issue which divides them down the middle, and only does us minimal damage in my opinion.

(In a story I saw in the Washington Daily News a fortnight ago, we were being criticized by Catholic leaders for not making Walton's report public.)

The President might well use the closing of these Michigan schools as a peg on which to hinge a brief statement deploring the trend and calling for the one-day conference in D.C. Walton et. al. have recommended.

Farm Area. Humphrey has the kind of support here, I am confident, that we enjoyed back in 1968 -- much of it related to a faith in the fellow as one of their own, probably more of it related to an anti-ins feeling among those rural Americans who have not been doing so well as in the past. In any event, these are states on which we depend for our base of support -- before even considering the big swing states. If we are hurting in Middle America, we are hurting everywhere. Humphrey obviously feels he has seized a good issue here, both for support at the convention and support in the general, should he win the nomination. This should be a top priority concern of the Administration -- yet as Wild Bill Scherle told me, there is really no one in the White House whom farmers and rural America types might conceivably look to as one of their own.

Hard Hats. RN's steps on construction wages, taken for the national interest, were nevertheless politically damaging, according to Scammon who spoke to a conservative group last week. If the demonstrations turn obnoxious this coming weekend and beyond -- perhaps we will get back some of these patriotic types. But Buchanan's view is that a meeting between the President and union men connected with aerospace and defense might be highly useful. RN could argue:

- "(a) we have got to end this war honorably and
- (b) in the present world environment, we cannot let the defense budget go down the tubes. I am doing these things for America. I know you gentlemen feel you can't support me politically, or can't support me on economics in general, but, by God, I am asking for your support on these issues. You have tremendous pull with the Democratic Senators, like Muskie and

Humphrey and Kennedy and Jackson. Can you exercise public and private leverage so that they will not cut back on this defense budget, and space budget (which incidentally means jobs to union men) and on our commitment to an honorable peace in Vietnam."

A risky venture perhaps.

But it seems there is a natural division between the bell-bottomed ecologists who want to return to nature -- and the hard hats whose prosperity depends upon, if you will, the military-industrial complex. Further, if and when the President takes up the defense of his defense budget, he might well argue that it is wrong to indict hundreds of thousands of American workers as a member of some monolithic "military-industrial complex."

"These men are building the weapons and machines that keep America strong and free."

This is an argument that the President might also press upon labor leaders.

"Gentlemen, one of the problems in this society is that the men who design and the men who construct the weapons that defend this country are being portrayed as some sort of pawns in a great military-industrial complex -- and this is wrong and not good for America. If we are going to have a strong nation, we are going to have to have respect for those Americans who keep it strong."

Against us, in 1968 and 1970, the Democrats were saying: "If you elect Nixon, you lose your social security; you lose your medicare." Our GOP organizations around the country in the coming campaign ought to be out at McDonnell-Douglas, at Lockheed, at Boeing, with such posters at the plant gate as "If Muskie wins, you lose." "If Humphrey wins, the Defense Budget is lost -- start looking for another job election day." In the areas where there is high unemployment, at the Boeing Plant in Seattle, GOP workers should be passing out "Wanted" posters with portraits of Muskie, Kennedy and HHHH, the inscription underneath "Wanted for questioning in connection with the death of the SST."

(Note: Riesel says, in RN's news summary, that labor was angered by HHH note on SST.)

Aerospace and defense unemployment ought to be hung around the necks of those who would increase it.

The Muskie Decline

There is an argument that Muskie is proving himself so ineffectual that we might actually want him as candidate, and thus ought not to muss him up so badly that he loses the nomination. I can't accept this argument. One recalls that Governor Romney by this point in time was well behind RN among both Republicans and Independents -- but he stayed up for fifteen rounds of unexampled punishment. And, though others disagree, I believe that, outside the WH, we should keep the heat on Big Ed. If, then, he does get the nomination, he will be scarred -- as to be politically ineffective. If he falls back further, he will yet fight more furiously for it; and the primaries will be no cake walk for anyone and the more brutal the fight within the opposition party, the greater our advantage.

The War

Humphrey is struggling heroically to get well on this issue, to make himself, now, an acceptable alternative, to the party's left. The Prodigal Son, however is not welcome back home -- if the New Republic and I. F. Stone are to be believed. A little Machiavelli here might be of use. If the President, who is not revered on the Left, were to publicly express thanks to HHH for the quiet support he has given on Vietnam -- HHH is likely to be astonished and stunned, and his left-wing courtship broken off on the spot. Perhaps Dole or the Vice President even might compliment HHH on the "strong support" he has consistently provided for the war in Vietnam.

Integration

True to form, Senator Ribicoff is now maneuvering his compulsory integration plan toward the floor -- demanding one and all take a stand on it. We ought to credit Ribicoff's courage in facing this issue -- but come down hard against him -- and force Muskie, and Humphrey and Kennedy to take a stand on this issue, a forthright stand. Almost certainly they will have to waffle on this one. Again.

the issues that divide Democrats must be brought to the public attention, if we are going to prevent the uniting of their party.

Polls

If we could possibly get a poll showing Humphrey taking the lead among Democrats, the "horror" about his re-emergence which E & N detected, would rise immediately to the surface, the press would focus on him, and the Democratic Left would start chopping him up, again, advantageous for us in the long run.

LBJ & Riots

Humphrey made a remark about LBJ, "I had a President who was absolutely paranoid about the war," which we should remind him and the country of. Further, Humphrey's statements about possible riots this summer, if some little Federal bureau was shut down, can be used again and twinned with his famous, "I'd lead a mighty good riot" remark. We can depict him as the "Bull Agitator" of the U.S. Senate.

These issues can be aired this weekend in MONDAY, in the sequel to The Muskic Watch. Right now, from our vantage point, it seems to me that "Humphrey's the One."

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

EXHIBIT No. 172

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

G

As you know, Buchanan has established a Muskie "watch".

Please talk to Marik about establishing a similar structure for Humphrey and Kennedy.

I assume that the other Democratic contenders are being watched by your Democratic Contenders Group.

Could you let me know on Friday, May 7, the status of this project.

Due Date
May 7, 1971

5/5/71 ^{CONFIDENTIAL}

Meeting with Pat Buchanan & TSM

1. Use of info on contenders

- back up for distribution to media
- "Monday"
- for counter-strategy
 - advance men prepare reception for traveling candidates

2. RMR prepare summary on present contender activity.

3. RAC research report - may use as input to "Contender Watch" by Jacobson & Jorg.

5/6 ^{CONTENTS}

Pat Buchanan

1. Enough data are being collected.
2. It is being used to some degree in countering the opposition candidates, but not nearly to the degree it might be.
3. We need to develop a recommended system by early so that it can be circulated among the Committee + submitted by June 30.

EXHIBIT No. 173

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: EMK - POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

A careful analysis of news clippings of recent weeks, coupled with reports of recent days, removes, I think, vestigial doubts that EMK is running actively for the Presidency.

Items:

Last night on the Elizabeth Drew show, Kennedy pointedly refused to issue any Sherman statements. In April, for the first time, he stated "I am keeping my mind open" about the nomination. ABC finds that he has written to former top aides indicating he is assessing the situation. Humphrey thinks he is a potential active candidate, as does Muskie. Daley, according to HHH, is "strong for Teddy." Riesel claims nearly all the top AFL-CIO types, excepting Meany, are holding back, waiting for Teddy; the same is true of many political pros around the country, according to Jerry Greene. Andrew Tully said a month or more ago that anyone who doesn't think Teddy is running "suffers from rocks in the head," and Andy Bicmiller of AFL-CIO indicates that if a fellow does not think Kennedy is running, he is "nuts".

Buchanan's View: Kennedy is keeping his options open -- against the possibility that RN may be so strong by summer '72 that the nomination will not be worth anything. In which event, he can stay out. However, at this point, he and his people have obviously concluded RN can be beaten -- and they are not about to sit this one out -- risking spending eight years outside the inner circle of power of a President Humphrey or a President Muskie. If Kennedy believes the Democrats can win -- as he quite apparently does now -- he will go after the nomination. If he thinks the Democrats by spring of 1972 are sure losers, he can yet stand off.

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CONFIDENTIALHard Evidence:

Mankiewicz, Salinger, Goodwin and Walinsky have all hooked up (CSM) with sure-loser George McGovern. These are not idealistic school boys willing to spend a year of their lives on an ideological lark. They are interested in power -- there is no power to be had by going the route with George McGovern.

It appears they have been given the go-sign by Kennedy to join McGovern, that the purpose is to serve (a) as a "holding operation" for the Kennedy staff, (b) to make top Kennedy personnel familiar with all the levers of state Democratic power when Kennedy makes his move and (c) to elevate McGovern in the polls and start cutting Humphrey and Muskie down to size where they can't be nominated.

McGovern is now moving in line with this strategy, with his overt violation of O'Brien's 11th Commandment and attack on HHH and Muskie for opposition to the Mansfield Amendment. Last night, Kennedy himself had the needle out for some of the "older" voices locked in the thinking of the past -- and he mentioned, specifically, the opposition to Mansfield Amendment as his basis -- refusing, however, to name names.

Also, in line with the strengthening of the weak sister, McGovern, is the emergence of candidates Jackson and Mills -- both of whom will corral conservative Democrat delegates who might otherwise be in the Muskie or Humphrey Camp.

Kennedy Strategy:

Avoid the early primaries in which the left-handers McGovern, Bayh, Hughes, etc. will all be knocked out of the box in the early innings -- freeing up their "Kennedyites" for the switch to Teddy. Manuever to guarantee that neither Muskie nor Humphrey moves into the convention with the nomination locked up. Hold open the option of going into the California Primary itself -- if that is necessary to halt the momentum of a Muskie or Humphrey. Nearing convention time -- have the left candidates, one-by-one, throw their support to Teddy and Teddy emerge as

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the single champion of that wing of the party -- with good labor backing, with good machine backing, and with young, poor, black unanimous behind his candidacy.

Muskie versus Kennedy:

Since November Muskie has lost almost 40 percent of his first-choice support among Democrats, dropping from 33-21.

Between March and May, Muskie's 1 point lead among Democrats over Kennedy (26-25) disappeared into an eight point deficit (29-21).

Among Independents -- Muskie's long suit -- his March lead over Kennedy of 18 points (31-13) was sliced all the way to four points (19-15).

Muskie still has tremendous support among Democratic Party leaders -- Kennedy, from the polls, next to nothing -- but Kennedy support among the rank-and-file Democrats, his ability to attract publicity and generate excitement and the support of the ideologically committed give him more than enough to balance off his weakness with the pros.

Impossible for me to believe the Kennedyites, who believe RN is vulnerable, are going to sit by and watch a Muskie or Humphrey take the prize in August -- and perhaps the Presidency, thus putting off the "Restoration" for four years, possibly eight, possibly forever.

The Kennedy Assets:

These are well known. Charm, "commitment", affinity with the young, polish, Kennedy looks, mystique, the Myth, charisma along the campaign trail; he generates enormous excitement -- as is attested by GOPers traveling with him.

Deficiencies:

1. Even his best friends never accused Kennedy of being an intellectual. On the Drew show, he tended to retreat into the New Left cliches, "we can build a better America," material, which

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reflects a lack of depth. Further, he tends to react somewhat hotly to attack. (PJB suggestion is that it might be well to have hang one or two on him -- from the Vice President or Dole -- taking some particular excessive statement, and really putting it to him, to ascertain how he handles himself. This would perhaps best be done by a moderate-liberal Senator who would unleash a stinging attack on him -- away from the Senate floor -- before television, about two-minutes of good work -- then we could see how he reacts.)

2. His far-left foreign policy positions, which win him the plaudits of the New Left journalists and fellow travelers in the media -- should be portrayed as shocking, alarming, frightening, dangerous to the peace, inviting war in Europe, "immature" and irresponsible. Not, of course, from here -- but in backgrounders with press, he should be portrayed as too reckless, too immature, too irresponsible, at his age, to be President of the United States. This fits hand in glove with the impression he has left upon much of the country and the center of the Democratic Party in the wake of Chappaquiddick.

It is the quiet constant repetition of private and public comments like, "Sure, Muskie is strong but this 'indecisive' thing is killing him" that is itself injuring Muskie's chances. He has been unable to shake the "indecisive" charge with which we have -- with his help -- tagged him.

3. His far left social policy positions should be broadcast and re-broadcast. He has the Left and the Radical Kids. We don't and won't get a one. The effort should be to identify him with them, to associate him with them, to tie him to them.

No matter that EMK is adored by the Party's Left, we have a serious problem only if he gets well with the Party's Center. The more he acts like Brother Bobby the better off we are; the less he acts like brother John, the better off we are.

4. Socially, Kennedy is out of touch with the political mood. The Jet Set, Swinger, See-Through Blouse cum Hot Pants crowd, the Chappaquiddick Hoe-down and Paris highjinks -- the more publicity they all get, the better. (The pictures of the Kennedy sisters, in mod attire, at the Kennedy Center, did them no good.)

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CONFIDENTIALChappaquiddick:

This, of course, will be kept in the public mind by the press -- speculating on whether it is helping or hurting EMK. We ought to stay miles away from it -- indicating even in private, "it's hard to say the effect; we don't know."

Racial Issue:

Kennedy's support of the social-engineering Ribicoff Plan should be emphasized -- and a check made to determine how many of his own children go to integrated schools -- and then this fact, if relevant, placed in Monday, or some publication to get attention. Monday could investigate this -- if Kennedy is guilty of hypocrisy on the question -- this made known.

The Democratic Right:

EMK openly endorsed the left-wing Mayoral candidate who lost to Rizzo in the primary by a whopping margin. The President might well congratulate Rizzo -- if and when he wins the Mayorality -- and try to wean some of these tough-line conservative Mayor types to a position of neutrality in a Kennedy-RN contest.

They have no reason to love EMK -- and it would appear to me that this effort would be at least as worthwhile as the effort to woo labor chieftains equally locked into the Democratic Party.

JFK:

Since EMK will be trafficking on the JFK myth, it would be well to document JFK's tough line on Defense, foreign policy, Vietnam, Europe, etc. over against EMK's positions -- to provide conservative Democrats with some rationale for abandoning the little brother of their hero.

Some of the above are tactical gestures, rather than strategic planning. But the main objective, again, is to keep Kennedy out on the Far Left of his Party -- to prevent his major inroads into the center -- so that if he is the nominee against the President -- we have a clear shot at all those conservative Democrats, who make

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up an integral part of the Nixon Majority. If he is nominated, it should be by the Left Wing of his Party so that LBJ, the South, and the Conservative Democrats will feel they have been run over top of by the unrepresentative radicals and the elite.

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EXHIBIT No. 174

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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FYI

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ED DEBOLT
BOB FINCH
BRYCE HARLOW
DICK MOORE
LYN NOFZIGER
RAY PRICE
BILL TIMMONS
RON WALKER

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

For Thursday's meeting, can you give some thought to the following questions which we will want to knock about:

1. Who is the likely Democratic nominee at this time, and how should the leading contenders be dealt with by our side between now and the first of 1972?
2. What is the likely opposition within the Republican Party to the renomination of the President? And how should the McCloskey movement be handled from the Administration, and Republican standpoints.
3. What is the best strategy we can employ to defend against the attacks of potential Democratic nominees, and how active and intense a strategy should we pursue in going after our Democratic adversaries.
4. Thoughts on tactics to be used to highlight the weaknesses in the other party, and the other candidates, between now and this coming November.
5. Related issues.

EXHIBIT No. 175

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1971

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
12021 333-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM:

JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT:

Democratic & Republican Contenders

Attached is a report on the current status of our tracking of the Democratic and Republican contenders. You will note that the planning committee, under Pat Buchanan, feels that adequate work is being done in collecting the data. The emphasis must be on using the information effectively, particularly in this pre-campaign period. Since this does not require a major change in resources or personnel assignments, we will proceed along those lines unless you disagree with the conclusions reached in the memorandum.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Our prevailing judgment at this time is that if Edward M. Kennedy wants the Democratic Nomination in 1972, he can win it; that he will make his final decision around the turn of the year; that the crucial factor in that decision will be his judgment as to whether or not the President can be defeated. If he feels the President is a loser, he will run. If the President appears strong, he will hang back for 1976 -- and possibly act in a fashion as to assist the President's chance for re-election.

If Kennedy hangs back, the group is divided as to whether Muskie or Humphrey would prevail at the convention. Humphrey seen as seriously damaged by the McNamara Papers.

Group divided further over who would be the most difficult candidate for RN. Some feel Kennedy would be an ideal opponent -- others feel Kennedy, because of charisma, myth, enthusiasm, would be the most difficult. No one mentioned Humphrey as the strongest of the three. One felt that Muskie did not have it upstairs to successfully traverse a Presidential campaign. Thus we should favor his nomination.

Group believed that it was still too early to make flat predictions.

CANDIDATES

KENNEDY -- Great strength among young, poor, black. The only Democrat who can generate great enthusiasm. Good support in labor movement, among lower-income Catholics. Charisma, the Repository of the Kennedy Myth, Good Campaigner. Strongest appeal to 18-21 year-old vote. Looks to bosses in the Northern Cities like a winner. Strongest among rank-and-file Democrats by Gallup Poll. Not likely to drop in coming months. His political operation is among the best. He can generate more and better publicity than any of the others.

Weaknesses: Chappaquiddick. Impression of immaturity and irresponsibility to many. Too far left; too associated with hippies and radicals. Not considered a heavy-weight either by party pros or fellow Senators. Anathema to the South. Too much of a left-winger; too jet set for Middle America. Would generate as much vehement opposition on Right as support on the Left.

MUSKIE -- Could unite Democrats. Strongest in polls of party leaders, and among Independents. Has non-partisan, non-political image. Strong on environment and "new priorities." Ideal compromise candidate, and current front-runner. Has general appearance of solid, responsible, able Senator who arouses no great emotion, but no great animosity. Odds-on-favorite in the early primary

Weaknesses: Indecisive, fumbling has cost him clean shot at unopposed nomination. Excessive appeasement of the radical left has alienated center-conservative Democratic support. Painted as intellectually and politically timid by both Democrats and GOP. Not very astute politically in handling of issues. Growing impression he is not presidential timber. No real enthusiasm behind him. As he lives by the polls, so he may perish by the polls.

HUMPHREY -- Excellent party connections, a good party man. Ran close in 1968 with LBJ albatross around his neck. Has risen in party polls. Centrist Democrat. Good on bread and butter issues, economics; positioned almost ideally on the issues for the Democratic Party. Good anti-Republican campaigner. Ebullient and likeable. Gets good publicity. Strong with the Democratic women.

Weaknesses: Old Face. Hemlock to the Gene McCarthy Left after 1968 -- his nomination, again, in 1972 would risk a party split, and possible third or fourth party. Despised by intellectual far left. No real enthusiasm for his nomination. Weak in the polls against the President. Would bring nothing to a Democratic ticket other than its basic traditional New Deal strengths. Would be perhaps one Democratic candidate who would keep the newly enfranchised young home in droves. Difficult to see how he can win major primaries -- even the late ones, Oregon and California. Removes Vietnam as an issue to use against Republicans.

JACKSON -- Strong with South, strong with labor, strong with conservative Democrats, with Jewish voters and money, with big labor and aerospace and defense contractors. Only Democrat hard-liner on Soviets and Defense Policy -- presents clear alternative to new isolationist sentiment. Choice not an echo. Anti-radical rhetoric. Has money backing, good support in Senate. Highly regarded, tremendous victory record in Washington -- 85 percent. Law and order man. Rallying point for Democratic conservatives. Ideal Vice Presidential Candidate for Edward M. Kennedy, if party divided over Kennedy nomination.

Weaknesses: Nomination would surely sunder Democratic Party. Would generate Fourth Party candidate as in 1948. Party too far left to nominate him now. No national recognition. Needs to go the primary route -- will lose in New Hampshire, a chance in Florida and Oregon -- but can't win the big ones. Again, less likely a potential nominee than a potential Vice Presidential nominee.

MCCLOSKEY -- What the ex-Marine has going for him is a general impression of solid, ex-Marine, honest, tough-minded, anti-war, candid, likely to capitalize on the anti-Nixon sentiment within the Party on the Left. Strategy against him should be, in our view, ignore him at the National level -- and publicize in Republican circles every far-out position, and statement, and appearance. To tarnish

his image as a selfless white knight. Anything that can be seen as moving him out on the left fringe diminishes the degree of Republican votes he can possibly win.

GENERAL STRATEGY

-- Attacks should not focus on any single Democrat. All should be hit now, and hard -- as attacks coming in mid-or late 1972 will be seen as wholly political, thus less credible, less newsworthy than attacks in 1971.

-- President should stay utterly aloof from political attacks.

-- The Democratic Party as an entity should be denigrated, as so irresponsible, such a disaster in the sixties, as not to be entrusted with national leadership again. Thus, Clifford, Harriman, O'Brien, and all potential candidates become fair game.

-- Public should not be allowed to forget the record of the LBJ Administration, of HHH's role, of EMK's background, of Muskie's bumbblings.

Disagreement was expressed over who should do the attacking.

One view, strongly held, is that American people are fed up with politics per se, and politicians, and if RN's official family, i. e. Vice President, White House Staff, or Cabinet, engage in partisan warfare, this reflects on the President as a politician -- and detracts

from him. Other view is that while President must stay aloof, the deficiency of Republican guns argues that we have to use what we have, i. e. the Vice President, occasionally Cabinet members, the RNC Chairman, the RNC, the Republican leadership -- and any Republicans we can find on Capitol Hill to carry the attack to the Democrats.

General concurrence that the press and media tend to tolerate more partisan and malicious assault on part of Democrats, which they would charge off to dirty politics on part of Republicans.

INVENTORY OF RESOURCES

Research Resources

-- RNC is keeping on-going in-depth files on all potential Democratic contenders, plus McCloskey, Gardner, Lindsay and Wallace. This material filed in data bank instant retrieval system.

-- Mort Allin News Summary, contains files of all major Democratic candidates, major comments and stories from 50 major newspapers.

-- RNC runs monthly digest of each potential candidate listing outstanding developments, etc.

Without going into further depth, we have more than enough political research, and filing going on. Any future allocation of resources should be away from research, and into production. In short, a diminution of input, and an increase in output. What is needed

now is not more personnel to squirrel away little nuggets for the winter -- but rather analysts, writers and producers, who can translate the daily grist into daily news copy.

OUTPUT RESOURCES

-- Monday has a high degree of credibility with the press; has been successful in moving anti-Democratic propaganda into the national media, i. e., the Muskie temper, the Muskie indecisiveness, the McGovern front for Kennedy, the Gardner operation. Each week there should be one or more major political news stories coming out of Monday.

-- Senator Dole, and the Vice President have carried the attack in recent months, Senator Dole especially. Our objective is to provide more raw material and convince more of our people on the Hill, in the Cabinet, and in the party nationally to use it. To this end, Ken Khachigian has been put on full time for solely this purpose. His job broadly outlined will be to daily view the incoming research materials, and to provide a daily diet of political attack material for party people -- great and small.

-- The letters to the editor operation out of the RNC will be tied in directly with this operation, bringing out more attack material on the Democrats nationally.

-- The Colson Shop, primarily, and less so than the Klein shop, can move out materials that we find in our research operations -- and that need to be moved now.

-- Schedules of the primary candidates, especially, will be gathered -- and of McCloskey -- so that suitable arrival ceremonies can occasionally be prepared, issue-rated by Walker's advance men.

-- Some raw data of significant importance -- such as the Godfrey Sperling article detailing control of McGovern operation by EMK types -- should be moved unadulterated to national political reporters. We will have either a covert or open operation on this later out of RNC to make sure political columnists are not missing first-rate anti-opposition material.

-- Discussion to be held with RNC to consider a mid-week abbreviated Monday version, which might well be called Watch on the Potomac, or some such, which would give insider accurate information on Democrats, etc.

-- Consideration being given to development of possible anti-opposition ads -- but this is still in the planning process.

-- Because we feel that need to have direct access to government sources of information, we have determined that Ken Khachigian, who is the first new full time man hired for this specific operation should stay in the White House complex -- not move outside.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE OPERATION FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

a) Focus not on stock-piling material but on moving it into the media -- on output, rather than input. We don't want to wind up in November of 1972 with 100,000 unused anti-Democratic documents in a super retrieval system.

b) Maintain as guiding political principle that our great hope for 1972 lies in maintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic rift between the elite, chic, New Left, intellectual avant garde, isolationist, bell-bottomed environmentalist, new priorities types on the one hand -- and the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society, ethnic, blue collar, Knights of Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats on the other.

The liberal Democrats should be pinioned to their hippie supporters. The Humphrey Democrats should be reminded of how they were the fellows who escalated and cheered the war from its inception.

c) Get as much anti-Democratic material into the media as possible. Eschew the ridiculous and wild as counter-productive.

Finally, we have a strong team at the RNC which has not always been the case; we have some national spokesmen who can take the

political attack effectively, which was not always the case in the last decade -- and we have some tempting targets. As of now -- we see no need for any appropriations from Nixon for President Fund -- we can handle it right now with what we have.

If and when we feel we need more people -- writers and analysts basically -- we will come around.

(There may be a necessity to establish an outside direct mail group to columnists, editorial writers, and political writers -- in order to get all our negative propaganda into their hands.)

Buchanan

EXHIBIT No. 176

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 355-0920

July 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: TRACKING PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS

Attached is a memo by Pat Buchanan outlining a strategy for dealing with opposition contenders. Several specific recommendations are made which will establish the direction and scope of our activities over the next several months.

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
17021 333-0920

July 28, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

The clear and present political danger is that Senator Muskie, the favorite in the early primaries, will promenade through the primaries, come into the convention with a clear majority and enormous momentum for November. That would be bad news for us.

If there is to be a contested convention, a divided convention -- the first priority is to trip up Muskie in the primaries.. This is in Kennedy's interest, in Humphrey's interest, in our interest.

Thus, Senator Muskie is Target A as of mid-summer for our operation. Our specific goals are (a) to produce political problems for him, right now, (b) to hopefully help defeat him in one or more of the primaries (Florida looks now to be the best early bet, California, the best later bet), and (c) finally, to visit upon him some political wounds that will not only reduce his chances for nomination -- but damage him as a candidate, should he be nominated.

As for the other Democrats, Kennedy, Jackson and Humphrey are the only credible ones we see - Humphrey the most desirable from our viewpoint. But any of these three -- especially Kennedy and even Jackson -- should be the subject of attack.

• For the next several months, especially while Muskie is hibernating in Maine for the summer, we proposed to concentrate our efforts on him.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

How. In the long run, for the November election, the best offense against Muskie is to point him as far left as possible, leaving the President as much of the center as possible. For the nomination, however, any stick should be used to beat him. He can and should be attacked from Right and Left.

For example, from the right, Muskie can be charged with cutting space and defense and throwing union workers out of jobs, with killing the SST and thus killing Seattle, with smearing the FBI, and Mr. Hoover, with endorsing Communist-Kook demonstrations, with favoring "forced integration," etc. From the Left -- and we should not ignore this line of attack -- it can be argued that Muskie is an amoral opportunist who supported the war when he didn't believe in it, who has protected polluters, who lacks the political courage of McGovern, who is indecisive and gutless, who is trying to have his toadies at the DNC "broker" the convention, instead of have it open -- of having spent a dozen years in the Senate without having accomplished a single objective.

Further, we should begin now to acquire two, three or several tags, to stick Muskie with -- such as the "Tricky Dick" that has been so damaging to the President over the years when utilized by his political enemies.

JACKSON. This presents a serious problem. First, Scoop is a friend of sorts of the President's, a supporter on defense and most foreign policy issues. Secondly, while he would be a formidable opponent for the President, if nominated, he cannot realistically be nominated -- unless the political focus turns to matters of war and peace and security. Then while it would be in our interest to have him knock Muskie down in Florida -- such a stunning victory for Jackson would boost him into a long shot for the nomination and a strong shot Vice President -- on a Kennedy ticket.

Any attack on Jackson, whose hard-line credentials are awfully good, would -- if it were to be an effective attack -- focus on his "secret liberalism," portraying him as the Errand Boy of George Meany. This could be done; it might actually "elevate Jackson (drawing the media to him) to the point where it would actually assist him in a Democratic Primary.

But, do we want to attack Scoop Jackson at all? This is a question for higher ups. Where, for example would Jackson stand in a Nixon-Kennedy race, where Jackson was not on the Kennedy ticket, Scoop is 60 or more -- 1972 is his last run at the nomination - would he prefer a seat in a Nixon Cabinet or a Kennedy Cabinet? Again, higher ups should decide if and when we should pull the lanyard on Scoop Jackson. Surely, it would make news.

Options: Attack Jackson as any other candidate.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Go easy on Jackson in the hopes of hurting Muskie.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

KENNEDY. A major target of opportunity, but not the primary target. Focus here should be on immaturity, recklessness, jet-setter -- not up to the stature required or stability required of a President.

HUMPHREY. If we have to run against someone, we prefer Humphrey right now, as no President is so virtuous as to be granted George McGovern to run against. Humphrey's nomination would be in our interest -- it may be necessary, frankly, to provide him with support.

McCLOSKEY. At this point, we agree McCloskey should not be attacked by his superiors within the GOP, or the national Administration -- in a manner to elevate him. Clearly, we believe that the proper way to deal with McCloskey is to have his national appearances (the media gives him network time regularly) matched by someone of Congressional level -- like Jack Kemp, who is beginning to match McCloskey and trouble him on their joint appearances. No major attack from the Cabinet, Vice Presidential or RNC National level, or Congressional leadership level should be made at this time -- in our view.

The proper way to discredit McCloskey is to (a) paint him as far left as possible and (b) if at all possible, find his sources of support, publicize them, and paint him as simply a pawn or cat's paw of the Democratic Party. Our objective is to damage his credibility with Republicans.

But we should do nothing to allow him to paint himself as a political martyr.

Specific options are detailed in the attached memorandum from Jeb Magruder.

RESOURCES

MONDAY is a credible publication--which gets irregular wire copy--and which we shall use weekly to move party line material aimed at issues dividing Democrats.

Bob Dole can be effective, but only occasionally--like Ford and Scott, he is inhibited by his relationship, his Senatorial courtesy to a fellow member if you will.

The White House Staff which could be utilized to put out some of this party-line material -- not for attribution of course -- on Muskie, is currently inhibited by an edict of "no politics" in 1971. We might need to have this altered for some individuals -- as we can serve as regular conduits for the kind of political material we want to move. The White House staff should be considered as a resource in the near future to pass on not-attributed material to the press.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

The Vice President -- We will need to know his inclinations and the President's desires on his use -- but he could be extremely effective in selected political attacks. He gets enormous coverage -- and he can put across a credible line on the Democrats.

Should the Vice President be used as a resource for opposition attack?

Yes _____ No _____ Comment _____

The Republican Party outside Washington -- especially state chairmen and state officers -- should be put to use. We believe that a co-ordinated system should be set up of calling these Chairmen, to have them issue coordinated attacks when something like the Kennedy comment on RN re: Vietnam breaks -- and to issue regular statements on the arrival of major Democratic candidates in their state.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

These last are political animals by choice, and their attacks upon Democrats do not constitute partisanship on the part of the White House. (Statements for these individuals could be drafted in our shop, but transmitted to the states via RNC.)

Some discussion has gone on of using the Citizens as Middle Man between WH and RNC -- we can of course follow that procedure, but, given a secure man at the RNC of which there are many, we think that direct contact would be best from here. We currently follow this procedure in drafting materials for Monday. We need to know basic policy on this.

- (1) Direct contact with RNC be made through Buchanan shop.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

- (2) Establish in Citizens (target date November 1) an operational arm which will implement strategy and tactics initiated by Buchanan shop.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Finally, we are giving some thought to preparing paid media advertisements -- issue-oriented -- in here and have them placed by the Citizens Group, or some political group formed in the various states. This can be an effective tool for driving home particular issue points we need made -- and drive them home before the political season starts -- when little is believed anyhow.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Special Projects. We would like to utilize Ron Walker's resources where possible to handle some close-in operations, pickets and the like, when candidates visit various cities. The candidate normally brings with him his own media; he attracts local media; and we would like to be able to "piggy back" on that media -- with our own operations, anti-candidate. This requires support activities from some source; Ron has an operation in place; and they will need approval -- either general or specific -- for these covert operations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Contact with Walker for activities may be made directly from Buchanan shop.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Contact with Walker should be made through operational arm in Citizens but initiated in Buchanan shop.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

Further, for non close-in operations -- we should use party personnel, working through the national committee. By these I mean handbills outside factory gates in the morning and evening -- when Muskie votes against some appropriations for SST. Something of that nature, which the local party can surely handle.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

EXHIBIT No. 177

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Attached from Ken Khachigian, re: Florida Primary, seems to me a good idea. Can you check it out with the powers that be?

Thanks.

Pat

*Gene -
Put in memo
form for A.G.
from me. Indicate
idea came from Buchanan
ask for approval disapproval
JL*


MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN 

SUBJECT: MCCLOSKEY AND FLORIDA PRIMARY

See the attached -- apparently there is a provision in the Florida primary law by which we could keep pistol-Pete off the ballot. I think it would be to our advantage to do so since RN will most likely be on the ballot (unless he files affidavit declining).

Can we get the word to Florida through Magruder or RNC to have the state chairman down there do what he can to keep McCloskey off? An unopposed RN in Florida with a unified party behind him might be a nice contrast to the bloodletting that will take place with the Democrats. Moreover, this will allow us to free up our resources to hurt the Democrats in their primary.

Attachment

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
(202) 333-0920

August 11, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: McCloskey and Florida Primary

Enclosed is an article from the July 21st Washington Post which indicates that there is a provision in the Florida primary law by which we could keep McCloskey off the ballot.

Pat Buchanan suggested that maybe we could have the Florida State Chairman do whatever he can under this law to keep McCloskey off the ballot. An unopposed RN in Florida with a unified party behind him might be a nice contrast to the bloodletting that will take place with the Democrats. Moreover, this will allow us to free up our resources to hurt the Democrats in their primary.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

Enclosure

bcc: Mr. Haldeman

JSM:ger

JSM Chron

JSM Primaries

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON POST
July 21, 1971

Nixon Foe May Face Florida Primary Bar

TALLAHASSEE, Fla., July 20 (AP)—Florida's top elections officer says a gap in the state's new primary law may enable pro-Nixon GOP leaders to close the Republican half of Florida's March 14 presidential contest to all but the incumbent president.

Secretary of State Richard Stone said in an interview Monday that Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) or any Republican challenger could be barred from the primary by a seven-member selection committee.

A candidate's name would be deleted if all committee members of the same party agree to do so. There are three Republicans and four Democrats who have the final say, he said.

"It is quite possible they might feel that way as party members," said Stone, who is the non-voting chairman.

State party leaders such as GOP Chairman L. E. (Tommy) Thomas of Panama City have been critical of McCloskey's vow to challenge President Nixon if he doesn't end the Vietnam war before the primaries.

"Tommy has indicated he would not try to block McCloskey, although he has said he would not open any doors for him," said a GOP spokesman.

But if only one of the GOP

members felt that the California congressman should be on the ballot, he would be, Stone said.

Secretary Stone also said he would "seek clarification" from two Southern political figures, Alabama Gov. George Wallace and Georgia Lt. Gov. Lester Maddox, as to whether they planned to run as Democrats in the Florida primary.

EXHIBIT No. 178

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CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

August 13, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak column from the July 25 Washington Post which indicates the Democrats are setting us a '72 Sponsors Club similar to the President's Club of the LBJ-era. For \$72 a month; there are a number of privileges accorded to those who contribute.

Pat Buchanan has suggested that we have someone we know, preferably a Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This could be arranged by having the individual write in explaining that he read about the club in the newspaper and is fed up with the Administration's policies and wants to contribute his share and become a member of the club. This would give us many advantages in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their strategy.

Recommendation

That we have someone join the '72 Sponsors Club.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

JEB S. MAGRUDER

bcc: Mr. Haldeman

JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Contenders

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT No. 179

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 5, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVIDING THE DEMOCRATS

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: "RESEARCH" (As Requested)

Because the Old Roosevelt Coalition was composed of numerous parts, there is more than one fissure within the Democratic Party which can today be exploited to the benefit of the President. Some examples:

IDEOLOGICAL FISSURES

The most readily obvious division among Democrats is along ideological lines -- the left and the New Left versus moderate and conservative Democrats. Militant blacks, the rebellious on the campus, the radical chic of Eastern liberalism are all within the broad confines of the Democratic Party. So, too, is their most antipathetic adversaries, the blue collar, white collar conservative Democrats.

To exacerbate the ideological division, a few suggestions which surely can be emended and added to:

1) The Platform Plank Against Extremism. The Democrats mirror to some extent the Republicans of 1964, and pressure for a plank in both parties denouncing Left-wing extremism, and New Left attempts to subvert and overthrow American institutions would be divisive in the Democratic Party. Specific denunciations of the Black Panther Party, SDS, those who have attempted to politicize and destroy the great American universities -- these are proposals to deeply divide Democrats. The feat is to focus Democratic attention on this. Could perhaps be done by a Dole speech, calling on both Republicans and Democrats to incorporate such a plank in their party's platform -- a speech made after some particularly outrageous campus incident preferably.

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2) Republican Praise for Attacks on the Left: Rather than attack the hard left, de rigueur for Republicans, we should shower praise upon Jackson and the Conservative Democrats who denounce the left wing within their own party. A specific example is Jackson's attack on "environmental extremists." We might well go back, dig up Jackson's attacks on his party's left wing, and use them. We did this to some good effect in the early 1970 campaign with the Vice President quoting Meany's and other denunciations of extremism in the Democratic Party.

3) Republican Praise for any Democratic Support on Vietnam. More injurious to HHH and Muskie, than an attack on their Vietnam position (which should not be excluded) is "praise" for their support of the President, on occasion. This goes far toward making them "Establishment" and driving a wedge between them and the ideological hard core of their party.

4) The McGovern-O'Brien Reform. The Left is counting heavily on these reforms. They may not be carried out to the letter. If they are, they will likely result in one humdinger of a convention; the President's political campaign personnel should be on the watch for violations, which are almost certain to occur -- and then elevate those violations in the media as shafting the young, the poor, the black and the women. We have already had some success with this in the Monday piece, which got national attention, alleging that O'Brien had thrown in with Muskie, they were putting the "fix" in at the convention, and throwing the blocks to the McCarthy kids and McGovern. Democrats are extremely sensitive about this; and concerned about the Convention.

(In this quarrel, our publications and spokesman, it seems to me at present, should take the side of the Far Left, saying we disagree with them; but that they have a just cause, and the Power Elite within the Party is denying them effective participation.)

5) Left-Wing Democratic Complaints, i.e. from McGovern and his people should find an echo and an amicus curiae in Republican statements and publications.

6) A Mailing List should be prepared and kept up to date of all Democratic convention delegates, as they are named. Anything any major candidate says that is offensive to their faction should be brought to their attention, and the attention of the press in their area.

Example: Humphrey's statement ruling out all signers of the Southern Manifesto should go out, one-page, to Southern delegates, and Southern papers -- particularly, say, those in Carolina where Sam Erwin was ruled out, and Oklahoma, where Carl Albert was ruled out by HHH.

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-3-

7) We have to develop several covert outlets within the national press, who will ask the hard questions that only a political adversary can think up. In addition, and perhaps as a substitute for this, we should have several divisive questions worked up, and distributed at major press conferences of the leading Democrats. Also, direct mail to questioners of major Democrats -- in short, little briefing papers to newsmen -- should go to those who interrogate them on ABC, NBC and CBS Sunday shows.

REGIONAL FISSURES

South versus North. Here the dividing line is essentially that of the race issue; but it goes further into the "liberalism" of the national Democratic Party leaders, and major candidates, which does not sit well with the essential "suburban conservatism" and even "Wallaceism" of Democrats in the South. To force a choice here, we need more than just rhetoric and mailings. Actions taken by the President and Administration are decisive here:

1) The Supreme Court nomination of a Southern Strict Constructionist will force Democratic Northern liberals, and major candidates, to anger either the South with a veto vote, or the blacks and the labor movement and the Northern liberals. A highly qualified Southern Conservative nominee to the Supreme Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party.

2) Elevation of the issue of compulsory school integration and neighborhood integration, via such as "bussing" and the Ribicoff Plan. Clearly, this puts Northern liberals like Muskie on an untenable hook. And with the Detroit horror show shaping up, this is going to be even more a national "voting" issue. Mr. Wallace has recognized this.

The serious problem here is that while Muskie may be in favor of compulsory integration by his votes -- the Administration is the one that is seen as in power, while various odious ruling and policies are being enforced.

Many of my sources tell me that it is the President -- since he is visible in office, and has made strong statements -- who is today being hurt worst by the bussing fiasco. That is not as it should be as I understand that the President political and moral position is that it is wrong and contra-productive to forcible integrate the races.

However, if we are to draw a line between us and the Democratic liberals, which leaves the Democratic conservatives on our side of the line -- then action will be required, in my judgment, on the President's part.

Frankly, this requires the kind of historic decision, bringing a constitutional

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end to the national pressure to integrate races in housing and schooling -- which requires a decision on the part of the President. This would really tear up the pea patch; and our current policy is one of accommodation with the courts not confrontation.

In conclusion, this is a potential throw of the dice that could bring the media on our heads, and cut the Democratic Party and country in half; my view is that we would have far the larger half. But that is not my decision.

3) A Wallace Candidacy in the Primaries: This is an excellent vehicle for surfacing and hardening the divisions within the Democratic Party, in the South. Regrettably, such a primary run is likely to hone his organization for a pass at the general. And if Muskie is the Democratic choice, "There's not a dime's worth of difference between them" is an effective slogan. But Wallace victories in Florida, North Carolina and Tennessee -- if they are in the cards -- could create some truly serious problems for the Democratic Convention.

4) The Defense Issue: Though less so than before, defense is an issue on which the majority of Republicans and conservative and Southern Democrats unite on one side -- with the liberal Democrats on the other. Again, this involves Presidential decision. Should the President elevate this issue, it is one which would divide the opposition party straight down the middle with Meany, Jackson and the Southerners on one side -- and Kennedy, McGovern, Lindsay on the other.

Again, however, the accomplishment of such a division requires a Presidential elevation of an issue where we have sought to mute differences via our thrust, "We have already re-ordered our priorities;" the Defense Budget is the "lowest percent of GNP since the Fillmore Administration," etc.

5) The elitism and quasi-anti-Americanism of the National Democratic Party have little appeal below the Mason-Dixon Line; and we should contrast the Party of Roosevelt, Truman, and JFK -- with the party of Ramsey Clark, Ronald Dellums and George McGovern.

ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS

The great Northern cities see a clear dividing line between the liberal, academic, intellectual Democratic elite in the Party -- and the working class Roman Catholic, Polish, Irish, Italian Democrats, from the Bronx, Queens and Cook County.

1) My view has been that these minorities, Poles, Irish, Italian Catholics, are larger minorities and easier to win than the "media minorities" -- i.e. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, Indians, etc., the darlings of the mass media.

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Conspicuous appointments of the larger minorities, the more available minorities (Irish, Italian, Poles, Slovaks, etc.) would reap us greater dividends, and wean away from the Democratic Party a more significant base than the play being given today say to blacks.

2) Aid To Catholic Schools. Clearly this divides the Democrats who run the New York Times from the Democrats who run for office in Queens and the North Bronx. The President's strong stand on abortion, a gut issue with Catholics, is another divisive factor within the Democratic Party -- if we can force Democrats to come down on one side or the other.

Again, however, these issues which have been shown by Governors like Rockefeller to be deeply divisive to Democrats on the State level -- have to be elevated on the National level in order to do us any good. There is another drawback. They are also divisive to Republicans. The Ripon Society liberals will be anti-aid to Catholic schools, pro-abortion, and more concerned with "censorship" and "repression" than porno.

But the favoritism toward things Catholic is good politics; there is a trade-off, but it leaves us with the larger share of the pie. If we want to throw the dice on this divisive issue, the way to do it is via a specific, tangible program of Federal assistance to non-public schools to save them.

Here, too, we have to force Democrats to choose among their vital voting blocs -- where the interests of those blocs directly collide.

3) Fourth Party Candidacies. Top-level consideration should be given to ways and means to promote, assist and fund a Fourth Party candidacy of the Left Democrats and/or the Black Democrats. There is nothing that can so advance the President's chances for re-election -- not a trip to China, not four-and-a-half percent unemployment -- as a realistic black Presidential campaign.

4) Black Complaints: As we did with Muskie we should continue to champion the cause of the Blacks within the Democratic Party; elevate their complaints of "being taken for granted."

ECONOMIC FISSURES

Where before, the economic interests of the Roosevelt Coalition were complimentary or harmonious, today that is not the case. This, fissure, too, can be exploited:

One could divide it between the loafing classes (welfare, students) and the working classes.

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-6-

A cutback in welfare, a hard-line on welfare would force Democrats to choose between the working class outraged by the excesses in that program and the welfare class, which is becoming a cohesive voting bloc.

A specific political position of stating that while the Democratic Left is constantly speaking up for the welfare class in this country, "the time has come for someone to represent the working class" might well be considered philistine or worse by the media, but would seem to be good politics. Tax relief, for example, is of a good deal more interest and concern for the working men of this country, than the massive welfare scheme we have proposed -- and the President is more likely to get working class support, Wiley's Welfare Mommas behind him.

Note: Since taking office, the President has increased by 500 percent -- from \$400 million to \$2 billion -- the food stamp and food assistance funds; and he still gets it in the neck for "starving the poor." Methinks there would have been more gratitude and greater rewards if those funds had been directed to the President's potential friends in the working class, and their interests.

If the President would become the visible and outspoken champion of the Forgotten American, the working people of this country -- and assert that the welfare types have been taken care of for years; it would force a division within the Democratic Party, would align the media against us -- but methinks it both divides them and assists us.

Like other proposals, the above calls for what the Vice President has termed "positive polarization" and requires really the kind of go-for-broke decision that we may not feel is either necessary or justified by our comparatively good field position.

The Black Vice President bumper stickers calling for black Presidential and especially Vice Presidential candidates should be spread out in the ghettos of the country. Also, anti-Muskie stickers. We should do what is within our power to have a black nominated for Number Two at least at the Democratic National Convention.

INSTRUMENTS

The President -- Used to the Absolute Minimum. His Muskie comment was most helpful (on the Black V. P.) but the President and the Presidency are the quintessential political assets we have and should be used in a partisan situation, only in extremis.

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The Vice President: We need a decision as to whether he can be used, or should be -- both from him and from higher authority within the campaign. Of course, he has incomparable visibility; he can make political issues in a way that few others can.

MONDAY -- Excellent credibility in the media; has already been used to good effect; will continue to utilize it along lines suggested in above memorandum.

MAILING OPERATION -- There should be set up a Mailing Operation to Democrats, on the Hill, and in the Party and Delegates, which will make sure that none of them misses a majority candidate position that is against his interests. Example, pro-abortion statements might be mailed to all Catholic newspapers and wire services. Cut-the-Budget-to-the-bone statements should be mailed to military and conservative publications, etc.

This operation would serve as midwife of the Democrats Right to Know. We ought to consider how to set this up, with perhaps the least possible "Republican" credentials; or perhaps if that cannot be avoided, set up some "Kremlinologist" operation for the Democratic Party, acknowledge it; and play it straight. Would require a full-time operation; and what should be avoided at all cost is the "excessive" mailings that really turn off editorial writers and the like.

GOVERNORS/CABINET OFFICERS/HILL PEOPLE -- When and how these types are to be used is a decision that needs to be made; also, what of Dole's use. Not much in a major way can be accomplished, absent a political operation which can "produce" for them what needs to be said. It is hard to visualize this being done on a part-time basis.

WHITE HOUSE POLITICAL AIDES -- Should they take the risk of "feeding" these kinds of materials from the WH?

Above are some thoughts on Dividing the Democrats, that need honing and discussion.

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October 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. WILLIAM E. TIMMONS

FROM:

ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.

Attached is the Buchanan/Khachigian memorandum on "Dividing the Democrats." Unfortunately, it was sent directly by them to the AG and Mr. Haldeman, rather than to you and me for review before submission.

Is there anything you wish to add to it which we might separately submit? What do you think of the memorandum itself?

Attachment

✓
cc: Mr. Jeb S. Magruder

EXHIBIT No. 180

*To Harry Fleming
Please check this
out and see if we
can get Dunn to
move*

Feb 2-18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1972

2/14/72

MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Scoop Jackson is making a desperate effort to have the Tennessee Primary shifted up from May 4 to March 30, according to the Times story attached, and it seems in our immediate political interest to have that happen. Muskie is a clear underdog in Tennessee, to both Wallace and to Jackson, and if we can get the Tennessee Primary moved to the 30th of March, we could have a defeat inflicted on Muskie -- five days before the Wisconsin Primary. That might help take the bloom off the Muskie candidacy a bit, before the final, and perhaps crucial early primary.

The stumbling block to a shift in the Tennessee Primary up to March 30 is reportedly Governor Winfield Dunn. Seems to me that it would be in our interest to have Dunn shift that primary -- in order to have Muskie defeated once more before Wisconsin. Perhaps Dunn has his reasons; but we ought to know them.

Buchanan

Jackson's Strategists Seeking An Earlier Tennessee Primary

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3.—A poll taken this week by Senator Henry W. Jackson's strategists, fearing that his chances in the pivotal Florida primary have been sharply curtailed by the candidacy of Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama, are renewing their effort to push forward the date of the Tennessee primary.

Mr. Jackson had hoped to use the Florida voting on March 14 as a launching pad for his drive for the Democratic Presidential nomination. But none of the private polls taken there in recent weeks has shown him better than fourth.

Tennessee—one of the few states where Mr. Jackson is considered the leader by well-informed local politicians—is scheduled to hold its primary on May 4. By that time, nine other states, in most of which Mr. Jackson has no real strength, will have held their balloting. The states are New Hampshire, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Alabama.

The Jackson strategists will try, therefore, when the Tennessee legislature convenes on Monday, to push the date up to March 20, five days before the Wisconsin primary. If they are unable to do that, they will try for April 20, after Wisconsin but before Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.

"We think an early vote here could give Jackson a good boost before Wisconsin," said State Senator Edward C. Blank 2d, the Washington Democrat's Tennessee manager. "Florida may prove to be a problem. Tennessee could be a big benefit."

Opposition to Liberals

Mr. Blank and other Tennessee Democrats conceded that chances were not good, partly because of technicalities in the state election law, for a March 30 primary. Gov. Winfield Dunn, a Republican, is reportedly opposed to the March date, as are the forces of Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, which are headed in Tennessee by former Senator Albert Gore.

But the prospects that the primary will be moved to April 20 seem better.

A poll taken this week by Floyd Kephart, political affairs director of station WSM-TV in Nashville, showed 43 per cent of the state legislators favoring April 20, with 22 per cent opposed and 35 per cent undecided. Governor Dunn is also apparently willing to go along with that compromise, which would be of considerably less help to Mr. Jackson.

Senator Muskie's standing among Tennessee Democrats plummeted last fall, when he made remarks at Chattanooga that were widely interpreted as an endorsement of busing. Subsequently, he was replaced as the star performer at a Democratic fund-raising dinner in Nashville by Boots Randolph. That leaves Mr. Jackson in a strong position in a state where Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and others long identified as liberals are unpopular.

John Jay Hooker, the Democrats' 1970 candidate for Governor, argues, however, that "Wallace is as much a problem for Jackson here as in Florida."

Mr. Jackson is the only candidate with a Tennessee headquarters. But he is threatened by the factionalism that has devoured the Tennessee Democratic party for years, costing it the Governorship, both Senate seats and other key offices.

Word is circulating in party circles that Mr. Jackson is former Gov. Buford Ellington's man, and that the activities of Mr. Ellington's former press secretary and protégé, Hudley Crockett, prove the case.

Mr. Crockett concedes that he prefers Mr. Jackson but says he has done relatively little work for him. Mr. Crockett said that Mr. Ellington, who has been at his Florida home for

several weeks, had taken no position at all.

Few political professionals accept that statement. Some of them, better at what they consider Mr. Ellington's role in the defeat of Mr. Gore and Mr. Hooker in 1970, want no part of Mr. Jackson.

"I was for him for a while," one State Senator said, "but when Ellington got aboard, I got off. Jackson would help us elect Democrats and he'd be a good President. But my friends and I just won't go down the road with Buford Ellington."

Mr. Blank, the Jackson manager, is aware of the problem.

"Ellington's gone to Florida," he said, "and I hope he stays there until after the election. I admire the Governor, and I'd love to have him be part of the campaign, but his name draws so dad-gum much fire we can't afford him. Best thing he could do for us would be if he'd come out for Muskie."

Despite Mr. Blank's disclaimer, suspicions remain strong in the Byzantine corridors of Tennessee politics.

They are so strong, in fact, that three influential Democrats said privately this week that Mr. Ellington had intervened after receiving a telephone call late last year from former President Lyndon B. Johnson, an old friend whom Mr. Ellington served as director of the Office of Emergency Planning and with whom, over the years, he traded prize bulls.

According to the accounts of the three Democrats, Mr. Johnson told the former Governor that Mr. Jackson was the only candidate who had not run out on the Johnson Administration's Vietnam policy and asked Mr. Ellington to help him.

Mr. Ellington could not be reached for confirmation of the story, although one source said, "it sounds right."

Mr. Johnson, who has said nothing publicly about his preferences in the 1972 campaign, was in Acapulco, Mexico, and unavailable. His press secretary, Willie Day Taylor, said in Austin, Tex., "I don't know anything at all about it."

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

February 18, 1972

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004
(202) 323-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. HARRY S. FLEMING

FROM:

GLENN J. SEDAM, JR.

SUBJECT:

Tennessee Primary Change of Date
Legislation.

Pat Buchanan's memorandum to the Attorney General and H. R. Haldeman dated February 4 indicated that a stumbling block to a shift in the Tennessee Primary up to March 30 is reportedly Governor Windfield Dunn.

My contact point to follow the Tennessee legislation has been Lee Smith, who is counsel to Governor Dunn. Lee advises me that the Governor has not been opposed to moving the date up and did not learn of the Campaign Committee's interest in doing so until the day the vote was taken in the Tennessee House.

Legislation had been introduced to move the Primary up to March 30 and that legislation did pass the Tennessee Senate. In the House of Representatives, however, the bill was pigeon-holed in an obscure House subcommittee.

On February 15 Representative Ashe, a Republican, moved to have the bill removed from committee and called to the House floor. There being 99 members in the Tennessee House, such a Motion would require fifty affirmative votes. The vote was 41 to 27 in favor of calling the bill up-- not enough to accomplish the call, and, thereby, effectively killing the bill.

Reportly the reason for the low vote was that the Speaker of the House and the House Caucus Chairman, both Democrats and both strong Muskie supporters were able to keep enough Democrats from voting to be able to keep the vote under 50.

Lee Smith reports that had Governor Dunn known of our desire to have the Primary moved up, he would have been able to support it. They believed, however, it was a battle among the Democrats and didn't involve themselves in it. Lee reports that it would now be impossible to remove the bill from committee and establish a date as early as March 30.

If we do have an interest in moving the Primary up, it might be possible to call the Bill up and establish a date of April 20 (a date

Tennessee Primary

-2-

proposed in earlier legislation).

cc: Mr. Jeb Magruder
Mr. Bob Marik
Mr. G. Gordon Liddy

EXHIBIT No. 181

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1972

ATTACK ORGANIZATION & STRATEGY

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MITCHELL
FROM: PJB/KEN KHACHIGIAN

We have been called upon to compose a memorandum delineating the division of responsibility and the formations of the "attack" strategy for the fall campaign. Herewith, our views and recommendations.

PRESENT SITUATION

"In my Father's house there are many mansions."

John:14:2

There are currently several quasi-independent attack operations running. There is Dole and the RNC, not infrequently orchestrated by C. Colson with Koch on drums. There is the "Speakers Bureau" run by Pat O'Donnell again, out of Colson's shop, co-ordinating with Parker for the President, and Damgard for the Vice President. Further, O'Donnell serves as conduit for the Administration "fact sheets." There is a Hill operation with Koch placing the materials at Colson's intermittent direction. There are political "surrogates" scheduled out of 1701 by Bart Porter, who moves Hill and Administration types into Re-Elect settings in the Primary States, and beyond. And there is Van Shumway who moves the political "line" out of 1701 to reporters and columnists.

CAMPAIGN

For the campaign, in our judgment, to canalize the attack to focus our resources, to avoid any embarrassing "gaffes," we need more co-ordination of attack materials being used; we need greater central direction of the scheduling of speakers; we need a central point of authority and direction over the attack -- holding veto power over what goes and what does not.

The one positioned to exercise this authority is the Campaign Manager, the Attorney General.

1. We recommend that no new controversial printed or media attack be made upon the Opposition Candidate without the concurrence of the Attorney General or his designated Deputy for this purpose.

2. There should be a marriage of the scheduling operations of 1701 and the White House; speakers should be placed under the one or other operation, for the campaign's duration; and the scheduling of the two groups should be regularly and closely co-ordinated so we can avoid both over-kill in one area and the neglect of another.

The attack materials for both "surrogates" (who will be the majority) and "Speakers Bureau" should be provided from the same source.

The "schedulers," both at 1701 and the White House, should leave their clients with open dates in October to move them into swing states; and they should receive regular guidance from the highest level of the campaign as to where our manpower should be directed.

THE ANSWER DESK

This operation was most useful in 1968; it can be made more effective in 1972. We recommend that:

1. An Answer Desk be set up and running in the RNC by the first of August, with a report by the 15th of May to 1701 and Buchanan/Khachigian as to how it is to be staffed.

2. That the Answer Desk contain an "expert" on the Democratic candidate, as familiar with his positions and statements and record as the candidate's own staff. That this expert, from the end of the Democratic convention to the first of August, review and glean the entire research file on the candidate -- so that we can have available only what we will need to use.

3. That by the 1st of August, the Answer Desk have prepared an Attack Briefing Book on the Democratic candidate that has been gleaned and cut to usable portions, containing voting records, position on top ten major issues of the day, etc., etc. The book should be put together in such a way as to emphasize the negative and the vulnerable; it should contain only the best items and quotes, etc.; it should be brief enough so that it will not by its very size prohibit inspection. Buchanan/Khachigian operation will look it over, attempt to glean it further; and provide paragraphs and pages, which can be inserted into speakers' kits.

This Attack Briefing Book should be updated every several weeks of the campaign; it should be provided to all surrogates, Cabinet Officers, the Vice President, Dole, Klein, etc.

4. Names, functions, home and office phone numbers of members of the Answer Desk should be in hand at Campaign Headquarters, and contained in Attack Briefing Books of all speakers, by August 1.

5. Answer Desk will provide daily a report of the Democratic candidate's attacks (also Vice President and major opposition speakers, if possible) plus a response -- to 1701, to the Vice President, White House, etc., throughout the campaign.

6. The Answer Desk should be provided with direct lines into all Administration research centers -- so they can get immediate access and first call on needed information to develop the answer to opposition attacks.

NIXON STATE CHAIRMEN

These individuals should be provided as well with Attack Briefing Books on the Democrats for their own use; they should be phoned on a regular basis as to what issues and what aspect of the opposition they should hit; they should be contacted immediately prior to a visit to their state by the Democratic candidate.

We cannot keep a daily watch on the Nixon Chairmen; they will be "left to their own devices" most of the time. But when a Democratic candidate, Presidential or Vice Presidential arrives, the National HQ, 1701, should have something available for the State Chairman -- that is consistent with the present line of attack being pushed at the national level.

LETTERS OPERATION

Talk
Shirley
We already have had great success in this area. Ken Khachigian should be responsible for determining, prior to August 1, that we have
a) a beefed up operation at the national level b) "letter operations" at the local level in each of the major swing states. This is an excellent way to put volunteers to work. The "letters" people at both the State and national level should be given the political attack line and regularly; and much of their work should be on the attack basis, getting guidance from the campaign leadership. Khachigian will get together with those in 1701 to determine that this operation is organizationally set -- by August 1 at the latest.

TRUTH SQUAD

Occasionally, these have been effective; too often, they are a waste of time and money. We propose making an effort to make it work this year. Basically, we envision the Squad as small, divided between the "tough cop" and the "nice cop." The former handles the gutting of the Democratic candidate; the latter the achievements of the President.

Central to this is the advanceman. He need not know how to build a crowd; but he must know how to attract media, both television and press. The advanceman further should be responsible for getting to the Truth Squad, before they touch down, the "lead" story the Democratic candidate has left in the headlines of that day -- and the "lead" story of the day in an issue context.

Reason for above is that the Truth Squad may want to focus on a local crime -- pointing up RN's record and statements -- or a local strike -- pointing up an RN proposal -- rather than the Democratic candidate's attack if it has been of a pro forma character.

Our ideal of a typical first rate Truth Squad would be Hatchet Man Dole with Good Guy Rumsfeld; young, tough, aggressive, attractive -- and willing to mix it up with the Democratic candidate.

The value of a Truth Squad is not in the faithful it attracts, but the media it receives. We ought to take a long second look at how our Truth Squad is doing -- three weeks into the campaign -- to determine if it is a cost-effective operation.

THE AX MAN

In 1968, Humphrey made extremely effective use of George Ball, who had independent, excellent foreign policy credentials of his own. Ball was willing, without prodding, or even mention, to gut either the President or Vice President. He attracted tremendous national media simply on his own standing and expertise. Bob Ellsworth performed something of this function for us on the Primary Trail -- where he, as "Campaign Director" could attract press in his own right; and say those things the rest of us would have to go to confession for.

In any event, with the Attorney General as Campaign Manager, we should have a similar "heavyweight" with a similar title, but no organization responsibility, solely a duty to get national press, to get on national television shows, and to hammer the opposition candidates. This would

OK
Hold
until
convention

*file
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lead
Sister
provide*

be an added weapon in our arsenal; he could play the role that Ray Bliss was constitutionally ill-designed to play in 1968. The title would not cost a dime; it would give us an added voice; he should be a man of stature, of Cabinet weight if not rank -- someone who on his own is worthy news. We need someone, however, with an instinct for the jugular; he should be provided the Attack Briefing Book, all the attack materials, and programmed solely for the national media -- not GOP rallies.

A Nelson Rockefeller -- if he would turn over New York management to his aides -- and handle this national attack job, would be the kind of individual to whom I am referring.

SURROGATES, HILL & ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN

By September, after the GOP convention, our scheduling operations should be married, or co-ordinated totally at the least. We should inventory our people -- from the Hill, Cabinet, White House, etc. -- and top Campaign Management should determine what states we heavy up in -- then the "schedulers" from WH and 1701 should co-ordinate the scheduling of our people into these states.

Running two separate and equal operations is foolish; the needs of the campaign should dictate where our people go; and those needs are best determined by Campaign hierarchy.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

On the assumption Vice President Agnew is our man, the following should be done. His plane should carry at least two top speechwriters, the full attack updated briefing book, a telex for direct communication, telecopiers, phones from 1701, etc. Election of 1970 demonstrated that V. P. Agnew can get more coverage than any Vice President in history; that he makes tremendous copy; he will be the bayonet of the Administration in 1972.

The error in 1970 was not the "Law and Order" issue; it was in not realizing how the Vice President could overwhelm the national media in three weeks to the point where the issue had already been "made" nationally, to the point where by October 1, the Democrats had been thrown on the defensive, had re-directed their media to defense the issue, had started talking law and order, and were seen climbing in and out of police cars. By the time September was over we had played out "attack" trump and we had no other effective "attack" issues to make.

All our gains of September were thus lost in the attrition of October -- when the pendulum swung back.

Again, the Vice President will have a planeload of reporters with him; he will get more media than any other "attack" resource we have; our best writers should be aboard his aircraft.

In the 1972 campaign, we should keep before us some of the lessons for an attacking candidate -- from 1968 and 1970:

1. The old situation where it took months or weeks to "make" an issue, and bring it before the public, no longer obtains. The President and the Vice President -- with the kilowatts of their office -- can "make" an issue in a matter of days, by repeated hammering.
2. Correspondingly, issues come and go more rapidly. The Democrats got well on "law and order" in October of 1970. This argues strongly for a) flexibility on our part, a flexibility we did not show in the last two campaigns in shifting either gears or issues and b) an inventory or bank of campaign attack issues so that we can switch off one and onto another as the need appears and c) a phased attack plan which can provide us ahead of time -- what issue the Administration "attack" people will focus upon that week. Instead of shooting our bolt in the first speech -- we should in 1972 be able to shift easily off of one "attack" issue and onto another and then a third. d) We may need to demonstrate the ability -- in an even race -- to hold back from using available ammunition until a later point in the campaign.

Eisenhower once indicated that while plans were worthless, planning was essential. We ought to have, by September 1 -- a planned schedule of "attack" on the opposition candidate, which moves from one issue to another, in ascending order, until the major attack is not launched until October 10th at the earliest -- and see if that schedule works out in the early days of the campaign.

Again, what we are suggesting is that a) we have four or five issues ready to surface at any time b) we not put all our eggs in a single basket and start swinging that basket in September and c) despite pressure to go "all out" in September, due to bad polls or the like, we "hold back some powder" for October.

*OK
get to
work on
this*

SENATOR DOLE & THE RNC

In our view, Bob Dole should be brought in on strategy meetings, provided with all the attack materials, plus a writer; and he should be kept focused upon the shortcomings of the Democratic candidates -- rather than respond to O'Brien who will be attacking the President and Vice President.

His scheduling should likewise be co-ordinated with our surrogates; he has a position giving him national stature, and access to national media. Like the Vice President, but to a lesser degree, he should be heaved up.

ACCURACY IN MEDIA

Oh - how hard we set up.
We did not need Edith Efron to inform us of what the national networks did to RN in 1968; this has to be prevented in 1972. Suggest establishment of a "Fair Coverage Committee" or "Equal Time Committee" which might be located in the RNC, which would "clock" precisely the positive and negative coverage of presidential and vice presidential candidates on the networks. If we are getting anything more than "equal time," this committee can remain silent; if we get anything less than equal time, it should confirm same with Mort Allin's news monitors -- and then send a memorandum to John Mitchell who should get on the horn to the network President and point this out, indicating that if it is not corrected, and equal time not provided -- this will be made an issue in the campaign, and the subject of legislation in the coming Congress. The newspapers can do what they want; but we cannot allow NBC to start "making" the economic issue for the Democrats, the way they sought to do it in 1970.

COPE'S COUNTERPART

The most effective instrumentality of the Humphrey campaign was alleged to be, not without justification, the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE).

COPE's Herculean efforts in 1968 putting out millions of pamphlets, attacking specifically the anti-union record of George Wallace, won back millions of union voters to the Humphrey banner by election day -- and very nearly carried the day for the former Vice President. We have nothing to rival COPE -- AMPAC and BIPAC do not have the tens of thousands of volunteers that COPE can muster in a particular campaign.

But we have the necessary volunteers in our citizens' groups, GOP and youth groups, etc., in the various states; and we do have the needed expertise and writing capacity here in D. C. to emulate their effort.

Recommend that soon after the Democratic convention there be established one General Committee, with a high-sounding name, and other committees tailored to specific issues, i. e., "United States Security Council," which can issue effective attack releases, which can then be mailed in bulk to GOP and Citizens Groups for distribution in target states. Chuck Colson's shop could have such, one imagines, established in a matter of hours.

The specific committees should zero in on issues -- depending on the Democratic candidate -- where the opposition is especially vulnerable. For example, were Muskie the nominee, we would have a Committee on Defense of the United States, one on Space, one on Aid to Non-Public Schools, etc.

Again, these committees would issue hard-hitting, targeted material, which we would then have distributed by regular GOP troops, outside churches, plant gates, ball parks, etc.

MEDIA ATTACK

In our view, the Democrats in 1968 were more successful than we in using "attack" commercials. They focused on the Vice President, with some nasty materials, but also on Social Security and Medicare -- suggesting that a vote for Nixon was a vote to diminish both. These were effective, selected targeted media attacks -- using commercials. We recommend a program of something similar for this year. Here are some ideas.

1. In areas where bussing is a gut issue, which is likely to be half the metropolitan areas in the United States, and all the South, in September of 1972 -- we run straight one-minute commercials using Muskie or Humphrey or Kennedy statements in support of bussing. They should be tough, straight, and make their point -- written and produced here.
2. In areas where space is a concern, like Houston, Florida and Southern California, we should have spot ads against the Democratic votes to cut the space program.

3. Same with defense. The Democrats have voted against almost every weapons system proposed by the Administration. Muskie's and Kennedy's records are atrocious. We should have a one-minute spot on television and radio, in conservative areas, which documents these votes against and concludes -- "Senator Muskie voted to strip America's defenses below the danger point; President Nixon believes that peace requires American strength. Re-elect the President -- Vote for Richard Nixon."

Further on this issue. We should have the VFW, at their conventions, mail the Muskie Defense record to their entire membership. We should do a direct mailing to the American Security Council list, if we can get it. And take out ads on defense, contrasting RN and Democratic positions in all four conservative publications.

4. On all the black radio stations in the Swing States, we should run ads on Muskie's statement about no blacks for Vice President. "If he doesn't think the time has come for one of us to be even considered for Vice President, then the time has come for Black America to tell Ed Muskie we don't think it is time for him to be considered for President. Write in Shirley Chisholm."

5. The SST vote alone, where the Democrats were against us, should be used on radio and television and at plant gates throughout the State of Washington. Again, a television ad or a radio spot -- just stating the Democrat votes, what it did to Seattle and the State of Washington, how RN fought for it -- and vote for Richard Nixon. In some cases in these ads, it may be sufficient to attack the Democratic position, simply to turn off the voter -- where we have no possibility to winning that particular voting bloc.

6. In the farm belt, we should be able to contrast Butz "fighting for the farmer" with statements by the various Democrats that the prices of farm products are too high -- again, targeted commercials to specific groups. Every individual has contradictions in his position -- we ought to be sure that every concerned group is aware of those of our opposition -- and media attack advertising is the way to do it. Not just news stories, but television and radio spots as well.

We will need to get together with the media people prior to the Democratic convention; we will want a slice of the media resources and advertising budget; we will need to know soon from the advertising personnel, what kind of film and tape they can acquire from commercial networks, which we can put to use.

The Attorney General should clear the media ads -- and draw off the poison if there is any -- but we should not hesitate to use them. Most of the best pro-media we get will be the President himself, live as President; and we ought not overlook this effective mechanism.

Just as the Democrats ran that ad of the Vice President -- with the heart thumping to indicate a heartbeat away in 1968 -- so we ought to have the capacity to put together spot ads in a matter of days and have them on the air -- as the campaign develops. In any event, we need a budget for this -- small pre-convention and much larger post-convention.

Were Humphrey the candidate, for example, we could run the horror clippings of 1968, war, riots, coffins, urban violence, crime and say, this is the result of what Hubert Humphrey called the "politics of joy" in 1968. Let's not go back to that horrible year, 1968 -- let's move forward with President Nixon.

THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

Just as the largest audience the President had in 1968 was at his August convention, so the largest audience the Republican "attack" surrogates will have in 1972 is in San Diego. We need a Walter Judd, or several of them out there -- doing the job in 1972 on the Democrats that Judd did in 1960.

Following the Democratic convention, we should consider who our speakers will be, at what hour and time in San Diego, and guarantee that some of the most hard-hitting and tightly drafted attacks on the Democratic candidates come out of that convention.

The attack speeches should be orchestrated and advanced, with an audience cheering at the right lines -- the way the President did it himself in 1968, in his acceptance speech. We will get no better chance to focus the nation's attention on the weakness of the Democratic candidates and the Democratic Party than in 1972 and we ought not blow all that national television.

BUCHANAN-KHACHIGIAN

Our primary role, given the small size, is oversight, and assistance.

1. Provide checks on various "attack" operations to determine their effectiveness in terms of media.

- Bushman*
K.
+ Morgan
Muller
La Rive
Decker
2. Take a direct hand in creating radio, TV, spots on the "attack" and the pamphlets and help direct where they are to be distributed.
 3. Monitor operations, through news summary staff.
 4. Recommend to Attorney General shifts in strategy -- point up when we feel one line of attack is being exhausted, and another might be better pursued. In campaign we anticipate regular, if not daily, communication with the top campaign staff on how well things go, and where there needs to be a new attack or improvement.
 5. Help draft the speeches the attacks on the Democrats for the Republican convention.
 6. Have a seat on the board where the attack strategy on the Democrats is being considered, and where states are being selected. Further, we will need to have direct access to the poll data of the campaign, so that we can know where the attacks should be directed, against whom and how in what states.
 7. Produce, with a small group, some of the covert materials -- i. e., matter we would not want to be identified with, but nothing that would be wholly destructive, if uncovered.
 8. Over see update of the briefing books.

GENERAL THOUGHTS

1. In the turmoil of a campaign, it is likely that centralism will break down; that is not unexpected, nor necessarily bad; however, it is important that we attempt to impose some kind of strategy upon our surrogates who are making the attack, and the other instruments we have.
2. After the August convention, for certain, we ought to go at once on the attack -- as we did in 1970. We have the forums to command the media, and we ought to throw the Democrats on the defensive and keep them there -- so that they have no chance to make their issues, in particular the "economic issue". There is no reason -- given our superior media position -- that we can't dominate the news.
3. Avoid at all costs the kind of "attack" by individuals or media or ad that opens us to the "Tricky Dick" charge, or the "Old Gutfighter" allegation. Granted that the press is less indulgent with us than with
/_ copy illegible/_

4. Keep in mind that there are only two deadlines every day, and one evening news show. If an attack has captured the media, no need to top it with a new one; let it ride.

5. Start the attacks early in the campaign as the number of undecided is then largest. Again, however, we should show the kind of flexibility we did not in 1968, by being able to open up an entirely new front in mid-October, if some other attack is being countered or stalled. The old military adage -- always commit your reserves from a new direction -- should here apply.

6. The last five days of the campaign, we should close up shop -- and everyone who is not tongue-tied should be out in the boonies on as many radio, television, speech appearances as he can fill. The last voice heard in the campaign may be the one to which some swing voter hearkens. About one week before the end of the campaign, we can no longer rely on Red Blount's fellows to deliver our message to the outlanders; we have to start using the phone -- and everybody who can skate should be out on the ice.

7. When the candidates are determined, there should be a strategy meeting of sorts to determine what "personal" aspects of the Democratic candidate are vulnerable; and while these may not be the grist for attack ads, we should get them out to our speakers. For Muskie, for example, "instability," his outburst of temper, his breaking down completely after criticism from a publisher. For Kennedy, "immaturity," "playboy," etc.

8. The Congressmen who will be running, especially those who are safe, should be given -- via phone -- the line to hit for the President, the attack line, in a boiler room operation, plus last mailed materials -- one week prior to election, with phone calls for any late update.

9. Finally, the attack strategy, as stated, should be flexible; it may be that after making attacks early in the campaign, we want to go over to promise what we are going to do for America in the second term, to ignore the opposition. Perhaps the polls will tell us that is the approach to take. If so, no problem; we would as soon walk to victory as run.

EXHIBIT No. 182

MEMORANDUM

April 12, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

Attached is a plan for our activities at the Democratic National Convention which was written by Patrick J. Buchanan and Kenneth Khachigian. We recommend that you approve this plan.

Approve X

Disapprove _____

Comment _____

Subject to comments

JEROME S. GAUDER

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN

Understand that we have a suite of rooms at the Fontainebleau in Miami Beach, as we did at the Conrad Hilton in Chicago. Following plan outlines our recommendations as to the best use of personnel and communications in Miami Beach during the Democrat Confab in July.

PERSONNEL -- Two "spokesmen" who have national credentials, who are effective on the media, who are politically savvy, who can do television, press conferences and backgrounders -- with great credibility. One would be a "tough cop" to counter-attack; the other the "nice cop" to praise the President's record, and to answer more in sorrow than anger the charges being elevated. One writer in residence. Two secretaries to run the machinery and to do the typing. (They can be provided by the Dade County GOP.) A press officer out of 1701 who can gather the media.

EQUIPMENT -- Some Nixonaires should be in the suite regularly, to attract media, and to serve drinks. One of the primary functions of the press officer and spokesman is to continually feed the "line" to visiting press. The "reception room" should be functioning almost around the clock. And the individuals sent should have good rapport with the national press.

Two typewriters, xerox machines, a dex and telex machine will be essential, to receive research and background materials from RNC, and from the Answer Desk -- which could be operational as of that date. Further, there should be security in the communications room and all rooms, excepting the hospitality suite at all times to prevent some of our friends from seizing in-coming materials -- to prevent the "planting" of salacious anti-Democratic literature in our quarters.

Wackenhut guards will likely be needed.

Security cleared by Jim Mc Cord.

PUBLICITY -- The Republican Forward Observation Post should be made public; the first of the personnel should arrive around the opening day of the Convention, when the major media starts. It should spend almost all of its time with the national press. As for any "intelligence" function, this seems highly unlikely -- that will be done by the networks, and the Observation Post will have neither the personnel nor contacts to be undertaking this kind of assignment.

The purpose of the group is, foremost, to make news -- to piggy back on the enormous media coverage that will be provided for the Democrats, to point the finger at running sores in the Democratic convention.

If, however, Miami Beach becomes a re-run of Chicago, the best posture of the Observation Post would be one of near absolute public silence -- getting out of the way of the best possible story we can have. Just serve drinks then, make background comments, that if they can't unite and run their own convention, how can they unite and run their own country.

If the convention goes well, then the Forward Observation Team can comment on the proceedings, on who is being "shafted" on any attacks against the President -- can point up as well any differences between the Democratic Platform of 1972 and that of 1968.

Further, because what the country sees of the convention will come from the tube -- the "line" should go to the Observation Post from Washington, not the other way around. The political chieftains here, who have access to full monitoring of the networks, should be making the decision as to what the response should be.

On "response" to Democratic attacks, in Q and A, of course, the FOP would have autonomy.

DANGERS -- If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably point up to the Republicans at the Fontainebleau to distract attention from themselves. Secondly, they could "plant" the kind of materials that would embarrass us; thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate that the Republicans up there told us to come down here and "raise hell." Anyone at the Observation Post should be clean as a hound's tooth -- and the Observation Post should have no hand in any "covert operations" ongoing in Miami.

RESEARCH FACILITIES -- There is in PJB's judgment no great need for these down in Miami; any research can be done here -- and twixed down to the Command Post. Also, a phone call from Miami can get that material from Washington.

Presumably the "speakers" in Miami will know how to respond to an O'Brien attack, and if any research needs to be done, the "writer" in Miami can get it from D. C. Our Answer Desk at RNC could be in operation by then providing the materials from RNC regularly to Miami.

Further, the Shumway and Magruder operations and Buchanan and Khachigian should remain in regular touch with the Command Post -- transmitting any directives that come out of the political operation here.

ISSUES -- The Observation Post can call attention to any groups that are being shafted at the convention, such as the Wallace delegates, or the "kids"; it should be little and disparage the Democratic Platform; it should be able to "leak" stories indicating whom Washington believes to be strongest or weakest; it should be in a position to make predictions, etc.

The press man at the post should be able to whip up a press release; he should be in contact with the major network shows; he should be in regular contact with our operation and 1701 -- and we should be getting instructions from the top.

OTHER ACTIVITIES -- We should give consideration to scheduling our primary "surrogates" in major media centers inside and outside of Washington during the Democratic Convention. They can make the most news in their forums -- by keying off the Democratic Convention. If it is a shambles, they should make the point in the city or region where they are sepacking. This will require some scheduling of top speakers, such as the Vice President, Senator Dole, and surrogates -- during this period of the summer. And thoughts on the "line" should be forthcoming to each from the Political Operation at 1701, or out of here -- as determined by the political leadership.

This will be a time of Democratic dominance of the networks. If their show is a horror show -- we can just get out of the way, or simply point to it. If they are doing well, then we should be "jamming" their communications a bit by getting on the air and in the press to the maximum degree possible with rebuttal during the convention's duration.

All "surrogates" out on the road during this period should be also kept in touch with RNC's Answer Desk, as well as 1701, for information and the "line."

EXHIBIT No. 183

*Hand carried to
Mr. Mitchell 4/14/72*

April 14, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

Attached for your consideration and review is a memorandum which was prepared by Pat Buchanan and Ken Khachigian concerning contender tracking and strategy.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

April 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO:

JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN

Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early primaries, locking up the convention in April, and uniting the Democratic Party behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The likelihood -- great three months ago -- that the Democratic Convention could become a dignified coronation ceremony for a centrist candidate who could lead a united party into the election -- is now remote.

The purpose of this memo is to suggest new goals -- and to elicit advice from the campaign leadership on how to proceed -- and against whom. Had we our druthers, we would at this point choose as opponents McGovern, Humphrey, Muskie and Kennedy in that order. Here is the way the primaries shape up at present, in both our judgment and that of the more respected politicians about, in the media and Democratic Party.

WISCONSIN -- April 4: The Wisconsin returns made McGovern a credible candidate and whipped up a Goldwaterlike enthusiasm for him throughout the country, from which he will benefit from now until July. He has inherited the media enthusiasm Big Ed retained with the Cape St. Elizabeth Show 18 months ago. Humphrey lost a golden opportunity to assume the mantle of front-runner; he was injured in terms of November; he lost the publicity and momentum that went to McGovern and could have been his. But he is still very viable. Muskie was crippled, but not killed. Wallace was strengthened for the merry month of May, which we anticipate he will dominate.

MASSACHUSETTS & PENNSYLVANIA -- April 25: Both states have personality as well as delegate contests. HHH, McGovern, Muskie and Wallace are on the ballot in both. However, Humphrey is concentrating on Pennsylvania to the exclusion of Massachusetts;

and McGovern is focusing upon Massachusetts with only targeted districts in Pennsylvania. Muskie, who is in danger of being whipsawed in the two primaries, seems to have opted to make his major effort in Pennsylvania. The 182 delegates in Pa., compared to 102 in Mass. is clearly one reason. Another is that Muskie seems to believe now that he stands a better chance of becoming the Regulars' candidate acceptable to the Left, than the Left's candidate acceptable to the Regulars.

At this point Humphrey looks like the winner in Pennsylvania, which will give him a leg up in Ohio a week later. And Muskie who two months ago was a 4-1 favorite in Massachusetts could conceivably lose both primaries on April 25. If he does, he has another bullet hole in him -- though he may still not be completely dead.

INDIANA, OHIO, ALABAMA, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA -- May 2: In D. C. Walter Fauntroy is favorite son, about whom no more need be said. Alabama is inconsequential. In Indiana, all the major candidates seem to be abandoning this primary to George Wallace, and at this point Wallace will win the Indiana Primary and the headlines that go with it -- setting himself up for Michigan, and other good things to come. Muskie has just about pulled up stakes; Hubert is focusing on Ohio, and McGovern is simply not a statewide winner -- give this one to Wallace.

Ohio, however, is another story. The winner of Pennsylvania a week before -- we believe HHH will take it for the first primary win in his political lifetime -- will have the whip hand here. Muskie will contest this with all he has; if he loses here as well as Pennsylvania, it becomes difficult to see how he can last another month, till California. McGovern is here -- as everywhere -- targeting on delegates, to pick up a few even if he loses the primary by a major margin. It's HHH or Muskie in Ohio. We pick Humphrey here as well.

WALLACE MONTH

TENNESSEE -- May 4: Everybody's abandoning this one to Wallace, who should sweep it -- along with 40-45 of the delegates.

NORTH CAROLINA -- May 6: Everyone is abandoning North Carolina as well -- everyone that is expect Terry Sanford. We give North Carolina to George Wallace also. (If Sanford should upset Wallace here, highly unlikely, he will be Tom Wicker's "New South" hero for next month.)

NEBRASKA & WEST VIRGINIA -- May 9: West Virginia will feature a head-on between Wallace and Hubert Humphrey, the only two candidates on the popular ballot. If Humphrey whips Wallace he will get immense favorable publicity -- good both in Maryland and Michigan. He will look more and more to the Regulars as the Regular to support all the way. If Wallace beats Humphrey here, it will be a humiliation for Hubert, and the Democratic Party nationally -- exposing just how far away the national leadership of the Party has gotten from its base. Wallace's momentum for North Carolina and Tennessee will be working in his favor here. (Anyway to help Mr. Wallace here would help in November.)

Nebraska -- everyone is on the ballot. It is a McGovern target state; he could do well here. We have no real reading.

MARYLAND & MICHIGAN -- May 16: If Humphrey has defeated Muskie in both Pennsylvania and Ohio -- then both these states shape up as Humphrey versus Wallace contests, and either man could win both of them, or one of them.

Maryland has 53 delegates and Michigan 132. The latter is the major northern industrial state most suited to a Wallace campaign, as bussing is "the" issue.

Yet, there is no way to predict the outcome here -- as much will depend on what has gone before. If Wallace and Humphrey do as we predict in the previous primaries, then the Maryland and Michigan contests should be showdowns between the two, with McGovern picking up his customary handful of delegates in both. Muskie has formal UAW support, but if he loses Pennsylvania and Ohio, and does not win Massachusetts, that UAW endorsement will be more an embarrassment to Woodcock than an advantage to Big Ed.

Note: Cross-over voting is allowed in Michigan. Again, our people should go for Wallace and McGovern.

OREGON & RHODE ISLAND -- May 16: Rhode Island with 22 delegates is Muskie country; and if Big Ed is still alive, if not well, these delegates should be his. Oregon, with 34 delegates, is symbolically important -- given the nature of the state, and the media attention it invariably receives. Everyone is on the ballot in Oregon -- including Teddy. In the wake of Wisconsin, some have already conceded Oregon to McGovern; but whether he carries the state will depend greatly on how well he does in the intervening six weeks between now and then.

Jackson's support is not strong in Oregon; and it is difficult to see how he can last until then. More likely, this will be a McGovern, Humphrey and Muskie contest -- again, depending on whether or not Muskie is still alive.

Muskie's polls which showed him leading in Oregon are now as out of date as all his other polls. No projections here -- but this is central to McGovern's planning.

CALIFORNIA, NEW MEXICO, SOUTH DAKOTA & NEW JERSEY -- June 6: Despite Wallace's challenge, South Dakota's 17 have to go to McGovern. New Mexico's eighteen -- who knows -- likely a split between Humphrey and Muskie, and perhaps Wallace, who says he may work the state.

New Jersey is one of the two crucial primaries of the day -- though it will be overshadowed by California, which is Big Casino. In Jersey there are 109 delegates; Muskie had the upper hand here, but appears to have lost it as both former Governor Hughes and Senator Williams are backing away from him. This redounds to Humphrey's benefit. He is probably the favorite here, with McGovern again targeting on districts where he can pick up delegates. (Wallace has not decided yet on a major push here, though he has two weeks left to file.)

California is where it is at for the Democrats, with 271 votes -- winner take all. This is nearly a fifth of what is needed for nomination. This prize, the possibility of seizing it for bargaining leverage and prestige, is what may keep a bedraggled Ed Muskie in the race.

Wallace could not get on the ballot; McCarthy will not campaign and Jackson will have pulled out by then -- in our estimate. This leaves it between Humphrey and George McGovern. If Muskie stays in and has any appreciable support, then what he draws from Humphrey could well give the Golden State to George McGovern. McGovern has organization here, enthusiasm, and money; and it could pay off.

Further, he is the lone candidate on the Left for the balance of the primaries -- and thus the more "centrists" left in the primaries -- Jackson, HHH, Muskie or Wallace -- the merrier for George McGovern.

NEW YORK -- June 20: New York's 278 delegates is the largest, but this will be split up considerably by the time it gets to Miami. New York does not have a statewide vote; moreover, the delegate slates do not have the candidates' names appended. So you vote for delegate, John Jones, and that is that. Candidates tend to get popular figures pledged to

them to run for delegate; strong grass roots effort is essential here; so McGovern should do extremely well in the Empire State, probably more delegates than anyone else, but not more than 100.

THE NON-PRIMARY STATES

Several points need to be made.

- A) Regular Democrats are not doing as well as they have in the past.
- B) A lot of liberals are getting into the convention who weren't there in 1968.
- C) Unions are not doing as well.
- D) There are sizable numbers of "undecided" delegates winning -- and we do not know precisely to whom they will go.
- E) McGovern is doing extremely well in non-primary states, maximizing his potential -- when George is winning them in Georgia, and Virginia, and picking off two-thirds of the Kansas delegation, it means they have a Goldwater type operation going, and going well.

THE SCENARIOS

SCOOP JACKSON -- No way we can see him winning the nomination, and no reason for his continuing much further. Wallace has eclipsed him on the party's social conservative right. We predict Jackson will either be out after Ohio or after Oregon -- the longer he stays in, however, the better for us, as he draws votes that would otherwise be Humphrey's or Muskie's -- and so he aids George McGovern.

HUBERT HUMPHREY -- Victory for Hubert lies in knocking Muskie out of the race in Pennsylvania and Ohio, in taking West Virginia and Michigan and Maryland from George Wallace, and winning California. Humphrey, in our view, is the odds-on favorite to become the Last Best Hope of the party Regulars against the McGovern insurgents. By and large, he does not contest any more major primary races with McGovern, directly, head-on -- before the decisive California primary. His competition in Pennsylvania and Ohio is Muskie, and if he takes Muskie out of the play there -- he contests Wallace in West Virginia, Maryland and Michigan.

Clearly, once Muskie is eliminated -- if he is -- Humphrey's approach in California is to paint George McGovern to the Regulars as the death-knell of the Democratic Party they have known. Even should Hubert lose California narrowly, he will likely carry New Jersey and pull some delegates out of New York.

Our problem with HHH is that he has never won a contested Democratic Presidential primary.

ED MUSKIE -- It is truly ten minutes to midnight for Big Ed. If he loses both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania on April 25 -- which he could -- it is hard to see how he can regain his momentum to become the Candidate of the Party Regulars. McGovern has already locked up the Left.

Muskie's chance to rehabilitate himself comes April 25 in Pennsylvania, and then a week later in Ohio. If he wins the first, he can conceivably win the second, and become himself the Candidate of the Regulars -- the last man who can prevent a McGovern nomination. The problem for the Regulars is that unless they settle on a single candidate before California; they are going to lose California -- to McGovern. From our standpoint, then, it would be good to have Muskie win something, good to have him and Jackson stay around for the California primary.

Muskie is today in a position not dissimilar from RN in 1968 -- had RN not swept the primaries. Had Miami come down to a three-way contest between RR, NR and RN -- then as soon as it appeared, the left or right candidate would win -- RN in the center would become the beneficiary of the opposite wing's support. In other words, had Nixon not won on the first ballot, he could still have won on a later ballot, by getting the panicked Rockefeller support, should Reagan rise, and the panicked Reagan support should Rockefeller approach the nomination.

Ed's second chance lies in the fact that he is more acceptable to the Left than Humphrey and to the Regulars than McGovern.

Absenting only Teddy Kennedy, he still has the best chance of uniting the Democratic Party today.

One final note: Muskie could come alive and well if he should two weeks from now win both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. That could bring him to life in an instant -- and though highly unlikely, it is not altogether outside the realm of possibility.

GEORGE MCGOVERN -- McGovern has these assets going for him:

- A) He is maximizing his support in the non-primary states, with a hustling team maximizing his support and winning him, nickel and dime, delegates in some of the damndest places.
- B) Even in the primary states where he is very nearly conceding defeat, such as New Jersey, Maryland, Michigan -- he will be picking up small pockets of delegates.
- C) He has momentum after Wisconsin; he has generated tremendous enthusiasm on the Left; he has convinced the True Believers that they can take over the party; and their challenge now has a "credibility" it has never previously had.
- D) He is targeting well. The states he says he can win -- he can conceivably win, i. e., Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, California and New York.
- E) He will go to Miami with support in every section of the country if not damn near every state.
- D) The convention he goes to will be more liberal and conscience oriented than any previous convention since the GOP in 1964. If Kennedy stays out and the convention goes more than two ballots, a lot of delegates are going to vote their hearts instead of their heads -- and the Democratic Party could wind up with this fellow as nominee.

McGovern's problems are apparent; he is of course anathema to conservative Democrats; but also, after Massachusetts, he is going to have a dry spell in terms of publicity for a few weeks -- and this could hurt him if Humphrey is dominating the news and building momentum with headline victories.

GEORGE WALLACE -- As someone put it, if Wallace were nominated, the Democratic Party would self-destruct on his way to the rostrum. There is no scenario for a Wallace nomination. However, he could take 300 delegates into the convention; his delegates will be challenged; anything is likely to happen; there is no way now to predict what he will do or what will be done to him -- the Democrats themselves will have to decide that.

OUR NEXT GOAL

What we need now is a decision on whom we want to run against. We believe that McGovern is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He could be painted as a left-radical candidate, the Goldwater of the Democratic Party; and at this point in time we would inundate him. The Wallace Democrats, South and North, as well as the Daley and Meany Democrats, would have to take hemlock to support a fellow whose major plan is to chop 32 billion out of defense. Also, he is weak with the blacks, and would have to cater to that vote -- to his great disadvantage. Humphrey can take the blacks for granted in a contest with the President.

If we want McGovern -- and we believe we should -- then what we want is a showdown in Miami between the Regulars and the Left -- between Humphrey and McGovern with McGovern winning. And if McGovern loses that showdown -- then by all means, we want Humphrey. The Left would never take him again; he would guarantee a horror show in Miami Beach and a walkout of the Left following.

Muskie is our third choice -- the reason being that Muskie, despite his weaknesses is still a potentially unifying candidate for the Democrats, after a Humphrey-McGovern deadlock.

EDWARD MOORE KENNEDY

Evans-Novak, in a column that looks to have come from the horse's mouth, say that Kennedy would accept a genuine draft. He is in the catbird's seat today. Though there will be pressure on him to endorse McGovern -- if McGovern carries Massachusetts two weeks from today -- he can sit back and observe until July.

If the convention deadlocks on the first ballot, and if there is a deep division within the Democratic Party -- he is the major unifying figure on the national scene today. Though he would be unacceptable to the South, in a national election, he would bring to his candidacy all the McGovern support, plus the Kennedy charisma, plus the support of the Meanys and Daleys. A Democratic Party deeply divided, thirsting for unity and victory, would welcome a Kennedy.

For this reason, we do not believe our strategy should be to flush Kennedy out. As Kennedy is elevated, McGovern recedes -- and We Want McGovern.

Just as it would have been foolish for LBJ -- who wanted Goldwater in April -- to flush out and elevate the more formidable RN -- so it is foolish for us we believe to flush out and elevate EMK -- when he is far stronger and more dangerous than McGovern. We should elevate and assist McGovern in every way conceivable.

Nor can we surface Kennedy -- if he doesn't want to be surfaced. If we indicate we are apprehensive about his candidacy, that makes his candidacy more likely.

Right now, Kennedy is still in the background. There is a liberal media love affair going on with George McGovern; they will help George against Humphrey and we should help him as well. Every notch we move Kennedy up, we move McGovern down a peg. What we should do is begin publicly to take George McGovern seriously, and any pressure we could place upon EMK to endorse McGovern as the leader of the Left should be exerted. We might even attack McGovern to elevate him -- also, to get the record on him into the media.

McGovern has a long shot at the nomination, a very long shot. But if he wins, we win. Let's let him have his run at the nomination, and assist him in every way we can. Today, he gets 5 percent of a Democratic vote nationally; and RN swamps him in the polls -- and people do not yet know what a wild man he is. McGovern's The One.

EXHIBIT No. 184

Feb mag.

April 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pullout of Muskie, the chances of a McGovern nomination are immensely improved. Thus, we must do as little as possible, at this time, to impede McGovern's rise.

Though he may act irresponsibly and make wild attacks, we should, by and large, resist the temptation and leave him alone. Vietnam is the exception. He can be hit hard on this subject -- a point which not only elevates his candidacy but also gets the President's position restated while reinforcing the strong anti-war sentiment behind McGovern.

On the other hand, the ammunition which will be our stock in the campaign -- the extremist, radical labels; the pro-amnesty and pro-abortion positions; the radical chic; the gut-the-military attitude; etc. -- should be held in abeyance until we are reasonably sure McGovern has the nomination.

The temptations will be high in many quarters to go after McGovern, but word ought to go out to lay off with but few exceptions. We have plenty of time to attach labels later, and the same labels which will defeat McGovern for the Presidency are the same labels which could prevent him from getting the nomination. Let's not do Hubert's work for him.

*I agree with this - Pass
along to our staff - RNC etc
JMN*

EXHIBIT No. 185

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN MITCHELL

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At your request and with the considerable assistance of the RNC research people, we have put together a basic attack document. Due to the simple volume of materials available and the rush of events, we felt it would be near impossible as well as unwise to put this together as the comprehensive contender attack piece. In point of fact some of the most damaging things coming out of the California primary have yet to be entered simply due to time constraints.]

As you are reading this, we are currently working on another set of materials which takes this basic raw information and works it into speech insert formats. The focus is on McGovern and what is being done is to take one or two outrageous quotes on a particular issue -- say, defense -- and putting it into a text which frames the argument for our spokesmen. In a sense, we are preparing an attack briefing book the first complete edition of which should be ready this coming week. A separate document for use by the press corps will also be prepared in the near future.

In the meantime, the attached materials are for your review, and no dissemination has been made, pending your comments. Also attached is a copy of the Domestic Council response to the DNC FACT production. I feel this document is not useful to us in the campaign, not because it reflects poor work, but because the issues therein are deadbeat issues. I suggest also that the FACT publication is little known and probably less quoted, and to use the Domestic Council-prepared materials extensively might simply elevate the DNC attack. At best, we recommend that FICTION 1972 be put in pamphlet form as a "suggested" response by our spokesmen if they are confronted by the DNC attacks.

Finally, unless you object, we are going to Defense for a crash study on McGovern's defense proposals with breakdowns such as how many jobs would be lost, how many bases closed down, strategic considerations, etc. The same will be done with his domestic tax and welfare proposals.

EXHIBIT No. 186

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN MITCHELL

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

We agree with virtually everyone that post-California, the McGovern Record must begin to become part of the public record. The national perception of McGovern as a moderate and even a conservative must begin to change -- before McGovern begins changing his positions from left toward center. We have all the necessary materials in our judgment -- in an Assault Book to be ready tomorrow possibly -- to tar McGovern as an extremist. Not in our memory has there been such a wealth of material with which to tag a national candidate as an extremist; and if we fail here, the price will be significant as McGovern could then conceivably march into November as the "Citizens Candidate" with the cleanest national image since Mr. Eisenhower. Booting our opportunity would be a tragedy -- the important questions are not whether we get our materials on the public record; but timing and tone and degree and emphasis.

In our judgment Humphrey's effort to tar McGovern as an extremist was a gross failure because a) Humphrey came off as a politician in panic, making wild accusations against a calm, conservative appearing fellow; b) his tone of attack was negative and bitchy and strident; c) it came too late in the game.

In our efforts, which we feel can begin with the Re-elect campaign statement, following McGovern's smashing victories -- we can avoid these pitfalls.

First, McGovern will be in his pinnacle of glory -- he will have a sympathetic press, even an indulgent one -- and the Nixon Campaign Statement should not go hard against the grain of this national sentiment, should not be immediately "rough and tough." Some congratulations, generosity and whimsy in that statement might well fit the occasion. But at least one crucial part of our message -- perhaps iteration of his welfare reform proposals and awe at the cost to taxpayers -- should be reflected in the statement by John Mitchell.

The next occasion we understand will be the appearance by Mr. Mitchell on Sunday. For that, we think we either ought to prepare a briefing paper, plus a book -- or make some sort of joint determination as to

what points we wish to get across in this national forum. The ex-AG will be able to make headlines on this -- we can determine ourselves which of the materials we have we want dropped here, and iterated by our speakers around the country.

Our tone should at all costs, avoid any sense of being embattled; we should be generous to George, if you will, but looking forward with enthusiasm to the contest. Any talk of McGovern being an easy mark should be eschewed. We probably have on record right now ninety per cent of the outrageous or idiotic positions or statements Mr. McGovern will take -- and we have five months in which to get those to the American people.

There is no need now to shoot it all out of the cannon. We should feed it out to the public in morsels -- one at a time -- and wait until the public has digested one outrageous position, and McGovern has been forced to answer -- before moving onto another. Here, rather than a sudden massive attack -- a very gradual escalation, it seems to me, is in order -- husbanding our resources, and dealing them out bit by bit.

We will proceed -- unless told otherwise -- to draft a statement for Mr. Mitchell post-California, and have it ready for him by noon on Wednesday.

1. There is a strong feeling on our part that the term "radical" was overused in 1970; that it has lost much of its electric charge; that the term "extremist" is a far more difficult one to defend against; and that in our on-going effort against McGovern -- his positions and he himself should be characterized as "extremist" in character, not "radical."

2. A portion of this Assault Book -- perhaps the segments dealing with the au courant and controversial issues -- should be moved out to columnists and editorial writers. Some portion of the Assault Book should be put into the hands of surrogates, for their use, in coming weeks -- before the Democratic Convention. The segments should be chosen by the Attorney General. Again, we would recommend that right now, we restrict ourselves to "seconding" the allegations of Humphrey and Jackson, not using too much of the unused material immediately -- and quoting Democratic attacks on McGovern as much as initiating new ones.

3. There are already some press appalled at McGovern's potential candidacy -- and there is no certainty the regular Democrats -- after their shellacking today -- are going to roll over and play dead. Far better if they do the preliminary hatchet work. They are a good deal more credible than we at this game. Before we move, we should know what, if anything, Daley, Meany and LBJ, etc., plan to do.

4. There is an interesting development shaping up. McGovern's ambitious children seem to be busy "stealing" Wallace delegates -- and playing false, by "ripping off" the Wallace delegations in Tennessee and elsewhere, places like Michigan. This is excellent. We should hold back commenting upon the process, which Governor Carter is raising hell about, until it is accomplished -- and then accuse the Democratic Convention of shafting the legitimate popular winner, and stealing the delegates of a bed-ridden martyr.

5. Quietly, and right now, we should put to work -- as far away from us as possible -- an in-depth of the background, character, financial deals, land transactions, loans, business associations of George McGovern. Was he associated with Billy Sol Estes or Bobby Baker; who are his sugar daddies back in the Dakotas? In short, a thorough, intensive investigation of the kind that the liberal press did on Vice President Agnew in 1968.

6. Post-California, let's proceed along these lines for the next week. But, on our view, there should be more input, and we should await more reactions -- from the four primaries Tuesday -- before "locking in" to any strategy all the way to the Convention.

Again, our immediate recommendation is a "gracious" response to McGovern's win -- a response which at the same time moves onto the public record McGovern's welfare proposals -- and raises the question of where the tax monies will be coming from to put all these millions of Americans on welfare.

JUNE 8, 1972.

ASSAULT STRATEGY

Buchanan/Khachigian

Herewith the Assault Book on which Ken Khachigian and I have been working the past week. Within are enough McGovern statements, positions, votes, not only to defeat the South Dakota Radical—but to have him indicted by a Grand Jury. *If* we can get these positions before the public; and *if* the election hinges upon issues—only with enormous effort could we boot this election away.

However, in addition to the statements, issues and positions of George McGovern there are 'preceptions' which we must address as well—"perceptions" that, unless dramatically altered, could give us considerable difficulty in the fall.

1. In a country where the "politician" is in increasing disrepute, George McGovern is perceived as a candid, honest straightforward, citizen non-politician.

2. In a nation where the "Establishment" is viewed with a mixture of frustration and contempt by left, right and the angry Wallace center—George McGovern is perceived by many as an anti-status quo, anti-Establishment figure—the candidate of the common man.

3. In a political year when the mood, we are told, is "throw the rascals out," we are the "ins" and Mr. McGovern is perceived clearly as one of the "outs." He is outside the power elite of the Democratic Party; he is perceived as outside the power elite of the American Government.

4. George McGovern has been and remains the "underdog" in a nation that has always had a warm spot for the "underdog."

5. In a era when the public yearns constantly for a "new face," George McGovern is the newest, freshest face on the national scene, and the face of Richard Nixon is the most familiar of any political figure in the United States.

Before addressing how I feel we should deal generally with each of these "perceptions," and specifically with the assault materials provided let me add these concerns:

1. The Republican Party is sleek and fat and incumbent. Our Conservative foot soldiers who out-marched the Democrat's union troops in 1968 are sullen, bitchy, angry. Our little old ladies in tennis shoes are not all enamoured of H.R. 1, wage and price controls, and \$100 billion in deficits—while George McGovern has an organization the likes of which the U.S. has not seen since the Goldwater Legions.

He has tens of thousands of True Believers, working night and day for him—spurred on by unanticipated triumphs and the anticipation of running the "Old Politics" right out of the White House.

As of now, in a seat of the pants judgment, I would say that if we are running 50-50 with George McGovern in the polls election day—he could conceivably beat us by four to six points, on the basis of his first-rate get-out-the-vote machinery.

2. The hard-fought Democratic primaries have resulted sharply in increased registration—especially by McGovern types—and any lopsided registration figures in the primaries will be lopsided anti-Nixon votes in the fall.

3. While McGovern's positions are woolly-headed, he is an ambitious and pragmatic politician—who will not hesitate to move crab-wise to the center to win this election. Some of the more garish of his positions will surely be shed by the fall. Further, my understanding is that his campaign film biography is an excellent piece of work—designed to portray him as the antithesis of the "radical," indeed, as the bomber pilot who won the war against Nazi Germany. We can anticipate that his commercials will be equally designed to hit the Democratic center.

Clearly, in addition to the problems listed, we have tremendous advantages—the Presidency, the view of millions that McGovern is some sort of wild radical, the split within the Democratic Party, the tendency of McGovern's red hots to "stick it" to the Daleys and Meanys when the opportunity arises, etc. But this memorandum is directed toward both general and specific suggestions to resolve our problems, to get the radical record of McGovern into the public record, to change the national perceptions of the two.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We should move to re-capture the anti-Establishment tradition or theme in American politics. Incumbent Presidents *can* do this; RN did it in November 1969, when, as President of U.S., he called on the common man to stand with him against the elitist-backed mobs in the streets. That, coupled with the Vice President's standing up to the Establishment media, and slugging it out, raised RN to

the highest point of his Presidency—69 percent approval. Why did we reach that level? Because, even though Newsweek led "Nixon in Trouble," even though Broder was writing of the "Breaking of the President,"—RN led both the Presidency position and the anti-Establishment position. How do we enhance our anti-Establishment credentials—and take Mr. McGovern's away—without surrendering the political asset of Incumbent President?

(a) We need to shed the "in bed with Big Business" image. PJB believes we should seek out the opportunity to "take on" some egregious, giant, preferably, but not necessarily Democratic, corporation publicly—as Kennedy did with Big Steel in 1962. Business will be with us in 1972—but one of our problems is a too close identification in the public mind with Corporate Power. ITT reinforced that. Public presidential anger at the price-gouging of some Big Business firm would be, in my judgment, a good thing.

(b) If we have abandoned the idea of introducing or supporting "tax reform"—I trust we have not—I would recommend RN publicly veto one, two or three huge spending bills—on national television. Two minutes would be sufficient. The focus of the veto is that the taxpayer is already burdened enough by massive liberal spending programs that accomplish nothing, but break the back of the taxpayer. And RN believes the time has come in this country, for less massive federal spending, not more; for lower taxes, not new inflation, and not new taxes. Most likely, McGovern will be voting for all these spending bills.

Our objective: Move him visibly into the posture of more and more government spending—and get ourselves on the "tax cut," working-man side of the issue. In my political judgment—what the nation wants is not more spending or the taxes or inflation required to pay for it—but less spending and lower taxes. Government takes too damn much of the earnings dollar in everyone's view, and we should be anti-tax in 1972.

(Indeed, in my opinion, this would apply to the so-called added value tax as well—since the average fellow is not likely to make the distinction between good and bad taxes). One recalls that some years back, the President, in a quite effective television piece, vetoed, with a sweep of the pen, a major spending bill. Suppose we knocked off three in a row—calling for holding the line on spending and holding the line on taxes.

(c) As the campaign progresses, we should increasingly portray McGovern as the pet radical of Eastern Liberalism, the darling of the *New York Times*, the hero of the Berkeley Hill Jet Set; Mr. Radical Chic. The liberal elitist are his—we have to get back the working people; and the better we portray McGovern as an elitist radical, the smaller his political base. By November, he should be postured as the Establishment's fair-haired boy, and RN postured as the Candidate of the Common Man, the working man.

(How about RN going to Cadillac Square on Labor Day this year!!)

Just as Goldwater ended up 1964 portrayed *both* as a 100% Conservative—and a radical; so George McGovern must end up in 1972 portrayed *both* as an extremist and as the pet of the national liberal Establishment. Both are, after all, true.

(d) The individual nationally who has done the best job on the above is Kevin Phillips—who writes of George hobnobbing with Schlesinger, Ford Foundation liberals, the radical chic, prancing around his \$100,000 Japanese palace in \$15 Pucci ties. My recommendation is that PJB—using our Radical Chic materials, as well as the Assault Book materials, write, not a full-length book but a 5000-word piece, using full color, good paper, like *First Monday*, with pictures of Hiss and Hoffman and other endorsees, and that this be printed and distributed by the millions. A quality, brightly written, colorful, picture biography of McGovern of 5000 words would be infinitely superior to those old full-length hatchet biographies that are never read.

(e) "The clammy hand of consistency should never rest for long upon the shoulder of a statesman."—Senator Ashurst

In addition to portraying McGovern as radical—we should, at the same time, never let the public forget he was part and parcel of the Democratic liberal establishment that passed all the huge spending programs of the fifties and sixties that failed. McGovern's high spending, high tax proposals have been tried. They failed to help the poor; they bankrupted the workingman; they are taxing to death the middle class.

2. We cannot allow McGovern to succeed in this fraudulent effort to portray himself as Mr. Honest Citizen—rather than Mr. Politician. He can and should be nailed as a waffling, deceptive, crafty, politician. In this, I disagree with the

President. We should not only nail him with his radical positions, *but also* hold up a mirror to his shifts of position—which are certain to come. There are any number of sticks to beat him with—including that of the waffler who doesn't know where he stands. *The use of one does not exclude use of the other as well.*

Further, though a bit outrageous, McGovern can be charged, among Democrats, with "packing" caucuses, with "stealing" the nomination from the more popular candidate, with not representing the average man in the Democratic Party—but rather the left-wing organizers. As stated in an earlier memo, we should also wait until his people take delegates from Wallace—and then charge him with "stealing" delegates from a man in a hospital bed—discrediting his "reforms" and his "new politics," as no more than the old Gut Politics of the past. Also, anything that shows the McGovern people, making deals, softening positions, backing off, waffling—should be spotlighted—not downplayed.

3. To reverse the "underdog" image of Mr. McGovern—we should, upon his nomination, cease speaking of an easy win. We should in public, both to rally our troops and to remove this "underdog George" label—argue that the Democrats have the largest party. We should leak polls showing us worse off than we are. We should attempt as well and often as possible, again, to show McGovern as the Candidate of the *New York Times*, the Ford Foundation, Harvard, elitist left-wing professors, snot-nosed demonstrators, black radicals, and the whole elitist gang. This contest must wind up not as they envision with McGovern, Honest Man from South Dakota against Tricky Dick and his advertising budget—it should be Richard Nixon, candidate of Middle America, against the radical darling of the Liberal Establishment.

When Harriman and Clifford, and the old gang assemble around him—that will be the moment to strike.

4. About the "new face" thing—little we can do. Except to use the attack materials herein to fill in all the blanks in the McGovern image, fill them in with some of these materials, in working class neighborhoods, and we cannot but turn them off of George McGovern. The man has not been known well at all nationally—except for two weeks or two months at most. Impressions of McGovern may be favorable, but they are not fixed. They can be changed. And we should be moving this material into the public record. How?

(a) Not bitterly or stridently. To do so gives the appearance of arrogance and power which we want desperately to avoid. Thus, when our "heavies," if you will—the Vice President, Bob Dole, etc.—use this material they should for the present be scrupulously exact and precise, and avoid for the present—the blistering attack. There will be "time enough."

(b) The material should be targeted—not shot-gun. For example, abortion, amnesty, pot, the removal of the personal tax exemption (a killer for large Catholic families) these should be targeted for speakers, and for pamphlets and for ads in Catholic and ethnic areas, Catholic and ethnic papers, Catholic and ethnic forums.

(c) We should focus *at once* on the welfare schemes here—and on the military budget. They hurt George in California. McGovern is clearly moving on these proposals; even his friends, at the Post and Times, are signaling him to get off them; and he is indicating that he might. They ought to be hung permanently around his neck as the first order of business.

(d) We must not blow all of this assault material out of the cannon now; in 1970, we shot our wad in two weeks. There are five-months between now and the election, and we should hang these one at a time around McGovern for the rest of the year.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Catholics

1. The abortion, PJB statements, aid to parochial schools, and marijuana statements—as well as the removal of the personal tax exemption, which would be devastating to large Catholic and ethnic families—should be used in a campaign flyer (contrasted with McGovern positions) to be distributed at Catholic churches in key states on Sundays—and should be used as the basis of targeted ads in the Catholic and ethnic press. (Once after the Convention—and last 2 Sundays of campaign).

2. Volpe could take up McGovern propositions and before a national Knights of Columbus group—indicate that unintentionally, some are "anti-Catholic" in character, which Catholics concerned about Catholic values and the preservation of the Catholic family should fight. (If we could get Volpe to do this—PJB could write the two-page speech insert, for release, all media.)

Jewish voters

3. No reason why, with McGovern, we cannot make strong inroads here. Suggest that Secretary Laird devote a single speech to the impact of McGovern's Navy cuts on the American Sixth Fleet—with the conclusion, not unjustified, that the future of Israel, the survival of Israel—with McGovern's naval cuts—would be the decision of the Soviet Politburo. Again, the lead should be that—with George's defense cuts, without building the F-14 and F-15 to combat the MIG-23, "U.S. Navy could not intervene to save Israel."

4. The gist of the attack materials here on Israel—the HHH, the Jackson quotes about Israel being endangered by McGovern's position included—and McGovern's voting record—should be used in speeches before Jewish groups, in soliciting funds of Jewish groups. (Needless to say, above should be surfaced on television stations in N.Y.C., Chicago, Los Angeles.)

Space

5. Again, targeted material here. Florida, Texas, Southern California. We should get a list of the top ten defense plants in the country, the top ten aerospace plants, as well as the five NASA centers. And leaflets should be prepared and distributed at each of these entrances—at least twice this coming fall.

Lines: If McGovern wins, Los Angeles will have an unemployment rate that will match Seattle's and Southern California will be the West Virginia of the seventies.

The SST votes, as well as Jackson's quotes, should be used in media ads all over the State of Washington (We lost it in 1960.) McGovern should be blamed for not only threatening future unemployment in Seattle—but for the existing unemployment to aerospace. But, again, the pamphlets should be targeted—and the statements should be made on regional television, primarily.

Defense

6. As stated, Laird is doing an excellent political job. But we ought to go down this list of military cutbacks of McGovern—determine what firms (such as McDonnell in St. Louis) build these various weapons. And all these firms and their employees should be notified by campaign workers, by ads and the like—*just what plants will have to be shut down.*

7. We have Defense already busy at work on a major speech or statement by Laird which will name all the bases that will have to be shut down, by McGovern's defense cuts. This information should be also provided to both Democratic or Republican Congressmen in that district, and to the local press there. And the Democrats should be called upon to support or repudiate McGovern's cuts.

8. In every "conservative" district—our people should be provided with the McGovern book; and Republican candidates should be encouraged to call upon their Democrats to repudiate this or that particular stand of their national candidate. This will require distribution, eventually of hundreds of copies of our completed book.

9. We believe sections of this attack book should be sent out, piecemeal, to all pro-Nixon columnists and newspapers in the country. We can have it printed in sections by the Republican National Committee—condensed even further than it is in a tight handy book for newsmen and editorial writers. But this should be done—only after the specifics in each section have been used to make front-page attacks.

10. All military publications, Navy League, etc., including the conservative publications (NR, ACU, HE, YAF, ASC) should be induced to run in brief, but full, the McGovern Defense Programs, ASAP.

11. We yet believe that the focus of attack on defense should be—at the national level—scare the hell out of the public first; and then follow on and say, that incidentally, this would also mean a loss of X million jobs. McGovern will want us to focus on jobs first—but we should not lose the Defense Argument—we are stronger here, frankly, than on the jobs argument. (For if we don't need those planes and ships and missiles, hell, everyone would want to switch over, as at the end of WWII.)

Welfare

12. McGovern has two proposals. He has tried to get away from the \$6500 per family one—but he can be hung with both. Our speakers, our people on the tube should be conversant with each.

One good line: *"Under George McGovern, two dozen and one hippies could get together and set up a commune in Taos, New Mexico, and not do a lick of work all*

year—and McGovern would send them every year a check for \$25,000. No wonder Jerry Rubin and Abby Hoffman enthusiastically support his candidacy."

Program for business

13. Again, these two pages should be double-checked, then used for fund-raising, and for possible ads in the WSJ, and for scaring the living hell out of the business community.

14. At appropriate time, Shultz and/or John Connally should give a hair-raising speech on what the McGovern proposals would mean to American society, and the American economy and the stock market.

15. From the way the market is reacting, it is apparent that McGovern's nomination should bring about a sharp drop. We should do nothing to prevent this from happening. Indeed, if Shultz or Connally or one of them can predict that McGovern's election would mean a depression or panic on Wall Street, and do it credibly, then they might well do so.

16. Specific business groups—such as real estate firms and brokers and the like—should be the target of *direct mail*, with a brief outline for each of what the McGovern proposals mean to them. To other business groups—direct mail, in this case, is the best means of alerting the businessman, without alerting the liberals—the mailings might well be done (these and others) by independent groups. (Needless to say, the McGovern plan to phase out the oil depletion allowance should not go unnoticed in the Lone Star State.)

Integration and race

17. This has to be handled gingerly—but on digging up that Ribicoff proposal, we find it legitimate to charge McGovern with wanting to by federal direction integrate the suburbs, with favoring "racial balance" in the nation's public schools, with believing that bussing is an "essential" tool to accomplish the job.

On this, our speakers should say, we know George is sincere, but we think that compulsory integration of neighborhoods and schools would lead to racial tensions and disorders, not racial peace and harmony, we oppose him on all three.

18. Southern Senators and Congressmen should be shown the specifics of the Black Caucus program which McGovern has endorsed "in toto,"—even before we use these publicly. The Southerners will have to repudiate McGovern or force McGovern to repudiate these proposals—or take hemlock. Our candidates in the South—Senate and House—should be provided all this material by Harry Dent. As should our State Chairmen in the South. We can put it into form.

19. When McGovern backs off some of these Black radical schemes, as back off he must—we should continue to hang them around his neck—and then mail his recantation to the black media.

20. In Forest Hill, Missouri, and Warren, Michigan—and in blue collar neighborhoods, frankly, speakers should argue against the McGovern integration proposals—and in favor of retaining the integrity and value of ethnic neighborhoods.

Chicago and demonstrators

21. McGovern has said that the May Day demonstrators would not be on the streets but "having dinner at the White House" if he were elected. In this section—we have an idea for a commercial—juxtaposing RN and McGovern on the May Day demonstrators and indicating a vote for McGovern is a vote to have Rubin and Hoffman ("Guess Who's Coming to Dinner") at the White House.

22. McGovern's comments about the Chicago police ("those sons of bitches . . . those bastards") should be used—not prudishly, not condemning him for bad language. He can be excused for that—but condemned for the attitude his statement represents, a lynch mob attitude toward the nation's peace officers, a knee-jerk tendency to [copy illegible] and condemn the policy. This should be done also in letters to the editor to all Chicago papers.

(Independent letters operation—as well as speakers—should be using these materials to target in on sections of the country.)

23. Resurrecting McGovern's comments on Hoover would be most effectively done by the ex-AG and Pat Gray and the Vice President.

24. MONDAY can do an effective job for us—by back-paging each week one of a numbered series of effectively written and documented attacks on McGovern—giving readers materials for use themselves, in the boonies. (For example, suppose MONDAY one week simply ran the McGovern Defense Program as outlined in our package for the locals.)

Ellsburg

25. McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsburg to violate Federal law is a matter which we should wait to exploit . . . say two months after the Demo-

cratic Convention—it should serve as a centerpiece of a national speech—perhaps by the Vice President. (Again, our concern is that we not “mix up” our attack.) One specific area per speech, rather than the Scott, “Three A’s—abortion, amnesty, and acid” approach. This last is so “cute” as to make it appear we are simply political, not serious, in our disagreement with McGovern.

Vietnam

26. Two points should be hammered here: (a) McGovern has been constantly wrong in his predictions about what Hanoi would do; he has even been duped by Xuan Thuy and (b) the SOB would leave our prisoners in Hanoi—and count on the good will of that barbarous regime to get them back. Any attack on his Vietnam position should be prefaced by saying “We do not question his patriotism.”

27. McGovern’s Right from the Start can be countered—but this is a defensive maneuver for us since presumably we think his position wrong now and wrong then. Rather, the approach to be taken here is to charge that he is a) Old Sour Grapes is harassing and stabbing in the back the President who is ending a war his President could not win or end and b) McGovern waffled all over the lot on the War, like every other Democratic politician and we have the quotes here to prove it.

Rhetoric

28. We have dug up a 1964 quote where McGovern called Goldwater the most “unstable radical and extremist” ever to run for the Presidency, which can be used against him. Also, his rhetoric, which we have documented, should be used to make either a pre-emptive or retaliatory strike for his certain charge that we are “polarizing” while he is attempting to “bring us together.”

29. In terming McGovern as an extremist—we should begin by quoting Democrats like Carter, Yorty, Humphrey and Jackson, of course—just as the Rockefeller quotes were more devastating against Goldwater than the LBJ attacks.

McGovern’s friends

30. This fellow Mott, who bankrolls McGovern, is, I understand a screaming fairy who makes \$800,000 a year and pays no taxes—we are trying to interest MONDAY in doing a take-out on him in the near future.

Speakers

31. To make the case against McGovern most credible, we not only need our heavy hitters—but we need the Democrats mentioned—and especially our liberals. Neal Freeman suggests the following be commissioned to do some of the rough work on “George McGovern extremism.”

1. Rockefeller
2. Javits
3. Aiken
4. J. S. Cooper
5. Douglas Dillon
6. Scranton

If of course, we could get Meany, Wallace or Jackson—that would be outstanding.

32. Ken Khachigian and I will monitor McGovern’s appearances and hopefully be mailing and phoning questions to any panels or interviewers. If we have an advancement traveling ahead of the McGovern campaign—he should be providing the questions, which we can provide him.

33. Some on the media are slobbering all over George; they may have to be charged publicly with being pro-McGovern—to force them to back off a bit. In this light, Godfrey Sperling had an excellent piece today, we understand, which perhaps our people should be quoting (Incidentally, given his performance the other night, Vanocur is a positive disaster for us—and McGovern’s most effective campaigner. He may have to be fired or discredited—if we are to get anything approaching an even shake out of that left-wing taxpayer subsidized network.)

34. Again, we have to be on guard against any too harsh or strident an attack. With a hostile media out there—they will pounce on the first allegation of “Tricky Dick,” or “smear” campaign. Perhaps an early address—attacking some of the smear books around already about the President, and some of McGovern’s comments might be used to pre-empt or mitigate this certainty.

35. Mr. Dent can make the argument that George McGovern “said he would be delighted to run with a black man, but not George Wallace.”

36. We need to dig up film of McGovern at some of these demonstrations with the VC flag in the background, and with demonstrators chanting and shouting, etc.

37. From McGovern's statements, it is fair to say he would cut off all assistance to our NATO ally Greece, but consider giving military aid to the black guerrillas in Southern Africa.

38. McGovern favors giving away (Black Caucus) 1% of U.S. GNP to foreign aid, with priority on Africa—which amounts to \$11 billion—about a 400 percent increase in foreign aid.

39. McGovern's old statements about Henry Wallace, about the U.S. starting the Cold War, etc., should be moved into all the ethnic language publications. And all his far left background should be disseminated to the far right in the U.S. for them to publish as it is too complicated for us to handle.

Nixon's Thru in '72

40. This is a slogan we can turn to our own advantage. For example, if Daley is booted out of the Democratic convention—on his arrival at his Mayor's office in Chicago—some bearded types can be out front with signs—"DALEY'S THRU IN '72—VOTE MCGOVERN [copy illegible] for an example, come to mind. Or at Defense Plants "THE M-I-C IS THRU IN '72" (Military Industrial Complex) VOTE MCGOVERN.

We have some other thoughts and ideas—but we are sending these along for immediate consideration.

PJB/KK

EXHIBIT No. 188

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN

FROM: CHUCK COLSON *ccw*

Has anyone run any checks or investigations on the key McGovern staffers? I was told yesterday that Gordon Weil has some very questionable things in his background. He is apparently one of the chief brain trusters who travels with McGovern.

cc: Pat Buchanan

EXHIBIT No. 189

Clark Inc.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

The manner of McGovern's response to our attacks upon his rhetoric, and positions, has emerged. Responding to a rather mild critique of his welfare plan and new politics -- by Herb Stein -- McGovern responded thus:

"He called the attack 'the opening shot of this year's campaign against me and said, 'Nixon obviously realizes that this year's campaign is going to be waged primarily over the rampant unemployment, inflation, economic uncertainty and favoritism, which now burden this country.' "

"The attack (Stein's) tipped his (Nixon's) hand that he is going to try to cover up with the kind of political hatchet work which has characterized every campaign he has ever run. "

Thus, even a mild criticism of McGovern's record will likely produce charges of "Tricky Dick;" "Smear Tactics" the old "Low Road" so familiar to Nixon and his hatchet men. This is, it appears, the McGovern strategy for answering all of the material we have piled up on Georgie; and it is a strategy which McGovern will be counting upon the press to assist in its implementation.

What this means for us, I think, is that we must

A) Be scrupulously accurate in our allegations, and calm and reasoned in quoting his wild statements and positions.

B) Get the jump on McGovern by using his Adolph Hitler quotes, and other blood-curdling charges on the record, before he starts charging us with vicious attacks. We have four or five of McGovern's statements which justify a demand for an apology to the President, which justify further, our moving them into the public press -- with the expressed hope that George McGovern will not do this kind of vicious name-calling, and comparing of the President with Hitler in this campaign. Our hope that George McGovern will get his campaign out of the smear stage, right off the bat. "We intend to confront Mr. McGovern on his issues and his position, but he has an obligation to clear the record of the slanderous libels he has made against the President of the United States; I refer specifically to.... etc. etc. etc.

Each time McGovern raises this charge of "smear" we ought to have those quotes to stuff right down his throat.

In the last analysis, if the need appears, we should be ready to have the President go, late campaign, with a "more in sorrow than anger" speech, detailing the McGovern positions, and denying the "Hitler" charges.

Buchanan

EXHIBIT No. 190

July 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO:

CLARK MACGREGOR
H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

Lines that can be moved by background, and through interviews, into the press. The focus upon the convention will begin to die after the weekend, and continue until ours; and some of these lines will lose much of their currency within a few weeks.

1. The McGovern Market -- Since McGovern won the California nomination the Dow-Jones has dropped 34 points, had dropped every day of the Democratic Convention. McGovern's election would knock the bottom out of it; given his far-out economic positions.
 2. The effect of the "quotas" for young, black, Chicano has been to drive the old people out of the Democratic Convention; while those over 55 amount to 20% of population; they got only eight percent of the Convention seats; Democrats will be hurt with this group badly this fall; as with traditional Catholic and Jewish supporters who, like Meany and Daley, have given way to the kids and the zealots.
 3. The McGovern Myth -- It is a myth to say George was the candidate of the "people;" he lost N. H. and Illinois to Muskie; Ohio and Pennsylvania to Humphrey; Michigan, Maryland and Florida to Wallace; he ducked Indiana and West Virginia.
- Only GOP cross-overs helped him get 29 percent in Wisconsin; and the only major state where he won against a still viable, active opposition was California -- where he blew a 15-point lead in the last ten days -- down from a twenty-point lead to a five-point victory. McGovern's victory is not a popular victory; it is more a coup d'etat of the Democratic Party, where a youthful leftist and suburban leftist elite has deposed and ousted the traditional Catholic and Jewish leadership of the Democratic Party. The fellow is not the people's choice.

McGovern has severely tarnished his reputation for candor and credibility; it is lying in shreds on the floor of the Convention. Here the most pro-abortion on demand candidate opposed his own position in the platform; he deserted the women he promised to support on the South Carolina Challenge; he had his lieutenants gut the tax-economic program he himself is proposing; he deserted the "Chart(r)" to woo back big labor; where for the last ten years he was talking about "begging" in Hanoi; now he is going on about a "residual force." He went downstairs to rap with a hundred screaming demonstrators -- simply because they raised unshirted hell in the lobby -- but could not counsel with the office-holders in his own party. His heart is with the extremist left-wing.

Downgrading Eagleton -- He was -- according to varied reliable estimates -- anywhere from McGovern's 4th to 7th choice. In short, Eagleton is not even the most qualified man who could be picked, and when potential candidates continued to turn McGovern down, he reached down far enough to get someone who would finally take it. Not exactly a tribute to Eagleton's qualifications.

McGovern and Eagleton are both utter lightweights in foreign policy in an age when a deft hand is needed more than ever, to guide the Nation in a transitional period of world politics. (SALT, Open Door to China, Soviets, etc.) McGovern has to his credit the achievement of being Food for Peace Director for 18 months, which means handing out surplus food to third world nations. Eagleton won his foreign policy spurs as Chairman of the Senate District Committee.

McGovern's selection of Eagleton is a triumph of the "old politics" he was picked in deference to his religion, geographical location, purported youthfulness and self-styled ability to cozy it up with the labor bosses.

Buchanan

EXHIBIT NO. 191

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Connelly Attached is the second edition of the McGovern Assault Book. Am turning a copy over to the Vice President (he has his) and to MacGregor, Dole, RNC, Dent and several others. What is needed, however, in my view, and somewhat desperately, is some kind of co-ordination of the Assault Strategy. To date, it has been decidedly haphazard and ad hoc, and time is running by. Recommend thus:

*All sent
H. R. M.
7/24.*

1. An ad hoc committee be set up with MacGregor or his man, Colson, Buchanan, Dole or his man, Lofton, the scheduler of the Surrogates, to lay out the attack strategy for that week or that several days. Further that this group pass judgment on what mailings should go out from White House, RNC, and 1701 -- so that we don't inundate editorial writers and political writers with so much trivia that nothing is used. Further, that the letters operation be tied in, so that we can orchestrate their work -- which in my view has been quite good.

On the briefing material I gave the Vice President, it was used exactly as written; he is a loyal soldier and we should have one of his top people -- say Goodcarle -- to sit in on this group as well.

At this point in time, I think we should be meeting three times a week, at least. Again, we have all the material on McGovern; we need to systematically move it before the public.

2. Suggest that Buchanan be granted authority to do some political backgrounding for the political reporters. Have been over this material more than anyone, and today, I probably know McGovern's positions, and wild statements better than he does. If some of the political reporters were steered over here, for a background basis, we could move some of this stuff out on the record in concert with the speakers.

1219

3. Has any follow-through process been set up to see that those recommendations we made, some forty of them, a month and a half ago, are being carried through at all. We have no way of knowing over here whether these ideas are simply sinking down the memory hole or are being carried out. One gets a feeling of a disjointed operation.

We badly need some central governing body or authority that sees to it that the ideas the President wants implemented are implemented, and that can assess the opposition strategy.

4. Have got everything in thus far, on strategy and opposition, with the single exception of the 5000-word piece, which I will try to get written this week -- during briefing book time. However, would like to devote as much time as possible in the future to strictly anti-McGovern activities, and if as much as possible of the other governmental stuff (except some of those vetos) can be moved elsewhere, it will free up more time for what is Topic A.

Buchanan

1220

EXHIBIT No. 192

10730467230

*Mr. Kruger
Magawala
Mull
Mull
Fisher
Brockman
Felt*

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

August 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: CLARK MCGREGOR
H. R. HALDEMAN
CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Political Suggestions

1. In the Assault Book, we have the quote from McGovern about not "manufacturing foolish projects," like the space shuttle. Would it not be wise to have this put into ads and pamphlets right now in that area of California which just benefited hugely from the space shuttle contract.
2. Along the same lines, the old anti-Tydings ad which was so effective, in my view, in Maryland, "If Joe Wins, You Lose," would seem to me an ideal all-purpose ad for GOPers in areas affected by McGovern's space and defense cuts. "If McGovern Wins, You Lose," or "If McGovern Wins, We Lose." Again, the negative ads, I would think, will do more to make the President a big winner than the positive "Re-Elect the President."
3. Spock-Hobson will get very few votes; but almost one-for-one they will come out of the hide of George McGovern. In California they are said to have some 60,000 (?) workers. The more exposure the two get, the higher the vote they get, the more they take from George. Hobson is, of course, a black militant and if he gets tremendous exposure in the black press -- in ads, etc. -- it could draw off a few thousand black votes from McGovern. Any private help we can give that ticket by ads, PR money, publicity, etc. might help.
4. "I am behind Eagleton 1000%" is now, of course, an ironic term, which we can utilize ourselves, such as George has taken a strong new stand -- he is behind Israel 1000%, the term used as a prelude to a "dumping;" anyhow, it is a light line which can and should be used to reflect on the McGovern deviousness, and can be done in a light fashion

Buchanan

Additional Distribution of Memoranda

SUBJECT: Buckanan Memo
re Political Suggestions

Dailey Failor ✓ Porter _____

LaRue _____ Sedam _____

Marik ✓ Shumway _____

Miller _____ Sloan _____

Odle _____ Teeter _____

Other _____

ee h

EXHIBIT No. 193

September 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BETTY NOLAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

This letter, bearing a Washington Signature should go to every paper in the State of Michigan, and especially to every Catholic newspaper in the State. It should go to the Catholics papers today, if possible, as many of them go to bed on Tuesday night. Suggest using a D. C. name for the letter. Let me know if there are any problems.

Buchanan

cc: Colson
Failor

To the Editor:

According to Monday's New York Times, Michigan voters this fall will decide the abortion-on-demand question for your state -- at the same time they decide on Mr. McGovern's future. The two questions are closely inter-related.

As the attached letter shows, Senator McGovern favors unrestricted abortion policies. And though, today, he claims that he would take no Federal action, to carry out his views, on June 25, 1972, he told the New York Times, he would reverse the President's order and make every military hospital in the nation an abortion center. In an interview by James Naughton:

"He (McGovern) said that as President he would reverse Mr. Nixon's order to military hospitals to abandon the liberalized abortion rules, but would otherwise do nothing to implement his personal view that it should be 'up to the family and doctor' whether an abortion is warranted."

With this pledge, Mr. McGovern made abortion-on-demand -- in military hospitals -- a national as well as a state issue, and voters should consider it, going into the polling booth in November. I pray that you will support the right-to-life of the unborn and reject Mr. McGovern.

Sincerely,

HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
 ALLEN J. ELLINGER, LA.
 JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS.
 B. ENFRETT JORDAN, N.C.
 GEORGE MCGOVERN, D. OAK.
 JAMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
 HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
 LAWTON CHILDS, FLA.
 JACK MILLER, IOWA
 GEORGE D. Aiken, VT.
 MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
 CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
 ROBERT DOLE, KANS.
 HENRY BILLMON, OKLA.

COTTE M. MOUSER, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
 AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 2, 1971

Dear Ms. Gibson:

Thank you for your recent and thoughtful communication regarding abortion.

In my judgment, abortion is a private matter which should be decided by a pregnant woman and her own physician.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours

George McGovern

George McGovern

Ms. Beatrice Gibson
 1708 Fallowfield Avenue
 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216

EXHIBIT NO. 194

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Beginning Monday, there are but seven weeks left in the Presidential campaign. Our two operative principles on the attack in those seven weeks should be a) the issues of 1972 have long ago been decided and made and b) we should re-cycle those issues, points and positions which resulted in the collapse of the McGovern campaign. There seems to be a tendency on our part at times to seek out some new indiscretion on the part of the Opposition and attack that simply because it is "new." When we have an airtight case of forcible rape -- this is like saying, "And yeah, we can get him for jaywalking, too."

In the last few days, in my judgment, we have allowed McGovern to "lead" the national debate; our major political statements have focused (i. e., Butz counter-charges, and MacGregor) precisely on those issues McGovern thinks are the only winners he has. In addition, we have sought to counter the charges of campaign financing finagling with the old discredited "tu quoque" argument ("you're another")--which is the weakest of all arguments.

Meanwhile, little has gone into the public record in the last several days -- from us -- which focuses on and advances the major personal and political issues which are ours. This is partly our fault; but partly the reason is that we now need heavier guns than the ones we have been using.

There may be a point to muddying up the matter -- but we have other fish to fry this fall; and we ought to be about that business.

THE FIRST WEEK. I would open up with two barrels this week. The first is Foreign Policy. And the Vice President is the man. High-level defense of RN's brilliant foreign policy is first third -- and then into McGovern's Asian and European policies as enunciated by him and Chayes.

Filled in with McGovern quotes; McGovern on the POWs; McGovern on the Middle East. Conclusion and lead -- George McGovern is a well-intentioned, but naive bungler, whose foreign policy views are foolish and would be dangerous to the peace and security of the United States and the world. Call for a national debate on two opposing views of America's role in the world. The second barrel would be a John B. Connally, highly publicized response to McGovern, hammering on the title Confidence and Credibility. All of the McGovern waffles would be rolled into this one on the credibility side -- the McGovern flip-flops -- then also, in a peroration, the worst of the McGovern radical rhetoric. Why John Connally broke with McGovern, could include Hoover remark, Hitler remarks, etc. Extremist rhetoric unbecoming a presidential candidate -- least of all these charges is what he says about me. If we could get that peroration on the air; "the language of an extremist" we could resurrect our big winner. Also, to be included here is the Humphrey, Jackson, Muskie and Meany statements -- the more brutal ones on McGovern. Why Democrats are staying away in droves.

The two speeches would be on different days -- maybe two days apart. Given free time, I could get done the entire first speech and the "core" of the second.

What we ought to remember in both these speeches is that the press is less interested in writing about a pro-speech, than they are about attack material -- whether the attack is high level or low level. Both speeches should be built up -- and we should make our television on them those nights.

Note: The attack group should be aware of what the President is doing that day also for media -- he can knock us off the front pages and the networks quicker than anyone else.

THE SECOND WEEK. Economics and Welfare. Connally and/or the Veep would be excellent on Economics. Reagan, if he would do one of our speeches, would be ideal on Welfare at the National Press Club.

The economic speech would give the voters a choice between the present prosperity and radical change -- radical change that would mean a busted stock market (capital gains tax), a destroyed aerospace industry and an undeclared economic war in the American middle class. The McGovern previous proposals should be regurgitated; his simplistic and naive approach should be laid out. His \$100 billion increase in budget and thousand in taxes the lead. The language in an economic

speech is vital. We could work on this one as well. The Welfare speech should focus on McGovern, of course, as in favor of pouring millions more in; putting millions more onto the rolls.

These items should serve as the key for surrogate speakers as well. However, the letters operation need not be geared in to this -- in our judgment that should be moving the negative, radical material on McGovern into the key states at full blast. We can be much more direct in letters than in rhetoric.

THE THIRD WEEK. The Social Issue. In this week a major address should be written, again preferably with the Veep in the lead-off contrasting the President and McGovern on social issues. Marijuana and drugs. McGovern's endorsement of the Black Caucus and what it contains. Bussing, bussing, bussing. RN versus McGovern on the use of scatter-site housing; amnesty. While the Vice President can high level this -- laying out the deep differences between the two -- others can really start hitting hard on the issue. Also, law and order, the Hoover quote -- etc. This can all be drawn into this question. This is 1970 politics, but the issues are ours this time, and if we can get McGovern talking on them, they are winners. No name-calling -- just point out here the radical record.

THE FOURTH WEEK. Defense. This is one area McGovern has held fast. We could lay out his defense budget at the top level and portray it as an invitation to disaster in Europe, the Mideast, the world, the future. Again, here we have quotes from Jackson and Humphrey to back us up. And two days after the defense speech -- there is released the "ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE MCGOVERN DEFENSE BUDGET" from Laird to Capitol Hill, giving state by state the number of jobs lost by McGovern Defense Budget and aerospace cuts, also the number of bases shut down and exactly which ones and where. All laid out, special mailing to every newspaper in every state in the country. Something he will never catch up with.

Within this week as well, we ought to have some real tough speeches in the aerospace communities, the "Ghost Town" stuff. Also, the same thing they did to us around the military bases in 1970. Included in the military stuff would be McGovern's attack on the Military Industrial Complex whereas what he is talking about is the workers at GE, McDonnell, etc.

If we go this route, we are at the Middle of October -- there is no need now to decide what we will do those last three weeks. This includes our basic inventory of large, overall issues. Other sub-themes include:

A) The Ellsberg connection, tying McGovern to him and his crime -- as soon as the indictment come down, if McGovern insists on charging people, uncharged by the Grand Jury. This would be a separate tough attack; and it should be echoes all over the country.

B) Space, and defense should of course be on-going issues for any speaker in a community near an aerospace plant or military base. Perhaps our Nixon people ought to be doing what they did to us in 1970 -- put out the rumor around every big base in the country that if McGovern is elected this base will shut down, this plant will close.

C) The McGovern Quotes need to be gotten out. We will do another mailing on the Best Twenty-five -- and maybe the time has come to move them and our Attack Book (truncated) to the National Press, or at least the most friendly of the national columnists.

D) The Democratic Party and its rescue. This is an ideal Connally Big Speech some time, urging Democrats to take back the party of their fathers, by repudiating the extremists who have seized it in November. In the speech, he could lay out cold all the radical leftism, and extremism of McGovern positions, a real blistering speech on McGovern, the kind that the President and the Vice President cannot make -- but hitting him on the twenty odd issues where he has been so vulnerable. The kind of thing that Human Events would publish -- genuinely hard, which we could then get out into the hands of our entire speakers list from top to bottom to use, as their basic text.

E) We have to start back to getting the Democratic anti-McGovern quotes into the record again -- The Meany, Humphrey, Jackson quotes. Also, the "elitism" and "extremism" themes need to be renewed to the average voter.

F) The attack group should continue -- making sure that these themes are moved week-by-week -- still meeting day-by-day to key off something McGovern has said, to fire at targets of opportunity, to program our people on the media to keep moving all these good materials we have back into the public record again and again. The Hoover quotes and the quotes on the Chicago Police are two examples. Our objective should be to either move McGovern off of his Watergate issue, onto our issues or kill him on our issues; secondly, to continually break any momentum he develops by changing the subject in a week.

FINAL NOTE: Again, the critical point is that just as McGovern ought to make "Nixon" the issue -- so the issue this fall is McGovern. Will

he and the hard-core left-winger radicals who took over the party take over America. That's the bottom line. If the country goes to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, thinking him vaguely anti-America and radical and pro the left-wingers and militants, then they will vote against him -- which means for us. What we have done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President thirty-four points ahead -- but McGovern thirty-four points behind.

The best tribute to what we have done, I think, came from McGovern I believe just after the convention when he said -- "They've got fifteen guys shooting at me from all sides while the President's acting like he's not even in a campaign." If we can continue that, we're golden.

Buchanan

EXHIBIT No. 195

FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA.
FEB 28, 1972

MR. W. LOEB
M.A. CHESTER UNION LEADER
MANCHESTER, N.H.

DEAR MR LOEB:

I AM HAROLD W. ELDRIDGE, RETIRED AND A LIFELONG CAPE COD RESIDENT, FORCED TO STAY IN FLORIDA DUE TO A HEART CONDITION, AGE 76 YEARS.

I WAS THE PERSON THAT ASKED MR MUSKIE THE QUESTION ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BLACKS. A YOUNG MAN COMPANION OF HIS, CUT INTO MY QUESTION AND MADE A JOKE OUT OF IT, HE DID SAY "THAT MAINE HAD FEW BLACKS, BUT DID HAVE A LARGE ETHNIC MINORITY, COMMONLY CALLED "CANUCKS" AT THIS POINT A YOUNG LAD STANDING NEAR ME WITH SOME FRIENDS, ASKED WHAT THEY WERE, AND SOME ONE ANSWERED SOMETHING ABOUT COME TO NEW ENGLAND AND SEE.

I READ ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN MANCHESTER IN THIS SUNDAYS FT. LAUDERDALE PRESS, I TRIED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE NEWS DESK EARLY, THE YOUNG LADY TELEPHONE OPERATOR LISTENED TO MY STORY, AND SAID TO CALL BACK AT THREE PM IN THE AFTERNOON, I CALLED AGAIN AT THREE PM, AND A YOUNG MAN ANSWERED THE TELEPHONE LISTENED TO ME, AND SAID THE THE DESK MAN WOULD BE IN ABOUT FOUR PM, I HAD MADE TWO TRIPS OUT TO THE TELEPHONE, SO I WILL CALL THEM TODAY. THE YOUNG LAD FROM DEERFIELD DID NOT LIE, HE TOLD THE TRUTH. I DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO ANY FUSS ABOUT A STUPID REMARK, MY HEART CONDITION WILL NOT ALLOW IT. I HAVE READ OVER THIS LETTER TYPED BY A GOOD NEIGHBOR FOR ME AND IT IS JUST WHAT HAPPENED.

Harold W. Eldridge

THE ABOVE LETTER is reproduced just as it arrived at the Union Leader. It tends to confirm a previous letter by Paul Morrison, reproduced on Page 16 and also postmarked from Florida. Sen. Muskie has

in effect, called the Morrison letter a fraud. Readers may be interested in weighing this additional evidence of what was said by Sen. Muskie in Florida.

EXHIBIT No. 196

2/24/72 Manchester Union Leader #19

FEB 17, 1972
Deerfield Beach
FLA.MR Loeb -
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
MANCHESTER
New Hampshire

Dear Mr Loeb - I saw you on TV the other night and my friends father gets your newspaper. We went to Ft. Lauderdale to meet Sen Muskie - we were right beside him at Seal house, when one of the men asked him what did he know about blacks and the problems with them - he didnt have any in Maine - A man with the Senator said "I got hot blacks but we have CANNOCKS"

What did he mean? We asked Mr Muskie laughed and said come to New England and see. could you ~~right~~ write me the answer. or print it in your paper - my friend gets it from you. Thank you.

(PAUL MORRISON
Deerfield Beach
FLA. 33001)

EXHIBIT No. 197



UNITED DEMOCRATS for KENNEDY

Headquarters:

7894 GEORGIA AVENUE
SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND 20901

Telephone:

ROBIN FICKER (Chairman)
Office: (202) 833-2450
Home: (301) 589-5245

Dear New Hampshire Voter:

Time and again the men and women of the Granite State have demonstrated their independence and rugged individualism, leading the way for the rest of the nation. Now is again such a time. Through your votes in the democratic Primary this year you can change America's course.


All of the Democratic candidates are good men but they are not great men. Only one man -- Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts -- has the strength, the sensitivity, the personal qualities of leadership to be a great president.

Moreover, every poll demonstrates that Kennedy is the one Democrat who will surely beat Richard Nixon in November. He has never wavered in his convictions; he alone can rally the poor, the blacks, the young, the old, the farmer, the laborer and the middle class into a winning coalition.

The Senator decided not to seek the Democratic Presidential nomination. But, if the Citizens of New Hampshire call for him to lead us by writing in his name on the Democratic ballot, that example will be followed by millions of Americans across the country. And Senator Kennedy will answer our call.

These are troubled days for America. None of our present candidates -- Republican or Democratic -- can inspire our people and lift our nation out of its doldrums; Senator Kennedy can; he can change America's priorities and direction; he can restore our sense of purpose; he will complete the unfinished business so nobly begun by his brothers before him.

Robin Ficker



Chairman
United Democrats
for Kennedy

REMEMBER: ON MARCH 7, WRITE IN KENNEDY FOR PRESIDENT

EXHIBIT No. 198

HELP
Muskie

DEM.

SUPPORT
BUSSING
MORE CHILDREN
NOW

EXHIBIT No. 199

LAW OFFICES
KALMBACH, DeMARCO, KNAPP & CHILLINGWORTH

SUITE 900 • NEWPORT FINANCIAL PLAZA / 550 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE
NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA 92660
TELEPHONE (714) 844-4111

HERBERT W. KALMBACH
FRANK DeMARCO, JR.
SHERWOOD C. CHILLINGWORTH
HAROLD BERAL
ALEXANDER BOWIE
ROBERT M. OLSON, JR.
ROBERT H. MORRISON
RICHARD C. GREENBERG
THOMAS D. PECKENPAUGH
TERRY L. RHODES
OAKLEY C. FROST
ALAN R. WOLLEN
LARRY B. THRALL
ERIC W. MARTENS
RALPH J. MORGAN
DAVID PATTERSON SMITH
WESTON L. JOHNSON
BRUCE E. HARRINGTON

LOS ANGELES OFFICE
611 WEST SIXTH STREET • SUITE 1900
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017
TELEPHONE (213) 625-2191

OF COUNSEL
JAMES R. KNAPP
JAMES H. O'CONNOR

September 27, 1971

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Donald H. Segretti
14013 West Captains Row
Apartment 117
Marina del Ray, California

Dear Don:

Enclosed are two checks: one for \$667 for services rendered for the last half of September, 1971; the other (\$5,000) represents an advance for anticipated expenses.

Please let me know if you have any questions or if there is any way in which I can be of additional assistance.

Regards,



Herbert W. Kalmbach

HWK/ah

Enclosures

LAW OFFICES
KALMBACH, DeMARCO, KNAPP & CHILLINGWORTH
SUITE 900 NEWPORT FINANCIAL PLAZA
550 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE
NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA 92660

Mr. Donald H. Segretti
14013 W. Captains Row
Apt. 117
Marina del Ray, CA 90291

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT No. 200

September 28, 1971
4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in among demonstrators who are demonstrating against the President. It should be MUSKIE FOR PRESIDENT in big letters and should be held in a location so that it is clearly visible.

At Muskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, there should be a sign or two which goads them. For example, at a Muskie rally there should be a large WHY NOT A BLACK VICE PRESIDENT or perhaps WE PREFER HUMPHREY or something else that would goad him along.

At Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies, there should be Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be well-placed in relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get.

EXHIBIT No. 201

Senator Muskie:

Can you answer?

Why -

Do you REFUSE to even CONSIDER a Black or Chicano as a running mate? Your public answer that they do not yet have "political equality" only fosters any bias that exists and avoids the question.

Do you speak in terms of equality for minorities yet send your children to all-white private schools in Wash D.C.? ACTION, not WORDS, are the mark of a true liberal!

Speak against Vietnam yet continue to support the draft which has a bias against minorities?

Allow your personal Catholic views on abortion dictate your public stand AGAINST modern abortion laws? Abortion should be a personal matter and not dictated to individuals by YOUR religious views.


Why did you vote FOR UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA by voting against the SST? Such action shows a bias against California by an out-of-state carpetbagger!

Are you a bigot with a temper?

* RECYCLE This *

EXHIBIT No. 202

Dwight L. Chapin



Mr. Don Seguth
14013 West Cogburn Row
(Apt 112)
Marina Del Rey, California

POLITICS

Don -
 Ask me really mind etc
 back on this
 obviously the pen now
 went to give EH con-
 keep his temper - lets
 from he can't.

X
 You &

Frank Reynolds reported times have changed since RN went to Whittier, but it is still not a hot bed of radicalism. Still when Muskie came to speak he found a group of Chicanos had taken over the stage. Muskie on film said he would like to "make one thing perfectly clear." ... Whittier is not the only place RN has been where I would like to go." Laughter. Reynolds said Ed had come prepared for conservative questions but the Chicanos gave them no chance, and Big Ed proved he could keep his cool. Muskie reportedly was pleased by the reception he received from those willing to listen, but more importantly, said Reynolds, he proved he can keep his temper under stress. ... UPI says Muskie got an "enthusiastic response" at Whittier as he exhorted over 1,000 students to get out and vote and change the country. He speculated that drop in Gallup may have been due to black VP statement. He favored abortions for therapeutic reasons but opposed them as birth control measure. ... David Carley, Muskie's Wisconsin chairman, said Proxmire's decision to opt out makes that state's primary the most valid and most important in US.

HHH said the Admin "will try to substitute advertising for achievement" in a \$35-million campaign to re-elect RN. "Our response," Humphrey said, "must be action, progressive leadership and bold new policies for a brighter America tomorrow." Noting RN's visits to China and Russia, HHH said "we may see him with Mao near the Great Wall, but will we see him at Hunters Point, in Watts or East Los Angeles?" ... Gov. Carter of Ga. says Dem nominee will have to get tougher than is now apparent on busing to get his support. He emphasized that Dems mustn't be anti-South and Southern Dems want full partnership in party.

AP notes Monday and Dole's speech indicate GOP is taking issue with EMK's verbal attacks on RN. The Star's Paul Hope writes on EMK's "dramatic rebound" and sees him essentially in the race while noting anti-Kennedyites are wondering where EMK gets off in questioning RN's integrity, as he has so often recently, considering Chappaquiddick. ... John Roche finds good reasons for seeing EMK as the likely choice the he

EXHIBIT No. 203

| | | | |
|--|--|---|----------------------------------|
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| KIND OF BUSINESS EVALUATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN MATERIAL | | | |
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| SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT <i>James R. Norton</i> | | DATE OF APPLICATION JANUARY 4, 1972 | |
| ADDRESSES VERIFIED BY <i>Inquiry Jan 11/72</i> | | TELEPHONE NUMBERS VERIFIED BY | |

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| REMARKS: | <p><u>Re: Address verification - attached</u></p> <p>The residence address has been verified for the patron listed below:</p> <p>James R. Norton, dba Citizens Comm. for Representative Gov. 7 Buckskin Lane Rolling Hill Est., CA</p> <p style="text-align: right;">90182</p> <p><i>Notified</i> JAN 12 1972</p> | | | |

EXHIBIT No. 204

Flatland Park
Singo Park at
Chicago Avenue.

Ida M. Fisher
Gymnasium,
Ice and Penn.

Set on front
feet and given

WFO 65-6983

BE HEALTHY—Limber, vital even over 80, with corrective massages, corrective exercises, stretch-omatic. Multiple Sclerosis research pays off. Correction now possible. Reducing and yoga classes daily 2 p.m.-5 p.m. **ALL THERAPY FOUNDATION** SPTX & SOLARIUM. Call 949-350-3716.

SENATOR MUSKIE—You Wouldn't accept a Black or an American Indian, would you accept a Jewish running-mate?

AS
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SERVI

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CALL A
NEA

arXiv:0904.0644 [hep-th]

and card readings. Offer all clients such as future love, career business, lucky days, and more. Blvd. for appointments 2500 Madison Drive.

YOUR HOROSCOPE CAST—for the next 2 years. Also Private Readings. 371-3024.

Senator Muskie Would You Accept A JEWISH RUNNING MATE?

5. Special Notices

ALL For rent suitable for
parties, dances, weight wat-
ching, etc. Available by month or
week. Address her, piano call
10-1019.

16. Privileging Schools

Full and Part Time
Available. Complete
Supplemental year
starts a new career
Officer. Good oppor-
tunity. All have
clean record
and telephone.

DURNIN
 SECURITY S
 1401 7th Cal.

Mon. Fri. 7 a.m.
Sat. 9 a.m. - 6

Equal Opportunity

CARPET CO.-n.
Cleaners & M.
necessary 150 0

GC-12345-4 3:00
10/25/2005 10:00PM

FOR STUDENTS
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Box 507, San

ORGAN PLAYER WANTS TO JOIN
ROCK GROUP. DUAL EARFISA. EX-
PERIENCED. Call 666-8342.

WANTED: SINCERE GENTLEMAN
SEEKS RUNNING-MATE. White
preferred, But natural sense of
rhythm no obstacle. Contact E.
Muskie.

People roommate to share one bed.
room furnished, air-conditioned
apartment with pool. Call evenings,
661-5635.

10 Park
Park at
Avenue.

Fisher
asylum,
1. Perca

Front
Ocean

BE HEALTHY—Limber, vital even over 80, with corrective massages, corrective exercises, stretchomatic. Multiple Sclerosis research pays off. Correction now possible. Reducing and yoga classes daily 2 p.m.-6 p.m. **ALL THERAPY FOUNDATION SPA**
SOLARJIMA Call 949.330.0010 ext. 3713

SENATOR MUSKIE—You Wouldn't accept a Black or an American Indian, would you accept a Jewish running-mate?

**AT
HOT
SERVIC**

BEL
TOP COMM
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WORK AT PRICES YOU
5% DISCOUNT TO

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 ne other
 ded, Cal

Found: Men's brown horn rim glasses. Found between engineering and Memorial Bldg. May be picked up in Ashe 319

Lost; Running — Mole. Answers to the name "Boy." Black; small reward. If found Contact E. Muskie Immediately.

MISCELLANEOUS

Sensuous &
Chick, phone,

Master, You are
everything is yours
(... and I am
slave.

F. J. MIZZLES,
ABOUT WITH
RIER . . . WE
GUESS WHO

CAN WE TRUST MUSKIE WHEN:

He supports bussing **OUR** children, yet sends **his** children to private all-white schools in Washington D.C.! Is this the way a public official should set an example in our democracy?

He advocates political equality for all persons without regard to race, religion, or color; yet Muskie states publicly he would **NOT** accept a Black or American Indian for the Vice-President nomination. Such a public statement by a leading Democrat fosters such political inequality. Where does he stand with regard to other minorities (such as Jewish persons)?

He talks about the unemployment, yet **opposes** the SST and the space-shuttle. Has Muskie proposed any viable alternative to assist this segment of our economy? How many of us have friends who are unemployed engineers?

He actively foster's an image of a poor man's campaign; yet raised \$86,000 at a \$250 a plate dinner in Los Angeles on Feb 21, 1972. In truth isn't **EM THE Fat cat** of the party? If he hits you for a donation ask him about this:

Muskie Raises \$150,000, A Record, at Maine Dinner


Special to The New York Times
PORTLAND, Me., Jan. 15—Nearly 700 supporters of United States Senator Edmund S. Muskie turned out here last night for a dinner that raised about \$150,000 for his Democratic Presidential campaign.

No political dinner in Maine had ever before raised so much money. The previous high was \$80,000, raised in 1970 when Senator Muskie successfully sought re-election as a Senator.

A private reception was held last night for those who contributed \$1,000 each. Dinner tickets were \$250. The proceeds will be used to finance the Muskie primary campaign in New Hampshire.

N.Y. Times/Jan 16

1972



**BUS
MUSKIE
HOME!**

ALL ABOUT ED MUSKIE

All observers agree that emotional stability, trustworthiness, and coolness under fire are essential qualities for any man seeking the Presidency. Herewith, some comments on Ed Muskie's qualifications:

THEO LIPPMAN AND DON HANSEN - Muskie's biographers: "A potentially explosive man with a waspish temper . . . often triggered by the trivial . . . Nobody doubts that Muskie's temper tantrums are genuine." -- in their book, Muskie.

SUSAN SHEEHAN - Muskie biographer: "Muskie's sisters . . . remember him as a stubborn man with a nasty temper, who would tease them but not take teasing in return. A friend recalled that, when he was in his 30's, he kicked over a Monopoly board after another player made a lucrative move." -- in the N.Y. Times Magazine

IRENE MUSKIE - The Senator's sister: "Ed . . . has a terrible temper. Ed just couldn't bear to lose a game. If he lost he'd throw the cards, yell, and stamp off." --Theo Lippman and Don Hansen, in their book, Muskie.

PAUL HOPE -- Syndicated columnist: "Muskie . . . has a rather short fuse . . . He frequently boils and fumes." --Washington Star

GODFREY SPERLING - Political reporter: "He loses his cool under pressure, can very well evoke voter uncertainties on how the man might react under the much greater uncertainties of the Presidency. Would we want him to be the one who must make the decision on pushing the nuclear button?" --Christian Science Monitor

THE STAKES IN PRESIDENTIAL POLICY MOVES ARE MUCH GREATER THAN THOSE IN A MONOPOLY GAME. CAN WE TRUST ED MUSKIE UNDER PRESSURE, FELLOW DEMOCRATS?

SEN. EDMUND S. MUSKIE - On himself: "I don't urge people to trust me. I don't really think that as a man I'm more trustworthy than other men." --Washington Post

MRS. JOSEPHINE MUSKIE - The Senator's mother: "I don't know why Ed wants to be President. I don't see anything wrong with the President we have now." --quoted in the National Review

SEN. VANCE HARTKE (D-Ind.) - "Muskie isn't going to win. I don't think he has a political principle in him other than the fact he thinks he ought to be President. People aren't dumb, they're going to see through it." --Village Voice.

TRUST MUSKIE?

We think that President Harry Truman put it best, Sen. Muskie: "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen." Good politics and bad temper don't mix.

COMMITTEE FOR A STABLE CANDIDATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. T. FOLEY, CHAIRMAN

Of the Lot

TAMPA — I read with regret in the December 29 Tribune about Senators Muskie and McGovern's comments on the bombing of North Vietnam. It seems that whenever Muskie or McGovern make a statement to the press, it usually has to do with foreign policy, mainly Vietnam.

It's a pity that some Democratic Presidential candidates are still capitalizing on this worn-out issue. They give little indication of what they would do for the domestic welfare of Americans if they should unfortunately, for us, become President. They are so busy campaigning they cannot be in the Senate to vote on important domestic issues.

McGovern is occupying himself with a mass search for a member of a minority to be Vice President and twelve different representations for his Cabinet. Muskie is worried about keeping his temper and meanwhile escapading about the countryside enjoying his father-like sincerity image implanted upon us by the press.

I don't know much about the Democratic Presidential hopefuls who presently hold public office, but many act this way. In other words, they are too busy campaigning to fulfill their obligation of serving America.

One man, Senator Edward Kennedy, is better than the whole bunch. His concerns range from health problems to the war. He has the courage, the will power, and the support to lead the party. He is the man who deserves the nomination rather than these political monsters who are still waving a useless war issue and who are themselves useless to the Democratic Party and America.

J. P.

Hubert Humphrey and Mayor Dave Kennedy have conspired in not supporting Senator Muskie's military assistance for Israel plan that provides \$500,000,000 for military sales and credits.

The other candidates are lukewarm in their support of Senator Muskie's full-scale support of the Israeli's cause. All labor supporters are urged to join with the freedom loving people of Israel to support Senator Muskie in his valiant fight for the Democratic nomination.

EXHIBIT No. 205

February 25, 1972

CITIZENS
FOR
MUSKIECitizens for Muskie
CommitteeTop of the Biscayne
Terrace Hotel, 340
Biscayne Blvd.,
Miami, Florida
33132

Campaign Manager
Jackson for President
Senate Office Building
Room 137
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I have voted in Democratic campaigns for several years, but I have never seen the kind of abuse to the Party going on this year. I have worked for Senator Muskie for several months and the only trust and believing I have left in his campaign staff is that they will continue to lie, cheat, and mislead the Democratic voters. I have seen his state staff people invite several thousand people to a rally in Tampa on January 7, 1972, and then joke about the fact that the room they rented could only accomodate 400 people. The theory of Alan Baron was that the press would be impressed with the over-flow crowd. But what of the Senator's responsibility to those who sincerely want to hear and see him in person? In addition, these same people planted "loyal" workers to ask easy questions. Is this moral?

All this I was told is the way to work things if you really want to win, but I have finally had it... and this is the reason:

United States Congressman Sam Gibbons has "loaned" full-time to Senator Muskie's Headquarters in Tampa his federally paid assistant Hector Alcade, two U.S. Government-owned IBM electric typewriters (serial numbers 9064754 and 5274506), continuous use of the Congressman's secretaries for a whole week in January when Muskie's state headquarters was moved to Miami, and the use of the Congressman's mailing privileges. The typewriters are located at 330 W. Platt Street, Tampa, Florida.

Perhaps I am naive to object to taxpayer's paying for Senator Muskie's campaign -- but I do object! This is not honest!

I have resigned my position on the Muskie staff and hope that all campaigns are not run the way this one has been. Perhaps you can do something to straighten things out.

Sincerely,
A FORMER MUSKIE STAFF WORKER
IN MIAMI (under Mary Gooden)

cc: Richard Gilliam
Florida State Chairman
Jackson for President
238 W. Kennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33606

EXHIBIT No. 206

CITIZENS FOR MUSKIE



Citizens for Muskie
Committee
Top of the Biscayne
Terrace Hotel 340
Biscayne Blvd.,
Miami, Florida
33132

Dear Fellow Democrats:

Primary time is upon us and I am sure you have been smothered with literature from many candidates. We on the Senator Ed Muskie staff sincerely hope you have decided upon Senator Muskie as your choice he is the best qualified to be President in November.

However, if you have not made your decision you should be aware of several facts:

Senator Henry Jackson of Everett, Washington, was involved with a seventeen-year-old girl named Joan Cramer while he was a senior at Everett High School. The result was an illegitimate daughter, named Mary Ann Cramer, born February 7, 1929. He refused to marry the girl and after a paternity suit paid child support until September of 1937, when for \$4,500 he settled with the mother. Prior to his marriage to Helen Hardin on December 16, 1961 he was arrested twice in Washington, D.C. as a homosexual. Once was May 5, 1955, and the second October 17, 1957. No charges were ever brought against him because of his position.

Senator Hubert Humphrey has similar skeletons in his closet. He was arrested for drunk driving in Washington, D.C. on December 3, 1967 after hitting two parked cars and a mailbox. In his car at the time was a known call girl named Mary Virginia Reese. Miss Reese was paid to entertain Senator Humphrey for the evening by Mr. John Murray, a lumber lobbyist. Senator Humphrey is on the Agriculture and Forestry Committee of the Senate.

These are not pleasant facts, but they should be considered by you before you vote on March 14.

15
Qualie Hight

JUAN ANTONIO**AVISO A LOS CUBANOS**

**EL SENADOR EDMUND MUSKIE
FUE MISINTERPRETADO RECIENTEMENTE AL DECIR QUE LOS E.U.
DEBEN AYUDAR A LOS CUBANOS
A BOTAR EL GOBIERNO DE
CASTRO. ED MUSKIE CREE QUE
TODAS LAS PERSONAS TIENEN
DERECHO A EL GOBIERNO QUE
ELLOS ELIJAN Y DEBEN RESOLVER
SUS MISMOS PROBLEMAS.
COMO BUENOS AMERICANOS, NO
DEBEMOS INTERFERIR. MUSKIE
NACIO EN MAINE Y ES UN BUEN
AMERICANO. VOTE POR ED
MUSKIE.**

Replica -

TRANSLATION -- Senator Edmund Muskie was recently misunderstood to say that the U. S. ought to help Cubans overthrow the Castro government. Ed Muskie believes that everyone has the right to the government they elect and to solve their own problems. As good Americans, we should not interfere. Muskie was born in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie.

EXHIBIT No. 208

NEWSMAKERS

MEET
JANE
MUSKIE!

The beautiful people are El Morocco bound again, gliding into the New York nightspot that has opened and closed like a gilded accordion in recent years. In its latest incarnation, the cafe-society landmark retains many familiar features—the zebra-striped banquettes, the fake palm trees and even Angelo the maître d' and Ellen the cigarette girl. One departure is that El Morocco has become a private club, with a \$500 initiation fee and \$200 annual dues for such couples as Jacqueline and Aristotle Onassis, who turned up at one of last week's reopening shindies. Hope Hampton and Huntington Hartford were on hand, too. Elmo's clientele is still A-1, but prices are phase two—a mere \$2.50 for scrambled eggs and \$8.50 for a dinner that once would have cost \$30.

TV personality Joe Garagiola, 45, a former catcher in the majors, came on the air sounding as if he had let the team down by dropping an easy foul pop. "Jesus Christ, I'm sorry, goddamit," he fumed in frustration after repeatedly blowing lines while taping-of all things—a Christmas commercial for his morning show on NBC television. By mistake, a station technician included the profane outburst in the tape that was unwittingly broadcast by more than 100 stations around the country, and Garagiola charged himself with the error. "I sincerely apologize for that blunder," he said on his program the next day. "It will never happen again."

The White House could be in for a drastic change of pace if Jane Muskie becomes First Lady. Campaigning in New Hampshire last week for "Big Daddy," as she jokingly referred to her husband, the Maine Democrat's 44-year-old wife unleashed the kind of style that provided a field day for Women's Wear Daily reporter Kandy Stroud, who took down all the breezy quotes. "Let's tell dirty jokes," shouted Jane to the reporters and aides aboard her chartered bus. Also: "Pass me my purse—I haven't had my morning cigarette yet." She chewed gum, sighed that she couldn't wear a certain dress because someone else had "the g.d. thing on" and owned up to a preference for two drinks before dinner and crème de menthe afterward "because the next day everything seems to work just right. But I can't mix booze and wine or I get a headache and have little dreams." Spying Senator Ed's picture in a newspaper, his wife hooted: "There he is. Isn't he cute?"

And the late Adm. Richard E. Byrd by the South Pole as he said he did? The claim that Byrd's claim to the first polar flight had been challenged before, but never as fully as this. "It was an out-and-out lie," said polar veteran Bernt Balchen, 72, a Byrd colleague who was his chief pilot on the



Adm. and Jane at El Morocco: Zebra-stripe

expedition that made the last flight over the South Pole in 1929. According to Balchen, the lieutenant "Josephine Ford" flown by Byrd and captain Floyd Beaman was too slow to make the round trip between Norway's Spitzbergen islands and the North Pole in the elapsed time of less than sixteen hours. "Floyd told me the whole story," said Balchen, who accounts for his previous silence on the subject by insisting that the name episode was deleted from his autobiography when Byrd's son refused to sign the publisher. The episode surfaced in Virginia Sen. Harry F. Byrd's column. Balchen's charges were printed in an interview last week. "It is significant," says the senator, "that the entire Balchen ex-

Floyd Be years, an Admiral teen year

Lyndon after a I cigarette tribulation man w years i smoke,

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Jane Muskie: Boost for 'Big Daddy'

December 27, 1971


NEWSMAKERS

The beautiful people are El Morocco-bound again, gliding into the New York nightspot that has opened and closed like a gilded accordion to recent years. In its latest incarnation, the cafe-society landmark retains many familiar features—the zebra-striped banquettes, the fake palm trees and even Angèle the maître d' and Eileen the cigarette girl. One departure is that El Morocco has become a private club, with a \$500 initiation fee and \$200 annual dues for such couples as Jacqueline and Aristotle Onassis, who turned up at one of last week's reopening shindies. Hope Hampton and Huntington Hartford were on hand, too. Elmo's clientele is still A-1, but prices are phase two—a mere \$2.50 for scrambled eggs and \$8.50 for a dinner that once would have cost \$30.

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Did the late Adm. Richard F. Byrd fly the same plane as the first polar flight in 1926 has been debated before, but never as bluntly as "It was an out-and-out lie." So says polar veteran Bernt Balchen, 72, a former pilot colleague who was his chief pilot on



Admiral Jackie at El Morocco: Zebra stripes and phase-two prices

extension that made the first flight over the South Pole in 1929. According to Balchen, the trimotor "Josephine Ford" flown by Byrd and copilot Floyd Bennett was too slow to make the round trip between Norway's Spitsbergen islands and the North Pole in the elapsed time of less than sixteen hours. "Floyd told me the whole story," said Balchen, who accounts for his previous silence on the subject by maintaining that the same exposé was deleted from his autobiography when Balchen's family threatened to sue the publisher.

The admiral's nephew, Virginia Slims' Harry F. Byrd Jr., rallied to the famous explorer's defense after Balchen's charges were published last week. "It is a lie," he said, and the senator, "that the man, Balchen quotes,



Jane Muskie: Boost for "Big Daddy"

Floyd Bennett, has been dead for 43 years, and that the man Balchen libels, Admiral Byrd, has been dead for fourteen years."

Lyndon Johnson, 63, who quit smoking after a heart attack in 1955, is back on cigarettes. How come? "The trials and tribulations of Christmas," smiled the man who got through more than five years in the White House without a smoke, though there was fire aplenty.

His first trial for the fatal shooting of a policeman resulted in a manslaughter conviction that was overturned on appeal, and two subsequent trials ended in hung juries. Trial No. 4 for Black Panther leader Huey P. Newton, 29, was on tap in Oakland, Calif., until last week when the case was abruptly dismissed at the request of District Attorney Lowell Jensen. "It would be fruitless to have another hung jury," explained Jensen, but he added: "We think he is absolutely guilty." Defense attorney Charles R. Garry countered that Newton had served nearly three years behind bars in addition to being tried three times before being cleared. "And now," said Garry, "instead of the court saying we're sorry, Mr. Newton, that we put you through this inconvenience—because the prosecution is supposed to be that he is innocent—they act like they're doing him wrong."

Here's the terrible John Connally," said Richard Nixon, introducing his Secretary of the Treasury to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in a one-hour scene from this week's CBC documentary called "December 6, 71: A Day in the Presidency." After fling hands with Connally, Trudeau looks at his hand and cracks: "I'll count my fingers."

HUMPHREY

POLISH-AMERICAN STUDENTS

EXHIBIT NO. 209

DISGUSTING

THE SECRET MONEY IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

Among the various evils of presidential politics, the existence of secret money is probably the most disgusting.

Campaign donations are given under-the-table to protect the identity of donors with special selfish interests.

Presidential candidates — and their policies — are bought and sold by the big-money people. It is corruption of the worst kind.

In this present campaign, there are four different kinds of candidate:

1) The candid candidates, namely Chisholm, Lindsay, McCarthy, McCloskey, and McGovern. They have all agreed to make a full voluntary disclosure of their money sources. They are not embarrassed to identify their backers. They believe in "honesty in politics."

2' The silent candidates, such as Ashbrook, Hartke, Humphrey, Jackson, Mills, Wallace, and Yorty. They're keeping quiet about their current money — it's anybody's guess as to where it's coming from. Probably fat-cats who have a substantial self-interest in electing them. Maybe defense contractors, oil producers, or real estate operators. Who knows? They themselves know but they certainly don't want the voting public to know. So we're left to use our imagination. The underworld? Good grief! But who knows?

3) The corrupt candidate, and the epitome of this is Richard Nixon. He blatantly helped his brother Don get a \$205,000 hand-out from Howard Hughes in some political shenanigans. Last year Nixon's Republican National Committee hustled some \$322,500 from the dairy farmers in exchange for rigged increases in the price of milk. And the latest is the \$400,000 promise from I.T.T. which Nixon's

legal beagles apparently helped to solicit.

Thank goodness for Ralph Nader, Jack Anderson, and the Senate Judiciary Committee — otherwise, we might never hear about these thoroughly corrupt political bribes.

4) Perhaps the worst category is the deceitful candidate — and Edmund Muskie fits that description perfectly. The Maine senator says he's in favor of disclosure, but he hasn't reported anything since his 1970 senate race. He told New Hampshire voters last Sunday that he has already disclosed his money sources — and that's a lie. Not one dime has been reported for the past 17 months. Though he has allegedly received some \$3-4,000,000 since.

Muskie says he has nothing to hide, but the authoritative Wall Street Journal states that he's getting dough from Republican defense contractors.

Two weeks ago today, he told a Tampa audience that he wasn't reporting his money because "You wouldn't want me to break the law, would you?" What a sham! He himself knows that it would break no law to tell the truth.

Worst of all, two months ago, he commented that if he were to make a full voluntary disclosure, he'd be "out of the race." And that's the man who asks us to "Trust Muskie."

all U.S. voters have a right to know whether candidates are already sold out to selfish financial interests.

THIS PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT IS SPONSORED
AND PAID FOR BY:

COMMITTEE FOR HONESTY IN POLITICS
STEWART R. MOTT, CHAIRMAN
515 Madison Avenue,
New York, N.Y.

P.S. This committee is supported by many concerned citizens who would like to restore confidence in the political system and assure honesty in politics. If you would like to assist our work, please send your donation and comments to the above address.

Now he says he will disclose the fat cats behind him (after he lost badly in Florida and cried in New Hampshire). Why is he waiting for full disclosure— is it to fix up his books?

THE COMMITTEE WILL LOOK FOR YOUR NAMES AS PART OF MUSKIE'S
FAT CATS! THEY BETTER BE THERE!

EXHIBIT No. 210

= FREE =

all you can eat lunch with
Beer, wine, or soda!
with

* Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

— * Lorne Green

— * Mrs. Martin Luther King

WHEN: Sat April 1, 1972
12 Noon - ?

WHERE: HHH Headquarters, Room 800
238 W. Wisconsin Avenue


WHY: Pre-Easter Open House 
Bring your family and friends
Free easter eggs and balloons
for the children

EXHIBIT No. 211

| | | |
|---|--|----------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Ans. Src. 2 mo.</i></p> | | DATE: |
| | | INQUIRY ONLY: |
| | | REQUESTER PROGRESS: |
| | | DATE MAILED: |
| | | WCB: |
| | | RATE TOO HIGH: |
| | | OBJECTED TO: MILEAGE |
| | | OUT OF AREA: |
| | | GIVEN TO ARM: |
| | | HAS AN EXCHANGE: |
| <p>INFORMATION FOR TELEPHONE CO:</p> | | Best REC: |
| | | OKL: MBL: |
| | | IRL: PL: |
| | | Change-Over: |
| | | Pos: J.U |
| | | Rate: 15.00 |
| | | MSG: 30 |
| | | S.D. Cmt: |
| | | 3 Mnts. in Advance: |
| | | To Be Pre-Paid: |
| <p>TYPE OF SERVICE:</p> | | Form Mailed: |
| | | S.G. Count: |
| | | Printed Due: |
| | | Follow up: |
| | | AMT. PAID: 30.00 |
| | | 4/12/72 |
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| | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| DATE OF ORDER: | March 12 | TEL. NO.: |
| ACCOUNT NAME: | Simmons, Don | |
| ADDRESS WITH TEL: | | |
| CITY: | ZIP: | |
| MAIL TO: | 14000 W. Pine | |
| CITY: | Salt Lake City, Utah | |
| ANS BY: | No. Of RINGS: | |
| DUE DATE: | | |

| 1972 | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May | Jun. | Jul. | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|---------------|-------|-----------------|------|----------|------|------|------|------|
| Bal | | | | | 15 00 | | | | | | | |
| Rate | | | | 15 00 | 15 00 | | | | | | | |
| Tolls | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Count | | | | | 0 | 1 | 3 | | | | | |
| EM | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mall | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Count | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CX | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| WU | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RC | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | | | | 15 00 | 30 00 | | | | | | | |
| Paid | | | | | 30 00 | | | | | | | |
| Installed: 4-12-72 SU: | | | | Pos. 3 Jk: JU | | Phone: 391-7207 | | | | | | |
| SVC. FOR 2ND ONLY | | | | Rate: 15.00 | | Hrs: | | Address: | | | | |
| | | | | Limit: 30 | | Days: | | | | | | |
| | | | | M. M.: | | Bus: | | Bill to: | | | | |
| | | | | Postage: | | Res: | | | | | | |
| V I F M A M V U A S O N I P | | | | | | SIMMONS, DON | | | | | | |
| 1/2 | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Postmaster
Return to
Post Office
Box 1000
St. Louis, Mo.
63101

RECEIPT

Date April 12, 1972

9434

Received From Don Simmons

Address _____

Thirty dollars & no cents Dollars \$ 30.00

For 2 mo. Ans. Soc.

| ACCOUNT | | | HOW PAID | | | By <u>B. Beck</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|--|-------------|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| AMT. OF ACCOUNT | <u>30.00</u> | | CASH | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
| AMT. PAID | <u>30.00</u> | | CHECK | | | |
| BALANCE DUE | <u>—</u> | | MONEY ORDER | | | |

Receipt

This whole article is about (+ by one of) my people

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19

(Circ. 10,000) → PENNSYLVANIA VOICE

BLAIR STOBACH

Don: Great! I didn't think we could get this printed!
Protesters
Counter-demonstrators = U.S. 116, 118.
Blair Stobach was one of my own henchmen - I did not think
Points of Order

A.B.M.

(anything but Muskie)

Act I: On April 11, Senator Edmund Muskie flew into Philadelphia to officially begin his campaign for the Pennsylvania Primary. Even though the Senator arrived on the scene about 20 minutes late (due to the traffic situation) no one seemed to notice since it was a nice day. The Polish String Band began to play and the Senator emerged from his car and proceeded to do the usual hand shaking and waving that is expected of all political leaders.

Act II: As the Senator began to speak several dissidents in the crowd began to show themselves. First, another Democratic hopeful had counter-protesters present who raised anti-Muskie posters and circulated anti-Muskie literature. Second, the homosexuals had several Gay Power signs and third, several people had signs asking Muskie to do something more about the war than to just talk.

As Muskie's speech began to develop, it was obvious that he was quick to criticize Nixon while all the while remaining non-committal on his intentions. For his criticism of Vietnamization several onlookers hollered, "well what's your plan?", and then the gay participants would shout, "well what about our rights?". As Muskie's speech continued questions from the crowd became more demanding, but Edmund, in his usually suave style, was able to circumvent the problem with the greatest of ease; he ignored them.

Suddenly, and without warning, some old lady sneaked up behind the counter demonstrators and grabbed some of their signs and ripped them to shreds. Then the police and the security agents, inconspicuously clad in black raincoats and sun glasses, began to move in. The women who attacked the sign-bearers dropped fragments of the posters in question on the ground before another innocent long haired observer asked her if Muskie was for pollution the streets. She, realizing her dire predicament seized upon her only avenue of defense: "Why don't you get a job?". Meanwhile another protester was getting jabbed in the ribs by some half-pint and it took the presence of the police to settle that matter. (There are all my protesters)

Epilogue: That night on the 11:00 news, John Facinda summed up the crowd listening to Muskie as "unruly" and he claimed that the security agents were kept busy for most of the afternoon.

PAGE 3
that this would make the paper, so I forgot to tell you about it; I didn't see it until Thurs. night. Right after I talked to you this is great

EXHIBIT NO. 212

4289

EXHIBIT No. 213

Skip - Philly April 23, 1972

Don
 Talked to Jack Connor, Sen. Humphrey's
 deputy press secretary, tonight, about
 the paying of demonstrators by M's
 people, gave him names, places, etc. -
 told him I was reporter Bob Schmidt
 of the Daily News, and that our paper
 had received calls and letters about it.
 He said the Senator had a comment for publication,
 but that they, "off the record," were in fact
 covered (see next page)

Don.

Press coverage very sparse for M's opening,
 though one paper mentioned the Gays
 (clipping enclosed). Two of three ~~radio~~ stations
 mentioned smallness of crowds, and a third
 said crowd was often disorderly and
 contained many hostile hecklers.
 Also, the one channel had (the one I didn't
 watch - channel 11) two of our signs and two
 of the Gays' signs on camera; I don't
 know what the second sign was, but the

(2)

price of a mere \$3 for gas, four people
 to go with me down to the U.E.W. hall
 at 3 p.m. for what should be a fun
 Q. & A. session, down in ~~Delaware~~ Essington,
 Delaware County. Already have the
 four questions planned - one ~~on~~ on
 temper and stability, one on ingratitude
 to HHH [who made him], and two on his
 flip-flopping on the War + Nixon's peace
 ... was good.

again this had been going on and were checking further into the matter, and that the Fair Campaign Practices Committee had been contacted, but that further proof might be needed to make the charge stick for publication purposes, etc.

He also said, "off the record" that the H. people were very disturbed and planned to complain to John English about it, personally, on Monday ^{- 3 PM}.

SIGNS

MUSKIE
FCA. - 9%.
WISC. - 10%.
PA. - 11%.
(WITH LOVE)

M-U-S-K-I-E
SPELLS
LOSER
HAA IS THE MAN!

PRO-BUSING
ED'S KIDS
GO TO
PRIVATE
SCHOOL

Muskie looked right up at these two, right on front of him as he left, and scowled perceptibly.

EXHIBIT No. 214

one was the HHH is no Crybaby - MUSKIE
 IS NO PRESIDENT sign I enclose
 a couple of clippings, though press
 was disappointing, however, we did
 grandly piss off his staff and
 rattled him considerably.
 See back of these cards for
 what signs said.

P.S. My guys vocally talked-up loudly } Love This job,
 HHH as their candidate throughout } K/D
 FSN's speech, pissing off the M. people grandly } #


A VOTE FOR WALLACE . . .

IS A WASTED VOTE

On March 14 cast your ballot for

SEN. EDMUND **MUSKIE**

SIGNS (cont.)

 MUSKIE
 HELP SAVE
 THE U.S.A.
 WITHDRAW NOW
 HHH - '72

HHH IS NO
 CRIMINAL
 MUSKIE IS
 NO PRESIDENT

A MUSKIE
 IS A FISH
 HHH IS
 A
 PRESIDENT

IF YOU LIKED HITLER
 YOU'LL JUST LOVE
 Wallace

HUMPHREY
He Started the War
Don't Give Him Another Chance

EXHIBIT No. 217

MCCARTHY 72

Ex 217 182

528 No. La Brea Ave Los Angeles, Ca.-90036 (213) 933-5667

Dear McCarthy Delegate:

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour in California and wishes to convey his thanks for your support during his appearances. As you know, we do not have the funds to conduct an extensive campaign here, but Gene assured me the campaign will continue though the convention in Miami.

Realistically the race in California is now between Senator McGovern and Senator Humphrey. The latest polls indicate it will be a close election.

It has been decided that a win by Senator Humphrey would benefit our cause more than a win by Senator McGovern. If McGovern takes California he will win the nomination on an early ballot in Miami. If Humphrey wins in California, Miami will deadlock which will enable Gene McCarthy to gain the nomination; or at the very least to heavily influence the drafting of the Party platform. Accordingly, we ask you to unofficially support Senator Humphrey on June 6. We realize Senator McGovern's views are more attuned to Gene's, but this sacrifice is necessary. Anything that can be done to stop McGovern would be helpful, but IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE NAME OF MCCARTHY.

As a solid McCarthy supporter we know you will keep this letter and our strategy confidential. Thanks again for your continued support.

Sincerely,

Barbara Barron

EXHIBIT A

Dear Chisholm supporter:

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour of California and while in Los Angeles he had the pleasure to discuss with Shirley Chisholm the California political situation. It was felt by both parties that if George McGovern wins in California he has all but locked up the nomination; but if Hubert Humphrey wins in California, the Miami convention will deadlock which will enable both Gene McCarthy and Shirley Chisholm to heavily influence the Party platform. The latest polls indicate the California primary will be very close.

Accordingly, I have been asked to urge you to unofficially support Senator Humphrey on June 6. We realize Senator McGovern's views are more attuned to Shirley's or Gene's, but this sacrifice is necessary to accomplish the basic objectives of the Shirley Chisholm and Gene McCarthy movements. Anything that can be done to stop McGovern would be helpful, but IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE NAME OF ANY PARTICULAR CANDIDATE.

I have been assured by Shirley Silverstein at Chisholm State Headquarters that you will keep this letter and our strategy confidential.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Barbara Barron". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

EXHIBIT NO. 218

GEORGE MCGOVERN'S REAL RECORD ON THE WAR



- 1964** Aug. 7, 1964 George McGovern voted for the Gulf of Tonkin H.J. Res 1145 Resolution.
- 1965** May 6, 1965 George McGovern DIDN'T VOTE during passage of Supplemental H.J. Res 447 Appropriations of \$700 Million for U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam.
- 1966** March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Morse Amendment to S2791 to Supplemental Defense Appropriations Bill to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
- March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Gruening Amendment S2791 prohibiting the use of drafted serviceman in Southeast Asia unless they volunteered to go.
- March 10, 1966 George McGovern voted for Foreign Assistance HR12169 appropriations of \$315 Million for support of effort in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic and \$100 Million for President's contingency fund.
- March 22, 1966 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations HR13546 of \$13,135,719,000 primarily to support U.S. operations in Southeast Asia.
- 1967** Aug. 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill. George McGovern voted HR10738 against Morse Amendment to reduce appropriations by 10%.
- Aug. 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill. George McGovern voted HR10738 against Clark motion to recommit the bill to committee with amendments deleting \$3.5 Billion.
- March 1, 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations S665 for Vietnam of \$4,467,200,000.
- March 20, 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Defense Department HR7123 funds for the war in Vietnam of \$12,196,520,000.
- 1968** June 26, 1968 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations HR17734 Bill of \$6,373,735,498-bulk of which was for increased costs of Vietnam war.

DON'T BELIEVE IT? CHECK THE RECORD!

Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government

POLITICAL OPPORTUNIST

Humphrey opposes sane drug laws, abortion reform, busing, welfare reform, and tax reform. Yet at times he speaks in favor of certain aspects of these issues. When it comes to issues HHH talks out of both sides of his mouth-WHICH SIDE YOU HEAR IS WHAT HE THINKS YOU WANT TO HEAR.

The best known examples: The WAR. Humphrey's strong backing and encouragement of LBJ helped build the Vietnam War. HHH strongly defended sending 550,000+ men to Vietnam. Now that the War is unpopular he's against it. BUSING. In conservative Florida Humphrey, "didn't like it" but in liberal Wisconsin Humphrey "though it had merit."

WHAT IS HUMPHREY REALLY LIKE?

He's a wheeling-dealing politician who fits in with the old Party bosses such as Daley, Meany, and Johnson. All are Fat Cats.

He sold out a long time ago. You don't accept large donations without strings. We are not fools to think otherwise.

This year is OUR chance for the New Politics; let's not lose it.

DO NOT VOTE FOR HUMPHREY. HE'S A LOSER!

Democrats against Bossism. T. Wilson, Chairman.

Permission is granted to reproduce this
& distribute it in your local area.

HUMPHREY



A FISHY SMELL

FOR THE WHITE HOUSE?

EXHIBIT No. 219

4299

***** SLUSH FUND *****


In 1971 Humphrey got \$83,151 in outside speech payments from private interest groups-twice as much as any other Senator did. This is virtually double his Senate salary.
Washington Star, May 22, 1972.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY would be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Reagans we have now.


He is the "boss-candidate" of the Democratic right. His victory would be a victory for the old-line reactionary elements in the Party.

We must not stand quiet while Humphrey and his cronies steal the nomination in the smoke filled back rooms of Miami. We must get out and work for the New Politics!

Humphrey is a left over from the old-time political bosses who lusted over power. He captured the Party in 1968; let's not permit it again.



U.M.W. PRESIDENT TONY BOYLE



Humphrey: Memories of 1968

Humphrey is a union dominated politician who has stood in the way of stronger Federal control over union racketeering. He sits cheek-to-cheek with convicted criminals such as Tony Boyle of the United Mine Workers. Remember the Yablonski murders?

In April 1972 Boyle was convicted of illegally using the union treasury to support Hubert Humphrey to the tune of \$30,000 for his '68 campaign. The New Republic, page 6, May 20, 1972.

Humphrey, who pictures himself as a liberal, is again rubbing elbows with supercop Mayor Daley as he did in '68 and '70. HHH has sold out.

That is why Kennedy and others have abandoned Humphrey in 1972.

EXHIBIT No. 220

May 26, 1972 Part One

Is Mayor Yorty involved in a plot to sabotage McGovern

YORTY FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE

885 Subway Terminal Building
417 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, California 90013

Telephone:
213-485-1000

May 21, 1972



L.A. Free Press
Attn: Arthur Kunkin
4715 McGowan Drive
Los Angeles, California 90041

Dear Mr. Kunkin:

I have done minor work for Mayor Yorty and his staff for almost a year now. I never agreed with his beliefs but my parents supported him and so was just apprehensive 3 weeks ago I was contacted by Harriette Anisole about doing a "manuscript project" to understand the strength of Senator McGovern and to a lesser extent Senator Humphrey. I said I was very interested. A couple of days later I was contacted by Sam Bricefield (a Yorty Delegate) and asked me by the name of

The "project" was the two letters from McCarthy Headquarters which I have attached. I left the project a few days ago and promised to keep quiet about it. I cannot. If this is what politics is all about, then help us and not country.

Over 7,000 letters were mailed to Clinton supporters throughout California. The letters to McCarthy Delegates was to a smaller group (a few hundred) as the "right mailing list could not be obtained."

I feel better calling someone. I hope a public airing of this type of tactic will help clean up politics. You may also tell this letter to the Yorty people as several people were in on the "project" and I shall keep saying anything.

Sincerely,

AN HONEST POLITICAL WORKER

628 No. La Brea Ave Los Angeles, Ca. 90028 (213) 533-56

McGARTHY '72

Dear Clinton supporters:

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour of California and while in Los Angeles he had the pleasure to discuss with Shirley Clinton the California political situation. It was felt by both parties that if George McGovern wins in California he will be all but locked up the nomination but if Robert Kennedy wins in California, the McGovern connection will be destroyed which will enable both Gene McCarthy and Shirley Clinton to heavily influence the party platform. The latest polls indicate the California primary will be very close.

Accordingly, I have been asked to urge you to unofficially support Senator Humphrey on June 6. We realize Senator Humphrey's views are more aligned to Shirley's or Gene's, but this sacrifice is necessary to accomplish basic objectives of the Shirley Clinton McGovern would be helpful. Anything that can be done to stop McGovern would be helpful, but it should not be done in the name of ANY PARTISAN CONSIDERATION.

I have been assured by Shirley Clinton that at California State Headquarters that you will keep this letter and our strategy confidential.

Sincerely,

Barbara Barron

McGARTHY '72
528 No. La Brea Ave Los Angeles, Ca. 90028 (213) 533-56

Dear McCarthy Delegates:

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour of California and while in Los Angeles he had the pleasure to discuss with Shirley Clinton the California political situation. It was felt by both parties that if George McGovern wins in California he will be all but locked up the nomination but if Robert Kennedy wins in California, the McGovern connection will be destroyed which will enable both Gene McCarthy and Shirley Clinton to heavily influence the party platform. The latest polls indicate the California primary will be very close.

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I have been assured by Shirley Clinton that at California State Headquarters that you will keep this letter and our strategy confidential.

Sincerely,

Barbara Barron

Barbara Barron

ART KUNKIN

Politics is rightfully known as a dirty and undemocratic business. An honest and honorable politician who has truly succeeded in attaining office is a rarity for a very good reason. There is almost always an opponent who is so to do anything immorally necessary to seize a position of power over other men and control of the taxpayers' money.

For some men this ego trip involves the office of local dog catcher; for others it involves the high offices of Congress or even the Presidency. The difference between successful politicians, high or low, usually involves difference of personality and perspective, not of morality. As long as positions of political power are as desperate as they are from day to day meaningful control by a highly conscious public, I suspect men will have little chance in politics. He will be instantly forced to choose between being successful in life and his honesty.

It is before an election that the experienced politician asks his best and acts his worst. On the one hand, he, or she, will be smooth talking the public for their votes and, on the other hand, doing anything immorally necessary to discredit his, or her, opponent. Where politicians are allowed to get away with it, they have even been known to do away with elections completely, or do away with their opponents, completely. Fortunately this country is not yet at that point even at the point where we suspect the fraudulent vote counting that normally occurs elsewhere. But the above

letters show the depths of immorality which is not uncommon in United States politics.

The two letters purporting to be from the Los Angeles office of Eugene McCarthy are forgeries. They are obviously designed to throw suspicion of behind the scene dealing upon all the liberal Democratic candidates.

Barbara Barron of the McCarthy office, whose signature is affixed to these forgeries, told the Free Press in a phone conversation that she is the very person that someone fabricated these letters photographically copying her signature and the McCarthy letterhead from some other document or letter. She has already received many phone calls from recipients of these letters, even though they were only first mailed on Friday, May 19.

Many of these calls, not knowing that the letters were prepared and mailed by someone outside the McCarthy office for devious purposes of their own, were quite prepared to believe that anti-Vietnam war McCarthy was unscrupulously prepared to secretly aid the more hawkish Humphrey to defeat the anti-war McGovern. Others were willing to suspect the Humphrey forces of being the prime force behind the letters as Humphrey stood most to gain by a liberal interpretation. Still others were willing to believe that McGovern campaigners themselves had fabricated the letters as a double reverse play to get votes because McGovern appears as the victim.

Of course, the forgeries appear ridiculous on their face in view of Eugene McCarthy's open and frank endorsement this

week of McGovern in the California race. McGovern, although he has not yet fully withdrawn from the Presidential race, does not have the finances nor organizational strength to mount a primary campaign here; but the letters obviously served their purpose in confusing well-meaning voters who are not cynical enough, nor experienced enough to expect this low behavior from men who claim to have motivations.

Our information from the Los Angeles area has shown that knowledge that the letters were not of McGovern's campaign office to throw suspicion on McCarthy, McGovern and Humphrey. Frankly we don't know, I hope Harriette Anisole, who is involved in our letter, last Tuesday, and she would know of it. Unfortunately, her denial was to be expected, who was involved or innocent. Mayor Yorty was out campaigning and could not be reached for comment. Hopefully he will make some clarifying statement in letters by our next issue.

Barbara Barron has told the Free Press that reported the incident to the police and is hoping public or private investigation will reveal the truth. I think the matter serious enough to urge that an information state forward, regardless of consequences, because every act of honesty, how well we preserve and deepen the democratic form exist in this country, however abused they may

J. L. STEWART CO.

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Tom Wallace

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City

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|-------|-------------|-------|--------|
|-------|-------------|-------|--------|

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Colored Stacks

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THANK YOU Please keep this copy for reference

VOL 1

13145

72145

No. 02753

RECEIVED

DL 5-26-73

EXHIBIT No. 221

*Towne Motel*1200 BRICKELL AVENUE (U.S. 1) • MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131 • 315 373-0746
DOWNTOWN MIAMI

September 19, 1973

Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities
Room 6-308
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Distinguished Gentlemen:

We are enclosing any and all records, files, documents, ledgers, bills, receipts, telephone messages, order forms, memoranda, recordings, photographs, correspondence, cancelled checks, relating directly or indirectly in whole or in part to the Presidential Campaign and election of 1972, including but not limited to work, service, and employment ordered and requested by Don Simmons, Donald Segretti, Donald Durham.

Yours very truly,

TOWNE MOTEL

By: *James A. McClendon*JM:ic
encs

4304

Temperature _____
High _____

Catherine

ON DUTY

Morning _____

Low _____

TOWNE MOTEL

Afternoon _____

Clear _____

DAILY REGISTER

Windy _____

Cloudy _____

Rain _____

Saturday

Date: June 10, 1972

Evening _____

| Room # | NAME | Paid or Owes Thru | PAID | CASH RECEIVED | RENT | SALES TAX | MISC. |
|--------|---------------|-------------------|------|---------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Kronquist | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 3 | Yones (Sp) | 6/10 | Pd | 32.00 | 30.00 | 2.00 | |
| 4 | Carswell | 6/10 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 5 | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Clarit | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 7 | Simmons | 6/10 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 8 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Fagerquist | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 10 | Wijetilleke | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 11 | Martinez | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 12 | Richards | 6/10 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 14 | Bucknell | 6/10 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 15 | Blockson (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | | | |
| 19 | Craft (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 20 | Cherry | 6/10 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 21 | Cardenas | 6/10 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 22 | Gallarno | 6/10 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 23 | | | | | | | |
| 24 | | | | | | | |
| 25 | | | | | | | |
| 26 | | | | | | | |
| 27 | | | | | | | |
| 28 | Reboredo | 6/10 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 29 | | | | | | | |
| 30 | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | | | | | | |
| 32 | | | | | | | |

Note #11 paid local telephone \$.45

Rent 148.00

S.T.A.V 6.72

9/2300 .45

56.17

4306

Operator

High

ON DUTY

Morning

Catherine

Low

Tonne Motel

Afternoon

DAILY REGISTER

Evening

Sunday

Date: June 11, 1972

| Room # | NAME | Paid or Owes Thru | PAID | CASH RECEIVED | RENT | SALES TAX | MISC. |
|--------|---------------|-------------------|------|---------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Kronquist | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 3 | Yones (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Walter | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 7 | Simmons | 6/11 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 8 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Eagerquist | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 10 | Willetilleke | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 11 | Wiggins | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 12 | Gonzales | 6/11 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 14 | Bucknell | 6/11 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 15 | Brackson (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | | | |
| 19 | Craft (Sp) | | Pd | 62.40 | 60.00 | 2.40 | |
| 20 | | | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | | | |
| 23 | Gonzalez | 6/11 | Pd | 14.56 | 14.00 | .56 | |
| 24 | | | | | | | |
| 25 | | | | | | | |
| 26 | Hernandez | 6/11 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 27 | | | | | | | |
| 28 | Valle | 6/11 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 29 | | | | | | | |
| 30 | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | | | | | | |
| 32 | | | | | | | |

Note #19 paid for week \$62.40

Note #28 paid local telephone \$1.15

Rent 164.00
S.TAX 6.65

70.65

4308

#7487

Temperature _____

High

Catherine

ON DUTY _____

Morning

Low

TOWNE MOTEL

Afternoon

Clear _____

DAILY REGISTER

Evening

Sunny _____

Cloudy _____

Rain _____

Monday

Date: June 12, 1972

| Room # | NAME | Paid or Owe Thru | PAID | CASH RECEIVED | RENT | SALES TAX | MISC. |
|--------|---------------|------------------|------|---------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| 1 | | | | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Yones (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Walter | 6/12 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 7 | Simmons | 6/12 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 8 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Breenstien | 6/12 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 11 | Palla | 6/12 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 12 | Stancil | 6/12 | Pd | 9.36 | 9.00 | .36 | |
| 14 | Bucknell | 6/12 | Pd | 8.32 | 8.00 | .32 | |
| 15 | Blackson (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | | | |
| 18 | Otto | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 19 | Craft (Sp) | | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | | | |
| 21 | Maidon | | | | | | |
| 22 | Maidon | 6/12 | Pd | 20.80 | 20.00 | .80 | |
| 23 | Gonzalez | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 24 | | | | | | | |
| 25 | Phillipps | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 26 | | | | | | | |
| 27 | Allen | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 28 | Valle | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 29 | Wozniak | 6/12 | Pd | 10.40 | 10.00 | .40 | |
| 30 | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | | | | | | |
| 32 | | | | | | | |

Note Coke machine \$11.90

Note #21 paid telephone \$1.37

Note #12 paid telephone \$1.21

Note local telephone calls \$1.05

Rent — 131.00

S.TAX — 5.56

Chk. 2750 — 11.90

DATE

SHEET No.

TELEPHONE RECORD SHEET

| Room No. | Exchange | Number | Time | Amount | Remarks |
|-----------------|----------|--------|------|--------|---------|
| Brought Forward | | | | | |
| 19 | 358 | 3231 | | 15 | pol |
| 11 | 871 | 6160 | | 15 | pol |
| 19 | 949 | 3167 | | 15 | |
| 11 | 871 | 3616 | | 15 | pol |
| 11 | 445 | 5345 | | 15 | pol |
| 23 | 379 | 5411 | | 15 | |
| 23 | 666 | 2141 | | 15 | |
| 23 | 111 | 2141 | | 15 | |
| 6 | 350 | 3868 | | 15 | pol |
| 6 | 350 | 3301 | | 15 | pol |
| 23 | 666 | 2141 | | 15 | |
| 23 | 634 | 6753 | | 15 | |
| 6 | 711 | — | | 15 | pol |
| 6 | 379 | 4784 | | 15 | pol |
| 11 | 271 | 1777 | | 15 | |
| 21 | 704-386 | 3865 | | 1.37 | pol |
| 12 | 704-633 | 9047 | | 1.21 | pol |
| Total | | | | | |

EXHIBIT No. 222

TELEGRAPHIC MONEY ORDER RECEIPT

PAYMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF \$207.90 RECEIVED

SIGNED: *[Signature]*

Order subject to conditions below and on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

FD-1113 93 500 38

FT LAUDERDALE FLA 33309

Two hundred and no. 200.00

MR. DOUG KELLY

807 W. OAKLAND PARK BLVD

FT LAUDERDALE, FL 33309

APT G-6

Johnson

ENJOY THE PARTY

| | |
|-------|--------|
| AMT. | 200.00 |
| FEE | 7.90 |
| TOLLS | |
| TAX | |
| TOTAL | 207.90 |


ROGER JOHNSON

P.O. Box 1776, LA Calif

THIS FULL NAME: ADDRESS

TELEPHONE NUMBER

EXHIBIT No. 223

DEPOSITED WITH
 SURETY NATIONAL BANK

THIS IS YOUR RECEIPT
 ALWAYS OBTAIN AN OFFICIAL RECEIPT WHEN MAKING A DEPOSIT

NAME SYMBOL TRANSACTION NUMBER, DATE AND AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT
 ARE SHOWN BELOW

667.00 D6

ALL DEPOSITS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND TERMS STATED ON SIGNATURE CARDS CURRENTLY USED

EXPLANATION OF OTHER CHARGES AND CREDITS ON YOUR TELEPHONE BILL
 213 667-9621 (334) *** 8 NOV 17, 1971 PAGE 1

| DESCRIPTION | MONTHLY RATE | PERIOD | | CHARGE OR CREDIT |
|---|-----------------|--------|---------|------------------------|
| | | FROM | THROUGH | |
| YOUR MONTHLY SERVICE CHARGE IS BILLED IN ARREARS FROM THE 17TH PAID IN ADVANCE CREDIT FOR PORTION OF MONTH BILLED BEFORE SERVICE CONNECTED CHARGE FOR CONNECTING OR CHANGING SERVICE ON OCT 25 | 965 | OCT 15 | OCT 25 | 750CR 290CR 2300 |
| LOCAL TAX | | | | 15CR |
| US TAX | | | | 29CR |
| TOTAL CARRIED TO BILL | | | | 3534CR |

NEWPORT CENTER OFFICE
 SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
 890 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE, NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA

N 124990

January 14, 1972

20-1981
1222

*** DONALD H. SEGRETTI *** \$5,000.00*

\$5,000.00

PURCHASER'S COPY of
 CASHIER'S CHECK

RETAIN THIS COPY FOR FUTURE REFERENCE

NOT NEGOTIABLE

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DECLARED BELOW
IF NOT CORRECT PLEASE NOTIFY US PROMPTLY NO RECEIPT REQUIRED

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|----------|--|----------|
| 10/27/71 | For services rendered as an independent contractor October 15 - 31/71. <i>169 Account # 074 443</i> | \$667.00 |

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DECLARED BELOW
IF NOT CORRECT PLEASE NOTIFY US PROMPTLY NO RECEIPT REQUIRED

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|--------|----------------------|------------|
| 1/3/72 | Advance for expenses | \$5,000.00 |

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DECLARED BELOW
IF NOT CORRECT PLEASE NOTIFY US PROMPTLY NO RECEIPT REQUIRED

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|----------|---|----------|
| 11/29/71 | For services rendered as an independent contractor November 16 - 30, 1971 | \$667.00 |

Newport Beach, California

IF NOT CORRECT PLEASE NOTIFY US PROMPTLY NO RECEIPT REQUIRED

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|----------|--|----------|
| 12/13/71 | For services rendered as an independent contractor December 1 - 15, 1971 | \$667.00 |

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED BELOW
IF NOT CASHED PLEASE RETURN TO US PROMPTLY TO AVOID CANCELLATION

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|----------|---|----------|
| 11/11/71 | For services rendered as an independent contractor November 1 - 15, 1971. | \$667.00 |

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED BELOW
IF NOT CASHED PLEASE RETURN TO US PROMPTLY TO AVOID CANCELLATION

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|----------|---|----------|
| 12/27/71 | For services rendered as an independent contractor December 15 - 31, 1971 | \$667.00 |

Herbert W. Kalmbach
Newport Beach, California

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED BELOW
IF NOT CASHED PLEASE RETURN TO US PROMPTLY TO AVOID CANCELLATION

| DATE | DESCRIPTION | AMOUNT |
|---------|---|----------|
| 1/17/72 | For services rendered as an independent contractor January 1 - 15, 1972 | \$667.00 |

EXHIBIT No. 224

TELEPHONE LOG—MORRIS [SEGRETTI] TO CHAPIN

DATE, NUMBER, AND LOCATION

September 1, 1972—(213) 647-0476—Los Angeles, California
 June 19, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 June 16, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 June 8, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 May 1, 1972—(415) 848-9214—San Francisco, California
 April 18, 1972—393-9832—Washington, D.C.
 March 24, 1972—783-9714—Washington, D.C.
 March 24, 1972—638-7723—Washington, D.C.
 March 21, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 March 14, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 March 8, 1972—(212) 247-8897—New York, N.Y.
 March 6, 1972—(312) 686-9533—Chicago, Illinois
 January 31, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 January 28, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 January 25, 1972—(212) 679-9798—New York, N.Y.
 January 24, 1972—(215) WA2-8185—Philadelphia, Pa.
 January 20, 1972—638-2260—Washington, D.C.
 January 19, 1972—638-8870—Washington, D.C.
 January 19, 1972—341-2580—Washington, D.C.
 January 18, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 January 17, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 January 12, 1972—(614) 236-9462—Columbus, Ohio
 January 10, 1972—(317) 637-0620—Indianapolis, Indiana
 January 3, 1972—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 December 28, 1971—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 December 17, 1971—(608) 257-8811—Madison, Wisconsin
 December 16, 1971—(414) 432-9538—Green Bay, Wisconsin
 December 16, 1971—(414) 494-9844—Green Bay, Wisconsin
 December 13, 1971—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 December 7, 1971—(713) 928-9309—Houston, Texas
 December 7, 1971—(214) 351-9087—Texas
 December 6, 1971—(305) 634-9381—Florida
 November 29, 1971—(415) 822-1750—San Francisco, California
 November 26, 1971—(213) 821-9990—Los Angeles, California
 November 20, 1971—638-2260—Washington, D.C.
 November 19, 1971—638-2260—Washington, D.C.
 November 18, 1971—(603) 623-8235—New Hampshire
 November 10, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 November 9, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 November 8, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 November 6, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 November 6, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 November 2, 1971—265-2000—Washington, D.C.
 November 1, 1971—265-2000—Washington, D.C.
 November 1, 1971—393-9027—Washington, D.C.
 October 28, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 October 15, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California
 October 5, 1971—(213) 821-9760—Los Angeles, California

One outgoing: September 1, 1972.

Marina del Ray (Talked to his mother).

EXHIBIT No. 225

| | | |
|-----------|--|---------|
| 22 Sep 71 | Received # 91 Service 15 Sep 1971 | 667 - |
| | # 102 advance on expenses | 5000 - |
| | Both on S-P Nat Bk | |
| | account 1222-1251-169-0744 | |
| 19 Oct 71 | Received # 103 S-P Nat Bk, Newport Cent Office | 667 - |
| | # 1222-1251-169-074443 | |
| | Printed Herbert W. Holmbeck | |
| | Trustee account for client | |
| | Signed by C. Annette Harvey | |
| | for service 10 Oct - 15/71 | |
| 25 Oct 71 | Perkins Expense | 3 - |
| 26 Oct 71 | The New York Times - 10 Oct 1971 | 71 - |
| | Bundy's accounting service | 1250 |
| Jan 12 | Expense paid | 5000 - |
| Mar 1 | Expenses - cash given by Ann Harvey at Herb's office | 5000 - |
| Mar 23 | Expenses paid - cash given by Ann Harvey at Herb's office | 25000 - |

Check re invoice for Smith, Thomas in P#100
4371

8 July 21 Standing to San Juan to San Diego to L.A. - Knight's morning
800
11.12

11 July L.A. to Monterey - 11.51

EXPENSES (cont'd)

| | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|
| 22 JUL 71 | TERPANE | | 9.84 | |
| 23 JUL 71 | MONTEREY, CALIF - UAL | | 7.72 | |
| | SF TO CHICAGO - UAL | | 63 - | |
| 25 JUL 71 | CHICAGO TO WASH DC - UAL | | 35 - | |
| | DC TO SF - UAL | | 78 - | |
| | SF TO MONTEREY - UAL | | 10.80 | |
| 7 AUGUST | MONTEREY TO LA - UAL | | 11.58 | |
| | LA TO MONTEREY - UAL | | 12.96 | |
| 8 AUGUST | MODESTO TO SF - GLEN WEST | | 14.00 | |
| | SF TO MONTEREY | | 16.00 | |
| 13 AUGUST | MONTEREY TO LA - UAL | | 17.00 | |
| 14 AUGUST | LA TO MONTEREY | 276.46 | 11.00 | |
| 22 AUGUST | TELEPHONE BILL | | 2.87 | |
| 22 SEPT 71 | LA to Washington DC | | 155 - | ✓ |
| | SEPT Telephone Bill | | 2.86 | |
| 23 SEPT 71 | Hotel Bill - Wash DC | 500.29 | 44.00 | |
| | 3 days Sheraton Park Hotel | | | |
| 24 SEPT 71 | Washington to Portland | | 155 - | ✓ |
| | Benson Hotel Bill | | 90.35 | ✓ |
| 26 SEPT 71 | Portland to SF - United Airlines | | 48.00 | ✓ |
| | SF to LA - TWA | | 16.00 | ✓ |
| 1 OCT 71 | PSA, LA to SF - form | | 23.00 | |
| | LA to SF - form | | | |
| | LA to SF - form | | | |
| Check to missing = 151 | | 800.49 | | 800.49 |

EXPENSE (cont.)

| | | | | | |
|------------|---|----------------------|--|--|--|
| 7. Oct 71 | lunch w/ C.D. agent Mr. Herb Hacking at Post of Call - Sam Feltin 5.56 + tip | \$ 7.00 | | | |
| 11. Oct 71 | lunch w/ Ed - C.D. agent Jimmy Mayberry - Post of call 4.93 + tip | \$ 5.50 | | | |
| 12. Oct 71 | Beady's answering service - 1 Nov 71 | 10.50 | | | |
| 14. Oct 71 | N.Y. Times - 6 months sub. The New Republic - 1 yr. P.O. Box #174 Venice, CA 90291 - 6 months | 41.05 6.- 5.70 | | | |
| 19. Oct 71 | Rent on office | 25.00 | | | |
| 18. Oct 71 | Advance for Telephone calls - (cash) Ed. Collins, New Jersey | 5.- | | | |
| 27. Oct 71 | Cash to Jimmy Stramb - personal check on money in bank | 50.- | | | |
| 25. Oct 71 | Printing Expense | 3.- | | | |
| 26. Oct 71 | The N.Y. Times - Balance of subscription Beady's answering service | 11.- 18.50 | | | |
| 28. Oct 71 | Cash to Ward - Turnipnut for agent's expenses | 20.- | | | |
| | Cash to Jesse Benedict for phone expenses - 11.45 11.45 | 10.- | | | |
| | check to myself #103 Santa Monica 21 Oct 9 Nov 71 | 448.17 | | | |

EXPENSES (Cont)

Total up to 1,277.57

| | | | |
|-----------|---|--------|-------|
| 30 Oct 71 | TWA from LA to Albuquerque | 55 - | |
| 31 Oct 71 | TWA from Albuquerque to DC | 117 - | |
| 1 Nov 71 | Lunch w/ DC | 13 - | |
| | Drinks w/ DC | 7 - | |
| 3 Nov 71 | Skerton Park Hotel Bill | 69.79 | |
| | Cab Fare to Airport | 3 - | |
| | Hertz Rent-a-Car for Jane Story dinner | 3.56 | |
| 3 Nov 71 | American Airlines to NYC for DC | 26 - | |
| | Cab to American | 5 - | |
| | Hotel Bill in NYC | 83.88 | |
| | Bus to Airport | 3 - | |
| 4 Nov 71 | Lunch w/ Steve Swindle in Salt Lake | 6 - | |
| | Domestic Airlines from NYC to Salt Lake to LA | 163 - | |
| 8 Nov 71 | Shorthand Printing of Questions for Muskie - 1000 copies | 11.24 | |
| | Receipt for D. Daly - cash | | |
| | Cash to Unknown Student at Whittier College | 1.0 - | |
| 8 Nov 71 | Telephone charges (217) 8219760 Thru 28 Oct 71 | 148.57 | |
| 9 Nov 71 | Check to Ron Sanford for tickets at SF on 8 Nov + advance | | 165 - |
| | To myself from cash | 753.69 | |
| | Expense from 10 Dec 71 | | |

(5)

| | | | | |
|----|--------|---|-----|------|
| 9 | Nov 71 | Check to Jess Gendick for work re: EM on Sunday Sat. 7 Nov 71 | | 305- |
| 11 | Nov 71 | PSA flight LA → SF | 16 | 50 |
| 12 | Nov 71 | United AL SF → Fresno D. busin | 12 | 50 |
| | | Busin. 12.30 - 2.00 SF | 14 | 76 |
| | | Meal - Fresno - O Wagner | 3 | 10 |
| 13 | Nov 71 | Postage + office supplies | 3 | 73 |
| 14 | Nov 71 | Pictures for ID | 6 | 03 |
| | | Rent on office 18 Nov - 18 Dec | 250 | - |
| 16 | Nov 71 | UAL LA to NYC | 16 | 3- |
| 17 | Nov 71 | NYC Bus + Taxi to hotel | 2 | 80 |
| | | Hotel - NYC - New's Marten | 37 | 00 |
| 18 | Nov 71 | NE Airlines to Manchester | 29 | - |
| | | Taxi + bus to La Guardia | 4 | - |
| | | Hotel Wingfield - N.H. | 15 | 49 |
| 18 | Nov 71 | Hertz - Manchester N.H. | 27 | 02 |
| | | NE Manchester to Wash DC | 49 | 50 |
| | | Taxi to hotel in DC | 3 | - |
| | | Misc. calls - DC | 3 | - |
| 20 | Nov 71 | Hay-Adams Hotel in DC | 27 | 30 |
| | | Phone calls at hotel | 25 | 8 |
| | | Taxi to airport + tip | 4 | - |
| | | Plane UAL DC → Knoxville | 40 | - |
| | | Print to mail from card | 70 | 14 |
| | | insured funds 10 Dec 71 | | |

⑥ Expenses (con't)

| Total expenses to date 3,239. ⁶⁰ | | | |
|---|-----------|--|---|
| 2 | 21 Nov 71 | Hotel in Knoxville - Holiday Inn Bus Fare to airport | 11.75 3 - |
| 22 | Nov 71 | Air - Dallas - Knoxville → L.A. | 172 - |
| 29 | Nov 71 | Office supplies Airline Ticket Eastern LA → Tampa Cannaway Inn + tip, Tampa, FL | 1.05 143.00 21 - |
| 30 | Nov 71 | Drinks w/ Lee Haywood, Tampa Dinner w/ Lee Haywood, Tampa | 1.50 6.24 |
| 1 | Dec 71 | Drinks w/ Bob Berg - Tampa Add'l Hotel Bill - Cannaway Inn, Tampa Tahiti Inn Hotel, Tampa Bob Berg - advice on salary | 4.30 1.00 1.50 50.00 |
| 2 | Dec 71 | Hotel Phone - Tampa Rte for rental car Dollar-a-day rent-a-car - Tampa Airline - NW Orient Tampa → Miami Taxi from Miami airport to New Everglades Hotel, Miami Everglades Hotel | 1.20 2 - 22.89 24 - 2 - 20 - |
| 3 | Dec 71 | Cats for - Hotel to Mouse Trap lunch w/ Harry Dewar at The Mouse Trap - Miami Paid to myself | 3.75 6 - 487.60 |
| | 29 Dec 71 | | |

⑦ Expense (cont)

| | | | |
|----|--------|---|--|
| 4 | Dec 71 | Parking fee - to car ^{Miami} Hotel Everglades + Balance of Bill + phone Lunch w/ Doug Kelly Advice to Doug Kelly Budget rent-a-car - Sears | 21 - 17.03 5 - 40 - 16.11 |
| 6 | Dec 71 | Taxi to Miami Airport Nat Airlines - Miami to Houston Bus + taxi to Holiday Inn - Midtown Holiday Inn - Midtown, Houston | 2.50 74 - 5.25 12.73 |
| 7 | Dec 71 | Taxi + Bus to Houston Airport Taxi in L.A. American Air - Houston → L.A. | 5.50 2 - 1.00 |
| 8 | Dec 71 | Printing fee Parking at Airport Lunch w/ Bob Norton | 14.45 1 - 3.78 |
| 9 | Dec 71 | Dinner w/ Gary Helquist PSA flight Gary H SF → LA → SF (call) | 13 - 35 - |
| 10 | Dec 71 | Gen Tel Bill - Nov - Business Dinner w/ Jim Popovich at Adriatic Rest - Walkin' Shed | 20.625 22.29 |
| 13 | Dec 71 | Bob Reng - 15 Dec - 1 Jan Taxi to LAX American AL LA → Chicago Taxi to Holiday Inn - Chicago Paid to myself 28 Dec 71 | 50 - 4.00 12.5 - 1 - 475.639 |

③ Expenses

| | | |
|-----------|------------------------------|--------|
| 14 Dec 71 | Parking in Chicago | \$2- |
| | Drinks at Evelyn Lounge- | 275 |
| | Diamond Hotel | |
| 15 Dec 71 | Breakfast w/ Bill Rayburn | 455 |
| | at Diamond Hotel - Chicago | |
| | Parking Fee - Chicago | 275 |
| | Drinks w/ Harry Burnett- | 625 |
| | Diamond Hotel | |
| 16 Dec 71 | Holiday Inn at O'Hare | 6464 |
| | airport | |
| | Budget rent-a-car | 3171 |
| | North Central Airlines to | 27- |
| | Greenbay, Wisc. | |
| | Budget rent-a-car | 1378 |
| | Greenbay | |
| | North Central Air to Madison | 20- |
| | Taxi to Park Motor Inn - | 175- |
| | Madison | |
| 18 Dec 71 | Lunch w/ John Asether at | 452 |
| | Park Motor Inn | |
| | Advance to J. Tim Gatz- | 50- |
| | Madison | |
| 19 Dec 71 | Park Motor Inn - Madison | 5920 |
| | Taxi to airport | 175- |
| | North Central Airlines from | |
| | Madison → Chicago | 19- |
| | Parcel to myself 30 Dec 71 | 31240 |
| | | 479541 |

expended funds 10 Dec 71

(9) Expenses

| | | | | |
|------------------|---|-------|--|--------|
| 19 Dec 71 (cont) | Taxi from O'Hare to Ranocda Inn | 270 | | |
| | Drinks at Ranocda Inn w/ Tom Viney | 375 | | |
| | Brayiff Airlines - Chicago to Houston | 74- | | |
| 21 Dec 71 | Lunch 4/ Ron O'Brien - Houston | 115 | | |
| 22 Dec 71 | Gas for auto rental car - Houston | 380 | | |
| | Auto rental car - Houston | 4184 | | |
| | Es Holiday Inn - Houston | 3655 | | |
| | Continental Airlines - Houston to L.A. | 160- | | |
| 24 Dec 71 | Doug Kelly - Balance of pay 15 Dec - 1/2 | 35- | | |
| | Paid to Ward Transport for Pat O'Brien in L.A. Dec pay | 50- | | |
| 31 Dec 71 | Films for Florida H. Harker | 651 | | |
| | Fees to reproduce checks to pass | 400 | | |
| 2 Jan 72 | Jan Jan Tel Billing Service Bill 9990 | 1865 | | |
| | Jan Jan Tel Bill 821-9990 | 11158 | | |
| | Refund from termination of GP7 EC21 | | | (4503) |
| 3 Jan 72 | Payment to Ward Transport for Pat O'Brien (Jan pay) | 20- | | |
| | | 62521 | | |

(10) Expenses (cont.)

| | | | | | |
|---|--------|-------------------------------------|--|--------|--|
| 4 | Jan 22 | Taxes to LA Airport | | 1.25 | |
| | | National AL - LA → Houston ✓ | | 100 - | |
| | | Dinner + Dinner w/ Don | | | |
| | | Chickham - Houston | | 10.25 | |
| 5 | Jan 22 | Ramada Inn - Houston ✓ | | 12.60 | |
| | | Bridgman - car - Houston ✓ | | 20.12 | |
| | | Lunch w/ Bob Lawrence at River | | | |
| | | Hotel - Houston | | 6.60 | |
| | | Parking - Houston | | 2 - | |
| | | Advance to Bob Lawrence | | 50 - | |
| | | National AL - Houston → | | | |
| | | Tampa ✓ | | 67 - | |
| | | King Arthur Hotel - Tampa ✓ | | 229.12 | |
| 6 | Jan 22 | Breakfast w/ Bob Lang - Tampa | | 4 - | |
| | | Payment to Bob Lang - Tampa | | 300 - | |
| | | Pickets for 1/2 reception 25 - | | | |
| | | Black pickets for H reception 160 - | | | |
| | | M's card for Dec 50 - | | | |
| | | Black f. expenses etc 55 - | | | |
| | | Lunch w/ P. Ang - Tampa | | 4.17 | |
| 7 | Jan 22 | Breakfast w/ P. Ang | | 3.50 | |
| | | Advance for expenses - Tampa | | 300 - | |
| | | To P. Lang | | 910.64 | |

⑫ Expenses (cont'd)

| | | | |
|-----------|------------------------------------|------|--------|
| 11 Jan 72 | - Advance to Doug Kelly - | | |
| | - Mianin for add'l radio cal | ✓ | 50 - |
| | - Drinks 4/ Mary Ann blood - | | |
| | - Columbus | | 5.25 |
| 12 Jan 72 | - Pick Ford Hayes Hotel - Columbus | ✓ | 48.50 |
| | - Budget rent - car - Columbus | ✓ | 17.71 |
| | - Trip to airport | | 1.50 |
| | - TWA - Columbus → Chicago | ✓ | 71 - |
| | - TWA - Chicago → L.A. | ✓ | 110 - |
| 14 Jan 72 | - Advance payment to Tom Kierney - | | 100 - |
| | Chicago | | |
| | M-ag - 25 | | |
| | Pay for (4) - 15 Jan - 50 | | |
| | Expense 25 | | |
| | Photos for Harkley | | 3.70 |
| 15 Jan | - Bob Norton | | 115 - |
| | 250 15 Dec - 15 Jan pay | | |
| | 50 Tel Deposit (615) 274 7404 | | |
| | 15 Answering Service E. St Louis | | |
| 17 Jan 72 | - Bob Deng - pay 15 Jan - 1 Feb | | 75 - |
| | - Doug Kelly pay 1 Jan - 15 Jan | | 75 - |
| | - Bob Norton - advance for | | 100 - |
| | SF trip | | |
| | - Jim Popovich | | 150 |
| | 250 - end of thing train - L.A. | | |
| | 250 - end of thing train - L.A. | | |
| | 30 Expense | | |
| | 20 advance | | |
| | | 8328 | 765572 |

(B) Expenses (cont)

| | | |
|--------|--------------------------------|-------|
| 18 Jan | Stationery supplies | 5.67 |
| | Lunch w/ Jim Papovich & drinks | 10.25 |
| | at Charles's Brews - W. Corner | |
| | Bobby Bremer - Houston | 1.00 |
| | 50 pay - 20 Jan - 10 Feb | |
| | 35 expenses | |
| | 25 to M. agent - Houston | |
| 19 Jan | American RL LA → DC | 15.50 |
| | Bus to Wash DC from | |
| | Dulles | 2.50 |
| | Taxi to Hotel | 1.40 |
| | Dinner w/ DC in Wash DC | 2.60 |
| 20 Jan | Banger Hamilton Hotel - DC | 22.60 |
| | Taxi to Hay Adams Hotel | 1.00 |
| 21 Jan | Hay - Adams Hotel - Wash DC | 37.50 |
| | Wash DC - Phil - Train | 1.00 |
| | Taxi - Phil - To Hotel | 2.50 |
| 22 Jan | Dunks w/ Emory Wyatt - | |
| | Phil. Pa. | 3.25 |
| 24 Jan | Baggage check at Hotel | 1.05 |
| | Hotel Bill - G. Franklin | |
| | Phil. Pa. | 67.09 |
| | Dunks w/ Bob Kielby at | |
| | Sheraton Hotel - Phil. Pa. | 11.50 |

(15)

Expenses (cont.)

| | | | |
|---------------|--|----------|---|
| 3 Feb (cont.) | UAL - San Francisco LA → SF | 16.50 | |
| | Drinks w/ Mike Silvers at San Francisco | 5.25 | |
| | Bus to SF airport (round trip) | 3.20 | |
| | UAL - SF → L.A. | 16.50 | |
| | State Bar Fee of Calif (Cover) 1972 | 70.- | ✓ |
| 8 Feb | Ward Turgut Feb '72 | 20.- | |
| | Paym't for Pat O'Brien M-1 LA | | |
| | Doug Kelly | 55.- | |
| | Expense for M-1 + ad in Miami Beach Paper | | |
| | Bob Burg | | |
| | M-1 Jan - P.E. Griffin - Tampa | 75.- | |
| | J-1 Jan - Tampa | 50.- | |
| 9 Feb | General Tel PSI-8890 | 274.84 | |
| | Drinks w/ Jim Pasvich - Charlie Brown - W. camera | 5.25 | |
| 10 Feb | Advances to Bob Weston for Printing, A.O. Box & Feb 21 Bluebird Dinner | 100.- | |
| 11 Feb | Taxi to L.A. Airport | 1.25 | |
| | Mad AL LA → Miami | 154.- | |
| | Motel - Miami Frolics - 3 nights Dennis Simon | 37.44 | |
| | | 9664.121 | |

⑩ Expenses (cont'd)

| | | |
|--------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| 12 Feb | Lunch w/ D. Kelly | 5.88 |
| | Advance to D.K. | 75- |
| | Doug Kelly - Day 1-15 Feb | 75- |
| | Hisc - Fri | 5- |
| 13 Feb | Budget road - a - car - Miami | 39.50 |
| | National Al. Mi → Tampa | 24- |
| | Tampa Airport Hotel Inn | 14.80 |
| 14 Feb | Breakfast w/ B. Burg | 3.20 |
| | Dinner w/ B. Burg | 6.97 |
| | Advance to B.B. | 135- |
| | Bob Burg - Pay 15 Feb - 1 Mo | 25- |
| | Eastern Al. Tampa → Houston | 53- |
| 15 Feb | Holiday Inn - Houston Airport | 13.85 |
| | Lunch by B. Burger - Houston | 3.40 |
| | Continental Airline - Houston - L.A. | 20- |
| | Taxi to car at L.A. | 1.25 |
| 17 Feb | Printing - four articles | 181- |
| | 10340 SW 99th St. | |
| | Miami, FL 33156 | |
| 19 Feb | Stationery | 1.50 |
| | Postage - Packages to D.K. - Miami | 3.05 |
| | | 1.05 |
| | | 4.40 |
| 21 Feb | Art materials - for ad | 6.56 |
| | Advance to Popovich | 10- |
| | Books for Popovich | 4.50 |

⑮ Expires (cont)

| | | |
|--|--|--------|
| 29 Feb (cont) | | |
| Dinner Kelly - Miami | | 2.00 - |
| For Miami beach personnel | | |
| " " Open house at | | |
| Jewish Distribution | | |
| Posters on bussing det. | | |
| Bobby Harris - Houston | | 1.15 - |
| Pay Feb 15 - April 15 + M-1 | | |
| pay expenses | | |
| Postage | | 5.36 |
| Jim Popovich - L.A. Picket express | | 2.00 - |
| for M dinner on 31 Feb 72 at Sandy Hutton's L.A. | | |
| 1 March Bob Berg - "M staff" meals | | 2.00 - |
| Helen Ecking M bussing | | |
| Posters - Release of printing cost | | 25.85 |
| Mailing materials | | 5.87 |
| Mailing cost - air mail | | 46.70 |
| Other postage | | 4.40 |
| lunch w/ Kent Clements - Julie | | 3.00 |
| 2 March Tip at LA airport | | 1.00 |
| Western AL - L.A. → Salt Lake City | | 5.10 - |
| 4 March Dinner w/ Steve Swindle | | 12.50 |
| 8 | | |
| 5 March Budget rent - a-car Salt Lake | | 26.10 |
| Roadway Inn - Salt Lake | | 5.60 - |
| American AL - Salt Lake → Chicago | | 9.20 - |

Expenses

| | | | |
|----|-------|---|-------------------------|
| 9 | March | Arrowhead Hotel - Miami | 12.50 |
| | | Buiter - Awariz Press picnic | 1.50 - |
| | | - Hite fare passouts | |
| | | Fossell picnic | |
| | | Drinks by Doug Kelly | 4.50 |
| | | Arrowhead Hotel | 12.50 |
| 10 | March | Arrowhead motel (2 nights) | 35 - |
| | | Gas | 4.75 |
| | | Payoff to 4 Blacks to pass out literature | 19 - |
| | | Printing - Registering passport | 1.5 - |
| | | Misc | 6 - |
| 11 | March | Gas | 5.25 |
| | | Motel - Tampa Keller-Simmons | 1.50 1.72 |
| 12 | March | Auto - car - rental | 60.11 |
| | | Expenses to Bob Long - Tampa | 200 - |
| | | Boiler room - HQ breakfast | |
| | | Stink bomb | - |
| | | Literature + stink bomb at picnic | |
| | | Howard Johnsons - Tampa | 17 - |

| | | | |
|----|-------|--|--------|
| 20 | March | P.O. Box 90183 J. Norton | 5.70 |
| | | Marcel Tel 301-9990 Feb | 343.38 |
| | | Marshall Oldman - LA for M-1 | 20 - |
| | | Doug Kelly - pay for 1 Mo - 15 Mar | 75 - |
| | | Drinks & Steve Buswell - LA | 9.40 |
| 21 | March | Bob Rung - Tampa | 700 - |
| | | M-1 - Feb - Mar 15 (terminated) | } 300 |
| | | J-1 - Feb - March 15 (terminated) | |
| | | Bk. Pay Mar 15 - 1 April | } 400 |
| | | Phone trip + airline express to Pittsburg & Cleveland | |
| 22 | March | P.O. Box 174 Venice Calif | 3.70 |
| | | Drinks by Bob Katz - LA. | 7.60 |
| 23 | March | Alibi Answering Service | 20 - |
| | | (GIP) 374 5404 | |
| | | SW Bell Co for line (GIP) | 15.21 |
| | | American Al - LA → Wash DC | 15.5 - |
| | | Misc | 2 - |
| 24 | March | Taxi in D.C. | 70 - |
| | | Misc in DC | 4 - |

Expenses (cont'd)

(23)

| | | | |
|----|-------|----------------------------------|-------|
| 26 | March | Stetson-Hilton D.C. | 90.65 |
| | | Taxi to Nat Airport | 3.- |
| | | Eastern Air - Wash DC → NY City | 26.- |
| | | Bus to Manhattan | 3.- |
| | | Taxi to Hotel | 2.40 |
| | | Drinks w/ Mike & Martin | 4.- |
| | | NY - H ₁ | 4.80 |
| 27 | Mar | Wellington Hotel | 20.65 |
| | | Taxi to Penn Station | 2.25 |
| | | Price (baggage check etc) | 2.50 |
| | | Metro liner NY → Philly | 2.35 |
| | | Drinks w/ Bob Neely | 8.50 |
| 28 | Mar | | |
| | | Music | 5.25 |
| | | Drinks w/ Skip & Jim | 2.75 |
| | | Admission to Skip & Jim for | |
| | | Sigro etc. | 4.00 |
| 29 | Mar | | |
| | | Postage & misc Stationery | 2.35 |
| | | Holiday Inn - Midtown Philly | 5.27 |
| | | Doug Kelly - pay 15 hrs - 1 cent | 75.- |
| | | Taxi to Philly airport | 6.35 |
| | | United Air - Philly → Midway | 55.- |

15225.37

②4 Expenses (cont)

| | | | |
|----|-------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| 30 | Mar | Tom Kinney - balance of Ill work | 20 - |
| | | Travel budget - O'Hare | 14.70 |
| | | Gas for rent - a-car | 3.45 |
| | | Misc | 2 - |
| | | Dinner w/ Bob Berg | 14.50 |
| 31 | Mar | Gasoline to milk. | 6.75 |
| | | Printing of HHH rally | 21.77 |
| | | Bob Berg - Pay 1 April - 15 April 75 | 97 - |
| | | Balance for express & misc | |
| | | Misc | 9.50 |
| | | Breakfast w/ Bob Berg | 5.25 |
| | | Dinner w/ Bob Berg | 4 - |
| 1 | April | | 6.4 |
| | | Ramada Inn - Mpls., Minn. | 18.57 |
| | | Gasoline to Chicago | 3.50 |
| | | Hertz rent - a-car - Chicago | 81 - |
| | | Chick's S. - | 12.5 - |
| | | Balance of work in Minn. | |
| | | Hecklers - cigars etc | |
| | | United AL - Chicago → LA | 12.3 - |
| 2 | April | | |
| | | Ship Linnem | 55 - |
| | | 4 of his pay 35 | |
| | | Express for Cigs etc 50 | |
| | | Doug Kelly - for express - North | 200 - |
| | | Water down coast | 5.91 |

Expense (cont.) (25)

| | | | | |
|----|-------|-------------------------------------|--------|--|
| 4 | april | Brody's answering 821-9996 | 18.50 | |
| | | Postage (Billing Refine) | 8.40 | |
| | | Dinner & drinks by Ste | 14.50 | |
| | | Subway (Cantor's info) | 9.00 | |
| 6 | april | Also to Son's shop & back | | |
| 7 | april | Mike's Silver - SF M, | 20.00 | |
| | | Shop Service - Philly | 30.00 | |
| | | Pickup sign & lunch by | | |
| | | Patricia Miller - Advertising | 30.00 | |
| | | Pickup, sign, etc. | | |
| 8 | april | Bob Nisling - Philly | 30.00 | |
| | | For HHH Hobbs 6 apil | | |
| 10 | april | Left lunch by Rich Town - Mayfair | 10.00 | |
| | | Had - LA | | |
| 11 | april | Lunch by Rich Town & Ed Lewis - | 10.00 | |
| | | LA | | |
| 12 | april | A-1 answering service - LA | 30.00 | |
| | | (avg 38, 2202, 3 months M. L.) | | |
| | | New York Times subscription - Encls | 52.25 | |
| | | Booked T. J. L. - 821-9980 | 226.00 | |
| 13 | april | Grove A1 - LA to DC | 15.50 | |
| | | Boston office to DC | 3.00 | |
| | | Misc | 4.00 | |

(25) Expense (cont)

| | | | |
|----|----------------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| 23 | april | Donation to H, M, Mds for Stationary | 20 - |
| 24 | april | Skip dinner - express in Philly | 50 - |
| | | Bob Long - minor expense | 20 - |
| 29 | april | Brady's Drawing dinner | 12.50 |
| 30 | april | Mike Martin, Jr H, NY | 35 - |
| | 15 April 1 May | Doug Kelly - Minn | 201 - |
| | | Pay 75 + Balance of trip to DC & NYC | |
| | | PSA - LA → SF | 16.50 |
| | | Dinner w/ Mike Silva - SF | 4.50 |
| | | Dinner + tip w/ Mike Silva | 1.75 |
| 1 | May 22 | Budget rent-a-car SF | 12.92 |
| | | PSA - MABA SF → LA | 16.50 |
| 2 | May 22 | Postage + misc | 5.35 |
| 4 | May | Mich Martin - NYC H ₁ | 10 - |
| | | Minor express | |
| 5 | May | Stationary | 3.94 |
| | | Misc | 5 - |

Expense (cont.)

9 May 72 Telegram to Smith w/
123 Charles Church
advising the supporting money
of House Harker

Expense of Bill Supply -
not relative to support

Feb advertising - City
making address books

10 May 72 - Grand Tel - April
\$31-5990

11 May 72 Giffy River - Dick Boston Jr.
McCarthy killed
Telegram to support Nixon
134 support

13 May 72 Clinton River - McCarthy
Nixon

15 May 72 Roadside for McCarthy
Stop McGowan, Nixon
Giffy River - near McCarthy
Nixon
Nixon

4-

10-

10-

5-

7-

13/13

31757

32-

13/13

5-

(23)

50 Expenses (cont.)

| | | |
|-------------------|--|-------|
| 15 May 78 (cont.) | Balance of McCarthy mailing - printing letter to church supporters | 856 |
| 16 May | Mike Silva - SF expenses | 30 - |
| | Mike Martin, Jr. H. NP City | 25 |
| | Two weeks pay | |
| | Newark - research materials | 399 |
| | Foreign Affairs - research materials | 788 |
| 17 May | Postage | 16 - |
| | J & J Goldmeyer - McCarthy letter | 31.78 |
| 18 May | Postage - balance of mailer | 10 - |
| | Misc | 2 - |
| | Dinner w/ B. Norton | 18 - |
| 19 May | Joe Arrisla - Printer, Miami | 279 - |
| | 500 McGovern letterhead | |
| | 500 McGovern envelopes | |
| | 500 Party letterhead | |
| | 2000 HH press release | |
| | 2000 HH " " envelope | |
| | + air mail to LA | |
| | The Print Shop | 13650 |
| | 2000 H Street for War bumper stickers - Dick Carter | |

19526931

EXPENSES

(31)

| | | |
|--------|---|------------------|
| 21 May | Stationery | 208 |
| | Phone | 4- |
| 23 May | Parking & misc (Stationery) | 6- |
| | Postage - HH stickers to SF | 7- |
| 24 May | D.R. - Miami | |
| | 1-15 May pay | 75- |
| | Room Deposit - Miami Beach | 25- |
| | M ₂ - Miami | 10 |
| | 15 May - 1 June | 75- |
| | Advance for summer | 315- |
| | Total \$500 | |
| 25 May | Brady's answering | 12 ⁵⁰ |
| | Misc | 4- |
| 26 May | Postal Order - Press - Turner | 11.25 |
| | Mem of Mike Minton - McG | |
| | Real Records - War Flyers | |
| | J. L. Stewart Co. mem of Tim Walker | 72.45 |
| | 4000 art H flyers "Early on"? | |
| | PSA, LA → SF & Return | 53- |
| | Mike Silver - SF | 50- |
| | \$10 to M ₂ for pay | |
| | \$40 expense & to pass out | |
| | flyers etc. | |
| | Misc - Parking, gas, drinks w/ M ₂ | 8- |

Expenses (cont.)

| | | |
|-----------|---|-------|
| 30 May 72 | Postage for anti-H | 80 - |
| | flyer stencils to Doro | |
| | Central Committee H. lab | |
| | Fishy Snell for WH. | |
| | - Misc. | 3 - |
| | - Envelopes | 5 - |
| 31 May 72 | Trip (Gas) to Santa Barbara | 12 - |
| | & return to mail anti-H | |
| | litter | |
| | Monograph machine | 150 - |
| 1 June | Stamps | 8 - |
| | Monograph stencils | 2 - |
| | Blank paper | 344 |
| | Misc. | 4 - |
| 3 June | Stamps - H Press releases | 23 - |
| 5 June | Leon Brisola - Printer - Miami | 120 - |
| | Stamps - H Press releases | 18 - |
| | Mike Martin, Jr. | |
| | H ₂ - New York 1 June - 15 June 75 | 37 |
| | Express 17 | |
| | Doug Kelly - Miami | |
| | 300 - Colson for Miami | 300 - |
| | 15 Expenses for 10 boxes | |

91 070 941

Expenses (Cont'd)

(33)

| | | |
|---------|------------------------------|-------|
| 9 June | Nat'l AL LA → Miami | 328- |
| | Acq - LA | |
| | Univ. Tel 821-9990. May Bell | 96307 |
| 10 June | Travels Hotel Miami | 48- |
| | Donald Senior | |
| | 9019 W. 64th St. | |
| | NYC | |
| | 3 nights | |
| 11 June | lunch w/ D.K. at | 12- |
| | Doral Hotel | |
| | Parking | 2- |
| | Misc. | 6- |
| 12 June | Parking - Du Pont Plaza | 150 |
| | Breakfast w/ D.K. | 550 |
| | D.K. Pay June 1 - June 15 | 350- |
| | advance to D.K. for expenses | |
| | for automobile, P.O. Box, | |
| | answering service. | 100- |
| 13 June | Hertz Rent - a - car - Miami | 41- |
| | Rent | 5- |
| | Taxi to car in L.A. | 250 |
| 20 June | To B.B. - Temp for people to | 50- |
| | attend Dino Conv | 50 |
| | D.K. | |

2231541

(5) (cont.)

| | |
|---|-------|
| 30 June Telephone charge to call Dc. | 9.40 |
| RQ Box 90122-JR Norton | 10.80 |

hand pay from Herb Hancock's office
was Jan 15, 1972. 4667 chrs
every 3 weeks.

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| Jan 15 - 1 Feb | 667 - |
| Feb 1 - 1 Mar | 1334 - |
| 1 Mar - 1 April | 1334 - |
| 1 April - 1 May | 1334 - |
| 1 May - 1 June | 1334 - |
| 1 June - 1 July | 1334 - |

29582761

4350

EXHIBIT No. 226

Personal Directory



Pacific Telephone

CLUB & COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| | Telephone No. |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Karl Nestler | |
| 409 Village Timbrook | |
| Route 13, Mill Creek Rd. | |
| Levittown, Penn ¹⁹⁰⁵⁴ | |
| (215) 945 0107 home | |
| (603) 989 7700 office | |
| X 323 | |
| Retired - | |
| As personal | |
| → Very Sly / cunning | |
| Change of critical CID unit | |
| now sec. director of | |
| banking institution | |

CLUB & COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| | Telephone No. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| Karl Hayser | |
| intention - Arthur Lippert | |
| Co. | |
| Stock Firm | |
| 140 Broadway | |
| N.Y., N.Y. | |
| Retired W4 CID. | |
| Outstanding - | |
| Very competent & experienced | |
| Trouble shooter - CID. | |
| Operation officer for Woburn | |
| now w/ security w/ | |
| brokerage firm | |

8900
485
Durham
Carl Polley



**You'll find them listed conveniently
in the White Pages of your
telephone directory
and in the
Yellow Pages, too!**

TELEPHONE NO.

US Col Fernand Kelly
Arlington Va
(703) 931 9297

Dept 252
5745 Senger Ave
Arlington, Va.

What ^{about John} Cunningham?

Ft Meyer
Patton Club.

LTC Kelly 1400 hrs
Main lounge

DIAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS YOURSELF AND SAVE
On most out-of-state calls, if you dial the call direct without assistance from the operator, you save money.

| NAME AND ADDRESS | AREA CODE | TELEPHONE NO. |
|---|-----------|---------------|
| ① P.O. Box / # '687 9621 address / | | |
| ② Recruitment - Personnel | | |
| a) Calif - Route ? | | |
| b) Portland | | |
| c) New York | | |
| d) Atlanta | | |
| e) N. Hampshire | | |
| f) Florida | | |
| g) Chicago | | |
| h) Wisconsin | | |
| i) Texas | | |
| j) Atlanta | | |
| k) Ohio | | |
| ③ Projects - Forens | | |
| a) Arch conflict / Schedules | | |
| b) Pickets / Muskie's home | | |

DIAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS YOURSELF AND SAVE
On most out-of-state calls. If you dial the call direct
without assistance from the operator, you save money.

30

| NAME AND ADDRESS | AREA CODE | TELEPHONE NO. |
|---|-----------|---------------|
| Who are they using for computer in Calif? | | |
| Muskie - at Hotel in L.A. - Screw him up at Hotel. | | |
| How did he vote on 55T. Prospects workers calc. Why did you oppose 55T. Black's back. | | |
| Catholic Church ask | | |

DIAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS YOURSELF AND SAVE
On most out-of-state calls. If you dial the call direct
without assistance from the operator, you save money.

31

| NAME AND ADDRESS | AREA CODE | TELEPHONE NO. |
|---|--------------|---------------|
| regarding planting couple people in Matchless Camp. | | |
| Any Dem for Minn in Demo Camp. | | |
| | | |
| Man in N.H. to write Linsky to work for him in N.H. | | |
| also Calif. - Volunteer. | | |
| | | |
| Linsky has lots of \$ | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

DIAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS YOURSELF AND SAVE
On most out-of-state calls, if you dial the call direct
without assistance from the operator, you save money.

35

| NAME AND ADDRESS | AREA CODE | TELEPHONE NO. |
|------------------|--------------|---------------|
| 1207 Kern Katz | | |
| 660 2020 10 | | |
| 209 2455 / home | | |
| CPT LaVine | | |
| (408) 242 4400 | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

DIAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS YOURSELF AND SAVE
On most out-of-state calls, if you dial the call direct
without assistance from the operator, you save money.

37

Duke Burton
John Nichols - D.C.

Portland
Saturday
3:10 - airport
ticket

arrived at Hotel

4:00

mother sleeping

① Mayfair room

② conference room

Republican

group

③ Dean Brown -
sent at 6:10.

④ sent at 6:30

⑤ sent at 7:15

⑥ sent at 7:40

⑦ Johnson room

⑧ Room Walker

head for country
5:00 pm/4:00 pm

San Francisco
 Los Angeles
 Fresno
 San Diego

New Jersey
 Atlanta, Ga
 New York?
 Washington, D.C.
~~Chicago~~

Calif.
 N.Y.
 Texas

✓ Calif.

Northern Calif. - S.F.
 L.A.

Oregon -

Person to find people up.
 Portland is ideal place.

Texas -

Dallas - Fr worth

✓ Houston - ideal

✓ Wisconsin -

Madison or (Green Bay)

Most of media out of Madison

✓

Indiana - B. Dye Country

Indianapolis

John Pulliam - newspaper.
 Chemistry of city.

Electio
 pro-Nixon

Torco - 1 guy -
of people is small.
Turning & Kennels

Operating & - \$5,000.

Wind Turbines
S.E. Valley
←

Georgetown - Car for
Corporate office

✓
Wellington.
Chicago - Daily good.
Need black riding cap
around shoulder.

New Hampshire - in Boston.
all of TV for NH come
out of back -

✓ Florida
Mr.

N.Y. - NY city.
Albany & Buffalo

N. Jersey


ask to

Rogers
433-3042 = Chicago
(512)

Dick Benton
D.A.'s office / Oakland
Oregon

Wish don't talk to police and
out and in large newspapers

Mike Washburn - Field Man
for Replic - Party. Acting
to finish. Field team
politics in SE. Was my
54k. Making \$9000 yr.
Actual Turnover - Seven-
+ the good stuff & bit
good common sense.
Ruscha High. Southworth
Local.
Harold Mann, Turner
Kushin but off the track
Mishkin.



Mike S. - working for
Kearney.

Red Country in S. Calif. - an
achieved man.

Met Nixon Foundation to be
open

Steve Brewster - working
for assembly in
Pasadena (And callin)

Lee ~~Hopkins~~ Hawth
 (813) 958 4409 office

Bill Norman
 → 391 4580
 Brandon, Brandon &

Com. Case
 John Adams
 127 & Ave of the Americas
 (212) 242 3530 10011
 989-6147 (212) 989-6147
 Morris & M.B. Morris
 Morris & M.B. Morris
 Morris & M.B. Morris

★ Perry Castro Prof Soc Sec
 260 E. 161st St.
 Bronx N.Y.
 222 4337

★ Robert Engle Lawyer
 6 Jane St.
 N.Y.
 928 3108

Willie Kachlauer - Pot
 Jane St.
 N.Y.
 621 2810 (212)

Prof Mc Govern - 8no

Mc Govern - 8no

634 070 - and

Bob David
 Bob David
 Bob David

Westchester County
 Scandale

→ Ann Barbara
 867 1034 Ext 2500

325

6721770

Co-ordinator
Rick Evans - administrator for N.H.

Vincent Narcissi, Pres.
Muskie for Pres.

12 Nov.

Peace Rally -
Sports Arena.

Dick Stewart - advance
for Muskie

Esther Newburg
505 - Park Ave, N.Y., N.Y.
593 1210
271 5400

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

ARNOLD & PORTER

1229 NINETEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

TELEPHONE: (202) 872-8700
CABLE: "ARPOPO"
TELEX: 88-2733

October 3, 1973

THURMAN ARNOLD (1891-1968)
PAUL A. PORTER
MILTON V. FREEMAN
NORMAN DIAMOND
WILLIAM L. MCGOVERN
CAROLYN E. AGGER
G. DUANE VIETH
REED MILLER
ABE KRASH
WILLIAM D. ROGERS
B. HOWELL HILL
JULIUS H. GRESHAM
EDGAR H. BRENNER
DENNIS G. LYONS
STUART J. LAND
ROBERT C. HERSTEIN
JAMES R. MCALICE
MITCHELL ROGOVIN
WALTER J. ROCKLER
CLIFFORD L. ALEXANDER, JR.
WERNER KRONSTEIN
PAUL S. BERGER
JAMES F. FITZPATRICK
MELVIN C. BARROW
BRUCE L. MONTGOMERY
JOHN D. HAWKE, JR.
MURRAY H. BRING
DANIEL A. REZNICK
GERALD H. STERN
MELVIN SPAETH
DAVID R. KENTOFF
DAVID H. LLOYD
RICHARD S. EWING
PETER K. BLEAKLEY
ALEXANDER E. BENNETT
RICHARD J. WERTHEIMER
HARRY HUGO
JACK L. LIPSON
JEROME I. CHAPMAN
MYRON P. CURZAN

JAMES A. DOBKIN
STEPHEN L. HESTER
MICHAEL N. SOHN
BROOKSLEY LANSHAW
PATRICK F. J. MACRORY
ANDREW S. KRULWICH
IRVIN B. NATHAN
ROBERT H. WINTER
NANCY K. HINTZ
NORTON F. TENNILLE, JR.
ROBERT D. ROSENBAUM
J. BRADWAY BUTLER
FREDERICK B. ABRAMSON
RICHARD L. HUBBARD
KENNETH A. LETZLER
DOUGLAS A. ROBINSON
STEPHEN M. SACKS
THOMAS J. MCGREW
MARK J. SFOONER
G. PHILIP HOWAR
DAVID SONDERMAN
STEVEN P. LOCKMAN
JEFFREY A. BURT
GARY H. SHERMAN
JUDITH N. STEIN
SIMON LAZARUS III
THOMAS E. SILFEN
IRVING D. YOSKOWITZ
DANIEL M. LEWIS
RONALD G. NATHAN
GARY S. GERLACH
LANNY J. DAVIS
PAUL S. RYERSON
THOMAS D. NURMI
JOHN W. FEDDERS
RICHARD A. GOLDSTEIN
PHILIP J. MAUSE
THOMAS B. WILNER
DIANA D. CLARK

MARTIN RIGER
ROBERT PITOWSKY
OF COUNSEL

Samuel Dash, Esquire
Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities
Room 1418
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Sam:

In line with the request we received from your office, I'm enclosing my notarized affidavit with respect to the Institute for Policy Studies and the testimony of Patrick Buchanan.

If I can be of further assistance, please give me a call.

Cheers,



Mitchell Rogovin

enclosure

City of Washington)
) ss:
 District of Columbia)

AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHELL ROGOVIN

Mitchell Rogovin, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am a partner in the law firm of Arnold & Porter, 1229 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia, and general counsel to the Institute for Policy Studies ("the Institute").

2. The Institute is a nonprofit District of Columbia corporation which is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as a charitable and educational organization, and which is not a "private foundation" under the Code. The Institute engages in research into public policy matters and is engaged in the training and education of individuals through its Ph.D. program. The Institute engages in no "political activities" that are forbidden under the internal revenue laws.

3. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities on Wednesday, September 26, 1973, Mr. Patrick Buchanan, in the course of his testimony, made several false allegations concerning the Institute.

4. In his testimony, Mr. Buchanan stated that the Ford Foundation "provides funds" for the Institute for Policy Studies, that the Institute was a "beneficiary of Ford money," and that the Institute "of course is Ford-funded." Mr. Buchanan sought to leave the impression that the Institute's funding has come primarily or in large part from the Ford Foundation.

5. In fact, the only funds the Institute has received from the Ford Foundation consisted of a one-year grant of \$7,800 received in 1964 for the specific purpose of holding seminars on the subject of the Alliance for Progress. This grant was a very minor source of funding for the Institute.

6. Mr. Buchanan stated that the Institute "holds seminars for Congressmen, for staffers, and the like, and they [the Institute] deal in trying to influence Congressmen and the like to vote in one direction."

7. In fact, the Institute has held conferences and seminars which have been attended by, among others, Congressmen and their assistants, but at no time has the Institute attempted to influence the votes of Congressmen.

8. Mr. Buchanan asserted that the Institute "funded the Quicksilver Times," which he described as a "radical underground newspaper," "which has a political point of view and which is sold for profit." Mr. Buchanan

stated further that since he was familiar with the Quicksilver Times as a "commercial venture, it would seem to me that this [alleged funding by the Institute] would be an illicit use of tax exempt funds." In the same sentence, Mr. Buchanan implied that the Institute had used Ford Foundation money to fund the Quicksilver Times.

9. In fact, the Institute has never funded the Quicksilver Times. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Washingtonian magazine article cited by Mr. Buchanan does not state that the Institute ever funded the Quicksilver Times.

10. The names of the Institute for Policy Studies and its Co-Directors, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnett, have been mentioned in the course of the hearings before the Senate Select Committee in connection with the so-called list of "enemies" of the Administration, against whom certain Administration officials urged that the resources of various government agencies be applied. In addition, an exhibit referred to during Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony, the Krogh-Young memo to Ehrlichman of August 11, 1971, indicates that both Raskin and Barnett were "overheard."

11. The Institute has been the subject of an audit by the Internal Revenue Service ever since the Nixon Administration took office. The latest audit began in January of 1970, apparently as part of the IRS "Special Service Group" program. The scope and nature of the audit can hardly be described as routine.

12. At present, the Internal Revenue Service, using quite unusual procedures, has proposed to revoke the Institute's tax exemption. The grounds for revocation do not include any of the alleged activities mentioned by Mr. Buchanan, but rather concern charitable and educational activities of the Institute which are indistinguishable from the activities of other institutions of higher learning in the United States, but which do involve viewpoints differing sharply from those of the Administration.

13. It appears that the Internal Revenue Service in this case has not followed Mr. Buchanan's professed belief that educational organizations which study social issues but which do not engage in political activities should be permitted to maintain their tax exemption regardless of whether they are considered "liberal" or "conservative."

14. The Institute has learned from a former FBI informant that the FBI on several occasions has infiltrated the Institute for Policy Studies with agents and informants and on at least one occasion joined with a member of the Metropolitan Police Department in the theft of documents from the Institute.


15. We have also been advised by a former Special Agent of the FBI that the FBI has improperly secured the bank records of the Institute without the use of legal process.

16. The Institute has evidence of illegal surveillance of the Institute by governmental agencies by means of wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and breaking and entering.

17. Representatives of the Institute will be able to supply you with further details of these activities.


 Mitchell Rogovin

Subscribed and sworn to before
 me this 3d day of October,
 1973.




 Notary Public

My Commission Expires May 14, 1977